

# Assisting in the protection of civilians

The Dutch Armed Forces on its way to 2030



Policy paper drafted by Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi



**Visiting Address:** Godebaldkwartier 74  
NL-3511 DZ Utrecht

Lutherse Burgwal  
NL-2512 CB The Hague

**Mailing Address:** P.O. Box 19318  
NL-3501 DH Utrecht

P.O. Box 16440  
NL-2500 BK The Hague

**Telephone:** +31 (0)30 233 33 46

+31 (0)70 31 36 300

**Fax:** +31 (0)30 236 81 99

+31 (0)70 31 36 301

**Website:** [www.ikvpaxchristi.nl](http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl)

[www.cordaid.nl](http://www.cordaid.nl)

**Email:** [info@ikvpaxchristi.nl](mailto:info@ikvpaxchristi.nl)

[cordaid@cordaid.nl](mailto:cordaid@cordaid.nl)

This policy paper was drafted by a joint working group of IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid, on the basis of initial research conducted by **Bart Klem Research** and the recommendations of **BBO** (*Bureau Beleidsbeïnvloeding Internationale Samenwerking*). In addition, we consulted a number of experts, including military sources. Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi would like to extend their gratitude to all those who offered their expertise and experience. The organisations, however, remain fully responsible for the content of this policy paper.

**Members of the working group:**

Paul van den Berg  
Erik Laan  
Cor Oudes  
Hans Rouw  
Miriam Struyk

Utrecht/The Hague, May 2010

## Summary

This policy paper outlines the organisation and composition of the Dutch armed forces with the aim to improve – within the framework of its core activities – its capacity to protect civilians in areas of armed conflict. As civil organisations, IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid can make a meaningful contribution to the discussion regarding the future of the Dutch armed forces. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) recently reopened this discussion with the publication of an exploratory document, which set the direction of the armed forces in the build-up to 2030. Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi believe that the Dutch armed forces should be better equipped to protect civilians. The cornerstone of this argument is the recognition of human dignity as the founding principle of the international rule of law. This requires a ‘3D approach’ (Defence, Diplomacy & Development), because economic, political and social development cannot be achieved without security.

We have identified a number of potential future threats to civilian populations in the build-up to 2030. First, we expect national and intergovernmental governments to face institutional deficiencies, inhibiting their ability to promote civil security. This will predominantly affect the ‘arch of instability’, a belt of fragile and repressive regimes that extends from central Africa and the Middle East, across the Caucasus, to central and southern Asia. In addition, much of the population in these countries feel socially, economically, politically and/or culturally marginalised or excluded. This has the potential to create a ‘breeding ground’ for radicalisation and asymmetric warfare. Increasingly, war economies will become an independent factor across the arch of instability, prolonging these conflicts and posing a threat to civilian security.

This raises an important question: which tools does the international community have at its disposal to enhance human security? The UN is an important player. However, in terms of protecting civilians, the UN’s actions are often described as being “too little, too late”. The EU has civilian capacity, but lacks the political will to deploy troops to avert serious human rights violations. NATO has the military capacity, but focuses insufficiently on the role and position of civilians in its theatre of operations. The African Union, lastly, promotes human security and the protection of civilians, but lacks the capacity to achieve its ambitions on the ground.

What can and should the Netherlands do to protect civilians in this international context? First, the Netherlands should participate in UN and EU missions dedicated to the objective of human security. The Dutch armed forces should specialise in stabilisation missions, while at the same time maintaining the capacity to participate in multinational interventions. The armed forces should also further enhance its expeditionary character. It will need more transport helicopters for rapid deployment in areas where civilians are under immediate threat. The capacity to deliver firepower remains necessary, as the armed forces must be able to protect human security even in situations of extreme violence. The MoD should invest in a gendarmerie unit to perform a multitude of military police tasks in unstable areas once the most serious initial threats have been contained. Military training should assign greater priority to human security, and the relevant doctrines should be adapted to encompass the broader notion of human security. The ability of the armed forces to sustain a mission should be prioritised over its ability to participate simultaneously in multiple expeditionary missions.

Within the framework of ensuring commitment to the promotion or protection of human security, a number of weapons systems will become obsolete, for instance, submarines. The number of combat aircraft can also be reduced in future procurement rounds.

We believe that the Netherlands should maintain a presence in international civilian and military alliances to protect civilians in the aforementioned arch of instability, which includes Africa. The profile of the armed forces suggested by IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid is a logical continuation of the line adopted by the MoD since the end of the Cold War. The options proposed by us will require some investments over the coming years, but also provide opportunities to shelve (F-35 Joint Strike Fighter) or phase out (submarines) several expensive weapons systems. This guarantees affordable armed forces that will be able to participate in high-level, international efforts to end armed conflicts and protect civilians. The table below sets out the tentative steps towards participation in a discussion on the future profile of the Dutch armed forces. It contains several proposals for improving its capacity to protect civilians. These proposals are outlined in more detail in this policy paper.

Protection Force: Armed Forces Profile aimed at Human Security

 <p>To acquire</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for reconnaissance</li><li>- Gendarmerie capacity for military policing tasks</li></ul>
 <p>To expand</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Tactical transport (i.e. heavy-lift helicopters)</li><li>- Special forces: Commando Corps and Royal Netherlands Marine Corps</li><li>- Sustainability: ability to sustain a mission</li><li>- Continued expansion of the military doctrine to include human protection (including rules governing violence, protection of refugees and the meaning of human security)</li></ul>
 <p>To reduce</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Fighter aircraft (no JSF's)</li><li>- Fennek reconnaissance vehicle</li></ul>
 <p>To phase out</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Submarines</li><li>- Nuclear tasks</li></ul>

Proposal for profile of armed forces geared towards protecting civilians

# 1 Introduction

This policy paper sets out a proposal for the profile of the Dutch armed forces, geared towards protecting civilians in areas of armed conflict. The policy horizon extends to 2030. The Dutch armed forces should be specifically deployed to protect human security, defined in this policy paper as *freedom from fear* or safeguarding civilians from immediate physical threats.

## Human dignity as fundament for security

To Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi, human dignity is the cornerstone of freedom, justice and peace. It forms the legitimate basis of the international rule of law and is the guiding principle of foreign and defence policy and development cooperation (3D: Defence, Diplomacy and Development). This embodies the belief that security between states remains a necessary condition for the security of people, but that national security alone does not guarantee civilian security and human dignity. It is a notion that is rooted in the value of each civilian and his or her community, and in the belief that the safety of civilians is an integral component of international peace and security. Human security, as a concept, takes human dignity – rather than exclusively national political and economic interests – as an explicitly normative starting point.

