Arming with Opportunities

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and a Community-based Approach

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Cover picture: Nuer men armed with AK-47 rifles guarding their cattle against raiders and thieves in Sudan. Sven Torfinn / Panos Pictures (source: http://www.ipb.org/smallarmsg.html)
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Glossary

ACIN   Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca
ALIR   Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda
AMUNORCA Asociación de Municipios del norte del Cauca
ANBP   Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme
ASOM   Asociación Municipal de Mujeres
AUC    Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
BICCC  Bonn International Center for Conversion
CAR    Central African Republic
CCS    Center for Conflict Studies
CDOT   Catholic Diocese of Torit
CODA   Comisión Operativo para la Dejación de las Armas
CORDAID Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid
CNRR   Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación
CPA    Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRO    Centro de Referencia y Oportunidades
CSAC   Community Security and Arms Control
CSO    Civil Society Organization
DDR    Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DIAG   Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
DRC    Democratic Republic Congo
ELN    Ejército de Liberación Nacional
FARC   Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FDLR   Forces Democratiques de Libération du Rwanda
GoS    Government of Sudan
GoSS   Government of South Sudan
HSBA   Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment
HTPVK  Holy Trinity Peace Village Kuron
ICC    International Criminal Court
IDDRS  Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
IGO    International Governmental Organization
IOM    International Organization for Migration
IRIN   Integrated Regional Information Network
JIU    Joint Integrated Units
KNPSD  Knowledge Network Peace, Security, and Development
KOPEIN Kotido Peace Initiative
LOKADO Lokichoggio Oropoi Kakuma Development Organization
LPI    Local Peace Initiatives
LRA    Lord’s Resistance Army
MDRP   Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCDDR</td>
<td>National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKS</td>
<td>Nederlandse Katholieke Sportfederatie</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAG</td>
<td>Other Armed Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Pibor Development Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Pibor Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHA</td>
<td>Réseau Haki Na Amani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudan Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPP</td>
<td>Sudan Integrated Peace-building Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSANSA</td>
<td>South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>South Sudan Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSUM</td>
<td>South Sudan Unity Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SODA</td>
<td>Seeds of Peace Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN) DPKO</td>
<td>(United Nations) Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>(UN) FAO</td>
<td>(United Nations) Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>(UN) OCHA</td>
<td>(United Nations) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRCO</td>
<td>United Nations resident Coordination Support Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUN</td>
<td>Western Upper Nile</td>
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Executive summary

The research starts with examining the best practices and lessons learned of past DDR experiences. These show that a DDR programme should always have a regional focus, as conflicts (even intra-state) often have economic and political linkages to outside. Given the fact that disarmament is almost never successful if not done voluntarily, a peace agreement is a preferred starting point. Incentives for weapons handed in can be problematic, as they can feed into arms trade or appear to be rewarding the instigators of the past violence. The biggest problem found in the demobilization phase arises when a programme lacks proper planning with the other phases. Reorientation programmes are an important step from the demobilization phase to the reintegration phase, in which the former combatants are being assisted in their economic and social integration in civilian society. This last phase is often the Achilles’ heal of DDR operations. First of all, because it is the most difficult to implement, as it cannot be done in easy to organize centralized camps like the first two phases. Secondly, it is found that funding is often lacking or exhausted in the first two phases. Finally, it is often highly problematic to actively involve the civilian communities in which the former combatants are to be reintegrated into. With special programmes focusing on former combatants, the status of being a ‘former combatant’ brings benefits with them. This obstructs reintegration as former combatants tend to hold on to this status, and also because communities feel benefits are going to the instigators of past violence and not to them; the victims. Moreover, after a war there is often not much to reintegrate into, and programmes often prepare former combatants with the wrong skills. Because of the special characteristics that vulnerable groups (children, women and disabled) bring with them that complicate their reintegration, special attention should be given to them. Critical is also good information to the former combatants about their opportunities, but also an information campaign to sensitize the civilian public and prevent aggravation caused by rumors. Another sensitive issue is the legal and political treatment that the former combatants – the known perpetrators of the violence – receive, and the DDR process must therefore be promulgated as a national programme under law and the role of reconciliation commissions can be very important. The relationship of DDR programmes with communities is critical to long-term recovery and this relationship is strengthened and deepened in the community-based approach.

Based on the problems experienced, a demand has grown for community-based DDR. This would, according to this paper, entail providing the communities with the skills and resources to support the reintegration of former combatants, rather than developing state-centered programmes for individual reintegration. Characteristic to community-based DDR is then the intent to take away the incentives to pick up arms, and the inclusiveness of the programme. A problem, however, can be a community’s limited interest, as it only focuses on its own priorities and leaves out the bigger picture. Another problem encountered is patrimonialism, and while designing a programme also this has to be taken into account. To organize community-based DDR a ‘triangle of stability’ referring to three important elements for stability is taken as...
starting point, and all elements need to be addressed depending on the situation. Economic opportunities can be developed by giving focal training and schooling in setting up small businesses in combination with micro-credits. Developing civil society is important, as this organizes and strengthens the community and can serve as a ‘watchdog’ to the government. Law and order can among other things be addressed by decentralization of the government if necessary; organizing communities into councils where local governance does not exist. Important is also the security sector which can be improved by for instance community-based policing. Critical is here the active involvement of the communities with the security sector and the improvement of trust and understanding. Participating communities in the DDR process thus receive tangible benefits, but these benefits are not individual, improving the reintegration of former combatants as well as the development of the community. The paper, however, does not advocate shifting policy towards solely a community-based approach to DDR. Indeed, in many situations a centralized state-centered approach may be more effective, especially in the first two phases. The paper therefore suggests that the situation on the ground determines the design of DDR programmes and how much a programme can be state-focused or how much the communities need to be involved then depends on the context.

How community-based DDR could be undertaken is illustrated with a case-study of Jonglei State, South Sudan. However, it should be kept in mind that this case chooses an extreme community-based focus, and does not aim to exemplify how DDR with a community-based focus should be designed in general. This case is particularly interesting, as a distinction between civilians and combatants is hard to make and a state-centered programme is not possible. Arms are in everyone’s hands, and although most of these are considered to be civilian since the signing of the CPA in 2005, the same small armed groups are now raiding cattle and protecting their own communities, using the same tactics and weapons acquired during the war. First, a brief description of the cultural historical and political context is given, followed by an examination of the nature of present armed conflicts in Jonglei State, as well as the elements contributing to them. There is a long history of cattle raiding between the tribes, and cattle has a high economic and cultural importance. Disputes also arise over land and grazing issues, as well as recent discoveries of oil in the region. Problematic is also the legacy of the civil war, as everyone involved is now familiar with firearms and war tactics. There have also been disarmament campaigns in Jonglei in the past, which has shown that forced disarmament does not bring better results than a voluntary campaign and has much higher costs. Based on this information it is then suggested that the lack of security and socio-economic opportunities are the greatest causes for people to remain armed. Some people are armed to gain wealth operating in armed groups and others arm themselves to protect them from the other; creating a vicious circle. Moreover, there is a great lack of trust between the various ethnic groups in Jonglei, also feeding into the need to remain armed. These issues therefore need to be addressed before disarmament can successfully be undertaken. However, although some recommendations are made the government had just started a disarmament campaign (with the threat of force). Given the government’s suspected intentions for the disarmament and a lurking relapse into war, any expectations on disarmament at this point in time therefore have to be very modest. Nevertheless, the security sector can be improved by workshops and community-based policing. Vocational training and micro-credits could help people to become marketable
in the job market and set up small businesses and overcome current frustrations with foreign
guest workers. Moreover, advocacy is needed to change current attitudes towards firearms, as
well as towards other ethnic groups and the bride price. Realistically, full disarmament is
improbable to succeed in the short-term, as security and economic opportunities are unlikely to
improve quickly. While addressing the security, economic, and related issues it is therefore
suggested that the use and ownership of firearms is first controlled by law which could then
pave the way to full disarmament.
Preface

“Only the dead have seen the end of war”

– Plato –

This research is undertaken in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies and Human Rights, after which I hope to continue a career in this field. And although it might be somewhat bold to try and prove a respected Greek philosopher wrong, I have always liked a challenge. The disarmament of groups after conflict and helping them to (re-)start a civilian live is seen to be vital to prevent relapse into war and the development of a country. The experiences with these efforts have created a demand for a community-based approach, although what this then entails has so far failed to be substantiated. Although not pretending to be exhaustive, this research therefore aims to fill this gap.

The research could not have been completed without the professional supervision of Georg Frerks, who often knew how to combine business with the pleasure of a glass of wine. Also essential was the staff of IKV Pax Christi, and in particular that of Miriam Struyk and Paul Allertz who gave me the chance to conduct field research in Sudan and their feedback on my work. Thanks also goes out to Jan Gruiters for allowing me this opportunity, as well as his constructive feedback. I am also thankful to the colleagues in Africa, Mariam Ayoti, Pasquale Ngorol and Camlus Omogo, who allowed me to join in on the context analysis in Jonglei, as well as Naftal Nyariki and Noortje Henrichs who provided me with logistical support. Gratitude also goes out to all the people who were willing to participate in interviews and focus group discussions. My thinking has also greatly benefited from the many joyous conversations with Hans Rouw, often lasting until late in the evening with a long bar tab, but always productive. Of course I cannot forget to mention my other fellow students; Stef Arens, Klaas Castelein, Alvin van Dijk, Indi Hussain, Els Jellema, Sara Koenders, Nelleke Kreeft, Anna de Laine, Adalgiso Montinari, Elise Muizert, Fons van Overbeek, Megan Price, Jeppe Schilder, Wendy Schutte, Hyder Syed, Medea Turashvili, Maartje Veldhuizen, Matty Verburg, Fanny Voitzwinkler, Nikki de Zwaan, and last but most definitely not least, Jessica Vorstermans. Also, I am grateful to my family and friends with whom many discussions on conflict, related issues, and unrelated issues have directly or indirectly contributed to the completion of this paper.
Introduction

“Peace is not an absence of war; it is a virtue, a state of mind,
a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice”
– Baruch de Spinoza –

What the famous Dutch philosopher said in the 17th century, still counts today. Simply disarming people will not bring peace. Taking away a weapon is not enough; the incentive to take up arms has to be taken away. That is the aim of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. DDR is found to be vital for the success of peace building missions, and failure of good DDR results in the proliferation of arms and criminality rates. The international community has been occupied with DDR for quite a few years, and literature is extensively available. This literature, however, mainly focuses on practical experiences, consisting of field manuals, reports and summaries of best practices and lessons learned, and theoretical work is often missing. Due to the many variables and the lack of effective indicators of reintegration, most literature maps case-specific experiences, although many experiences may also apply to other cases. In recent years there also has been a growing demand to approach DDR with a more community-based perspective. But practical recommendations on how to undertake such a community-based approach to DDR, or even attempts to define or problematize community-based DDR are lacking.

Informed by this lack of comprehensive knowledge, this paper will start with a literature research on DDR programmes worldwide, attempting not only to give a comprehensive overview of best practices for DDR programmes, but also to back up these best practices with theoretical frameworks. Derived from the experiences and lessons learned of past DDR initiatives, an attempt is made to make a start with concretization of what community-based DDR could encompass and fill in the gaps of knowledge on the matter. The literature research has been done in anticipation of an initiative by the Knowledge Network Peace, Security and Development (KNPSD) following the Schokland Agreement (Akkoord van Schokland). Among others, within this initiative a working group has formed on community-based security and DDR, in which both IKV Pax Christi and the Center for Conflict Studies (CCS) in Utrecht are partners. As the research has also been conducted in assignment of IKV Pax Christi, appendix 1 briefly mentions the programmes of IKV Pax Christi relating to DDR, and keeping possible funding in mind appendix 2 shortly discusses Dutch policy on DDR.

The literature research is guided by the questions how DDR programmes are implemented, what the cultural, political, and theoretical assumptions and guiding philosophies are behind the design of the programmes, and what experiences there have been in the past. Derived from the answers on these questions concretization of the notion community-based DDR is undertaken. Questions guiding this part of the research are; what concrete policy changes can
be derived from the lessons learned; what other community-based initiatives can inform ideas of community-based DDR; what constitutes community-based DDR and what does this mean in practice?

The first section will then discuss DDR programmes in general, whereas the second section focuses on DDR with a community-based approach. Most of the literature remains with the observation that there is a demand for community-based DDR. This demand has been growing with the widely accepted idea that programmes must have a bottom-up approach. Involvement and ownership by the local population is crucial to the success of development programmes, and large international agencies implementing top-down programmes with a lack of adaptation to local circumstances often incur many difficulties. Also NGOs and other participating organizations tend to label a project as ‘community-based’ since it has become a fashionable term in the field, yet these projects usually do not differ from the classic approach. Actual literature on community-based DDR programmes is not found, yet information is gathered from closely related subjects, such as community-based development and community-based reintegration, since they are founded on the same principles. This paper will thus bring more concrete policy recommendations on community-based DDR. Although the demand for community-based approach to DDR stems from the classic DDR programmes, this paper does advocate one over the other per se. Moreover, a differentiation between the two should not be made as such. Regional awareness and national coordination will remain very important in every case. The context determines programme design, and depending on the situation a programme may include more or less community-based elements. The third and last section is a case-study in Jonglei, South Sudan, undertaken by the Author. This study aims to bring the ideas brought forward in the literature review into a concrete case. This is not to say that the case-study explains how community-based DDR is implemented, but rather it illustrates how it could be implemented in this specific case. Jonglei State in South Sudan is particularly interesting, as many armed groups there have been involved in the conflict, yet after the signing of the peace agreement most of the armed groups were considered to be armed civilians. A classic DDR programme is therefore not a viable option in this situation. Currently the disarmament in Jonglei takes civilian disarmament as a starting point, yet these forced disarmament campaigns initiated by the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) are far from effective. By using the ideas brought forward by the literature review, the field research therefore aims to illustrate how community-based DDR could fill the gaps, as simply disarming people is not sufficient. After twenty-two years of civil war firearms are still seen by the population as necessary for their own protection and to sustain in their livelihoods. Therefore a more comprehensive approach addressing insecurity, but also the reintegration of the population into a civilian lifestyle is necessary.

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1 So called ‘classic’ DDR programs are often described to be either focusing on the individual combatant for his or her reintegration, providing him or her with benefits. Interestingly, this approach is also labeled state-focused, since it entails DDR on a state-level after a peace agreement, often through a national commission on DDR.
Moving beyond traditional monitoring and peacekeeping, multidimensional operations now attempt to lay the foundations for stability and development. In the recent years in post conflict peace-building efforts, DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) programmes have constituted an integral part of such operations. To make former fighters not only believe, but also take part in the peace process it was soon found that it takes more than taking away a soldier’s weapons and uniform. They need help to get back to or start with their civilian lives. DDR is found to “prevent the occurrence of circumstances in which former combatants find it easy to recommence war, further destroying the social fabric and often any economic progress that their countries had obtained prior to the armed conflict” (Edloe, 2007: 2). And according to the UN “a process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has repeatedly proved to be vital to stabilizing a post-conflict situation” and even if full disarmament is not achievable, “a credible programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration may nonetheless make a key contribution to strengthening confidence between former factions and enhancing the momentum toward stability” (UN, 2000: 1). The definition of DDR that will be used throughout this paper is taken from the UN (see box 1.), since it is the most widely accepted definition in the field and – although still broad – it sets clear boundaries between DDR and the rest of the peace process.

**Box 1. Definition of the DDR phases.**

The United Nations defines DDR as following:

**Disarmament** is the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone. It frequently entails the assembly and cantonment of combatants; it should also comprise the development of arms management programmes, including their safe storage and their final disposition, which may entail their destruction. Demining may also be part of this process.

**Demobilization** refers to the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their military structures and combatants begin the transformation into civilian life. It generally entails registration of former combatants; some kind of assistance to enable them to meet their immediate basic needs; discharge, and transportation to their home communities. It may be followed by recruitment into a new, unified military force.

**Reintegration** refers to the process which allows ex-combatants and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind compensation, training, and job- and income-generating projects. These measures
frequently depend for their effectiveness upon other, broader undertakings, such as assistance to
returning refugees and internally displaced persons; economic development at the community and
national level; infrastructure rehabilitation; truth and reconciliation efforts; and institutional reform.
Enhancement of local capacity is often crucial for the long-term success of reintegration. (UN, 2000: 2)

DDR is already a process in itself and it is not possible to carry out one part without proper
planning of the rest of the phases. But DDR is also part of the whole wider peace process, as its
details are often (and preferably) stated in the peace agreement, and DDR constitutes to SSR
(Security Sector Reform) and development. Therefore international bodies, such as the World
Bank, UNDP and UNICEF are usually present for the implementation of DDR. In an analysis of
the DDR programmes in the world in 2006 by the Escola de Cultura de Pau (Caramés et al.,
2007), the UN was involved in all cases, with an average of 3 international agencies per country.
Seven cases also had a UN peace keeping mission, with the costs of peace keeping operations in
the countries with DDR being almost double the costs of the DDR programmes in the 22
analyzed countries. Over 1,255,510 former combatants participated in one way or another in
some phase of DDR programmes in 2006. In 2005 there were 1,129,000 former combatants
participating in 20 cases. 40 Per cent of these were involved in armed forces reduction
programmes, and the rest in programmes demobilizing armed opposition groups or
paramilitary groups. More than half of the people in DDR belong to seven African countries,
and the continent accounts for 16 of the 22 existing cases. Furthermore it is estimated that the
total cost of the DDR programmes sum up to 2 billion dollars, at an average of $1,565 per
person (Caramés et al., 2007; 2006). As a result of this complexity of actors involved, DDR has
often been carried out in a fractured way; lacking coordination and effective planning and
support. Therefore UN’s Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
Standards (IDDRS) have been developed, which have become the leading document on DDR
(UN, 2008).