The emphasis on human dignity, which lies at the core of human security, is an acknowledgment that each and every civilian has a right to live in safety and security. To that end, Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi seek to assign political priority to those situations in which human rights are threatened most severely.

## Human security and core tasks of the armed forces

In this policy paper, IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid set forth several proposals that combine into a profile of the Dutch armed forces as civilian protection forces.<sup>1</sup> This approach closely resembles the second constitutional task of the armed forces, ‘improvement of the international rule of law and stability’. The profile proposed by us is therefore aimed primarily at this second task. However, the profile also enables implementation of the first and third constitutional tasks (‘protection of own and allied territory’ and ‘support of national civil authorities’). Moreover, in a globalised world, promoting international law is an essential and contributory factor to safeguarding the security of the Netherlands.

As one of the more affluent nations in the world, the Netherlands has a moral duty towards civilians elsewhere. That responsibility also has implications regarding the deployment of armed forces and the allocation of resources. Some of our proposals require additional investments; others will lessen financial constraints. The proposals set out in this policy paper can be largely achieved within the current Defence budget.

---

<sup>1</sup> Since 1999, there has been an ongoing debate within the UN regarding ‘Protection of Civilians’. Here, we use the term ‘human security’. (see §4 and <http://ochaonline.un.org/HumanitarianIssues/ProtectionofCiviliansinArmedConflict/ChronologyofProtectionofCivilians/tabid/1198/language/en-US/Default.aspx>)

## Pivotal issue in the discussion

The rationale and impetus behind this joint study, undertaken by IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid, is the interdepartmental Future Policy Survey of the Dutch armed forces, commissioned in 2008 by the Dutch cabinet. In our opinion, this exploratory study focused insufficiently on the role and position of civilians in conflict areas (see annex 1). Furthermore, in early April 2010, an ‘international security working group’ published a report as part of a broad budgetary reconsideration. This report contains a number of austerity measures for the Defence budget. In the opinion of IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid, this policy paper marks the first step towards promoting dialogue with the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, in order to adopt a broader civil-military coordinated approach to human security.

We are convinced that the Dutch armed forces and civil actors engaged in development and diplomacy could and should do more to defend the security of civilians in conflict areas. There can be no development without security, and vice versa. That is why it is imperative to include the perspective of civilians and civil society when addressing issues such as peace, security and development and when discussing the future of the armed forces. Only an effective, coordinated civilian-military approach (3D) can achieve the desired outcome in fragile states and regions. In this context, it is our responsibility to contribute to the debate on the role of the armed forces.

## 2 Basic premises

### **Human security and national sovereignty**

The proposals of Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi are premised on the notion of *human security*, which, in this brief, is narrowly defined as *freedom from fear*. *Freedom from fear* denotes the physical protection of civilians from direct threats. This is the duty first and foremost of local and national security authorities. On the basis of a social contract, drawn up between the government and 'society at large', civilians renounce the use of violence and grant the government a legitimate monopoly over the use of force. The government has a duty to use its monopoly to protect its citizens. Our proposal is founded on the belief that the sovereignty of nation-states is the cornerstone of global peace and security. However, this sovereignty presupposes a willingness and preparedness on the part of nation-states to protect their own citizens. This responsibility is an essential element of the sovereignty of the nation-state. The *responsibility to protect* is embedded in discourse and international law: it is the responsibility of the international community to protect the citizens of sovereign states if the governments of the latter renege on their duty.

### **International law and the use of armed force**

The proposals set forth by IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid concentrate mainly on *one* of the three main constitutional tasks of the Dutch armed forces: maintaining and promoting international law and stability. This does not imply that other core duties are less relevant or unimportant. However, the reality is that the vast majority of military deployments since 1989 stem from the need to protect and promote international law; coupled with an increasing realisation that international law is of vital interest to Dutch national security.

The Charter of the United Nations prohibits "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." There is only one legal caveat for the use of force other than self-defence: "Security Council directed or authorized use of force to restore or maintain international peace and security" in line with its responsibilities under the UN Charter.

In addition to prohibiting the threat or the use of force, the Charter of the United Nations also reaffirms "faith in fundamental human rights, and dignity and worth of the human person." Circumstances may arise during which the international responsibility to protect the targeted population by force contradicts with the prohibition of non-interference. This was the case in 1999, when a permanent member of the UN Security Council, in pursuit of national interests, vetoed the use of force to terminate the gross and systematic human rights violations in Kosovo.

In our vision, the obligation to respect human rights is unconditional. Therefore, under strict criteria, exceptions to the rule on non-use of force are possible if they aim to restore the international rule of law. These strict conditions include the occurrence of large scale human rights violations, in a situation where the use of force, as last resort, is the only way to bring an end to atrocities. Military intervention should be seen as a last resort. Moreover, the goal must always be attainable, and the use of force must be proportional and in line with to the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of non-combatants.

These criteria apply at all times, in every consideration to deploy military force. As set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, the "Security Council authorization is essential to secure the consent to deploy national military forces." At the same time, taking into account political realities, we take our guiding principle of *human security* seriously. Only in truly exceptional circumstances, to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe and where there is an overwhelming majority support of Security Council member states, should military intervention be authorised, even if such an intervention is obstructed by a veto-wielding member of the Security Council.

### **The use of force as part of a broader approach**

The protection of civilians in armed conflict requires an integrated approach. Military force can never bring a constructive and sustainable solution to a political conflict. Civilians in areas of armed conflict should eventually assume responsibility for their own safety, through security measures and infrastructure. Indeed, there are successful precedents of citizens creating a range of initiatives to resolve conflicts and achieve a cessation of violence.

However, in some cases, outbreaks of violence overwhelm societal security structures. International military forces can, in some of these situations, contribute to human security, but always within the broader remit of forging a political solution to the conflict. Then, armed forces play a crucial role in protecting civilians, but can only succeed if embedded in a viable political strategy, coupled with a coherent approach in which development and diplomacy assume a meaningful and credible role.

### **The armed forces and societal basis**

The deployment of the Dutch armed forces requires broad support from Dutch society, both politically and socially. This necessitates clear and unequivocal, transparent communication regarding the values and interests that are at stake and the objectives of the military campaign. A certain degree of prudence is required regarding the concrete possibilities of military engagement and the specific capabilities of the Dutch armed forces.

The objectives must be realistic to achieve and retain acceptance and support from society at large. The use of military force is dependent on the likelihood of a successful outcome. Political leadership is furthermore vital in mobilising civil and political support for military campaigns and to guarantee a clear political decision-making process.

### **The international context**

The resources available to the Dutch armed forces are limited. This should prompt realistic expectations of our armed forces. It is an unavoidable reality that the deployment of (large numbers of) Dutch military personnel will always take place in an international context. A similar conclusion was reached in previous Defence policy papers and in the Assessment Framework ('Toetsingskader'). The aim of this policy paper, therefore, is to draw attention to the international security organisations in which the Dutch armed forces play an active role. The ambition to protect civilians also has repercussions for the international context of military intervention. This is further elaborated in §4.

### **The Dutch armed forces and local actors**

Starting from the vantage point of human security, it is worth noting that military intervention for security purposes must be aimed at building local security infrastructures. Eventually, local and national security organisations need to assume responsibility for the safety of their own citizens; the Dutch military cannot assume structural responsibility for that task. The implementation of crisis management operations should, where possible, be aimed at supporting and strengthening legitimate local and national security structures, for example through *Security Sector Reform* (SSR). As long as national and local security structures are insufficiently robust to protect their own citizens, the Dutch armed forces should play a key role in creating a secure and long-term stable environment, in order to spearhead diplomatic initiatives for sustainable conflict resolution and development.

The Dutch armed forces must adhere to their principal task when supporting the build-up of local and national security structures. Cooperation between civilian and military actors should take place where possible. Each, however, should approach the cooperation with distinct tasks and responsibilities. Through a coherent, holistic approach, the armed forces are primarily responsible for security; issues such as social-economic development and political-diplomatic negotiations are best left to civilian actors. Only in exceptional cases, for example because civilians cannot enter an area for security reasons, may alternative solutions be sought. In such cases, it is the task (indeed, the *obligation* under international law) of the military to protect civilians and to lend humanitarian assistance.

### 3 Analysis of threats to civilians

The goal of peacekeeping missions to protect civilians requires a careful analysis of the actual threats facing civilians. We have outlined below four trends, all physical threats facing civilians in the build-up to 2030. Our context analysis differs markedly from the 'typical' analysis of *state security*. From the point of view of civilians, developments in international relations serve a different purpose. The added value of this threat analysis is rooted in a basic principle: state security is founded on the security of civilians. It is also worth noting that local perceptions of security differ, depending on the context, and are dynamic by nature. Outside interventions must be tailored to these local perceptions in order to increase the effectiveness of military interventions.

We have identified four future trends that threaten human security.

#### **Increased institutional deficiencies**

The first threat facing civilians is the failure of institutions to prevent or mitigate violence. Local and national governments, in particular in fragile states, are incapable of eradicating the threats to *human security* posed by warlords and criminal elements. Additionally, the effects of globalisation will increasingly threaten human security. Climate change and demographic pressures will exacerbate the effects of the economic crisis and the scarcity of water, food and energy. This, in turn, will lead to increasing social tensions, unrest and competition along ethnic, religious and national lines. The consequences for human security are potentially most severe in situations where state institutions are failing, and multilateral institutions are no longer able to mitigate the detrimental effects.

Regional and global intergovernmental institutions (such as the AU and the UN) are also marred by deficiencies, preventing them from adequately safeguarding security. Coupled with these shortages are the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD's) and inhumane weapons. The international community, partly due to the limited political clout of the UN Security Council, is unable to protect civilians when national governments are found unwilling or incapable to guarantee their citizens' security.

#### **Marginalisation of civilians**

Many countries are marred by political, economic and social exclusion of certain groups. Marginalisa-

tion is a common feature of repressive regimes in the Middle East, as well as in countries such as Rwanda and China. Much of the population in some developing countries is excluded from direct access to the resources and powers enjoyed by national and global elites. Marginalised groups themselves suffer from unsafe living conditions, oppressive behaviour and fear. There is also an inherent risk that the ensuing tensions could escalate into full-fledged conflicts, in which large swathes of the population are subjected to serious physical threats. Marginalisation can lead to armed conflict. We envisage an increase in intrastate conflicts over the next few decades as a result of marginalisation, increasingly threatening the security of civilians.

#### **Asymmetric conflicts**

Marginalised groups tend to engage in asymmetrical armed struggle. The strategy of asymmetric conflict is aimed not at defeating a militarily equal opponent, but at demoralising and exhausting an enemy superior in terms of weapons and resources. This type of warfare takes the form of asymmetric attacks on both military and civilian targets, rather than the conventional encounters on the battlefield. Within asymmetric warfare, it is much more difficult to distinguish between civilians and fighters, making it even harder to protect civilians. As a result of this complex threat, civilians increasingly become the target of actions by regular and irregular combat forces.

#### **Economies of war**

Many conflicts are asymmetric, intrastate and draw on unconventional financial sources. Economies that adopt a 'system of producing, mobilising and allocating resources to sustain violence' are traditionally known as economies of war. The Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, uses the revenue of poppy trade to finance its operations. This poses a threat to civilians, because through war economies armed groups are able to pursue their strategies over a sustained period of time. In addition, civilians are used as forced labourers and exploited. Another example is the ongoing struggle for columbite-tantalite (coltan) and diamonds in various regions in Africa. The emergence

of private military companies may also be perceived as a threat to civilians, primarily because of the absence of accountability mechanisms.

### **Arch of instability**

We expect the four abovementioned threats to harm the security of civilians over the next few decades. The effects will stretch from Africa to the Middle East, the Caucasus and Southern Asia. We would like to stress that military intervention is not a panacea for these problems. Depending on the context, military force certainly can, however, play a role, as part of an integrated approach working on peace, security and development. The developments outlined above can lead to large-scale threats to the physical safety of civilians.

### **Missions involving the Dutch armed forces**

In specific contexts, as noted previously, the armed forces play a crucial role in the protection of (the physical safety of) civilians. The phrase 'protection of civilians', however, remains somewhat abstract. *Human security* is a normative concept, and is not intended to be a standalone strategy. The right strategy must be identified based on the local context. On the basis of our threat analysis, it is our belief that the Dutch armed forces should focus primarily on stabilisation missions, while maintaining the ability to contribute to intervention missions depending on its resources and capabilities.