The need for an integrated approach, where DDR is a part of a wider peace process, can be
derived from Johan Galtung’s conflict theory (1996). His model suggests that a conflict can be
viewed as a triangle with contradiction, attitude, and behavior (see figure 1.). The contradiction
refers to the underlying conflict situation (real or perceived incompatibility of goals), the
attitude refers to the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other and themselves,
whereas the behavior refers to the parties’ actions. These three elements of conflict can be
equated with three forms of violence; structural, cultural, and direct violence. The disarmament
and demobilization phases intend to stop and prevent direct violence, by collecting those
weapons and demobilizing the amount of combatants that are seen as a surplus (threatening to,
or not needed for security). The other two elements – attitude (cultural violence) and
contradiction (structural violence) - are less visible at first sight, but need just as much attention
on order to prevent relapse into war. On a structural level, DDR programmes and the peace

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2 In 2006 the countries with DDR programs were; Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Central
African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Eritrea, Filipinas, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
Indonesia, Liberia, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda.
processes they are part of, are to create political areas where civil society and public power can meet and (peacefully) confront the vices that have created the conflict situation. On the cultural level, this will involve changing elements in the foundations of a society that are causing inequality and frustration, such as the glorification of a particular group, patriarchy, and war economies.\(^3\)

**Context: internal, regional and international**

While DDR programmes are designed especially for each case, there are a number of aspects that create an overall context. Firstly, the state has obviously been in a violent conflict and still lacks complete control over its territory. The central government is also troubled with various weaknesses, such as financial and logistical deficiencies, but usually it does enjoy the recognition of (most of) the international community as reorganizations within the government or elections often have taken place (Swarbrick, 2007: 14-15). The weak capacity of the government may spur or re-ignite the ethnic or communal animosity and trigger security dilemmas.

Contemporary conflicts are predominantly intra-state conflicts, but the regional and international influence and dimensions of the conflict cannot be neglected. Recent conflicts have often involved neighboring countries (or other foreign countries) whose position remains equivocal.

\[\text{In view of the sensitivities that are often involved during the early phases in a peace process, political or historical associations may make it undesirable to give}\]

\(^3\) This, however, is often not addressed directly in classic DDR programs, but through other elements of the peace process. A more community-based approach does try to address this, as will be shown in the next section on community-based DDR.
primary responsibilities for demobilization to regional forces even where they possess the necessary expertise and capacity. (UN, 2000: 13)

While these forces may be essential in ensuring security, the UN finds it “preferable for the international observers directly supervising demobilization to come from outside the region” (Ibid). Moreover, the regional aspect of many conflicts demands for cooperation between the different peace keeping missions in a particular region. An example of this is the World Bank’s Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) in Africa’s Great Lakes Region.

Implementation: starting with a peace agreement

DDR should always be the result of a political agreement or consensus, resulting from a peace process or other commitments, and although it can be induced by incentives, it cannot be imposed (Caramés et al., 2007: 8). Past experience suggests that in an ideal situation, “the basis for a successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme should be laid within the peace agreement which provides for the end of a conflict” (UN, 2000: 3). A peace agreement must therefore provide specific details for DDR from the start. This would include a timetable for the ceasefire to come into effect, flexible target dates marking both the beginning and end of the disarmament and demobilization phases, a sufficient number of cantonment sites, the building of solid institutions for the DDR implementation (e.g. a national commission on DDR), and security sector reform. (Edloe, 2007: 2-5; UN, 1999). Caramés also stresses that the commitment to DDR should not signify “capitulation, de-politicization, demonization, marginalization, bribery, subordination or especially, humiliation”, but that it should be “a process that dignifies the people involved in it,” especially since they have to hand in their weapons voluntarily (Caramés et al., 2007: 9).

However, while the inclusion of DDR is very important, experienced negotiators stress the delicacy with which the topic of disarmament should be handled. Dr. Julian Thomas Hottinger, who worked as a mediator in Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Indonesia, Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan and more, says that “despite the tricky aspects of ‘negotiating disarmament’, it should not be left to the last moment or be dealt with in scant provisions.” He proposes that mediators should carefully listen and look at local circumstances, not push too hard on disarmament while not forgetting the subject, and connect disarmament with SSR, justice security reform, and humanitarian concerns (2008: 30-35).

It should be noted that those who are engaged in the negotiations of the peace agreement are not the only ones responsible for its implementation. An agreement often commits the UN or the ‘international community’ to provide substantial assistance. In the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement for the resolution of the conflict in the DRC, for instance, the signatories made the UN responsible for the forced disarmament of foreign armed groups, but the UN never accepted this responsibility (Swarbrick, 2007: 17). Experience indicates that for an effective DDR programme, the international community must support the DDR plan and the peace agreement.
in a coordinated approach early in the negotiation process to fully assess and meet the political, military, humanitarian, and financial dimensions (Edloe, 2007: 8).

Without setbacks the phases of disarmament and demobilization should last a few months. Usually, however, this takes longer, up to 16 months. The reintegration phase then lasts two to three years (Caramés et al., 2007, 25).

**Disarmament**

The disarmament usually starts with ordering combatants to assemble at agreed points. A secure environment is then crucial. In the majority of the cases, according to Caramés, there is also “a certain lack of control and poor monitoring of the final destination of the weapons collected, with the consequent risk of them being diverted towards illegal markets” (Caramés, et al., 2007: 30).

To encourage complete disarmament the combatants must feel confident about their security (Edloe, 2007: 12). Therefore the disarmament often takes place in camps, where the demobilization phase is also completed. Swarbrick notes that the location for these camps should be selected according to a set of criteria, such as the defensibility against a possible attack, availability of water, the proximity to existing concentrations of combatants, the proximity to roads, ports, or airstrips for supplies, and the capacity to support the accommodation and movement in and out of several thousand people. Nevertheless it is advisable to keep the camps relatively small in order to ensure security. A case in this point is the experience in former Zaire (DRC) when the UNHCR lost control of the camps to Interahamwe and former Forces Armées Rwandaises soldiers (Swarbrick, 2007: 29). Once disarmed, those who enter the army should be redeployed to barracks or training camps; while those to (re-)enter civilian life should proceed with demobilization and reintegration. Delays may demand for the camps to accommodate the ex-combatants for a longer period of time than planned (Ibid: 30), although this is highly undesirable. This will be further discussed in the next paragraph on demobilization.

According to Edloe, effective disarmament occurred in cases where the involved forces “were disarmed immediately upon their arrival at designated assembly areas in order to avoid a relapse into war” (2007: 9). The problem then comes with the transition to the next phases. The disarmament can be functioning relatively quickly, but the setting up of proper camps for demobilization takes up more time, and the reintegration phase even takes years and is the most difficult to organize. However, waiting until later phases are ready to accommodate the combatants can leave a situation where bored, armed and restless combatants wander around the streets, prone to harm nearby communities. Seizing the moment, without being ready to set up the next phases, however, will also frustrate the disarmed soldiers who might lose their trust in the peace process (Swarbrick, 2007: 20-21). Moreover, in the Central African Republic (CAR)

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4 Thus an argument for a more decentralized community-based approach.
where the programme came some time later, ‘reintegrated’ former combatants had to be re-
identified as such, reifying the identity that was to be broken down (Alusa, 2007). The 
consequences of disarmament and demobilization without setting up any other steps were seen 
for instance in Iraq, where the Iraqi Army was disbanded and denied any security role. This 
largely contributed to the rapid proliferation of militias. A solution could be a so-called 
‘stopgap project’ such as used in Sierra Leone, which consisted of short-term employment for 
former combatants waiting to enter the formal reintegration process (Waszink, 2008: 10).

Table 1. Weapons handed in per demobilized combatant in selected countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>People demobilized</th>
<th>Weapons handed in</th>
<th>Weapons/person</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>48,819</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>2003-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>97,115</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>2002-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>21,769</td>
<td>26,295</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2004-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>31,761</td>
<td>18,051</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>2004-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>101,405</td>
<td>28,364</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Congo</td>
<td>17,400</td>
<td>11,776</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>2000-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL group</td>
<td>335,521</td>
<td>167,525</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Analysis of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes existing in 
the world during 2006 (Caramés, et al., 2007, 30).

Quantity of weapons

One of the points of inflection is when one of the DDR programmes acceptance requirements is 
the possession of a weapon, since this can exclude various groups. And while the popular idea 
is that each combatant has one weapon, in the reality in the majority of the combatant groups, 
such a distribution does not exist (see table 1). There are troops that do not participate in 
combat and in Sierra Leone soldiers were sent into the battlefield with wooden make-shift 
‘guns’ to give the enemy the impression of having a large force.

Incentives for disarmament

Conflicts often create war economies, where regions are controlled by warlords linked to 
international trading networks (for example weapons for diamonds, wood, etc.); armed gangs 
benefit from looting; rewards are given for supporting the regime; etc. Therefore the end of a 
conflict can be undesirable for some groups, and DDR programmes need to take these realities 
into account. Moreover, in many countries to deprive a man from his weapon is like 
questioning his virility, and “disarmament initiatives should include elements designed to 
change attitudes towards weapons, and should not just facilitate their collection” (Pouligny, 
2004: 9). Stina Torjesen takes the view of Joanna Spear here, in that “DDR needs to
accommodate the different economic needs and challenges of the different categories of combatant: fighters, midlevel commanders and top leaders” (Torjesen, 2006: 13).

That is not to say that every means should be used to persuade combatants to give up their arms. But they need to be given some prospects for their near future, since “forcible disarmament can only work when the government has the strength and political will to carry it out” (Swarbrick, 2007: 38). And experiences with forced disarmament have generally been very negative, since it as often creates a strong resistance to the government that is often already lacking strength and legitimacy. For instance, the DIAG programme in Afghanistan – where armed groups were simply declared illegal – has been a complete failure (see box 2). Moreover, it will be more likely that arms will be hid away for future use or illicit arms trade and the use of force can alienate the government from its population, decreasing its legitimacy (as perceived by the population). It is thus imperative to develop incentive to collect hidden weapons and weapons not surrendered. Such programmes usually give some form of benefit, “where weapons can be traded for cash or swapped for food, housing and construction materials” (Edloe, 2007: 14). The weapon often sustains or sustained a combatant in his or her livelihood, and in some cultures a certain status is derived from the possession of a weapon. Incentives are therefore often expected by the target group. By giving incentives, however, one should take note that there is the risk of appearing to sanction blackmail (development for guns) “or rewarding the men of violence for their intransigence” (Ibid. 39). Another great risk with giving benefits in exchange for the handing in of weapons, is that is stimulates arms trade. According to Caramés, opportunities for reintegration should therefore be considered “an opportunity to facilitate [the former combatant’s] transition to civil life” and not as a right (2006: 1). For these reasons many programmes therefore offer benefits to the communities that are expected to host the former combatants after their demobilization, and not directly to the former combatants. This not only avoids the appearance of ‘rewarding’ armed combatants (who are implicated with the past violence) or prevent the stimulation of arms trade, but investing in the community also directly helps the development and “can also be a more effective method of creating employment than, for instance, a one-off cash grant to an ex-combatant with limited experience in the management of personal finances” (Swarbrick, 2007: 16-17). Whatever measure is taken, the level of the ‘benefit’ given is an issue that needs careful assessment of the local socio-economic context.

Box 2. Failure to use either incentives or force.

The DIAG is believed not to solve real problems as the most powerful commanders have found a place in the government and its targets are mainly the old, retired, and weak commanders. There is no enforcement mechanism to really dispose of all commanders and disband armed groups; only two per cent of the illegal armed groups have complied until this date. This has resulted in that the Afghan population is generally disillusioned with DIAG and perceives it merely to be a token project to keep the donors happy (Frerks, et al. 2008: 36-38).

According to Edloe, another incentive for the handing in of weapons could be “on a ‘no questions-asked policy’ or in complete anonymity” (2007: 15). The problem here, however, is
that the signing in to a DDR programme often entails handing in a gun and registration, to prevent abuse of funds and benefits and to ease programme planning.

**Demobilization**

The biggest problem in the planning of the demobilization phase is that on many occasions the number of combatants is unknown. This can be due to a lack of advanced planning, but more often because the involved parties are unable to provide the proper information, or the information is suspect and incomplete. In the DRC, for example, the original number of soldiers declared was 220,000, even though the number of soldiers for payment lists totaled 340,000. Many participants who were not combatants but eager to join the programme for the incentives given, referred to as ‘ghost soldiers’ (ICG, 2005, 17). And in Afghanistan the number of combatants declared was exaggerated in order to obtain greater profits (Caramés et al., 2007, 33).

In the absence of reliable information on the number of combatants to be demobilized, Swarbrick therefore suggests that a census should be conducted whenever possible. Moreover, he suggests that a combatant wishing to be registered for demobilization should also register his or her weapon to avoid ghost soldiers or the caching of working weapons for future (illegal) use (Swarbrick, 2007: 32-33). Doing so, the real combatant-weapon ratio discussed earlier should of course be taken into account.

In a country where several hundred thousand combatants have to be demobilized, it seems logical not all combatants can be demobilized at once. Overcrowded camps can lead to security problems (former Zaire) or deterioration of conditions of hygiene. “In such cases it is usually carried out in phases (as was clearly specified in programmes such as those in Burundi, Eritrea, DR Congo or Rwanda)” (Caramés et al., 2007, 32). As mentioned before, the former combatants should be released or discharged from military camps or cantonment sites as soon as possible to prevent the period going beyond the level of tolerance of the combatant (Edloe, 2007: 16). This leads to the issue that combatants are to enter the programme as soon as possible, but not before follow up to the next phases is organized. Rapid organization and deployment is therefore highly desirable, but often difficult in large scale operations where the international community is asked to participate and fund. It often takes a long time before (and if) necessary resources and funds are made available. Since there are often great differences in the ‘phase’ of a conflict in which various communities in a country are, a community based approach is likely to be an interesting alternative to such large scale operations. This, however, will be discussed in the second part of this paper.

**Reinsertion programmes**

Before being discharged from demobilization camps into civilian life and rehabilitation programmes, it is crucial that former combatants participate in reinsertion (or orientation)
programme that focuses on socioeconomic opportunities and information regarding civilian life.

Successful demobilization occurs when humanitarian NGOs and human resource professionals visit ex-combatants and their spouses at cantonment sites and advise them on finding shelter, educational issues, job skills training, medical and healthcare benefits, AIDS awareness, and civic rights and duties. (Edloe, 2007: 17)

Such reinsertion programmes are also an ideal way for involved organizations to assess the skills, needs, and aspirations of former combatants for the design of reintegration programmes. In the DRC, for example, the UN remained hesitant to work with the private sector, in what was supposed to be an effort to provide solid jobs (Swarbrick, 2007: 41).

Reintegration

The UN DPKO Guidelines for DDR define reintegration as the “assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their and their families’, economic and social integration into civil society” (UN 1999: 15). The reintegration phase of the DDR programme is different than the earlier phases, in that “the goal of ensuring that warring factions can once more join civil society may require not only direct assistance to demobilized combatants, but also broader support to the country’s efforts to adapt the social and economic environment so that it can reabsorb them” (UN, 2000: 15). Therefore it is essential that the programme draws on local input, and that it supports a broader national plan for reconciliation, reconstruction, and development.

It is exactly this last part of the DDR process – that of reintegration – has proven to be rather difficult. Joining civilian society is a long and often difficult process that is fundamentally different from disarmament and demobilization. Unlike them, it cannot be completed in a matter of days, weeks or months. More likely, it will take several years. Besides, unlike disarmament and demobilization, reintegration is not a product industry. Rather, it is a process in which ex-combatants adapt to the requirements of civilian life, and communities allow them in. It requires reciprocal adaptation and acceptance, hence a considerable capacity for tolerance. (Faltas, 2005: 9). Moreover, the success of reintegration largely depends on the support former combatants receive from their families and communities (Caramés, 2006, 3). Furthermore, reintegration can not – unlike disarmament and demobilization – be imposed or centralized and it often remains the Achilles’ heel of DDR programmes. “Follow-up programmes are in many cases inadequately funded, host communities are not sufficiently involved, and co-ordination between the Ds and the R is poor” (Faltas, 2005: 1-2). Also the parties involved with reintegration are different from the principal actors in disarmament and demobilization, where

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5 The UN uses the notion ‘civil society’ here as a synonym for civilian life. In this paper I will use civil society as a reference to the social midfield in society; i.e. NGOs, faith-based organizations, etc.
the military is prominently involved (Ibid. 9). Whereas often a monthly payment is given to former combatants for a certain period of time, additional schooling or help to finding work often are not sufficiently provided. Another issue is that the psychological support for the (traumatized) former combatants is often lacking.

**Box 3. Lessons from Sierra Leone.**

One of the issues of the DDR programme in Sierra Leone was the question whether the right skills were taught to the former combatants. While most of them signed up for short-term training skills such as car repair and carpentry and had high expectations of getting jobs, they “were disinclined to take up agriculture; the sector most likely to provide opportunities in Sierra Leone” (Ginifer, 2003: 41).

An explanation for the former combatants to be reluctant in taking up agricultural trades is found in the work of Paul Richards. According to him the patrimonial systems subordinate young men (e.g., young former combatants) to the interests of his father or older brothers, which has led many young men to leave the rural area’s to town or diamond fields. This patrimonial suppression was actually, according to Richards, one of the main causes of the war and it is therefore not strange to see that many former combatants choose a different future than going back to the rural area (Richards, 1996; Richards et al., 2004: 5).

**Box 4. Missing the realities on the ground.**

A repeated problem is that DDR programmes are not corresponding with realities on the ground. In Afghanistan, for instance, several former combatants complained that their place in the army had been taken by people who were insufficiently trained, whereas they as former trained combatants now have to do other work. A professional soldier, who currently works as a cook in a psychiatric hospital, commented:

“I served in the army for many years and had to stand in this heat with three heavy bags on my shoulders. And while Alam Khan (a local Jamiat commander) has studied up to the second level in school, he is now in the army and I am a cook. It should be the other way around.”

(qtd. in: Frerks, 2008: 28)

Reintegration also suggests a return to the life that ex-combatants led before conflicts, to their former livelihoods, their villages and their families. In reality, however, it is often not simply the case that ex-combatants find their old lives back. A war changes everything. Ex-combatants may be unwilling or unable to go home. Their villages may have been destroyed, families may have become estranged or got killed, and disabilities or changes in market conditions may prevent them from taking up their old professions (Faltas, 2005: 9; UN, 2006: 3).

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6 And where much special training is given to former combatants, this can be perceived as ‘rewarding’ the perpetrators of the conflict. This will be discussed in the second section of this paper.
The reintegration phase, as a part of a DDR programme, is often seen as a decisive step for the consolidation of security. The issue, however, is whether this phase would be more effective if this short-term objective is combined with long-term objectives of development (Edloe, 2007: 19). According to Caramés reintegration as short-term stabilization is applicable in a situation where combatants simply have to be moved from military to civil life, moving them away from criminality until reform of the security or political sector has been completed. However, “these conditions are almost never met in post-conflict contexts”. He finds that reintegration should therefore not to be based on a transitional security strategy, “but rather on a long-term commitment to development and transformation” (Caramés et al., 2007, 33).