The primary purpose of a stabilisation mission is to stabilise the security situation, thereby protecting the civilian population. A stabilisation mission can follow from a military intervention. It is also conceivable that a national government requests assistance in maintaining law and order in a specific area or region. As a wide range of contexts and scenarios are conceivable, the concrete aspects of each mission are context-dependent. The tasks assigned to the armed forces, therefore, range from the physical safeguarding and maintenance of law and order in a particular area or region, to SSR projects. The Dutch armed forces should, in principle, be capable of undertaking such tasks independently within a demarcated area in coordination with other key actors (as is advocated by the 3D approach).

Intervention missions may also be required, subject to strict conditions, to halt or avert large-scale human rights abuses. The Netherlands does not have the capacity to undertake such an intervention unilaterally. The role of the Netherlands, therefore, is to ensure that the appropriate mechanisms are in place within the UN, EU and NATO to intervene as quickly as possible, where required, and that the Dutch armed forces are capable of contributing to these interventions. Armed interventions – as experience has shown – are synonymous with war. Especially if the aim of the intervention is to halt human rights abuses, it is of the utmost importance that such operations prevent civilian casualties. Military interventions must be meticulously planned to ensure the speedy creation of security buffers, where civilians can receive humanitarian assistance.

## 4 Protection of civilians

During military missions, and certainly in large-scale stabilisation missions and interventions, the Netherlands consistently operates within an international context. This international context is, of course, extremely relevant to the future of the Dutch armed forces. Within the European Union itself, there has been ongoing debate for many years regarding the development of a more integrated foreign policy and, parallel to this, the build-up of joint military capabilities. Examples include the Helsinki Headline Goals, drawn up in 1999, the closely related 'Petersberg tasks', and the establishment of EU Battle Groups. In 2004, the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities published the 'Barcelona Report'<sup>2</sup>, which proposed the establishment of a European human security force. Within NATO, there is ongoing debate on a new strategic concept. The Secretary-General of the UN regularly reports on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The *Department of Peacekeeping Operations* (DPKO) and the *Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs* (OCHA) published an extensive report in 2009<sup>3</sup> concerning the protection of civilians in *peacekeeping operations*. Unfortunately, the ability of international organisations to protect civilians leaves much to be desired. The Netherlands could and should play a pivotal role in mobilising improvements. We have listed below those organisations that we believe have the potential to protect civilians in all parts of the world, in particular in the 'arch of instability'.

### **UN: too little, too late**

In terms of discourse and policies, the UN is an advocate of human security. Unfortunately, the UN tends to perform below expectations, partly because of the lack of properly trained and equipped troops and an effective chain of command.

The Dutch armed forces are well equipped, and have a solid chain of command. These qualities could be deployed to help improve the effectiveness of UN missions. Many Western countries have refused to lend any significant support to UN missions because of its consensus-building structure and slow response. Experiences in the Balkan proved particularly damaging to the reputation of the UN. The vicious circle, in which Western nations refuse to participate in UN peacekeeping missions because of its poor reputation, which in turn is due to the hesitance of Western countries to supply troops, must be broken.

To improve the quality of UN missions, the Netherlands should consider contributing more of its troops within UN missions. Moreover, the Netherlands should urge the UN to improve the structure of its peacekeeping missions to resolve structural problems (in particular, the lack of capacity and substandard quality of troops).

### **NATO: capable, but what about civilians?**

NATO is the only organisation with genuine military clout. This makes NATO a potentially important resource in the protection of civilians; in particular, civilians who are facing threats from heavily armed government forces or terrorist groups. It is our belief, however, that the policies and actions of NATO focus insufficiently on the role and position of civilians in areas of armed conflict. Operations such as those in Kosovo and Afghanistan confirm NATO's tendency to resort to the use of heavy military tools, like air power. This can jeopardise the safety and security of civilians or places them in grave danger. Furthermore, NATO military operations tend to focus on the (Western) interest of nation-states, all too readily overlooking the need to protect individuals. Within NATO, protection is, at best, considered as a means to reach its military goals. NATO does however provide disaster relief and emergency assistance; the *NATO Response Force* (NRF, a rapid response force) was deployed in the wake of the Pakistan earthquake, and the floods in New Orleans.

The Netherlands should - subject to the findings of our analysis below regarding the EU - remain part of NATO and support initiatives such as the NRF. Rapid response is crucial for protecting civilians. To date, NATO has only deployed the NRF in emergency assistance operations. The Netherlands should insist that NATO policy, doctrine, and actions are geared more directly towards the protection of civilians. This necessitates the deployment of the NRF in the event of humanitarian crises or widespread human rights violations. The Netherlands should advocate the

---

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.globalgovernancewatch.org/authors/-study-group-on-europes-security-capabilities>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Protecting%20Civilians%20in%20the%20Context%20of%20UN%20PKO.pdf>

rapid deployment of the NRF in armed conflicts, when and where required, depending on context, with the specific purpose of protecting civilians.

#### **EU: lack of political willpower**

The EU – more so than NATO, which is primarily a military alliance – is a peace project, of which the main focus is political cooperation, social-economic prosperity, and the active endorsement of human rights. Based on its historical background and status, the EU has an obligation to protect civilians in armed conflicts. However, the EU (still) lacks the capability and political willpower for large-scale military deployment to protect civilians. The EU does not have the necessary military resources. This is, in part, due to the fact that many EU member states have not adjusted their military and defence policies to the new strategic environment of the post-Cold War era. As a result, most European armed forces are incapable of operating effectively in complex and demanding conflict situations, let alone protect civilians effectively. The EU does, however, have civilian capabilities (for example, experts in police and justice), which should be deployed alongside military operations, as outlined above.

The Netherlands, within the context of the European Union, should press for the reform of member states' armed forces and for institutional cooperation and political willpower. The EU should strengthen its military capabilities over the next few decades and bring them in line with its amply developed civil capabilities. Due to the possibilities presented within the EU for civil-military deployment to facilitate an integrated approach, the Netherlands should focus its military cooperation initiatives on the EU rather than on NATO. The EU, like NATO, has rapid response forces: the EU Battle Groups (EUBG). However, EUBG's have never been deployed, despite the occurrence of crises in which peacekeeping missions could have protected civilians. Within the EU, the Netherlands should insist that the Battle Groups, where required, actually contribute to the protection of civilians. Taking 2030 as our policy horizon, it is our belief that the Netherlands should focus on seeking closer cooperation within the EU, more so than NATO. As an EU Member State, the Netherlands should advocate missions that are specifically aimed at protecting civilians.

#### **AU: human security, but what about the military?**

The African Union is committed to the protection of civilians in terms of policy, but lacks the capabilities to undertake the complex tasks and missions these policies imply. In Africa, as on other continents, security must eventually be achieved through local, national and regional security structures. The Netherlands should work on strengthening the capacity of the AU to participate in crisis management operations and stimulate the capacity of the AU to protect civilians. The Netherlands can make a viable contribution to this development (for example through SSR projects in Africa) and could support AU missions by providing military hardware, such as transport and combat helicopters.

In conclusion, Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi believe that the Netherlands should adopt a more pro-active role in the planning and development of military missions within the UN and the EU. We would welcome, in particular, the development of the EU as a key player: capable of deploying substantial military capabilities alongside civilian instruments in crisis management operations that extend beyond EU borders. This requires, above all else, closer cooperation within the EU. The Netherlands should prioritise this cooperation, while respecting its current role within NATO. The Netherlands should contribute pro-actively to the AU's capacity to promote the safety and security of civilians in areas of armed conflict.

## 5 The Dutch armed forces as a protection force

The Dutch armed forces must be able to protect civilians in areas of armed conflict. Recent military interventions (most notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia), failed to a large extent to prevent large-scale human rights violations and protect civilians. Improvements are required in terms of input, commitment, mandates and political leadership, as well as military capabilities. The latter issue is the core focus of our proposal, in which we present a profile for the Dutch armed forces as a *protection force*.

### Personnel

In the end, the responsibility for the protection of civilians rests with foot soldiers: boots on the ground. Civilian protection demands a tailored military training regime. Despite substantial investments made by the Ministry of Defence in this area, IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid are of the opinion that military training (in general and mission specific) should be aimed more specifically at human security. The skills acquired by military personnel (initiative, worst case-reasoning, courage, camaraderie, etc) remain essential to embedding the *human security* profile of the Dutch armed forces. A profound shift in mindset is not required; instead, there should be a shift in emphasis on code of conduct and the meaning of *human security*. This encompasses human rights, context-dependent circumstances (political, social, cultural), aspects of gender and promoting safety and security. The goal is to ensure that the concept of 'territorial protection' is developed further to include the protection of civilians.

IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid attach considerable value to the personal safety and post-deployment wellbeing of military personnel. A society that expects men and women to put their lives on the line is equally obliged to provide these people with the best possible care, before and after a mission and after termination of service.

### Gendarmerie capacity

The Dutch armed forces have the necessary resources to contribute to crisis management operations with a high threat level.<sup>4</sup> The Netherlands could also participate in crisis management operations in times of relative peace and security, for example, by participating in SSR projects or by supporting local police. However, there is a general lack of capacity in *no war – no peace* situations, where the most severe threats have been averted, but the security situation remains unstable. In situations such as these, deployment of a *gendarmerie*-type police force is recommended. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (RNM) most closely resembles this proposed structure. Once the most severe threat has subsided, gendarmerie units are capable of providing security services similar to those provided by the police. This makes the RNM particularly well suited to deployment in unstable areas with no severe local threat. Moreover, the RNM can help rebuild and strengthen the rule of law, with the ultimate aim of handing over responsibility of these duties to local security forces as soon as possible.

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1996 illustrates the urgent need for the establishment of a *gendarmerie* unit. When the Stabilization Force (SFOR) was called upon to assist in low-level local conflicts, they would often unwittingly contribute to the escalation of these conflicts. As the international civil police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina were unarmed, they were consequently unable to lend credible assistance. A gendarmerie unit, as experience has shown, can provide the necessary protection without ensuing escalation.<sup>5</sup> The RNM currently draws on a gendarmerie pool of 250 for its missions abroad. Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi propose expanding this capacity to 500-1000 military personnel to undertake operational police duties during crisis management operations. This allows for the continued deployment of 200-300 military personnel. These military personnel could be deployed in combination with Dutch units, or as part of the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF).

The incorporation of specialist gendarmerie capacity into military units is highly recommended. It offers a number of advantages, such as enhancing the training capabilities for overseas tours of duty and strengthening the coher-

---

<sup>4</sup> 'Crisis management operations' is a broad concept; in its usage here it refers to the stabilisation and intervention missions mentioned in §3.

<sup>5</sup> IKV issued a report in April 1998, advocating the deployment of a 'paramilitary force' to plug the 'public security gap' in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The proposals presented in this paper match the recommendations of that report closely. IKV (1998) *The Bosnian Public Security Gap. An Obstacle for Peace. Report of the working group 'Policing in Conflict Areas'*.

ence during deployment. From a logistical perspective, deployment and training can be executed more efficiently by organising the RNM in organic units. When there are no training programmes or tours of duty scheduled, the RNA could be deployed for domestic purposes.

### **Sustainability**

The establishment of local and national security structures, such as police and military organizations, require long-term commitment. At the same time, civilians in areas of armed conflict must be able to engage in economic, social and political activities safely, without fear for their own personal safety. An international military presence must therefore be capable of providing this security until the local security infrastructure is operational. This requires long-term, sustained engagement.<sup>6</sup>

The safety and security of civilians can only be promoted durable if the international community is willing to accept continued engagement in sustained operations. This demands not only commitment of our armed forces, but also of our politicians and society at large. If the Netherlands wants to contribute effectively to the protection of civilians who are in genuine danger, long-term deployment (civil and military) is essential. Of course, troop deployment can be scaled down once the mission starts to attain its objectives and local and national security structures are in place.

The current level of ambition – set by the Dutch government<sup>7</sup> - emphasises simultaneous participation in several expeditionary missions. We propose shifting the emphasis to mission duration, depending, of course, on the context. A single major peace mission, in which Dutch armed forces are involved over a longer period of time, contributes more to the protection of civilians than simultaneous, but short-term expeditionary missions. Handing over responsibility for a mission to another country is, of course, also an option, though this carries the risk of losing experienced personnel and losing the trust of the local population. Sustainability is of the utmost importance for a mission to succeed.

### **Expanding transport capacity**

Areas of armed conflict are often vast and inaccessible. Rapid troop deployment by air is thus essential to protect civilians wherever and whenever required. Although the Netherlands already possesses substantial military transport capacity, strengthening this capacity for the purposes of protecting civilians is recommended. One option is to focus on one type of transport helicopter with heavy-lift capacity so as to allow for more efficient operations. Heavy-lift *Chinooks* can be deployed in many different environments and have a greater lifting capacity than the mid-range *Cougar*. In addition, the European Union should consider ways to improve the efficiency of its considerable fleet of transport helicopters. This could increase deployment capacity without necessitating unilateral procurement.