Box 5. Cash Payments in Mozambique.

When in 1992 Mozambique’s decade-long civil war ended with a peace accord, a total of 92,881 troops from both sides were demobilized. For two years former combatants were given salary (first six months paid by the government, the next 18 months by donors from a trust fund administered by the UNDP) and the ordinary soldiers (51 per cent of total) received 75,000 a month – the equivalent of US$7. Lower officers (another 35 per cent) were given between US$ 10-24. Because of a falling exchange rate there was money left over after the two years and each soldier was given an extra $52 (Hanlon, 2004: 376).

The experiences were rather positive. The soldiers had to collect their money every two months at the branch of the Bancio Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD; People’s Development Bank) with their photo identity card which was handed to them during the mobilization. Administration costs were very low, with 2,5 per cent for the UNDP’s reintegration support unit, 0,5 per cent for the UNDP headquarters, and 2,5 per cent for the BPD, so only US$ 1.8 million of the 35.5 million allocated was used for overhead costs (Hanlon, 2004: 377).

When surveys were taken after the payment period, 86 per cent said they were involved in agricultural activities, and the money was not their only means of survival. The money was often largely used to sustain their extended families, and 46 per cent said a part of it was spent on school fees for children. One study even showed that these cash payments gave “a new impetus to social life, especially in rural areas” (Lundin et al., qtd. in Hanlon, 2004: 376). Although only 21 per cent was used for investment in farms or businesses, Hanlon notes that with an average of 7.5 people per family and ordinary soldiers receiving US$7 a month this may not have been sufficient for more significant development.

Towards development

Post-conflict countries often have poor economic and social structures, making the available options for the reintegration of former combatants very limited. Investment in the infrastructure and development is thus required. This was the case in Sierra Leone, where the DDR programme was obliged to invest in educational and vocational institutions (Swarbrick, 2007: 42). Moreover, if reintegration is to be successful, former combatants must have faith in the mechanisms of governance. Reform of the state, SSR (security sector reform), and the development of human rights institutions may be required, as well as the codification of international norms into national law. Essential is then, “that the international community enhances its understanding of the systems through which majorities can express their will,
while recognizing the rights of minorities and, in particular, of the ways in which multiple ethnicities can be accommodated within a single State” (UN, 2000: 16-17).

The UN report of the Secretary General also states that in addition to demining, peace keeping operations should also employ the local population, including former combatants to undertake task, such as digging wells and helping with the repair of roads. Moreover, it proposes “further flexibility on the part of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the distribution of some percentage of a mission budget to support projects to be undertaken by the local population” (UN, 2000: 16).

Apart from a wider effort of development (to enlarge the absorptive capacities for reintegration), other activities that are carried out in the reintegration phase are mainly the undertaking of micro-credits, education, vocational training or access to employment. In case of former combatants resettling in rural areas, it should be taken into account that land is “an essential asset to the economic survival of former combatants” (Edloe, 2007: 21).

General experiences and lessons learned

The planning of DDR programmes is often complicated by a number of factors. As mentioned earlier, programmes are often designed without knowing exactly how many people will benefit and how many resources will be obtained from the international community. And although DDR programmes tend to be commitments made by the confronting parties as a part of the peace agreement (or shortly after), this causes that about “15 months usually go by before they actually begin” (Caramés et al., 2007, 25).

Another aspect is security, and where a peace keeping operation is not present, it might be necessary for a bilateral donor to guarantee the security of the combatants to be disarmed (Swarbrick, 2007: 32). Usually this is a UN peace force, but it can also be undertaken by for instance NATO (Afghanistan) or a coalition like in Iraq. However, this requires a very high degree of commitment from the donor and, as mentioned before in case of regional forces past sensitivities have to be taken into account.

As mentioned earlier, the average costs of DDR programmes worldwide sum up to $2 billion a year, excluding the costs of small scale projects of NGOs and indirect support of the DDR process by development and SSR. Usually it is safe to assume that government funding for DDR is inadequate and that contributions from external donors are needed. Insufficient funding and delays in funding are often considered to be one of the biggest issues in the planning and implementation of DDR programmes. One such a case was in Sierra Leone, where Ginifer finds the NCDDR was targeting former combatants with short-term rather than long-term reintegration programmes, because most of the limited funds were invested in the disarmament and demobilization phase (Ginifer, 2003: 39-40). Funding shortfalls and donors’ reluctance to pay soldiers directly, also causes irregular payment, under-payment, or non-payment of soldiers’ wages, which is a major source of instability and the erosion of the state authority
Another concern is that donors are “not serious about funding the developmental component of DDR” and to forget about the long-term reintegration processes very quickly (Pouligny, 2004: 20). Moreover, the fact that the number of beneficiaries is often very high aggravates the issues with funding.

Another dilemma is the degree of government ownership of the DDR programme. It is very important for national bodies to demonstrate a major aspect of national ownership – despite it being largely planned, funded, and carried out by international donors – since the usual weak government in a post conflict situation needs to gain strength and legitimacy. Swarbrick proposes that “national bodies concerned with DDR should ideally be created at the highest level of state,” and they “should bear responsibility for the receipt, expenditure, and accounting of funds (…) as well as for the planning and implementation of DDR activities” (Swarbrick, 2007: 49). However, national ownership assumes that a government is capable of carrying out these tasks. This is often not the case, either due to lack of competence or obstructing patriarchic systems. As also noted by Swarbrick, it can therefore be helpful for donors to create their own body in order to follow the proceedings of the government organs. Moreover, this organ can also help to coordinate the various initiatives of donor organizations.

Another important aspect is a good information to the public. Radio is often the best means of reaching people, since it has the widest audience in most post-conflict countries. Therefore, according to Swarbrick “the absence of an independent radio capacity can have a critical impact on the ability of the mission or the international community to deliver its message broadly” (2007: 43). Other ways to disseminate information to the general public is through schools, lectures, posters (although low literacy rates should be kept in mind here) community organized meetings, and other awareness programmes. The information to be disseminated regards not only times and places for weapon collection, demobilization and reintegration programmes, and socioeconomic opportunities for the target group, but should also pursue reconciliation between former combatants and civilians and build confidence for the DDR programme and the peace process as a whole (Edloe, 2007: 16).

Another complicating factor is that in most cases there is a diversity of several armed groups that participate, often causing disagreements between the various commanders or groups. Also the necessity to demobilize the most vulnerable groups (children, women and disabled) and to disarm and return militia from a third party country complicates the design of DDR programmes (Caramés et al., 2007, 16).

Vulnerable groups

As mentioned by UNIFEM, “the traditional profile of ‘the combatant’ fails to recognize that armed groups are constituted of men, women and children, in both forced and voluntarily capacities” (2004: 4). The experiences of children and women – sometimes supporting armed groups as nurses, cooks, or by carrying equipment in the bush, but often also as combatants – has to be acknowledged and given special attention. In Sierra Leone and Angola, for instance,
woman and girl fighters were only classified as ‘dependents’ and precluded from the benefits given to combatants. Another issue is that after a conflict many women that took part in the conflict do not fit the stereotypes of what makes a ‘good woman,’ which brings great difficulties for their reintegration (Pouligny, 2004: 8). Moreover, this leads some women to deny their participation in armed forces altogether, consequently not receiving the benefits they are entitled to. A short-term security perspective of donors also leads to the exclusion of women and other vulnerable groups, as they are simply not seen as great as a risk as men.

Because of the special characteristics that vulnerable groups bring with them that complicate their reintegration, special attention should be given to them. “DDR activities are not only less efficient, but run the risk of reinforcing existing gender inequalities in local communities and exacerbating economic hardship for women and girls participating in armed groups and forces.” Women and girls are often serve (voluntarily or by force) in support functions (such as carrying supplies, cooking, washing clothes, health personnel), but also as combatants, as well as being forced as sexual slaves. They are often also excluded from the lists supplied by leaders of persons eligible for DDR (UN, 2004: 129-130). Women should preferably be interviewed by female personnel, and should be receiving the same reintegration packages as male former combatants. To prevent re-recruitment, to minimize the impression that DDR programmes reward only those with weapons who killed and committed violence, and to ensure not only short term but also longer term development, it is vital that DDR programmes increasingly target women and other vulnerable groups (Bouta, 2006: 20-22).

Monitoring of projects

Due to complications mentioned above, other case-specific problems and “ineffective follow-up and evaluation mechanisms (…) no DDR programme in recent years has given optimum results.” An element that therefore should be included more firmly in DDR programmes is a follow-up and monitoring process, in order to track the degree of compliance with the programme as it was originally planned. Moreover, “this will act as a mechanism to reinforce trust between the participating organizations and donors.” For the first two phases the level of success can be assessed relatively well with a number of quantifiable indicators; weapons and demobilized soldiers can be counted. For the reintegration phase, however, this is much more difficult, since it is assessed more qualitatively and has a lack of effective indicators (Caramés et al., 2007, 10). Moreover, the multidimensional character of DDR programmes and the whole peace process in which they are embedded makes it very difficult to assess the individual contribution of specific programmes and organizations.

It is therefore not strange that most literature on DDR is only focusing on the details programme design and implementation and results and outcomes are generally only marginally discussed. Humphrey and Weinstein found that at the macro level, DDR studies have typically not engaged in comparing countries that received interventions with those that did not. At the micro level, according to Humphrey and Weinstein, “strikingly few rigorous attempts have been made to identify factors that might explain why some individuals and not
others are able to successfully reintegrate after conflict.” Moreover, no studies have compared the reintegration success of those that have and have not participated in DDR programmes (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007: 532).

In an attempt to overcome these shortcomings Humphrey and Weinstein present the results of their research, tracking the progress of DDR participants and non-participants in Sierra Leone. They found little evidence – contrary to conventional wisdom – that women or young people face a significant harder time in the reintegration process. Furthermore, high ranking officers did often not have faith in the new democratic system, and the abusiveness of the unit in which ex-combatants served is strongly correlated with problems in gaining acceptance into civilian life. However, the most surprising result they found was that they found little evidence that DDR programmes were instrumental in facilitating DDR at the individual level. Non-participants did just as well as those who entered DDR programmes. Although these results should be treated with caution, since spillover, selection, and sampling biases are likely to be an influence on the results here (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007: 533).

Although they adhere to their findings, they themselves also found that individuals who did not join the programme stated that they had other options, such as support from family or community or having jobs waiting. Those who participated in the programme might not have such options. Moreover, one of they ways to take their surveys was to let the chief of a community ask former combatants to meet at a public location (such as a town square) where people then were randomly picked. However, it seems not unlikely that those not integrated would listen to such a community notice. On top of that, the spillover effect of a DDR programme present in a country is hard to assess, but is doubtlessly of great influence. When former combatants successfully reintegrate in the community through a DDR programme, this brings faith to the communities – who cannot necessarily distinguish between those who entered or not. And the breaking down of the ‘war machine’ by the visible demobilizing of combatants brings much faith in the peace process in the community. Humphrey and Weinstein put too much emphasis on the former combatants for the success of reintegration, while this is – as mentioned earlier – largely determined by the family and community in which the combatant is to reintegrate. And where a DDR programme has an impact on these communities, some combatants will clearly find that they can reintegrate without applying to DDR programmes themselves. Moreover, Camilla Waszink observes a similar marginal difference in the socio-economic situation between those who did and those who did not receive a reintegration package in Liberia, but she attributes this to the high rate of unemployment in the whole country (2008: 10).

Humphrey and Weinstein do, however, suggest an interesting way to start disentangling the effects of DDR programmes, by stating that the programmes should be designed in such a way that the reintegration trajectories of participants can usefully be compared with those of non-

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7 Humphrey and Weinstein describe reintegration as “gaining acceptance into civilian life, finding employment, breaking ties to their factions, and adopting the new democratic political system” (2007: 562-563).
participants. Of course it is not suggested to refuse a certain control group the appropriate support but, although unfavorable, the high number of combatants to enter the programme and the trouble to get sufficient funds in a short period of time will often make it imperative to make choices about which community gets help first – although where the situation is particularly dire, random selection is obviously not prioritized. With a sufficient number of communities, it should then be possible to measure both individual effects (such as discussed by Humphrey and Weinstein) and community-level outcomes, such as levels of conflict (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007: 561). Such a monitoring system is especially useful for a community based approach, which will be discussed in the next section of this paper.

Another example of monitoring is the Fourth Client Satisfaction Survey of the ANBP in Afghanistan. Interestingly a similar survey was conducted a year later by for a research commissioned by CORDAID. While the survey of the ANBP claims that ninety per cent of the ex-combatants had found employment, the latter showed a lower percentage of about sixty per cent. According to the research for CORDAID this may be due to the longer lapse of time after the DDR programme was completed or to regional variations (Frerks et al. 2008: 44). It is clear, however, that obtaining reliable data on DDR programme results is relatively difficult.

**Link to justice, impunity, SSR, civilian disarmament and development**

And although it cannot be seen as a magic formula that can assist in every aspect of the peace process, it is nevertheless connected to a great deal of it. Therefore, “DDR cannot simply be treated as a technical tool. DDR is about social engineering; it is also about politics” (Pouligny, 2004: 8).

As has already been mentioned, almost all DDR programmes begin after a peace agreement. Usually this agreement involves joint participation in political and military power. A very controversial aspect for DDR programmes then, is the legal and political treatment that former combatants receive, especially with groups that are known for the human rights offences in a conflict (Caramés et al., 2007, 26). The DDR process must therefore be promulgated as a national programme under law. If a general amnesty has not been agreed, there can be agreed on some form of prosecution waiver for weapons surrendered (Swarbrick, 2007: 23). In Colombia, for instance, former combatants who fled from FARC or ELN are offered placement in reintegration programmes, and granted with amnesty if they only committed political crimes. Children are always granted amnesty, since minors are considered to be victims of the violence and thus deserve government protection (Pax Christi, 2006: 15-17). Moreover, the relationship between communities and former combatants is critical to long-term recovery and development. To consolidate reconciliation, the role of a truth and reconciliation commission to bring suspects to account can therefore be very important (Ginifer, 2003: 49).

This, however, often brings the dilemma of between bringing those responsible for the atrocities during the conflict to justice and granting immunity to prevent one of the parties from giving up the peace process. A clear example is that of Uganda and the LRA (other examples in table...
where the threat of prosecution by the ICC kept Joseph Konye from signing any peace agreement with the Ugandan government. Justice and reconciliation are not opposites on a scale. Without some form of justice reconciliation becomes very difficult, if not impossible. But as stated by Mahmood Mamdani in a lecture in The Hague; “justice is secondary – not unimportant – but secondary to a political objective; that is reconciliation.”

### Table 2. Political price of peace agreements in selected countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Basic aspects of the peace agreement</th>
<th>Political situation of the demobilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Offer of amnesty, creation of a new political transition structure and holding of elections Formation of a new armed forces</td>
<td>Integration in the new armed forces (ANA) or social reintegration. Political participation provided the person is disassociated from armed groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Immunity, constitutional reforms, establishing of a 3 year transition period and the holding of elections. Creation of a Truth and Reconciliation National commission and a Rehabilitation national Commission.</td>
<td>Integration in the new armed forces, social reintegration and occupying of positions of political power after the elections. The new President is the former leader of the armed opposition group CNDD-FDD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Cessation of hostilities, demobilization and submitting to the Justice and Peace law.</td>
<td>Non-compliance with cessation of hostilities and social reintegration. The Constitutional Court amended the Justice and Peace Law, offering to the demobilized paramilitaries a reduction on their crime sentences in case of confessing them, as well as victims disclosure and reparation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Reconciliation, inclusive agreement for a democratic transition, withdrawal of foreign troops. Reform of the security sector.</td>
<td>Social reintegration. Presence of militias from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, and the need to reinforce the borders with Sudan (regional dimension).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Amnesty, creation of a transition government and holding of elections. Establishing of a truth and reconciliation commission. Reform of the political and military structure.</td>
<td>Social reintegration without specifying possibilities of political participation. Protests from ex-combatants and former armed forces troops about the lack of payment of subsidies (shortage of funds for the programme). Feeling in the civil society of an unfair treatment in favor of the combatants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Autonomy in the South during six years and self-determination referendum.</td>
<td>Insecurity situation persistent in east and south of the country.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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8 Interesting to note here is that IKV Pax Christi field worker Dr. Simon Simonse played a vital role in starting up the negotiations between the LRA and the Ugandan government.
Another aspect that is closely related to DDR and justice is of course Security Sector Reform (SSR). In case former combatants live in an environment in which they feel insecure, they are unlikely to hand in their weapons, which they regard as a form of protection. “During a DDR process a properly structured and governed security sector needs to be in place to guarantee security when former combatants are demobilized and reintegrated into the community” (QCEA, 2006: 4). Of course this is often not the case in a post-conflict situation. Therefore, during the presence of the peace keeping operation, the DDR process must be linked to security sector reform. Usually this entails “the reduction of troop numbers, the professionalization of institutions and training that is focused on human rights and international law” (Caramès, et al., 2007, 11).

The concept of DDR is often only linked with the disarmament of armed combatants. However, this definition often does not correspond to the realities on the ground of many conflicts today. Usually a wide range of people are involved. As mentioned, in armed groups not everyone carries a gun, thus the possession of a gun as an entry requirement to a programme will exclude many (especially women and children) who need support just as much. Moreover, in many cases civilians are armed as well, be it armed as a deliberate strategy by warring factions, or armed by themselves in order to protect themselves. Also these groups need to be disarmed, especially when disarmament of the dominant armed group will leave a security gap, that can (and often does) lead to civilian violence (Waszink, 2008: 9). Together with disarmament (of the major and other groups) a force thus must take care of security. In the case that the national armed forces cannot be trusted with this task, the international community should temporarily do his.

To conclude this section, the practice and design of DDR programmes faces a number of dilemmas. As mentioned before in the paragraph on integration, DDR programmes have both long-term and short-term goals. The short-term goals are resettlement and the creation of short-term opportunities and income for former combatants who otherwise would be liable to become involved in crime or become opposed to the peace process. Such an approach, however, does not help a country establish political stability and social and economic recovery. Long-term goals are more directed at the development of communities and the country as a whole, and the (re)integration of the former combatants into civilian life. Choosing between short-term security and long-term development depends on the starting point; is there aimed for state/military security or human security. The choice also results in the choice of who will become beneficiaries of a DDR programme; in a state-centered DDR programme aiming at short-term security improvement, women are for instance not targeted as beneficiaries. By only supporting those who are considered most dangerous, however, the risk occurs of appearing to support those responsible for the violence. This leads to another dilemma in the design of DDR programmes; the dilemma of balancing peace with justice. The biggest problem found in the best practices is lack of funding and coordination between the actors involved. Another issue is the lack of proper context analysis. For instance, often many reintegration programmes are based on wrong assumptions of the market, leaving the former combatants with skills that are useless in their context. Of course, a problem in a post-conflict situation is also that there is often not much to reintegrate former combatants into.
If a long-term development approach to DDR is opted, this logically leads to an approach of DDR that is much more community oriented; community-based DDR (see figure 2). The evolution towards community-based DDR, the opportunities this approach brings along, the problems it is likely to encounter and the experiences with projects with a community-based approach will be discussed in the next section. This paper does not, however, advocate a continuing shift towards community-based approaches to DDR, nor does it advocate designing programmes in the ‘classical’ sense. Rather, depending on the particular situation, a fitting programme must be designed taking elements from the ‘classic’ DDR focus as discussed in this section, as well as taking elements with a more community-based development focus. Especially in the problematic phase of reintegration, taking a community-based approach promises to be much more effective.

**Figure 2. Short-term versus long-term DDR**

Based on Caramés (2006: 9)
Community based DDR

“We were born to unite with our fellow men,
and to join in community with the human race”
– Cicero –

Before going deeper into the theory and practice of community-based DDR, the reasons for the growing demand for such an approach will be discussed briefly. The problems that gave rise to a more community-based approach lie predominantly in the reintegration aspect. One problem with classic DDR programmes is that by offering special facilities to former combatants, they “unwittingly encourage people to present themselves as combatants, even if they never were never associated with fighting forces,” in order to claim the benefits associated with it (Faltas, 2005: 7). And as long as there remains a clear benefit attached to the status of being a former combatant, people will continue to claim it, even behave like combatants, and hinder the reintegration process. Moreover, focusing primarily on the former combatants – those seen to be responsible for the past violence – can be very problematic. Not surprisingly, this leads to harsh criticisms from donors, but more importantly; local leaders and communities. They felt that they needed and deserved the assistance much more that the former combatants (Haden & Faltas, 2004). Moreover, only targeting former combatants could be interpreted as an invitation also to also take up arms to also be able to benefit (USAID, 2005: 8). “For reintegration to go smoothly, benefits must be targeted widely. Former combatants frequently stress for such an integrated approach” (World Bank, 2006: 60).

Community-based DDR is then the providing of communities with the skills and the resources to support the reintegration of former combatants, instead of developing state-centered programmes for individual reintegration. Moreover, the focus shifts from providing security and aid to development, and it entails programmes in which communities will have to do much of the work themselves instead of things being done for them. Or as Hans Rouw puts it; “local communities must be the catalyst in the process” (pers. comm., Utrecht, 23 april 2008). Another change in approach is that “rather than taking away the guns, then, the priority for DDR should be on taking away the incentives to make use of them” (Nitschke, 2003: 9). This is done by developing society and thereby creating socioeconomic opportunities and peaceful ways to resolve conflicts within society. When the focus lies on people’s incentives, the approach logically becomes demand-driven, instead of measures dictated from above. This is (or should be) a key characteristic of community-based approaches, and will be further discussed shortly. The community is thus an important actor in DDR programmes, which is also acknowledged the IDDRS which sees them as “a principal partner in DDR programmes, not only as beneficiaries, but also as participants in the planning and implementation of reintegration strategies and as stakeholders in the outcome” (UN 2008). The IDDRS also mentions that sustainable DDR has political, social and economic dimensions involving the community level. It nevertheless does not go further into the notion of community-based DDR.
If ex-combatants are to become civilians, the sooner they will be treated as such – i.e. instead of a special group that is assisted by the international community in separate or parallel community programmes – the better they are likely to blend into the civilian society. Much would be gained, argues Faltas, if reintegration is a part of a much wider effort at education, job creation, reconstruction and recovery. Instead of setting up special projects to assist ex-combatants, projects should then perhaps support community efforts that provide opportunities for ex-combatants to make themselves useful and get actively involved in the reconstruction (Faltas, 2005: 11-13). Of course there is a need for special measures for ex-combatants, such as specific reorientation courses and psychological help. The definition of reintegration from the UN DPKO Guidelines for DDR (UN 1999: 15) mentioned earlier, can for this approach thus be adapted to: the assistance measures provided to former combatants and the communities in which they want to reintegrate that would increase the potential for their and their families’, economic and social integration into civilian life. The innovation of this approach is not necessarily in its “specific institutional or even pragmatic design, but rather the pragmatic acknowledgement that [it flows] from a sound diagnosis of the context” in which it operates (Muggah, 2006: 33-34).

Also the IDDRS talks about the importance of the communities and sees them as “a principal partner in DDR programmes, not only as beneficiaries, but also as participants in the planning and implementation of reintegration strategies and as stakeholders in the outcome” (UN 2008). While acknowledging the importance of community involvement in DDR programmes, and also mentioning that sustainable DDR has political, social and economic dimensions, it nevertheless does not go further into the notion of community-based DDR.

**Theory**

Before continuing with the practice of community-based DDR, the concept will first be critically discussed. In the literature one comes across various names for this and aligned concepts; community-based development (CBD), community-driven development (CDD: World Bank), community empowerment (World Bank), community-based reintegration (CBR), community-focused reintegration (CFR: USAID) to name a few. And while used in different contexts, the community is rarely defined. And it is “not just that the term has been used ambiguously, it has been contested, fought over and appropriated for different uses and interests to justify different politics, policies and practices” (Mayo, 1994: 48) But if the ‘community’ is already so hard to define, what exactly is a community-based approach, and how and why is this better, if indeed it is.

The increase of intra-state conflicts after the end of the Cold War and the weakening central state structures in many developing countries as a result, led to a rise in the popularity of community-based approaches. The main reason was that the expected trickle down effects to the grassroots level of state-centered development cooperation rarely took place. But although ‘community-based’ approaches have become fashionable recently – and many projects are
consequently labeled so, righteously or not – the idea of community development is not new. After the Second World War the British Colonial Office became increasingly concerned with community development, and it is suggested that administrators invented the term in an attempt to develop basic education and social welfare in the British colonies (Mayo, 1975: 130). From the 1950s onward the United Nations also started to use the term, drawing strongly from British literature and experiences in Africa and India (Midgely et al., 1986: 16). Sanders sees the origins of community development as a union of community organization and economic development. Community organization activities grow out of a societal responsibility coupled with local action. Satisfying economic development needs requires an application of a process. Sanders defines contemporary community development then as “the linkage of community organization, which stresses local action and the usage of local resources, with economic development, which emphasizes national planning, careful allocation of resources, and systematic movement toward well-defined goals” (1970: 9). This thus brings to the surface the contradictory characteristics of community development, since it emphasizes participation, initiative and self-help by local communities, but it is usually funded by national governments or international organizations. Derived from the ideas on community development was then the notion of ‘capacity building.’ Based on the belief “that all people have the right to an equitable share in the world’s resources, and to be the authors of their own development; and that the denial of such rights is at the heart of poverty and suffering.” Capacity building is then an approach to development rather than a set of top down interventions (Eade, 1997: 2-3).

On such forms of ‘participatory development’ there has also been much criticism. There is, for instance, argued that “rather than empowering those at the grass roots, it simply provides alternative methods for incorporating the poor into the projects of large agencies which remain essentially unaccountable to those they are supposed to serve” (Parfitt, 2004: 537). In this view such bottom-up approaches are simply other means to pursue the same top-down development agendas. However, this is rather generalizing critique that may be suitable to some World Bank programmes, but not to bottom-up participatory development programmes as a whole. Another issue is “the tendency to essentialize and romanticize ‘the local’” (Mohan & Stokke, 2000: 249). The risk then is that local social inequalities are downplayed, and it risks seeing the local detached from regional and global political and economic relations.

**Defining the community**

If community-based DDR is providing communities with the skills and the resources to support the reintegration of former combatants, one issue becomes the definition of the community. Defining the community, obviously, is defining the group of beneficiaries of the programmes. Rural communities are often seen as the easiest to define, as it is primarily defined in residential terms (Richards et al., 2004: 26). However, such a definition remains highly disputed, and often considered to be merely a Western ‘romantic’ vision of Southern realities. And even if such a definition would count in rural areas, it is unworkable in urban areas. The community you belong to is a part of your identity. In addition to physical boundaries, other identity factors determine what makes up a community, such as demographic composition, occupations,
socioeconomic boundaries, activities, etc. However, group identities cannot simply be equated with communities. So what does this mean for community-based development, where a community cannot simply be defined by means of physical boundaries (such as quarters or districts)? Especially in complex societies characterized by people’s mobility, and post-conflict situations with ethnic divisions, displaced persons and other factors that fragment the fabric of society. On what ‘community’ is community-based development based when the boundaries are unclear?

This paper suggests that community-based approaches in urban areas occupy themselves with the development of citizenship and civil society, local institutions, and infrastructure, just as much in rural areas. Although it is not always possible to divide a city into a number of small workable communities, the work remains the support and development of local civil society initiatives. Cities often do have community centers from where contacts can be established, as well as unions and other civil society organizations. The situation in every case is different and there always are groups needing special treatment. Keeping that in mind, however, the strength of community-based approaches is that they are inclusive and do not limit their support to only a part of the community. A definition of the community that goes beyond physical boundaries and limits to certain religious groups, ethnic groups, age groups or occupational groups is therefore useless in this report. This does of course not mean that community-based projects cannot be focusing on a particular group (for instance a particular labor union). The community thus refers to the focus of interest at question.

Community should then “be viewed as a set of meaningful social relations that constantly define and redefine the territorial dimension and that weave the economic and political dimensions together” (Piselli, 2007: 877). By regarding communities as social networks that may coincide with location, rather than regarding everyone in a specific location to form a community, one increases the understanding of social linkages within the community because one is focusing on what the community is, rather than what is could look like on paper. Moreover, it will presumably decrease intra-community and inter-community tensions since one treats the community (and its relations with other communities) in its reality, rather than as how one perceives the community to be (or how one would like it to become). For a community-based approach this also entails working with a realistic lens on existing communities and its capacities, where the existing structures and capacities form the default of the intervention, and where the programme design constantly has to be adopted to the changing situations.

Towards development

And even if the community can clearly be defined, a definition of community-based DDR remains very broad. The issue here is that as mentioned before, community-based DDR is getting closer to a development programme than a traditional DDR project. The literature discussed therefore not only concerns DDR projects (of which with a community based approach the literature is scarce), but also community-based reintegration projects (of which the
first two phases of DDR were designed along more classic lines) and community-based development projects (which might not include the reintegration of former combatants, but nevertheless remains highly similar in design).

The push towards community-based DDR projects – that is towards more development orientated projects – is based on the idea that “peace building is essentially a developmental initiative with a crucial security component, rather than the other way around” (Bush, 2004: 30). Lederach among others, sees peace building as a long-term transformation of a war system into a peace system, inspired by a quest for the values of peace and justice. He proposes a triangle with elite leaders and decision makers at the top, leaders of social organizations, churches, academics in the middle, and the grassroots community leaders at the base (Lederach, 1997: 39).

A comprehensive peace process should address complementary changes at all levels, from which the need for community-based approaches (focussing on grassroots and social organizations) is derived. It also states that the upper levels cannot be neglected; changes will not just work from the bottom up. Complementary initiatives with a more top-down approach do not become superfluous when community-based approaches are initiated. This will also become clear from the experiences in the field, which will be discussed later in this paper.

**Difference in phase and cleavages**

An interesting theory supporting the need for community-based approaches is brought forward by Stathis N. Kalyvas (2003). He compares the greed and grievance debate with the ontological description of war by Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. Where Hobbes’ war of all against all are motivated by personal interests and greed, Schmitt’s war refers to a politically motivated state to state war. A civil war, according to Kalyvas, is a mixture of these two; greed and grievance; Hobbes and Schmitt. There is a disjunction between identities and actions at the central or elite level versus the local or mass level. Local actions are more related to private issues than the master cleavage which is promoted by elites. Furthermore, individual and local actors take advantage of the war to settle local or private conflicts; the master cleavage legitimizes these actions. From this perspective community-based approaches are highly desirable, developing local capacities to resolve conflicts peacefully, rather than only working on a national level, treating the parties as unitary. This is also noted in field reports; “the prevailing frameworks have tended to be overly state-centric, with little attention paid to the many domains of life in which informal institutions and actors have jurisdictional authority and cultural legitimacy” (Barron, et al., 2004: 2).

Moreover, this perspective from Kalyvas partly explains why there are often differences between communities’ place on the ‘conflict curve’ (see figure 3) at a certain period of time. As mentioned by Cliffe, “the transition from war to peace is not a smooth or uniform process across a country.” One community can be moving towards peace, while another is not. Another community may have many refugees to cope with, whereas in other communities the population may partly have fled. Therefore it is thought that a decentralized approach will be able to do more justice to the specific needs of each individual community (Cliffe et al., 2003: 1).
Planning community-based DDR

How should a community-based DDR programme then be designed? Since community-based DDR entails the providing of communities with the skills and the resources to support the reintegration of former combatants, development projects are to be set up in order to help communities with the (re)construction of roads, schools, clinics, water pipe. Within such projects, former combatants can be employed, providing them with work experience, a salary, as well as the chance to show the communities in which they wanted to resettle that they were committed to reconstruct the war damages (Haden & Faltas, 2004). These programmes thus focused largely on the communities, yet at the same time provided the opportunities for ex-combatants to reintegrate.

The projects also intend to support communities in their own development, rather than doing everything for them. This requires a basic level of capacity in local institutions, and (in case of absence) often community councils are set up – usually through some form of democratic process – which is to decide upon the division and allocation of the funds granted. Important here is “the presence of a strong and influential sponsor,” participation with the regime emerging after the conflict, and “the political influence and capacity retained by local administrative structures” (Cliffe et al., 2003: 6). Also there is to be a basic level of security, in order for people to be able to express their opinion freely. The approach will not be successful if armed groups make the transfer of funds to communities impossible, or where armed groups control local governance structures (Ibid 5). Before going deeper into the organization of a community-based DDR approach and such community councils, some problems that are likely to be encountered will be discussed.

Moreover, this paper does not propose to move to a solely community-based approach and neglect the aspects of DDR as described in the first section of this paper. On the contrary, although as will be shown a community-based approach brings new advantages and opportunities, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants cannot
go without taking national, regional, and geo-political and economic issues into account. But on the other hand, a state-centered approach cannot neglect a local outlook. For instance, the laws concerning justice and the tackling of impunity of war crimes on a national level can create problems for the reintegration of former combatants on a local level. As mentioned before, a community-based bottom-up approach and a top-down approach should complement each other, and the context will determine which elements will be the most dominant.

Problems

Community’s interest limited

Transferring the decision-making to the community level, the community is enabled to identify their priority needs and projects. There are, however, some limitations on the scope of reconstruction needs that a community-based approach can address. A large part of the development process is the reconstruction of trunk roads, hospitals, etc. This infrastructure generally spans a geographical area that is too large to be addressed on a community level.

[Moreover], there are some important aspects of societal recovery which community decision-making may not identify or prioritize, either because the communities do not have relevant information or because they do not prioritize activities where the benefit is primarily external to the community. (Cliffe et al., 2003: 4)

This can include environmental and health issues, or other issues of which the benefits or dangers are not evident on the short-term.

Also, consistency with sector-specific projects is critical, since government projects or internationals organizations such as the World Bank may have set up national school rebuilding programmes, or constructing clinics on a state-wide level. Good information flows must prevent communities from allocating resources to a certain project, to later find that a state-wide sectoral programme would have provided the same school or clinic, and the community resources could have been used for other projects (Cliffe et al., 2003: 15-16).

Another logical issue with the development of local government institutions is that it runs the risk of undermining the legitimacy and efforts of the central government. And although this problem must be taken into account, the following paragraph will show a decentralization of institutions will also counter the issues encountered in patrimonial societies.

Patrimonialism

An assumption made by the World Bank is that “if community members are aware that the funds are essentially theirs, they have a stake in the project to make sure that the funds are spent well and according to the community’s expressed needs” (Cliffe et al., 2003: 3).
Patrimonialism, thus seems not to play an important role. The term patrimonialism from Max Weber describes a system of rule where the administration is only responsible to the ruler – as opposed to also responsible to its subjects. Apart from patrimonialism, the terms patriarchy, patronage and neopatrimonialism are also used. The latter originated from Eisenstadt (1973), who used it to describe a society where Weber’s patrimonialism co-exists with a rational-bureaucratic rule.

Although patrimonialism is not a specific issue for community-based approaches only, its presence in many societies. Cammack finds that donors and governments alike behave as though the power resides within the government institutions and that they function as designed. “Moreover, when they do not, they are labeled ‘dysfunctional’ rather than their behavior being seen as logical according to a frame of reference that is rooted outside the rational, democratic state in traditional socio-economic and political processes.” And it is this delusion that helps to maintain these structures (Cammack, 2007: 599-600).

Martin Meredith describes in The State of Africa (2005) how in many parts of Africa there had been a long tradition of ‘dash’ – of gift giving for services rendered. The bigger the man, the bigger the ‘dash’ and the ‘Big Man’ became an accepted feature of African life, a patron fostering his followers by his fame and fortune. The system existed before the colonization, but as argued by Mahmood Mamdani in Citizen and Subject (1996) was strengthened during colonization and duplicated in the post-colony. He argued that colonialism used indirect rule to establish a “decentralized despotism” and a two-tier society with few citizens and many subjects. Until independence the most opportunities for self-enrichment were for the white elites. At independence, this sociopolitical segmentation in society was replicated, but with local elites instead of European.

The lines of patronage radiated out from presidencies to regions, districts and villages. At each level, ‘big men’ worked the system, providing followers and friends with jobs, contracts and favors in exchange for political support; in order to retain support, they had to ensure the distribution of rewards. Throughout Africa, the politics of patronage and patrimonial rule became a common political pattern. (Meredith, 2005: 169)

The only way to obtain opportunities was through this patrimonial system. Politicians used their public office to extract commissions at every available opportunity. “The common cut on government contracts in West Africa was 10 per cent. Foreign firms and local businessmen alike budgeted for the extra 10 per cent that had to be paid either to politicians or to the ruling party to succeed” (Ibid 172-173).