### **Increasing the number of commandos and marines**

Special forces play an important role in protecting civilians because of their operational flexibility, effective deployment against a range of threats, broad experience and sensitivity to local contexts. The armed forces should expand its special forces capacity (Commando Corps and Royal Netherlands Marine Corps - RNMC) to contribute to the protection of civilians. In areas of armed conflict, situations can rapidly escalate. Special forces are uniquely placed to intervene quickly in such situations. In addition, special forces have been trained to operate in tough and long-duration asymmetrical battles, one of the four threats facing civilians. They also play a key role in the field of intelligence gathering and surveillance (population centres, refugee flows etc.). Despite the strict selection criteria, we believe that increasing the number of special forces personnel is possible if the emphasis is placed unequivocally on the duties and tasks outlined above.

---

<sup>6</sup> Units are deployed over a period of several months, requiring the continued deployment—on a rotational basis—of several units to guarantee a continued presence. A solid policy on sustainability allows for the measured, protracted application of military capability in the field. To date, the MoD has (generally) adopted a ‘three to one’ policy (1 unit deployed, two in NL), the Exploratory Studies recommend changing this into ‘four to one’.

<sup>7</sup> The current ambition level is set out in appendix 2

### **Investments in intelligence**

The objective of protecting civilians can only be achieved through effective intelligence gathering. The Dutch armed forces should further develop the capacity for intelligence gathering operations and focus its capabilities on the security of civilians. When facing issues regarding the rule of law, culture and development, the gathering of information is better left to other ministries (for example the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - MFA). The MoD should continue to develop the capacity to deploy Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV's) to protect civilian populations. UAV capacity should, in any case, be increased; this service is currently contracted out to (expensive) private security companies due to the lack of 'organic' personnel.

### **Greater focus on 'counterinsurgency'**

It is generally anticipated that crisis management operations involving the Dutch armed forces will manifest themselves in intrastate conflicts and involve counterinsurgency tactics. In recent years, the Dutch forces in Afghanistan have gained substantial hands-on experience in this field. However, further development of intelligence gathering, situational awareness, precision weapons, and the capacity to escalate violence gradually is required. This primarily involves training and educating military personnel and developing well-tailored doctrines. Expertise acquired during recent non-conventional conflicts must also be further elaborated.

### **Joint operations and firepower**

The Dutch armed forces must remain capable of executing military campaigns in a wide variety of contexts. Decisive and unequivocal choices must nevertheless be made. The main focus of this policy paper is on the capacity to stabilise violent contexts, if necessary after an (multinational) intervention. The armed forces must be held ready and capable to fulfil all tasks within the framework of these missions (see also appendix 3). The protection of civilians can imply a greater degree of operational flexibility and risk than is currently demanded even from the units in Afghanistan. An increased number of military personnel will need to 'leave the compound' to achieve and maintain its superiority in the area of operations. Rather than operating according to a 'base' scenario, as was the case in Uruzgan (one or two main bases, a number of smaller forward operating bases, and patrols in between the bases), the units would be expected to cover a wider area and become a permanent and visible presence for the local population.

The objective of protecting civilians must be achieved primarily through land-based missions, but nevertheless may require air force and naval support depending on the context. In coastal areas, ships can serve an important strategic and operational purpose by providing logistical support and serving as helicopter launch pads. Virtually every land-based operation requires air supremacy and - in some cases - air support. The Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAf) is needed to provide logistical and offensive support, and is a vital tool in intelligence gathering and surveillance. Military operations increasingly require the three branches of the armed forces to work in an integrated manner. The focus should be on military personnel on the ground, whose primary role is to protect civilians. The RNLAf should have the requisite systems in place to support the Royal Netherlands Army (RNA) and the Marine Corps in their operations.

Greater care should be taken when deploying air support. At present, the military is sometimes prone to escalating light infantry campaigns to full-fledged aerial attacks in order to protect its own and allied troops. The armed forces should be capable of using minimum force and escalating violence in the smallest steps necessary. In some cases, firepower will be necessary to protect civilians. To provide security to the population, the territory in which they live must be effectively and continuously safeguarded by the adequate deployment of force. Depending on the military hardware used by the forces threatening civilian populations, a wide range of firepower may be deployed, including armoured vehicles, tanks, combat helicopters and fighter aircraft. It is, however, of the utmost importance that the minimum force necessary is used, so as to avoid civilian casualties.

### **What is not needed for human security?**

In physical terms, our *human security* profile of the Dutch armed forces reduces the need for submarines. Submarine operations that could be aimed at protecting civilians can usually be undertaken by other weapons systems as well (for instance: the operational task of deploying special forces from submarines; special forces have their own resources and capabilities to execute landings from surface vessels). There are few scenarios left in which submarines will serve to protect the Kingdom's vital interest. Moreover, any such scenario would always involve

allied forces with submarine capacity. With its present naval capacity, minus the submarines, the Netherlands can still make a credible contribution to allied operations. Recent investments in Holland-class patrol vessels and a *Joint Logistic Support Ship* are a positive development, as these ships can play a key role in protecting civilians. The patrol vessels in particular will usually be deployed in coastal areas (e.g. to combat piracy). The Air-defence and Command frigates and M-class frigates play a role in the 'territorial defence task' of the armed forces.

Air supremacy and air support remain essential. However, as experience has shown, that does not require the number of fighter aircraft currently in service with the RNLAf.<sup>8</sup> For crisis management operations involving the Dutch armed forces, air supremacy will already exist *de facto*, due to technological superiority. Because of the importance of air support, the RNLAf should be capable of undertaking effective and accurate air-to-ground strikes, with minimal collateral damage. The tactical nuclear weapons currently deployed in the Netherlands should be phased-out, under an agreement within NATO.

The table below sets out the tentative steps towards participation in a discussion on the future profile of the Dutch armed forces and includes a number of proposals that could contribute to improving its capacity to protect civilians.