Patrimonialism is often found in African countries and, as mentioned earlier, Africa accounts far over half of the DDR programmes in the world. Moreover, patrimonialism is not unique to

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9 On the contrary, community-based approaches will prove to be more capable of dealing with patrimonial systems.
Africa. In many countries and societies the “official way of politics and business” is often not the easiest way to get something done. Corruption is rampant in Russia and other post-communist states. And also in most Western countries you are more likely to get the contract if you are befriended with the decision makers. In his book *The Dialectics of Transformation in Africa* Elias K. Bongmba (2006) describes such abuse of power as one of the reasons for the ‘African crisis.’ He describes what he calls the “privatization of power” which is “an exclusionary political praxis that has reserved political power and the spoils of power to a few self-anointed rulers.” This is done by the “turning a public office into a personal, private privilege.” Secondly, leaders have privatized power through bureaucratic centralization\(^\text{10}\), which slowed down government business and encouraged political corruption (Bongmba, 2006: 10-12).

Such practices obviously obstruct development, since resources and wealth are relocated to a small elite instead of benefiting those who need it the most and the entire society as a whole. But with such a system in place – and without contrary influences such as organizational reforms, high education, foreign interventions, etc. – communities remain highly reliant on these patrons for everyday needs. Because of the neopatrimonial system the state is unable to provide (public) services, which makes it an easy decision; “why expect the inefficient agricultural marketing board to deliver fertilizer when it is easier to obtain bags illicitly from a local councilor who distributes them from the MP’s private stock?” (Cammack, 2007: 601). And apart from development, the system also undermines a functional democracy and the functioning of law. In these societies the “judicial independence is under threat as courts are deliberately under-resourced, judges’ wages and pensions are at risk, individual justices are threatened with dismissal or worse, and tame judges are appointed to key positions” (Ibid 604). Moreover, elections are not contested around ‘issues’, but rather around personalities (individuals and their historical and cultural connections); governments attempt private control of the media, using it for slander and propaganda; and parliaments are generally weak – one problem is that politicians “generally account upwards rather than downwards to their constituents” (Ibid 602-03). In a post-conflict situation with already weak state institutions it is therefore important to keep in mind what consequences such neopatrimonial systems have.

Apart from feeding straight into the patron-lineages by not taking them into account with the formation of community councils for community-based DDR and development and directly disbursing funds to them, there are also smaller (local) issues that can play a role. In Sierra Leone, for instance, a report found that community labor (a form of ‘voluntary’ work every community member has to put in) was falling disproportionately on the shoulders of the uneducated. This meant that this form of community contribution to the development projects was found to be increasingly unreliable (Richards *et al.*, 2004: 43). For the planning of projects a good knowledge of the local situation and customs is therefore always required.

\(^{10}\) Decentralization would thus seem to be a logical answer to the problems with patrimonialism encountered. Of course it could lead to hard resistance of the central regime and those benefiting from the system. The process of decentralization and strengthening local institutions will be discussed later in this paper.
According to Bongmba these hierarchical (in his case African) societies need to be countered by civil society. He finds that civil society should be encouraged, and it is a strong civil society that can counter and negotiate with the hierarchical state (Bongmba, 2006: 96-97).

This idea that the solution lies in the strengthening of civil society is also supported by Richards et al. (2004). According to them, the key factor that holds the system together is not chieftaincy, since all communities need wise leaderships. This is also supported by the fact that similar patrimonial systems were found to be of effect in Tajikistan by Torjesen (2006), where such chieftaincies do not exist. The problem lies in the legal system, which as mentioned before is often very ineffective where patrimonial systems are active. “Some local custom may, in fact, be in conflict with national law and international human rights conventions signed into national law” (Richards et al., 2004: 40). Active human rights promotion could thus be (part of) the solution to the negative aspects of patrimonialism, because the issue is that “poor people’s access to their own assets is not protected by rights” and that this makes it “practically impossible for them to borrow, invest or accumulate” (De Gaay Fortman, 2002: 33). Similar observations are made by Cammack (2007). Moreover, he states the importance for donors to understand “the political context of a country, the informal as well as the formal processes.” Complementary to this, donors should also “help local people understand their own national informal power systems and structures and how they undermine their development and democracy” (Cammack, 2007: 609-611).

Another measure is decentralization, which “is supposed to bring the government closer to the people, and make it more accountable and transparent” (Richards et al., 2004: 32). The promotion of local governing institutions within community-based approaches to DDR make them therefore in itself already better capable in dealing with patrimonialism than the classic centralized approach. Moreover, by actively involving the population throughout the project cycle, it will be in a better position to assess progress and take responsibilities for decisions that may or may not have impacted the results. Decentralization and participation of the local population thus also protects the government from undue criticism (Cliffe et al., 2003: 3).

How to organize community-based DDR

As becomes clear community-based DDR (and community-based approaches in general) work with local initiatives by supporting and building upon them. The incorporation of local communities, however, is not an easy process. With whom should one cooperate and which local initiatives should be supported? This of course all depends on the context and the community’s experience of the conflict. Often there are not sufficient resources and opportunities available for former combatants to reintegrate and ensure their livelihoods. Also, conditions have to be created by which conflicts can be resolved through peaceful manners. This often entails some form of democracy and in the words of Winston Churchill “democracy is the worst form of government except all others.” The exact form should of course depend on the local context and should not be dictated from above.
But for such an integrated approach to development, attention should be given to all three aspects of the ‘stability triangle’ (see figure 4). The main idea behind community-based DDR is then the development of civil society, economic opportunities, and local governmental institutions, which – if developed well – would lead to a stable and democratic environment. This in order to create conditions in which the incentives for groups to take up arms are taken away and conflict can be resolved in peaceful manners. It would then be through mutually beneficial goals that communities and former combatants are able to work on a joint future.

![Figure 4. Stability triangle](image)

As mentioned earlier, the aid should be demand-driven, rather than dictated from above. Although discourses from people like Bob Geldof and U2’s Bono\(^\text{11}\) who mobilize the West with one-liners like “If we don’t help them, no one does,” give the idea that people in the global South are indeed helpless. We should not, however, get the idea that ‘we’ in the West are better able to solve problems in other countries than those who are actually from there. With such a perspective aid will remain, in the words of William Easterly (2006), a neo-colonial, technocratic, supply-driven enterprise. Change in society must come from within, and can only be supported from without. But of course demand-driven aid does not mean that there should be no conditions attached to it. Simply providing aid may lead to similar dysfunctional relations that were the cause of conflict. Nevertheless, we should realize the limits of our effectiveness. Where Easterly remains rather negative, saying that aid induced changes in society are inefficient, weakens domestic political authority and accountability to the populace and fosters corruption, Alan Fowler (2008) tries to build on this in a somewhat more positive way. In *the Broker*, he combines Easterly’s arguments with complexity theory, to get an understanding of the “tricky dynamics of achieving intended change.” An important defining characteristic “is complexity’s overarching concern with social processes rather than social structures.” Looking through this lens, Fowler explains society as continuously experiencing disruptions to which it generates responses to bring back order and stability (not necessarily the same order and stability). Developing aid is then just another disruption, likely to cause a change, but not necessarily the intended one. The key to understanding processes is understanding power. “Enduring patterns of processes and relations in society are perceived as structures which embody the distribution of power – that is, the relative individual or collective ability to get one

\(^{11}\) Nevertheless they doubtlessly have all the best intentions, and the aid and attention to the issues of development it creates is of course more than welcome.
way.” To bring about change it is therefore essential to make an assessment of the types of power and where they are located in a given society (Fowler, 2008: 12-13). Moreover, Fowler’s application of complexity theory to development, shows that the intended change of development projects is by far the likely outcome, and projects constantly have to be adaptive to the changing situations in which they are working.

**Developing the local economy**

With the development of the local economy, one of the key issues is to creating space for its development and to caution for obstructing long-term development. When international NGOs are hiring former combatants for development work, it is important that this will not lead to the development of an economy in which dependency on NGO employment is created. Moreover, the (relatively) rich development agencies should be careful in the setting of salaries and other job related advantages, since possible local businesses and employers must be able to fairly compete for the best employees.

As will be discussed shortly in the paragraph on developing the local government, the development of the local economy is quickened when local governments are provided with the opportunity to buy goods and materials locally themselves, instead of it being provided for them through central purchase. As is mentioned in the paragraph on patrimonialism, such systems (in which small governing elites profit) should not be reinforced by the development work, and take these systems down as much as possible, for they are a great obstacle for long-term development. Directly financing beneficiaries will therefore also decrease the chances of corruption (although of course it will be too optimistic to think that there is only corruption in the higher echelons). And in a society where the conflict has created cleavages between different cultural, tribal, or ethnic groups, economic growth will often benefit “those ethnic groups best positioned by history or culture to take advantage of the new opportunities for enrichment, deepening social cleavages rather than filling them in” (Muller, 2008: 33).

As mentioned, giving money to former combatants creates the danger of appearing to ‘reward’ the perpetrators of the conflict. Moreover, the results have often not been satisfactory. In the CAR, for instance, 3,577 individuals (out of a total of 7,553 beneficiaries) were given cash since they had chosen retail trade. At the closure of the programme it was revealed that 95% had failed in their businesses, in stark contrast with the numbers of those who had chosen small-scale farming and were given livestock (Alusa, 2007).

An interesting alternative to giving money is lending it. Micro-credits are worldwide seen as a successful way to support people to set small businesses in developing countries. Muhammad Yunus was even rewarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his Grameen Bank. According to Tom

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12 In Kosovo, for instance, teachers, doctors, and police officials received between $100 and $150 salary a month. However, a Kosovar working for an international agency as a driver or interpreter could earn over ten times as much (Bush, 2004: 28).
Body, “the availability of micro-finance is important for re-starting economic activity,” but also for former combatants. Training for former combatants could involve basic bookkeeping and other skills that would help them set up small businesses (2007: 7). In Uganda, for instance, CARE International ran a training course on how to select, plan and manage income generation activities for literate and semi-literate former combatants, as well as people from the host community. Almost three-quarters of the participants were successfully able to expand or start up businesses (Ibid. 13). And in Tajikistan aptitude tests, counseling, and training was provided to 400 former combatants, of which then 227 were selected for a micro-loan. Of these 216 were afterwards making sustainable livelihoods (Ibid. 23). And micro-credits do not involve large donations from the international community, and are thus much more easily funded. Moreover, they therefore do not necessarily have to be available only for former combatants. To take this even further, micro-loans could even be granted to joint initiatives between former combatants and other community members to promote the reintegration.

Developing civil society

As mentioned also the civil society has to be developed. A post-conflict situation is characterized with a tensed environment, insecurity and an impoverished economy and it offers little to reintegrate into. Moreover, the communities will have other priorities than the reintegration of former combatants. Civil society organizations often provide a channel for services where governments do not deliver them, from basic health and education to the promotion of dialogue. Strengthening of the civil society will increase the opportunities for former combatants to reintegrate. And at the same time a strong civil society is necessary in the context of the decentralization and democratization of the government, as it serves as a ‘watchdog,’ holding the government accountable for its actions. As mentioned before, it is also seen as a way to counter patrimonialism.

Ways to strengthen civil society are by educating in human rights and the support of local civil society organizations with recourses and technical support. Such organizations can be local NGOs and faith-based organizations but also worker unions and other interest organizations.

Another way to strengthen civil society mentioned by the World Bank is the direct parent involvement in running the local schools. Since school business directly affects the welfare of their own children, such meetings are one of the few occasions for which the poor will prioritize time to attend. Therefore this is potentially an important way of building skills in community participation (Richards et al., 2004: 32).

Developing law and order

If war is the continuation of politics by other means (Von Clausewitz, 1834), than for the return from war to peaceful resolution of conflicts in society it is inescapable to strengthen the political arena. With regard to community-based approaches this means the strengthening of local
governments. While the central government should not be sidestepped, strengthening of local institutions and decentralization has the advantage of involving the population and preventing large scale corruption. Although, again, one should not believe corruption is only reserved for higher echelons. Programme design should thus carefully be adapted to the existence of such local patriarchic systems).

Where community councils in some form do not exist, they need to be established. However, it is preferred to build upon existing mechanisms. The World Bank has some experience with the community support and the development of local institutions, usually in the form of community councils. Whatever model is chosen, the World Bank emphasizes that downwards accountability within the community is very important, and suggests mandating open meetings and the display of council decisions, budgets and expenditure on public notice boards as two basic ways to encourage this. Essential is also an effective local conflict resolution mechanism. “Such a mechanism may be based on tradition, religion or modern forms of justice but should engage negotiation and consensus-building to avoid winner-takes-all situations.” Moreover, institutional and implementation arrangements of projects occupied with such local institutional reforms “need to be simple and understandable to people who are not used to this way of doing business, even more so as education levels in post-conflict rural contexts are generally low.” The contents and presentation of procedures and processes have to be adapted to local circumstances, such as customs, language, and media (Cliffe, et al., 2003: 11).

The decentralization is also necessary because state legislation and state actors often do not have the same legitimacy within rural communities as informal rules and norms, as is mentioned earlier in this paper. Nevertheless it is unwise to simply turn to local and traditional leaders for the enforcement of rules, since this can too easily reinforce and institutionalize power imbalances and the marginalization of certain groups, such as ethnic minorities, youth, women, poor, etc13 (Barron, et al., 2004: 13). Also, not all chiefs are respected enough to lead such community councils. “Today, communities will often prefer to organize themselves. (…) In other cases, a village may have enough organizational capacity to form a committee (perhaps an alliance between merchants, elders, women’s groups and youth) and push ahead on its own.” The role of traditional chiefs or leaders should than be to give advice (Richards et al., 2004: 15).

Given the extent to which needs and preferences vary at a very local level, this suggests a need for the creation of instruments and forums through which community needs can be ascertained and enforcement mechanisms developed, rather than technocratic solutions developed by outside planning agencies and ‘experts’ far removed from the local situation. (Barron, et al., 2004: 13)

Community council development must thus preferably be based on existing mechanisms (to which the community is familiar), but in such a restructured way that it does not exclude certain community members. Moreover, as many state-building experiences have shown, such changes in existing mechanisms cannot be simply designed by outside technocrats and

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13 E.g. return to the pre-violence period with regard to underlying structures.
implemented in the field, but have to be developed by the community itself. The role for the outside players here is to support the community to do so by with resources and knowledge and the empowerment of the marginalized community members. Conditions to aid can be set, but this should not create too much upward accountability to donors and hamper downward accountability to the populace. However, extreme care should be taken not to reinforce old power structure (which lead to inequality and conflict) into a new setting and conflict transformation can play an important role here.

Financial management responsibility is also crucial for true ownership of the programme (and thus for the programme to help develop instead of bringing emergency aid). Therefore training of “a community financial management unit” is found to be important “to maintain effective accounts and guard against corruption.” Moreover, the provision of such technical assistance and investment in capacity building “has a high pay-off and enables community councils to implement projects with greater speed and efficacy.” According to the World Bank, such technical assistance may be provided by government staff, or NGOs and the private sector. The decentralization of governmental institutions by supporting the development of community councils means that effective mechanisms to disburse cash to local levels have to be found. Central purchasing of goods will “slow down activities, in addition to disempowering communities in the choice of goods and materials.” Moreover, from a community-based approach perspective one would promote the injection of cash into the local community, since this will foster local markets and production and draw back middleman and suppliers (Cliffe, et al., 2003: 11-14).

The World Bank experience is “that especially in the context of weakened social capital, members selected to serve on community councils are those who are trustworthy and can represent the community or group.” However, these individuals are not necessarily the most competent for the job. Therefore, it is advisable to assess the capacity and carry out training programmes. Moreover, community members need to be trained to monitor and hold the councils accountable (Ibid 11). The World Bank also warns for the risk of the role of the central government being too close or too distant from the developing local government. If local government development builds too much on existing state structures, it risks becoming “too much part of government bureaucracy rather than starting to change the way that services are delivered.” However, too little government ownership could lead the government to see the project “as competing with its services, or that it does not receives any credit for success.” This could undermine stability in the long term (Ibid 20).

Intrinsically connected to governance in the rule of law is the security sector. As in classic DDR programmes is already recognized by its strong connection with SSR programmes. After a civil war, however, the security forces including the police (often retrained soldiers) often have roots in the atrocities committed in the past. Yet, a properly structured and governed security sector needs to be in place to guarantee security when former combatants are demobilized and reintegrated into the community. This must, like is already undertaken in combination with the current SSR programmes, be addressed by training of security officers and making them subject to strict regulations. In the light of community-based DDR another interesting initiative was
undertaken by Saferworld in Kenya, called community-based policing. Community-based policing is defined as “an approach to policing that brings together the police, civil society and local communities to develop local solutions to local safety and insecurity concerns” (Saferworld, 2008: 2). The starting point of this initiative is that those most affected by insecurity often have little opportunity to engage constructively with the police, which can result in feelings of mistrust between the police and the communities they serve. Saferworld then gave joint trainings to police officers and civil society representatives, conducted by both civilian and police trainers. Committees were formed of key stakeholders, and a joint police-community forum was established to meet monthly, “enabling members of the community, civil society and the police to identify appropriate strategies to tackle crime in the area” (Ibid. 16). Also an open police day was organized, and a medical camp where police provided free medical check-up and other services, which helped to build trust and enabling the community and the police to interact (Ibid.). This is just one example of how security could be improved, and trust between the community and the security sector can be improved; something that is vital to any attempt at disarmament.

Reintegration in civilian life

The development of the local economy, civil society and governmental institutions does not only create better conditions for former combatants to reintegrate into. Giving communities a great role in the DDR process also “contributes to building up accountability at the level of families and communities – a way of ensuring social control over former combatants.” Moreover, community engagement “helps to provide balanced assistance packages given to ex-combatants while addressing the needs/perceptions of communities they are coming back to.” And building on local customary structures and empowering communities to define their own objectives generally gives more suitable solutions than measures proposed by outsiders (Pouligny, 2004: 11).

This, however, does not mean that former combatants should not get any special treatment. They are still a highly traumatized group with special needs. First of all they need psychological help, which is often lacking. They need help to find and move back to their families and former communities if possible, or find a new place to live. There they often need education or vocational training and help in finding a job. They are often accustomed to physical work and are unable to sit still, so putting them in school with ‘regular’ students would not make much sense. Moreover, they are a highly diverse group and, as mentioned before, the special needs of women, children and disabled have to be taken into account. Community-based DDR, therefore should not neglect these needs and solely focus on the development of opportunities for all members of the community including the former combatants.

Apart from developing opportunities within the community, while supporting former combatants with their characteristic problems, as mentioned before it is found very useful to use former combatants as a workforce in development projects (i.e. building schools, roads, etc.). Not only does this directly bring benefits to the community as a whole and are the former
combatants a cheap and local work-force, it also provides former combatants with the opportunities to get work experience. More importantly, they get actively involved in the reconstruction and can show their good intentions to the community in which they want to reintegrate. Moreover, working together is often more productive than talking together as working together can directly make clear that one needs the other to attain a goal. Other contact between civilians and former combatants can be facilitated in neighborhood and remembrance meetings and community parties organized by former combatants. In general such initiatives and help from former combatants in communities are found to build trust between the former combatants and the community. Trust that is essential for the reintegration of former combatants and for the community to move beyond the past war and atrocities. In an interview a former combatant of the ELN in Colombia for instance noted that “the people in the neighborhood like us [former combatants], because we decided not to tolerate the crooks and drug addicts. We started to solve the problems.” After a few former combatants stopped a few people from breaking into a house and stopping them until the police arrived, “the people were extremely grateful to us” (qtd. in Pax Christi, 2006: 37).

Another lesson from Sierra Leone is that generally development assistance “omits the dimension of the sacred, through which the collectivity realizes power.” Paul Richards notes that in two communities he visited a Norwegian and a Canadian agency primarily supported selected individuals (at the expense of emphasis on the community). While cemented houses were being build a local mosque remained unroofed and made of sticks and a church was still not rebuild. When Richards offered to assist the people with their places of worship, this brought an enthusiastic response. “A conversation took shape between the feuding parties about sharing labor on the two projects” (Richards et al., 2004: 22-23). The sacred should thus not be neglected, and it can offer a good opportunity for community and civil society development.

Community-based DDR

Derived from experiences in community-based development and reintegration programmes, this paper suggests that this entails the support and development of civil society, local governmental institutions, and economic opportunities, and by that taking away the incentives to pick up arms rather than directly taking away arms. The development of the local economy, civil society and governmental institutions does not only create better conditions for former combatants to reintegrate into. Giving communities a great role in the DDR process also “contributes to building up accountability at the level of families and communities – a way of ensuring social control over former combatants.” Moreover, community engagement “helps to provide balanced assistance packages given to ex-combatants while addressing the needs/perceptions of communities they are coming back to.” And building on local customary structures and empowering communities to define their own objectives generally gives more suitable solutions than measures proposed by outsiders (Pouligny, 2004: 11). Another characteristic of community-based DDR is thus that incentives to cooperate in the programme are benefiting the community as a whole rather than individuals or a specific target group. This
prevents feeding into arms trade – as can be the case with individual financial benefits – or appearing to favor a particular group, and aims to treat a community as a community.

This, however, does not mean that a community-based approach to DDR can neglect the special treatment that former combatants often need. They are a highly traumatized group in need of psychological help, help to find and move back to families and communities, and in need of education, vocational training and finding a job. Moreover, the special needs of women, children and disabled have to be taken into account. Community-based DDR should therefore not neglect these needs and solely focus on the development of opportunities for all members of the community including the former combatants. Actively involving former combatants in reconciliation, reconstruction and development projects is often found to build confidence with the community, as well as providing opportunities for the former combatants for their reintegration in civilian life.

Important to note is also that a decentralized community focus should not be at cost of a national or regional approach. A risk with a number of different agencies active in community-based DDR programmes is a lack in coordination. In Sierra Leone, for instance, rehabilitation packages varied from agency to agency. “Unequal treatment of adjacent villages fuelled wartime suspicions and conflict among neighbors. Ethnic tension was heightened in border zones” (Richards et al., 2004: 26). Moreover, conflicts – even though contemporary conflicts are predominantly intra-state conflicts – often have a regional dimension (political and economic), and DDR projects can attract unintended flows of people and goods. While focusing on a community-level, the national and regional level should therefore not be forgotten. Transferring the decision-making to the community level enables the community to identify their priority needs and projects, but the development of national infrastructure, hospitals, health and environmental issues etc. generally spans a geographical area that is too large to be addressed on a community level or is not prioritized on a community level. Community projects can also overlap with national initiatives, and to prevent needless spending of funds communication with national and regional initiatives remains very important.

Because community-based approaches aim to work with local initiatives by supporting and building upon them, choices on with who to work and the exact design of the projects have to be based on careful analysis of the situation on the ground. In the case of a civil war on a national level that is ended in a peace agreement and where hostilities have ceased (e.g. Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone), large-scale disarmament and demobilization are possible, with the design being more that of a classic DDR programme. However, the larger the number of demobilized combatants, the more attention is needed to support them in their reintegration and to sensitize the communities for their reintegration. The more hostile the civilian population is towards the former combatants (are they seen as perpetrators of violence or as liberators?), the more need there is for the integration of the DDR programme – and especially the reintegration component – with development projects on a community level. Development projects should involve both the community and the former combatants. Nevertheless should combatants receive schooling and help in finding a job, as well as psychological assistance. A
councilor could be appointed to a number of combatants in a region to monitor their progress and to intervene if needed.

In situations where a war is still going on (e.g. Colombia), however, large-scale projects are often not possible to organize. Nevertheless can DDR projects here contribute in zones of peace and show the ‘dividend of peace.’ More likely to bring results is the result of local initiatives in the demobilization and reintegration of deserters or captured rebels that choose not to go back into the war\textsuperscript{14}. A good example of this is the support of Indian tribes by IKV Pax Christi\textsuperscript{15} in Colombia that want to reintegrate Indian deserters from FARC themselves, instead of letting the government project take care of this. It is known that Indians do not successfully integrate in the cities (where the government projects are located), and such local initiatives in zones of peace should therefore be put to good use. In this example, the development of local mechanisms of governance and civil society would of course be less important than the facilitation of the initiative by IKV Pax Christi and political pressure on the national government and FARC to obtain and keep support for it.

Another plausible situation is that there is (no longer) a civil conflict at a national level, but that there are local skirmishes, such as cattle raiding and disputes and conflict between ethnic groups (e.g. South Sudan, DRC, Central Asia). In such a situation, the national government often does not have full control and local mechanisms of peaceful conflict resolution are absent or weak. Moreover, in a militarized society it is not desirable to deploy large numbers of troops (be it national or international). In such cases demilitarization is, in the words of Mahmood Mamdani, only possible through politics. The aim of DDR projects here should be to bring incentives for voluntary disarmament, by developing such mechanisms, as well as the civil society and economic opportunities. The central government should not be undermined, and therefore closely consulted, but such situations demand the more community-based support. A community-based approach might even be the only viable option here, since a clear distinction between combatant and civilian cannot be made. In such cases the community-based disarmament programme will in practice come much closer to a Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) programme, than to a traditional state focused DDR programme. Indeed, the Small Arms Survey describes a community security programme as referring “to a host of interventions designed to generate safe, weapons-free environments in post-conflict contexts” and finds that the UN is increasingly pursuing community security programmes to complement the ‘classic’ DDR programmes (Small Arms Survey, 2007a: 7).

To conclude, it has become clear that the situation on the ground determines the design of DDR programmes. Although after a conflict often every area needs attention, in one situation, for instance, the economic sector may demand most attention and another case may need more attention to law and order. How much a programme can be state-focused or how much the

\textsuperscript{14} In Colombia, for instance, captured rebels from the FARC and ELN sometimes claim to rather stay in prison than to be exchanged for hostages, as they are disillusioned by the life in the rebel movements, but could not flee while they were still in the bush.

\textsuperscript{15} This project will be further discussed in the next section on IKV Pax Chrisi and DDR.
communities need to be involved also depends on the context. On a scale with ‘classic DDR’ and ‘community-based DDR’ as its two poles, the case of for instance Sierra Leone would then be ‘context A’ and the case of South Sudan would be ‘context B’ (see figure 5). It is then also important for projects to be adaptive to changing environments, since what can start as a project in a country where a full-blown civil war has ended in a peace agreement, can end up being in a situation where local skirmishes arise. Moreover, although a community-based approach contains very promising elements, conflicts always have a regional context, and one cannot neglect the role of the central government. Because while the origins of community development may have originated in the colonial period, community-based approaches should not aim to by-pass national governments and impose ‘western ideas’ on good governance.
Case study: Jonglei State, South Sudan

“We have reached the crest of that last hill in our tortuous ascent to the heights of peace. There are no more hills ahead of us, the remaining is flat ground”
– John Garang –

In the following section the case of South Sudan will be further examined. However, it should be kept in mind that this case chooses an extreme community-based focus, and does not aim to exemplify how DDR with a community-based focus should be designed in general. The study aims to illustrate how the broad definition of community-based DDR could be used in practice. The case will specifically focus on Jonglei State, in the south-east of Sudan (see appendices 5 and 6). Jonglei is interesting with regard to community-based DDR because during the civil war a variety of armed groups were active in the state. After the signing of the Nairobi Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005 these groups were to join either the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) of the north or the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of the south. The war, however, has never simply been north against the south, as many small groups were fighting for their own personal interests. In the Sudanese context, “the term ‘armed group’ is considerably elastic.” Tribal groups, pastoralists, paramilitaries, and other collectivities were used by both sides as proxy forces against the other (Small Arms Survey, 2008b: 1). And while the CPA was signed between the SAF of the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM/A, the situation on the ground is far more complicated. This complexity means that there unfortunately are many hills ahead in the ascent to peace, unlike the quote of the late SPLA leader would make one believe. First, a brief description of the cultural historical and political context will be given, followed by an examination of the nature of present armed conflicts in Jonglei State. Apart from that, other elements contributing to the tensions will be discussed, such as the changes in culture caused by the war and ways conflicts are solved. Then comments are made on the past disarmament campaigns in Jonglei State, as well as on the ongoing campaign. Finally, a number of recommendations will be made, as the research was in part conducted to contribute to the context analysis for the SIPP, but also because this concretizes the ideas on community-based DDR into the context of Jonglei.

Because although the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and many other institutions talk about the disarmament of civilians with twenty-two years of civil war and almost everyone in South Sudan being armed, the distinction between combatant and civilian is hard to make. Throughout South Sudan local armed groups have emerged to protect their communities, cattle and property, in some cases later to become actively involved in the civil war and used as proxy forces by either the SAF or the SPLA, who then also provided them with arms. In Jonglei this

16 Noted, however, should be that the borders and names of counties are subject to change, as will be further discussed in the paragraph on land disputes and power struggles on page 53.
was the case with the Murle, mainly residing in Pibor county, and the ‘white army’ of the Nuer\textsuperscript{17}, making it a relevant area for the research. As mentioned by an interviewee; “almost everyone was a soldier, and kept their weapon. Some groups were disarmed, but then bought new arms” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008). Apart from that – or possibly because of that – Jonglei is considered to be one of the more troublesome states, especially concerning disarmament. In the context of South Sudan groups sometimes are merely armed rebel groups not under state control (the conventional definition of armed group), but sometimes also rebel groups with links to the government, or with support from the government. The definition to be used here is from Pablo Policzer (2005), stating armed groups as “challengers to the state’s monopoly of legitimate coercive force” (qtd. in Small Arms Survey, 2006: 3).

It is also hoped that this research can make a modest contribution to the existing literature on disarmament in Jonglei and South Sudan, and thereby be of academic and social relevance. While extremely complicated, tackling the proliferation of arms in South Sudan is vital for its stability and the prevention of a relapse into war, which many in South Sudan at the moment already view as inevitable (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008).

\[\text{Moreover, there appears to be a robust association between arms availability and persistent security in the region that has contributed to the militarization of its communities and the prolongation of many ongoing cross-border and internal conflicts. (Small Arms Survey, 2007b: 1)}\]

With most arms in Jonglei State in South Sudan in the hands of those labeled as civilians, and yet with most civilians having been actively involved in the civil war as what could be labeled a combatant, the context of Jonglei is found to be very suitable for a case study to the possibilities of community-based DDR. Moreover, as will be seen being a ‘warrior’ is very important in the pastoralist cultures of Jonglei. For these youth warriors simple disarmament has proven not to be sufficient and needs to be completed with programmes that assist them in starting up a modern civilian life; programmes that normally fall under the reintegration part of DDR programmes. According to Robert Muggah, project manager at the Small Arms Survey, “the integrated UNMIS DDR unit has acknowledged the importance of evidence-based and bottom-up approaches towards ‘community security’, and the program is expected to ensure linkages with longer-term SSR, “prepare a ‘community security fund’ to identify and support security needs in a participatory manner, and fan out disarmament activities to non-combatants” (2006: 34). With this case study in Jonglei on the possibilities of community-based DDR it is intended to find viable options for disarmament of the variety of armed people in the state, and to

\textsuperscript{17} The white army is not a single army, but rather a collection of armed groups of youth which were formed for the protection of cattle, and occasionally raided cattle themselves. Initially the power over the armed groups was in the hands of the traditional authorities in the community, but over time it passed from the chiefs to the white army youth. Later on some white army factions became part of the SSDF. White army factions also supported the SSDF in the attack on Bor in 1991, which will be discussed shortly. A more complete historical account of the development of the white army can be found in Young (2007b).
overcome the situation in which a distinction between civilian and combatant cannot easily be made. With community-based DDR, it is hoped, a bridge can be made covering the gap between classic state-focused disarmament and civilian disarmament.

Research methodology, problems and limitations

Following the divisions of qualitative research described in *Qualitative research practice*, the field research was a contextual one; mapping the problems around disarmament in Jonglei. However, the research was also generative as it attempts to provide solutions to these issues (Ritchie, 2003: 26-31). The research was undertaken between 13 May and 6 June 2008, of which two weeks were spent in Bor, Jonglei State, and one and a half weeks in Juba, the capital of South Sudan. The author joined the team of IKV Pax Christi for two and a half weeks (half a week in Juba, and the two weeks in Bor) who were doing a context analysis as part of the SIPP, in which disarmament is one of the focus points. During these two and a half weeks a number of interviews and focus group discussions were held with local community members, community leaders, and civil society representatives, and officials from the GoSS, various UN agencies, and NGOs. After this period another week was spent in Juba for another number of interviews. Apart from this a number of informal interviews were held with community members in the bars and hotels, and additional information was gathered in a variety of available literature.

During the period of research a small number of problems were encountered, of which the starting of the wet season was the most considerable and caused the research period to be shortened by two weeks. As can be seen on the map of Jonglei (appendix 6), the state capital Bor, where the research was started, is located in the far south-west of the state. The weather conditions made it impossible to travel further into the state over land, and travel by helicopter could not be budgeted. Also limiting travel possibilities was a conflict between the counties Uror and Duk which occurred shortly before arrival in Jonglei. During the attack 1,052 heads of cattle were looted from Uror county, seventy-seven children (who were looking after the cattle) were missing, 6,000 people were displaced, and twenty people of the Nuer tribe were killed. Other reports stated that at least thirty people died and that 70,000 heads of cattle were stolen from Uror by Duk County, and 1,700 heads of cattle were

Figure 5. Focus group discussion

A focus group discussion with youth in Bor, Jonglei. (photo by author)

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For a full list of interviews and focus group discussions, see appendices 3 and 4.
stolen from Duk to Uror (Sudan Tribune, 2008a). During the entire research period in Jonglei, the people of Uror threatened to retaliate against Duk County, making the situation unsafe. This also caused the Peace Commissioner of Jonglei to cancel his appointment, as he had to go by helicopter to the area to prevent the retaliation.

These travel limitations entailed that it was impossible to visit the areas of the state where most Nuer (in the north of the state) and Murle (in Pibor county) live, restricting the research to Bor, a predominantly Dinka area. This meant that the research threatened to be based solely on the views of one particular tribal group of the state. To counter this problem, an effort was made to find a Murle – the group to which most people attributed the problems in the state – in Bor Town. Apart from that interviews were held with people who had had the chance to travel through the state for NGO work or business and who could be considered objective, as they had no tribal relations with the various groups in Jonglei.

With constraints of time and resources the research was forced to focus on a smaller region, and Jonglei state was chosen for its context, but also because joining the context analysis team of IKV Pax Christi eased travel and research arrangements. This, of course, limits the results to only this particular region. Moreover, the situation within Jonglei itself is influenced by the situation in the whole of Sudan which will be discussed briefly, but cannot be completely analyzed. This means that it should be kept in mind that the conclusions of this research could be caught up by incidents on a national or regional level. Many believe, for instance, that the government in Khartoum, which feels increasingly vulnerable to an invasion by Southern forces, is trying to exacerbate divisions in the South. There are also fears that the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) might refuse to hold the planned elections of 2009 (e.g. by invoking reasons of insecurity in Darfur as an excuse) or attempt to rig them, as it is getting more likely that the NCP will lose. And if that would occur another North-South war almost certainly will break out (Natsios, 2008). Moreover, the research was caught up by reality as the Commissioner of Bor County expressed that a new disarmament campaign in Jonglei would start from the first of June onwards (pers. comm., Abraham Arng Jok, Bor, 28 May 2008). A few days later the news was also made public and the campaign began. This campaign and its consequences will be discussed later, but the threat of the use of force (informed by the motives for the campaign) will likely have a negative impact on arms control in the region, and thus for the number of viable recommendations that this report will be able to make.

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19 See Appendix 7 for a map of the division of ethnic sub-groups in South Sudan.
20 Given the high tensions between the various tribes this proved to be rather difficult. In December 2007 there had been a number of killings of Murle in Bor by Dinka, after which most Murle fled. One could therefore not ask around for ‘a Murle’ as people were afraid and would even think you would come to kill them.
Cultural, historical and political context

Before going examining the issues surrounding disarmament in Jonglei, briefly the historical and political context of South Sudan will be given. Most people live in compounds composed of a number of thatch-roofed *tukul* (huts) in an enclosure. South Sudan is administratively divided in ten states, which in turn are divided in counties. Jonglei state is divided in eleven counties, and the counties in turn are divided in *payam*, and each of those into a number of *boma* (villages). A given clan will normally inhabit a particular *boma* and a *payam* is generally coterminous with the area of authority of a chief (Ashkenazi *et al.*, 2008: 2-3). The *payam* is also administrated by a civil administrator, who forms the connection between the traditional chief and the GoSS authority. Each county is administrated by a commissioner, and each state has a governor, as well as a number of ministries.