Protection Force: Armed Forces Profile aimed at Human Security	
 To acquire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for reconnaissance</li> <li>- Gendarmerie capacity for military policing tasks</li> </ul>
 To expand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Tactical transport (i.e. heavy-lift helicopters)</li> <li>- Special forces: Commando Corps and Royal Netherlands Marine Corps</li> <li>- Sustainability: ability to sustain a mission</li> <li>- Continued expansion of the military doctrine to include human protection (including rules governing violence, protection of refugees and the meaning of human security)</li> </ul>
 To reduce	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fighter aircraft (no JSF's)</li> <li>- Fennek reconnaissance vehicle</li> </ul>

<sup>8</sup> By way of illustration: in Afghanistan, no more than 4 to 8 F-16s were deployed simultaneously. During Operation *Allied Force* in Serbia and Kosovo, a maximum of 20 F-16s were deployed simultaneously.



To phase out

- Submarines
- Nuclear tasks

Proposal for profile of armed forces geared towards protecting civilians

## 6 Protection of civilians and coherent policies

As noted previously, military organization geared towards international stabilization and intervention operations should be aimed primarily at the physical security of civilians. This creates a clear division of tasks that dovetails neatly with the 3D principle (Defence, Diplomacy and Development). An integrated division of tasks requires close cooperation between the MFA, the Ministry of Development Cooperation (MoDC) and the Ministry of the Interior (including the police). The activities undertaken within the framework of the 3D principle should be centralised so as to enable more effective and faster deployment.<sup>9</sup>

### Expert pool

An integrated approach, in which the armed forces focus primarily on human security, is only possible if civil actors can actually 'deliver'. Presently, this is not sufficiently the case. Recruiting deployable civilian experts is furthermore proving particularly problematic. To improve this situation, the relevant ministries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Development Cooperation, Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice) should broaden their pool of deployable experts.

The Ministry of the Interior should increase its investments in the deployment of police officers. The military component can call upon its 'apparatus' for structured troop deployment. Whilst the civilian component need not go this far, it is of the utmost importance that the government ensures the provision of sufficient deployable civilian experts. Tentative steps in that direction were taken in 2009, with the creation of a pool of civil experts for short-duration missions. Sustainability, in tandem with deployment duration of the military apparatus, should play a role in this regard.

---

<sup>9</sup> An interesting example is the British *Stabilisation Unit*: <http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/index.php/about-us>

## 7 Budget

### **Budgeting for a protection force**

The policy proposals set out in this document will inevitably cost money. Conversely, we believe that considerable cost savings can be made should the armed forces shift their emphasis to protecting the physical security of civilians. In the profile proposed by us, a number of expensive weapons systems are no longer required (in their present numbers). The current Defence budget, in our opinion, is sufficient to undertake existing and future tasks, including the protection of civilians. One important issue remains: the financing of crisis management operations. The costs of recent operations were considerably higher than estimated, reflecting the unpredictable nature of such operations. This does not necessarily require an increase in the Defence budget. Nevertheless, a viable solution must be found to financing crisis management operations. A decision must be reached regarding which department or budget to target (e.g. Defence or the Homogenous Group International Cooperation<sup>10</sup>) to cover budget overspending on crisis management operations.

The flow of funding is a decisive factor in interdepartmental collaboration. The present battle for funding is complicating the policy coordination of crisis management operations. For instance, the deployment of experts from the Ministries of the Interior and Justice carries with it financial complications. At present, the deployment of these experts is being financed through other channels than those allocated to the civilian experts from the MFA. The funds for this civilian deployment should be merged, enabling a more efficient, integrated civil authority approach. The cabinet should decide on ministerial contributions; the most logical conclusion is to assign primary responsibility to the MFA.

### **Potential cost savings**

A number of units and systems of the Dutch armed forces have become less necessary when set against the demands of human security. The short-term decommissioning and disbandment of materiel and units is not in itself very cost-effective. Instead, we have identified those systems that do not require replacement at the end of their lifespan. The corresponding organizational units can then also be disbanded. Advance phasing out can lead to relative cost savings and more effective deployment of military personnel.

First of all, we find that a reduction in the number of fighter planes would not significantly impact the capacities of the armed forces. Replacement in smaller numbers is therefore self-evident. Moreover, Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi are convinced that, relative to the costs, the replacement of the F-16 by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter generates few efficiency gains. In terms of *human security*, the F-35 adds too little in comparison to the capacities of the F-16 to merit such an investment. An upgraded F-16, to be replaced in due course by a fighter plane that offers genuine and fundamental improvements, is our preferred option. An important criterion in this regard is that any future F-16 replacement should contribute to the protection of civilians as outlined in preceding chapters.

As stated previously, the submarine no longer serves a vital purpose in the present (inter)national context, or for human security, and therefore does not require upgrades or modernisation. Lastly, the number of Fennek reconnaissance vehicles could be substantially reduced. The current number is based on a type of military operations that is not necessary for protecting civilians in areas of armed conflict.

Ultimately, decisions are taken in the political arena. Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi can only propose a profile of the Dutch armed forces; final choices are to be made by political bodies.

---

<sup>10</sup> HGIS is a separate chapter within the national budget on which expenses are booked made abroad by the Dutch government.

## 8 Conclusion: choosing for a protection force

In this policy paper, IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid have set out our proposals for structuring the armed forces to enhance protection of civilian populations. We are convinced that the human security in areas of armed conflict is an increasingly important responsibility of the Dutch armed forces. The framework provided by the Dutch constitution states that promotion of the international rule of law could be grounds on which to deploy Dutch forces. Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi are of the opinion that a stable international rule of law is premised on the creation of the safest possible living conditions for civilians. It is therefore of the utmost importance to ensure that the Dutch armed forces are structured and equipped to protect civilians from direct physical threats during crisis management operations.

In §5, we set out a number of concrete policy proposals, three of which are highlighted below. First and foremost, the armed forces should emphasise *human security* in their military training programmes. This can be achieved by allocating more time to the issue of human rights and specific tactics to promote the security and safety of civilian populations. Second, we recommend investing in increasing the capacity of gendarmerie-type military deployment, most notably in unstable areas. Lastly, we believe that the emphasis within the ambition level should shift from simultaneous expeditionary missions to sustainability in operations. The Dutch armed forces should therefore allocate even more resources to sustainability.

Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi believe that the deployment of the Dutch armed forces in UN missions can make an effective contribution to the protection of civilians. Although designed to protect civilians, UN missions typically lack the capacities to act decisively in threatening situations. The Netherlands can and, in our opinion, should contribute to capacity-building. Human suffering continues on a mass scale, in Africa in particular. As the Dutch involvement in the mission in Afghanistan seems to be ending, the Netherlands should focus emphatically on how it can contribute effectively to the protection of civilians in the 'arch of instability'.