Important to keep in mind here is also that South Sudan has a large variety of ethnic groups. The Dinka is the largest with approximately 2.3 to 3 million people, divided in about 25 different sub-groups. They are mainly found in Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Southern Kordofan regions, and they traditionally have no centralized authority, but a variety of interlinked clans, headed by chiefs. The second largest group in South Sudan is the Nuer, which are believed to have separated from the Dinka at a certain time. They are however, closely related to the Dinka, and have also assimilated many Dinka in the recent past. These two groups (all divided in a variety of ethnic sub-groups) are also the largest groups in Jonglei, together with the Murle. The Murle (approximately between 300,000 and 400,000) reside mainly in Pibor county, although they travel to other counties with their cattle during the dry season looking for water. Other groups in Jonglei are the Anyauk, Jie, Ngalam. Where the Anyauk are mainly agriculturalists, the Dinka, Nuer and Murle are mainly pastoralists (although they also cultivate) and apart from its economic value, also social and moral significance is attached to their cattle (Deng, 1998: 104; Gurtong, 2008). In Dinka culture it is, for instance, normal to refer to a person with the name of his bull, as using the person’s name would imply that one believes he is too poor to own cattle, and considered to be an insult (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, April 2008). And with marriage the family of the bride gets a number of heads of cattle as ‘dowry’. Cattle is thus, in all cultures of the three largest groups in Jonglei, very important and the traditions of cattle raiding combined with the proliferation of (modern) arms aggravates tensions between the various groups. This will be discussed further later in this chapter.
After more than fifty-five years of colonization by the British in 1954 an agreement was signed that provided for self-determination and self-governance for Sudan on 1 January 1956. The British had ruled Sudan divided in an Arab North and African South until 1946, when it decided to reverse this policy and unite the country. The South was not as politically organized as the North, and the Southerners felt more and more neglected as most government posts made available by the British went to Northerners. When the government in Khartoum disavowed promises to establish a federal system, this led to mutiny of Southern army officers and in 1955 the first civil war started. The war lasted seventeen years until the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which provided some autonomy for the South. Dissatisfaction had led to a coup d’état in Khartoum where Colonel Gafaar Nimeiry had taken power in 1971 and ruled until he was overthrown by another coup 1985.

This dissatisfaction, however, was not only felt in Khartoum but also in the South, and the peace signed by Nimeiry would not hold.

_The clashes between the Arab-run state and the peripheries are rooted in marginalization in the economic development process and exclusion from power structures. They are also related to the rise of militant Islam as a tool for political machination._ (Jok, 2007: 115)

Then in 1983 Nimeiri instituted the Shari’a Islamic law in the whole country, including the South. The SPLA formed to fight against the North for Southern independence led by John Garang and the second civil war started. In Khartoum a number of other coup d’états followed until in 1989 Omar Hassan al-Bashir took power, who ruled the country through the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation. Later he allied himself with Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF) that had been influencing Khartoum politics since 1979, after which he was appointed as president of Sudan in 1993 and the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation was dissolved. Al-Bashir used various groups as proxy forces to fight within and against the South. The notorious People’s Defense Forces of the GoS is believed to have taken over 200,000 children and women as slaves during their raids in the South and Nuba mountains (Alley, 2001). During the twenty-two years of war an estimated two million people have died and four million were displaced. As international pressure intensified in the twenty-first century al-Bashir was forced to start allowing international aid workers into the region. The SPLA was also gaining strength and according to some sources the SAF was losing. “The conflict was draining the central government’s coffers, and Southern rebels were endangering oil fields; the annual costs of the war reportedly exceeded the value of the oil revenues that the North now sends to the South each year” (Natsios, 2008: 84). Then on January 2005 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in

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21 It should be noted, however, that the situation on the ground is far more complex, and a division between North and South cannot be made in terms of Arab and African. Moreover, “Sudanese notions of race are not based on phenotypes alone, and they are not fixed.” They are also attached to practices such as religion and economic activities, and other cultural practices. Ethnicity then becomes something self-ascribed, fluid and changeable if deemed appropriate (Jok, 2007: 2-4).
Nairobi, formally ending the violence between North and South. The CPA started a six year interim period and in 2011 a referendum is planned in which the South can choose to either remain in Sudan with the North, or to become completely independent. In this six year period the government of national unity is to rule Sudan, in which the South has a large degree of autonomy.

However, “despite its name, the CPA is not truly comprehensive. The deal was in fact a carefully crafted agreement between two dominant military elites” (Small Arms Survey, 2006: 2). The CPA did not end the multiple conflicts between the multiple factions of armed groups from which South Sudan suffered, and during the two civil wars the governments in Khartoum all encouraged divisions within the South and hence South-South conflict (Young, 2007a: 1). Moreover, the CPA only included a mandate for the disarmament of the SPLA and SAF, but ignored the issues of other armed groups. Under the CPA, these Other Armed Groups (OAGs) were suddenly required to disband, and their members were to join the SAF, the SPLA, or one of a small number of government institutions. Most OAGs in the South have since then integrated into the SPLA, having no desire to relocate to the North; a requirement if they would align with SAF. Given the fact that many of these groups “had deep roots in local political, ethnic, and economic conflicts in South Sudan” the reintegration process has not surprisingly been far from smooth (Small Arms Survey, 2008b: 1-3). And although the large majority of the OAGs have formally stated their allegiance to the SPLA after the Juba Declaration, in most cases this new loyalty is far from unconditional and tribal and personal loyalties carry more weight than the new ideological ones (Ibid: 1; Young, 2007a: 3). And some of the cleavages exacerbated during the war are still pertinent today.

One of the most raw and still persistent wounds in the South (and in Jonglei) was caused by the Nuer attack on the Bor Dinka in 1991, which occurred a little after the split between Dr. Riek Machar (a Nuer) and Dr. John Garang (a Bor Dinka). More than 100,000 people (almost all civilians) were estimated to be killed in this attack and the victorious Nuer looted and took cattle with them back North. The pain and anger doubtlessly still affects the relations between Dinka and Nuer today (Young, 2007a: 3). This event happened after a split within the SPLA. The split took place around Dr. John Garang, a Dinka and long-standing Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA who advocated for a united secular and democratic ‘New Sudan’, and Dr. Riek Machar, a Nuer advocating for a politically independent South Sudan. The initial division was thus on a political issue, but after Riek broke away with the SPLA-Nasir both started to play the ‘ethnic card’ (Hutchinson, 2000: 6). The SPLA-Nasir later transformed into the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A), which suffered great losses and Riek Machar then grafted his remaining forces into the national army as the SSDF through the ‘April 1997 Peace Agreement’ with the NIF. After the agreement with Salva Kiir (and the earlier signed CPA between the SPLM/A and the National Congress Party (NCP)22, Machar thus came back to the SPLM/A (Hutchinson, 2000: 6-7). It should also be noted, however, that the origins of the SSDF lie not with the defection of Riek Machar, but in the revolt of Anyanya II, an armed group formed in the Nuer areas of eastern Upper Nile in the late 1970s to oppose the GoS and the

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22 The NIF transformed itself into the NCP in 1998.
Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which ended Sudan’s first civil War. While Anyanya II followed the ideology of Anyanya I from the first civil war in favor of independence from the North, the SPLM/A advocated a united ‘New Sudan. After the SPLM/A had defeated Anyanya II, Paulino Matieb, then SPLA deputy commander, retreated with his forces to his homeland in Western Upper Nile (WUN). Paulino then reached an agreement with Gaafar Nimeiri that he could operate in WUN, and while many in the SPLA/M dismissed him as a traitor, he developed a constituency in his home region and formed the Southern Sudan Unity Movement (SSUM). There he was supported by the SAF in attacks from the SPLA, and he became one of the SAF’s most effective agents against the SPLA. His relations with the SAF normalized and after the defection of Riek Machar the forces joined into the SSDF and Paulino accepted Riek’s leadership (Young, 2007c: 15-16).

Although the SSDF and the SAF both opposed the SPLA, their relation was far from robust given the SSDF’s considerable military capacity and their support for Southern independence. The alliance between Khartoum and the SSDF was maintained by providing resources, providing cash payouts to senior commanders, and playing the ‘ethnic card’ and drawing upon popular prejudices against John Garang and the Dinka ethnic group with the SSDF being primarily Nuer (Small Arms Survey, 2006: 3). Then in 2005 the situation changed dramatically when SPLA/M leader John Garang died in a helicopter crash and he was succeeded by Salva Kiir. The more moderate Salva Kiir negotiated the Juba Declaration in January 2006, which called for the integration of the SSDF into the SPLA. Since then most (but not all) SSDF members have aligned themselves with the SPLA (Young, 2007a: 3).

Another Nuer armed group in Jonglei are the ‘Fangak Forces’. In November 2007 Major-General Gabriel Tang-Ginya (a Nuer) claimed to have maintained personal control over his forces in South Sudan, and is considered by the SPLA and UNMIS as one of the more troublesome OAG commanders. His Fangak Forces are estimated to be between 1,200 and 1,500 man strong and are dispersed in small groups in north-west Jonglei State, around Fangak town and upstream at Phom el-Zeraf. Despite much anti-SPLA sentiment Gabriel Tang-Ginya has supposedly ordered his followers to wait for the referendum of 2011 and not to provoke the SPLA in the meantime (Small Arms Survey, 2008b: 3).

Apart from these Nuer forces, there is also the Murle in Pibor but their leader Ismael Konye capitulated in October 2006. In April 2007 his Pibor Defense Force (PDF) redeployed from Pibor to Juba to be incorporated in the SPLA or to be demobilized, and Konye became a ‘peace and reconciliation’ adviser to GoSS president Salva Kiir (Small Arms Survey, 2008b: 2). Nevertheless, many people interviewed during the context analysis believe that the Murle in Pibor are still under the influence of the government in Khartoum, thinking Khartoum tries to instigate conflict between Murle and the other groups of Jonglei.

The incorporation of Murle and Nuer in the Dinka dominated SPLM/A so far is much better than expected (e.g. Riek Machar (Nuer) as Vice President of GoSS and Ismael Konye’s (Murle)

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23 A more complete historical account of the development of the SSDF can be found in Young (2006)
declaration of allegiance to the SPLA). However, it is still a very unstable and difficult situation and with most civilians being armed during the war, with heavy trauma in the region, and cleavages between the different ethnic groups being fueled by the North, the tensions remain high. These tensions are exacerbated even more by the proliferation of arms in the communities as most communities armed themselves for protection during the civil war, making it easy for conflicts to escalate. Other concerns are that the SPLM may use the integration of other ethnic groups into the SPLM/A to strengthen their control and to dominate the other groups later on (pers. comm., Dr. Simon Simonse, Nairobi, 13 May 2008). The distrust between the various groups thus remains high, which was also visible during the SPLM convention that was held from 10 to 21 May 2008. During the convention the position of Vice President Riek Machar was questioned, which was seen by the Nuer community as a move by the Dinka dominated SPLM to push the Nuer back to the margin (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May 2008).

**Conflicts within Jonglei State**

During the field work in Jonglei state a number of conflicts were mentioned during various interviews and focus group discussions. As mentioned there was a conflict between Duk (Dinka) and Uror (Nuer), which was primarily about cattle. Other conflicts identified were between Pibor (Murle) and Pochala (Anyuak), between Pibor and Pochala (Nuer), between Murle and Dinka, Murle and Nuer, and Dinka and Nuer. These (and other) conflicts had in most cases economic causes, with cattle raids being the most important one. Other issues related to access to water points and grazing lands and abductions.

**Cattle raids**

As mentioned cattle is of very high importance in the culture of most groups in Jonglei State. Cattle not only has economic value but is also ensures status. The more cows one owns, the more respect the person gets. During one of the focus group discussions an example was given of a case where a man sold the child of the woman he divorced for cows. Cattle can thus even be worth more than one’s own children. In another focus group discussion someone mentioned that “you need cattle for survival. If you have no cattle you must take it” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008). These are thus clearly economic reasons for cattle
rustling, which were also underscored by an official of UN FAO (pers. comm., Bor, 22 May 2008). Another observation made was that in some communities raiding of cattle is a custom and seen as part of becoming a man. And as a Dinka in Bor mentioned: “Most of the tribes are cattle owners [i.e. Dinka, Nuer, Murle]. They are constantly raiding each other and it is very difficult for the government control them, because the government has no means to do something and it is hard to find out where the raiders hide themselves” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008).

Being pastoralists, the tribes of Jonglei travel through the state according to the time of the season. It was often noted that Pibor is a region that completely dries out during the dry season, forcing the Murle to move with their cattle closer to the Nile, into Dinka territory. The Murle usually are allowed to stay, but then conflicts start when the rains come. Either one of the groups often takes a small number of cows from the other when the Murle are about to move back. When someone loses some of its cattle, he will mobilize some of his tribe and follow the raiders to fight them and steal as much cattle back as possible. In a focus group discussion a women explained: “Immediately they claim war with them. There is no talking, no nothing. They fight. The government is too slow to react. They have to follow them immediately.” This is not just an issue between Murle and Dinka. A Murle interviewed admitted that Murle also raid from the Nuer and the Fanyak and other sources and reports show that cattle raids are also undertaken by Nuer as well as the Dinka. As one interviewee mentioned; “with cattle owners, where ever you are, there are always problems because of the need for more cattle and then it’s okay to raid. And that is not just Murle” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008).

Marriage in these cattle cultures is a way to redistribute wealth, as cows are being used as dowry. A girl can thus be used by a family to acquire cattle, whereas a boy is used to take care and protect the cattle, and possibly raid it. The dowry for marrying a girl is now at least fifty cows, but can even go far beyond a hundred, which is already too high for many people in Jonglei. When one wants to marry a girl one consults her father for the amount of dowry. In case more men are interested this can cause the men to drive up the amount they are willing to pay. In some cases even higher than the amount of cattle they have, forcing themselves to go raid the missing amount of cattle. If stolen cows are used as dowry and they are identified by the righteous owner, this will likely cause conflict between the families, or even the tribes involved (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008). A consequence of this dowry system is also that most marriages are forced, and only the males in the family decide over the dowry and who gets to marry the daughter. Although modernity is catching up in some places in Jonglei, this custom still perseveres, limiting the opportunities for women, and thus the development of the region. Moreover, a UNDP official stated that “people are taken up with success in marriage and are preoccupied with getting cows to get married. But the revenues of owning cows are not good. Young people get stressed and this is no sustainable development” (pers. comm., Bor, May 2008). The need to obtain as many cows as possible thus diverts attention from actual development and even leads to more conflicts as cattle is being raided. That raiding of cattle is

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24 As cows are very important in these pastoralist cultures, the owner will know every head of cattle it has and recognize it, often even having a name for every cow (Author’s field notes. Jonglei. May/June 2008).
primarily an economic issue is strengthened by the fact that people mentioned that raiding of cattle is becoming detached from tribe, and that young men (even in groups of mixed ethnicity) do it simply to obtain cattle. Nevertheless it is sometimes taken up as a political issue between tribes (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008).

Abductions

Another issue generating conflict in the region is the abduction of children. In the interviews in Bor the most mentioned cause of the abductions is the low fertility rate of the Murle, combined with a history of slavery in the region.

*We* [Murle] are trying to discourage this child abduction, since it is similar to child slavery. *Any educated Murle is trying to discourage this practice. But men and women complain that they don’t produce [children]. A women needs to produce ten, and they, or it’s because of the men, I don’t know, they produce only three or four.* (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008).

It is sometimes also claimed that the Murle are fierce warriors, who have always abducted children from neighboring tribes (IRC, 2004: 36). Indeed, the Murle are generally seen as an aggressive tribe compared to their neighbors. This may partially be attributed to the fact that there is less water on their lands, forcing them to take their cattle further afield for grazing and watering, producing a more aggressive state of mind; a comparable observation is made by Young about the Lou Nuer, Gawaar Nuer, and Duk Dinka (2007b: 15). This observation also is underscored by an interviewee, who said that “Dinka is peaceful, but Nuer are almost like us [Murle],” referring to their aggressive nature (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008). Moreover, abductions are often linked to conflicts over grazing land, forced recruitment, internal disputes between tribes, and “abductions have been used as a military tactic and tool” (IRC, 2004: 34).

Abductions, however, are not only carried out by Murle, as other tribes are just as known to abduct children. Referring to the Dinka and Nuer, for instance, Hutchinson observes that “it was not uncommon for past generations of raiders to carry off young women and children to be absorbed as full members of the family” (2000: 8). And when people go for cattle raids, they just take the children who are looking after the cattle along. Children are needed to look after cattle (boys), or to acquire more cattle (girls through dowry). Moreover, the more children one has, the more respect one gets, and having more children also means your tribe will have a bigger army. The practice of abducting children is also exacerbated by the selling of children, which one interviewee mentioned “is now a new style for the Dinka.” If a girl has a child of a relative (usually because of rape by an uncle or cousin25) the girl and the child have to leave the family, as this is forbidden in the Dinka culture. The girl and the child will be given to the Murle in exchange for cattle. This has somewhat ‘normalized’ the entire practice of selling children. And

25 A big problem is that there is no legislation against rape or defilement in South Sudan.
although it is not accepted and attempts are made to discourage it, it is generally known that
the price of a child is between twenty and fifty heads of cattle\textsuperscript{26}. Moreover, some Dinka
admitted that poor people now also sell their own children for cows, or abduct children to sell
them to the Murle; “A kid can also be sold for animals. And it is easier to rob a child and sell it
for cattle than to steal cattle.” A Murle also mentioned Dinka abducting children to sell them to
the Murle, but claimed that often the Dinka will then tell the police he saw a Murle abduct a
child and the police will then of course find the child with the Murle. The Dinka keeps the cows
that were paid with, the child returns, and the Murle will go to prison. “And this then annoys
us [Murle] and we will revenge heavily, also with abduction” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei,
May/June 2008). It becomes clear that the abduction of children is a great problem, not only as
it is violating human rights, but also as it is often followed by revenge and becomes a cause of
conflict.

Land disputes and power struggles

Since the CPA there have been some struggles in Jonglei over land, borders, or/and power. During
a focus group discussion with youth members from Jonglei, for instance, it was
suggested that disputes over land (and the place of the borders between states and counties)
arose when and where oil was discovered and people are getting more aware of the resources
of the land. People also have started claiming land close to the Nile, in order to have water in
periods of drought. There is also a problem of trespassing land in order to get cattle from one
place to the other, looking for grazing fields and water (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June
2008).