## Appendix 1      Relation between policy paper and Exploratory Study (‘Verkenningen’)

On 29 March 2010, the Dutch Ministry of Defence presented the findings of an exploratory study undertaken by the 'Toekomstverkenningen' interdepartmental working group. The report sets out four potential profiles for the Dutch armed forces. The first three profiles focus on the specialised roles that could be assumed; the fourth opts for ‘versatility’, i.e. the capability of executing various missions simultaneously, albeit on a modest scale. The selection of specialised roles is unavoidable if the armed forces want to remain capable of operating at the highest levels. Current fiscal constraints leave little scope to execute all tasks at the highest levels.

To that end, IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid propose a clear focus, one that enables the armed forces to make a significant and substantial contribution. This involves relinquishing the option of ‘versatility’ in favour of ‘promoting safety and security’, as set forth in the exploratory study (*Veiligheid brengen*).

In accordance with this policy option, the armed forces should be structured ‘to contribute to stability and development, for example in the arch of instability’. Such a policy option resembles the profile proposed in this policy brief and is thus endorsed by Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi, subject to the following comments:

- The *human security* profile, as proposed by IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid, retains the possibility of making modest contributions to multinational intervention operations, in order to halt or avert human rights violations. Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi believe in the importance of retaining this capacity. This objective can be attained through proposed intensifications and extensifications. Military intervention, as outlined above, is only permitted in exceptional circumstances to avert gross human rights violations swiftly and decisively.
- In our opinion, the ambitions formulated for the ‘*Promoting safety and security*’ policy option (with Defence expenditure equal) focuses too heavily on the number of expeditionary missions, at the expense of sustainability or quality of the deployment. As stated above, it is our belief that the Dutch armed forces should be engaged in long-term operations, rather than on participating in several missions simultaneously.
- The report is based on a vision of the future that explores four different scenarios. The 'Verkenningen' project group correctly acknowledges that the stabilisation missions proposed in the policy option will not always be feasible. Scenarios premised on reduced international collaboration will complicate stabilisation missions. On the other hand, the Dutch armed forces could make a valuable contribution to stabilisation missions in the two scenarios that promote international cooperation. It is important to consider these different developments in international relations. We point out, however, that stabilisation missions are likely to remain essential and feasible in less controversial areas, even in the scenarios with reduced international cooperation.

## Appendix 2 – The current ambition level

The armed forces guarantee:

- The protection of the integrity of the national and allied territory, including the Dutch Antilles and Aruba, if necessary using all available resources;
- an active contribution to the integrated foreign policy of the Netherlands. This includes:
  - high-quality and high-tech military contributions to international operations in all parts of the spectrum of force, also in the initial phase of an operation. This includes:
    - a contribution to the level of ambition of NATO. In that connection, the armed forces will also make a continuous contribution of varying size to the *NATO Response Force*;
    - a contribution to the level of ambition of the European Union. In that connection, the armed forces will also make a periodic contribution to the rapid-reaction capabilities of the Union, the *EU Battle-groups*;
    - a contribution to the *Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG<sup>11</sup>)* of the United Nations;
    - participation, for a period of no more than one year, in an operation at the higher end of the spectrum of force, with a brigade of land forces, two squadrons of fighter aircraft or a maritime task group;
    - simultaneous participation over a longer period of time, in no more than three operations at the lower end of the spectrum of force, with task groups of battalion size or, in the event of air operations and maritime operations, their equivalents;
    - participating in land operations as *lead nation* at brigade level and – together with other countries – at corps level, in maritime operations as *lead nation* at task group level and in air operations with contributions at levels equivalent to the brigade;
    - the implementation of special operations, including evacuation operations and counter-terrorism operations;
  - participation in police missions, including those of the European Gendarmerie Force with officers and units of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, and small-scale missions of a civil-military nature;
  - making available military experts for training and advice to security organisations in other countries;
  - providing international emergency aid at the request of civilian authorities;
- contributions within the borders of the Kingdom to the security of our society, subject to civilian authority. This specifically includes:
  - the implementation of national tasks, such as border security by the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary and the coastguard;
  - military assistance in the criminal enforcement of the rule of law, and in upholding public order and safety, for example with special support units and the explosive ordnance disposal units;
  - military support in the event of disasters and severe accidents.

Source: *Beleidsbrief Wereldwijd dienstbaar* (“Providing services worldwide”, MoD, 2007)

---

<sup>11</sup> SHIRBRIG was decommissioned in 2009.

## Appendix 3      Potential tasks of the Dutch armed forces, aimed at the protection of civilians

The tasks described below have been taken from *The military and civilian protection: developing roles and capacities* (Holt, 2006). This report explores potential ways in which the military apparatus can put the concept of *human security* into practice. As always, the roles are context-dependent. The tasks have been purposefully omitted from our proposal, because the dynamic context of the threats facing civilian populations cannot be easily translated into a concrete profile.

1. *Protection as an obligation within the conduct of war.*  
In war, military forces are required to abide by the Geneva Conventions and other international laws to minimize civilian death and injury and the destruction of civilian objects, and to allow for relief provided by impartial humanitarian actors. The occupying power is responsible for the basic security and welfare of the civilian population.
2. *Protection as a military mission to prevent mass killings.*  
According to principles outlined by the ICISS,<sup>12</sup> a protection mission is organised and deployed specifically to actively prevent large-scale violence against civilians.
3. *Protection as a task within UN-mandated peace operations.*  
'Civilian protection' is seen as one of many tasks for peacekeepers, but is unlikely to be the operation's central, organising aim.
4. *Protection as providing area security for humanitarian action.*  
Military forces or peacekeepers establish the wider security of an area, enabling others to provide support to civilians in that area.
5. *Protection through assistance/operational design.*  
Protection is a function of the design of relief and humanitarian programmes: refugee camps, water supplies and latrines, for example, are placed so as to minimise threats to vulnerable populations. The potential military role is to assist in reducing threats, such as offering physical presence as a deterrent.
6. *Protection as the use of traditional force.*  
Some military thinkers point out that civilians will enjoy better protection after a war-fighting force has been used to stop an enemy's actions.

Source: Viktoria K. Holt, 'The military and civilian protection: developing roles and capacities', *HPG Research Briefing*, No. 22, March 2006, p. 2.

---

<sup>12</sup> ICISS: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (principles were laid down in 2001, in the report *The Responsibility to Protect*).