Ownership of land is contested, now that the government in the cities calls for the registration
of land. “In the past you just put a mark and it was yours. Now it is a struggle to get land and
communities have representatives in the government which makes the land contestation
politicized.” An example was given of the counties Bor, Uror and Duk. Apart from a language
barrier, the people from these counties intermarry and share culture which makes the borders
unclear, from which arises conflict over the borders. They also share markets, but nevertheless
“the situation is fragile and can erupt overnight” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008).

Another example mentioned in various interviews was that of Khorflus County. Before the
signing of the CPA the county was called Atar. After the CPA the representatives to the state
and GoSS came from Khorfus and changed the name without consulting the people from Atar,
who now feel under-represented. Other examples are of North Bor becoming divided in the
new counties Twic East and Duk. When shown the latest available map of Jonglei made
available by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), people also
corrected the counties Wuror and Diror to be together and named Uror, and the county Waat is
claimed to be a part of the county Nyirol (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008). All

\textsuperscript{26} People could even explain in detail that a boy is more expensive than a girl, as the girl will leave the
family when she gets married. And the younger a child, the more expensive it is, since a young child with
no recollection of its birth parents is less likely to run away (Author’s field notes. Jonglei. May/June 2008).
these constant changes of borders and names of the counties (which are often named after a payam, village or city within the county) reflect the struggles of ethnic groups, ethnic subgroups, and clans over representation at state level and control over resources within these counties. One UNDP official explained it as following:

*Within Jonglei we may not even be talking about consolidating peace, but about how to bring about peace between counties, between tribes. There are many inter-tribal challenges. This used mainly to concern the Dinka with the Murle, but now also others such as the Nuer. There is fighting over the peace dividend and clans are trying to divide the counties.* (pers. comm., Bor, 22 May 2008)

### Ethnic tensions

And indeed ethnicity (or tribe) is an issue that cannot be neglected in the Sudanese context. In a study undertaken by PACT concludes that most conflicts in South Sudan are ethnically based. Important here, however, is to note that “that two-thirds of these are politicized, or fueled by external political actors (italics added, qtd. in: Bradbury et al., 2004). Because as Jok Madut Jok describes, race and ethnicity in Sudan is often used “as a mechanism for allocation of rights, resources and social standing” (italics added, 2007: 12). The underlying causes of the war should thus be determined viewing ethnicity – from a constructivist perspective – as something fabricated and structured to benefit those who benefit from the conflict (conflict entrepreneurs). But while not accepting ethnicity as a cause for conflict, the reality it may play for people on the ground (with the consequences this may have) should not be neglected. Especially since during interviews the blame for many problems were often put with ‘the others,’ who were sometimes given descriptions that painted a picture of uncivilized animals, rather than people with cultures very close to theirs. And a GoSS official even stated in a formal interview that “the Murle, and some Nuer, some ..., these types of people are now the enemies of the CPA, they don’t want to implement the CPA” (pers. comm., Bor, 22 May 2008). As this statement – and the following paragraphs – show, there are still high tensions between the various ethnic groups. And although most groups in Jonglei are strongly related to each other, and have cultures that show many resemblances, they also have a long history of raiding cattle from each other. And as will be discussed later in this section, the years of civil war have had great consequences for the way the various groups interact (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008).

As mentioned earlier, the attack on the Bor Dinka by the Nuer after the split within the SPLA in 1991 created a wound that is still felt today. And although there is no hard evidence and it is often only aired by those interested in weakening unity in the SPLA, it is also suggested that “the Bor Dinka resentment and a desire for revenge caused the SPLA High Command to unleash the violent disarmament campaign on the Lou Nuer” (Young, 2007a: 3). That these tensions are still felt today became clear during a focus groups discussion with women:

*Lou Nuer were with the Government [of Khartoum], although they where with the SPLA before [referring to SSDF]. Even if there was disarmament they had*
many weapons from both SPLA and SAF and just surrendered one. We don’t
know now who they belong to. They have made themselves a people who do not fall
under any authority. (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008)

Most resentment in Bor (where mainly Dinka reside), however, was against the Murle. Refering
to Pibor (where most Murle live) the Civil Administrator of Baidit payam, for instance,
mentioned that “it is only one county who is disturbing all counties. If the government can
bring out the guns from them, the whole state will be in peace” (pers. comm., Michael Jok
Major, Bor, 26 May 2008). And also the Commissioner of Bor County claimed that “the main
community making trouble is the Murle” and according to him in 2007 the Murle had raided
13,000 heads of cattle, killed 57, wounded 57, and abducted 17 in Bor County alone. He also
noted that because of this insecurity the communities in his county were arming themselves
(pers. comm., Abraham Arng Jok, Bor, 28 May 2008).

The Murle are indeed known to be relatively aggressive compared to the other tribes in Jonglei.
Raiding cattle is a question of honor and valor and references to herds captured in battle or
raids are made in their songs (Gurtong, 2008), although the practice of cattle raiding is as
mentioned common to all pastoralists in Jonglei. Many people, however, made comments about
the Murle that exceeded realities (see Box 4.), forgetting to mention that their people from their
own ethnic groups also participate in cattle raids and abductions. And an observation made by
a business man who traveled to Pibor a little earlier contrasted these remarks:

People here say that the Murle are very hostile and like war and all that. But when
I was there they were very friendly. They are so polite to strangers. They even
slaughter a bull for you and welcome you, unlike here. (Author’s field notes,
Jonglei, May/June 2008)

Moreover, in a survey of the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) in another part of
South Sudan (Maridi and Yei counties) it are the Dinka who are perceived to be the most violent
and aggressive (Ashkenazi et al., 2008: 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 6. Selected statements from Dinka about Murle.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“With Murle stealing is part of life. If you don’t want to rob and steal, you are not a man.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a Murle dies during a raid, people don’t cry. It’s normal. Previously they didn’t even bury their dead, but just left them for the vultures.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“It is the way of survival they have adopted, and they are a very tough people. They can survive in the bush for a long time, and just sleep in the open air, eat what is around. They can even eat mud if there is no food.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“They are Africans, although they have given themselves to the Khartoum government.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Abduction is just a way of getting a child to them.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If we want to stop the problem, we have to stop the problem at the roots; which is the Murle."

“So there is fear, but I cannot explain what brought this conflict, but in my analysis it is in their nature to rob.”

(Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008)

The division between the Murle and the Dinka has been exacerbated by the fact that the Murle fought alongside the SAF against the SPLA during the civil war. Moreover, in a number of interviews people showed their fears that the government in Khartoum is still trying to instigate conflict between the Murle and Dinka by providing the Murle with arms and ammunition. Another reason for the tensions with the Murle is caused by a lack of good infrastructure in Jonglei. Pibor, the capital of Pibor County, is only accessible by road with a maximum of five months out of the year. Easy access is only possible between January and March and when it rains planes can also not land, making the region only accessible by helicopter. People therefore simply hardly interact (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008).

From a Murle perspective, however, there are many fears of being marginalized. Although attempts are being made to divide the posts in Jonglei - the Commissioner is Dinka, the Deputy is Nuer, the Speaker is Murle - there are many ethnic groups who fear that the SPLA and GoSS leadership are dominated by the Dinka. Also the courts are not perceived to be fair by the Murle, where a situation can now arise where a Murle is judged by Dinka for an alleged crime committed against Dinka. When the Arabs were still in control, so it was explained by a Murle, “they would bring someone from another tribe to rule fairly. But now everything is controlled by the Dinka.” The same man also stated that “we lack everything [in Pibor]; education, health services, water, both for human beings and animals. In the time of the Arabs there was only one borehole provided in the county.” This marginalization, again, is also largely caused by the lack of infrastructure (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008).

An incident that further exacerbated the tensions occurred in Bor in November 2007. Many Dinka attacked the Murle who were in Bor, killing a large number of Murle and causing most other Murle to flee back to Pibor. An interviewed Murle commented about the incident:

Many people were killed, even the sick in the hospitals, who were sent here [Bor Town] because there are no good hospitals in Pibor. And the killing was done by security personnel, those who were supposed to protect them. (…) And the government didn’t see it as bad, but they took it as a good lesson for the Murle. The government did, until the present time, not take any action. It is up to now not secure here for the Murle. (…) There is a lot of fear. Everything is controlled by the Dinka. Most of the politicians and all of the police are Dinka. How can we feel safe? (…) If the security forces were mixed, they would not have done this.

(Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008)
So it is clear that although most conflicts within Jonglei have economic roots – with cattle raiding being the most important one – the tensions between the various ethnic groups play an important role in the conflict dynamics.

**Youth**

Apart from deepening tensions between ethnic groups in the region, the conflict has also led to a social and cultural breakdown. Moreover, there is the argument – albeit still controversial – that there is a correlation between a large youthful population and conflict, as young people are often the protagonists of protest, reform and revolution. This argument is also made by Samuel P. Huntington in his book *The Clash of Civilizations*, where also Sudan is expected to have a youth bulge, which is defined as a peak of the 15-24 year old group in the population greater than twenty per cent (Huntington, 1996: 119). And indeed the median age in Sudan is 18.7 years (CIA Factbook, 2008), and in 2005 40.7 per cent of the population was under fifteen years of age (UNDP, 2008). It is, however, not fair to attribute the problems in Sudan to the fact that there just happens to be a lot of youth. But, according to the UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) conflict causes a spiral of conflict, in that it prevents children from gaining education and turn excludes them from mainstream society, making them easy recruits for militias. “It is generally believed that as long as young people see themselves as outcasts, they are more likely to seek immediate solutions to their survival, including warfare” (IRIN, 2007). And in the report *The Role of Sudanese Youth in the Post Conflict Situation* the youth themselves make a similar observation:

> The Sudanese youth especially in the south, were born in the war and became militarily oriented. The element has rooted to a culture of hatred, hostility and aggressiveness. It is a challenge because the young people would take time and dedicate their energy to eradicate this culture, meanwhile we deplore the fact that in some areas, youth are mobilized to fight in the militias (2008: 2).

This idleness of the youth together with a large proliferation of arms is now aggravating the situation. As the Commissioner of Bor County complained: “now with arms the youth is looting and robbing those who are passing on the roads” (pers. comm., Abraham Arng Jok, Bor, 28 May 2008).

Apart from this, the availability of arms also causes a social and cultural breakdown. One youth mentioned during a focus group discussion that, “there is a lack of respect for the rule of law, but with a gun you can get respect. There is the breakdown of the rule of law, but also the breakdown of the traditional rule by elders who are now helpless against the many youngsters with guns” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008). As is seen in many post conflict situations, the availability of arms causes a social and cultural breakdown. This is especially evident in Jonglei, where the availability of arms has led to a proliferation of youth groups, making them easy recruits for militias. It is generally believed that as long as young people see themselves as outcasts, they are more likely to seek immediate solutions to their survival, including warfare. This is especially evident in Jonglei, where the availability of arms has led to a proliferation of youth groups, making them easy recruits for militias.

27 Due to the problems encountered mentioned earlier, the research limits itself here to the tensions between the three largest groups in Jonglei. With this the most important frictions between groups are nevertheless discussed.
countries where young people actively participated in conflict, the traditional values that balanced society have been (partially) broken down. Where before an elder was deeply respected, young people now find themselves in a situation where they can be respected themselves; by carrying and using a firearm.

Previously elders were very respected by the youth, but things have changed. Previously elders were more feared and more respected. Violating something said by an elder was seen as a curse, which would come back to you. But the war has changed this. This generation doesn’t even listen to their parents anymore. Before people fought with whips or sometimes sticks to prove who was the strongest and show bravery, but now they just kill each other. (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008)

Moreover, in the pastoralist cultures – in Jonglei especially those of the Nuer and Mule – being a warrior is very something important. And in the past there have always been raids between the tribes, albeit that this used to be done with traditional weapons and guided by strong moral values. During interviews it was often mentioned that today’s youth feels neglected by the demands of the elders for peace. The new generation feels that it is their turn to be warriors now, just as the elders had their chance in the past (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008).

The elders of Murle and elders of Dinka will not solve anything. The youth not accepting [peace] and claiming it is their time. They say: ‘you have been raiding all these years. Why stop now?’ (pers. comm., Alier Michael Molet, Civil Administrator Jalle payam, Bor, 26 May 2008)

In order to find ways to take away the incentives to take up arms this issue can therefore not be neglected. The large and young population without education and economic opportunities together with the proliferation of arms makes the situation very difficult. But with the borders of the region being very porous, simply taking away arms from the youth will not solve anything. A similar attempt has been made to disarm the youth of the white army, yet reports show that the region is still full of arms, and cattle raids and other conflicts are far from uncommon. Before going further with the issue of disarmament, however, the consequences of the war and the proliferation of arms will be further discussed.

Remnants of war

After the CPA there was the formation of the government. The first bullet was shot here in 1983, about 7 km away from here where we are now. So since then until the CPA, for 22 years there has been no government at all. The population of the

28 These cultural and moral values will be discussed more thoroughly shortly
SPLM has since 1991 almost completely been a displaced population. (pers. comm., Abraham Arng Jok, Bor, 28 May 2008)

Understandably, like the commissioner of Bor County explains in the above statement, twenty-two years of war has made a big impact on the country. There is hardly any development and, as David Lochhead observed, for many people an assault rifle such as the AK-47 is the only piece of modern equipment they own (2007). There is easy access to weapons, but not to medicines. However, development is a long-term project that needs to be undertaken by the people themselves, as opposed to emergency relief aid, and a self-help ethic is almost absent. Many respondents asked questions such as: “What is the international community going to do to help? Why is UNMIS only monitoring and not intervening?” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008). As an NGO field worker mentioned, “People are used to receive tangible things, and not used to soft projects. (…) For many years they have been living with the perspective of surviving another day and these long-term [development] projects are just very abstract to them” (pers. comm., Bor, 23 May 2008). There is also a lot of food and income insecurity, and there is hardly any production in the state making it dependent on imports.

Many people also noted that almost all of the GoS budgets go to salaries, leaving nothing for developing the institutions and the country. Indeed, a government official explained that there is much pressure to absorb the workforce. One official state that “these are transitional periods, from peace to war, and people are also not sure about 2011 [referendum] so the government does not want to frustrate;” referring to the high tensions between the various groups in the state. There already is a lot of uncertainty about what is going to happen, and it is feared that firing people and create more space in the budget will increase tensions (pers. comm., Bor, May 2008). That is one explanation given, but likely patrimonialism also plays a big role here, and giving friends and family a job within the government is preferred over investing in the development of the state. In most courtyards of the ministries in Bor, many people were just sitting there and getting paid. And most GoS officials were complaining not to have money for computers or internet to work on, or that there were no means of transportation within an
entire ministry. Nevertheless another GoSS official had a large flat screen in his office with CCN trough satellite connection on the background during the interview (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008).

But of course one cannot expect from a government that is just being born to function with perfection. Apart from a limited budget and much unemployment it is facing more problems. The new government of South Sudan is also struggling with the traditional leadership. As mentioned earlier, the elders are losing ground and respect to the youth. Moreover, they are also losing terrain against the GoSS, as it is trying to establish itself as having the monopoly on state power. During the research period in many interviews a tension was noticed between the traditional and local governing institutions (at village, payam, and also state level) and the GoSS level (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008).

Moreover, in an interview with Handicap International, it was argued that the level of violent trauma is exceptionally high in Jonglei, compared to the rest of South Sudan (pers. comm., Bor, 23 May 2008). Reasons for this could be that the civil war started there, as well as the recent violent disarmament campaigns of the government. Whatever the reasons, during the research period it was observed several times how people – otherwise very friendly – could become very aggressive over mere trivial issues (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008).

Apart from causing trauma, the war has also changed culture and customs. There is on the one hand a big gap between those who fled to other countries and those who stayed in Sudan during the war. There are a number of people who fled overseas, of which many are regularly visiting family, and a large number has returned from the refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda. Those who came back often had at least some form of education in the refugee camps, are often more familiar with ‘modernity’, and speak English (next to their mother tongue), whereas those who stayed are less influenced by other cultures and generally speak Arabic. This causes misunderstandings and tensions between those who stayed and those who fled. The latter, for instance, sometimes being referred to as ‘wewe’ by those who stayed, which means ‘you’ in Swahili and but depending on the tone can be used as an insult, implying cowardice in the Sudanese context. Another example was given by a UNDP official in Bor, who had to mediate in a family issue. The mother had come back from the refugee camps together with her daughter and as her husband had passed away in the war she moved in with her brother-in-law. The mother wanted to send the girl to school, just like she was in the refugee camps, yet the uncle wanted the girl to stay at home, as girls are not supposed to go to school according to the older people. Although now also the ways of those who stayed are changing, this illustrates the cultural tensions that arise today.

Indeed, one could often distinguish between young people who had stayed behind in Sudan and those who came back from the refugee camps, with the latter dressing in more modern and different styles of clothes from the West and other African countries, a wide variety of braided hair styles, and girls wearing jewelry and make-up.
Moreover, the war has changed the cultural customs that controlled war tactics of the pastoralists of Jonglei. Warriors should in principle adhere to the will of their chiefs and elders, and when they go to war they were instructed on the ethics of warfare. These ethical principles prescribe them not to ambush or kill their enemy outside the battlefield, and a fallen warrior covered by a woman for protection (women accompanied men in the battle to help the wounded and collect spears) must be spared, since harming women and children was strictly forbidden (Deng, 1998: 107). In fact, as Hutchinson describes, this was seen as not only cowardly but also “as a direct confront against God as the ultimate guardian of human morality.” Such an act would doubtlessly provoke divine anger and cause sickness, sudden death or other misfortunes. Acts of homicide within each ethnic group were governed by “cultural ethics and spiritual taboos” and the slayer would need purification and pay blood wealth cattle compensation to the family’s victim, and before the second civil war homicide hardly occurred. “Regional codes of warfare ethics also precluded the burning of houses and the destruction of crops,” although it was not uncommon to abduct young women and children to absorb them into their own families (Hutchinson, 2000: 8-10). These ethical restraints during intra- and inter-ethnic conflict gradually unraveled during the north-south war, as South Sudanese were forcibly drafted by both the SAF as well as the SPLA. To make sure their troops would follow their orders, SPLA commanders thus had to dismantle (at least for the time being) the earlier restraints on intra-ethnic violence that were so well respected before. Hutchinson observed this with the Nuer and Dinka, but an interviewed Murle gave a similar explanation:

> Before Murle would not kill another Murle, because the blood of a brother would effect the whole family of the perpetrator. He would have to move because he could not even drink from the same water [Nile] anymore. But these days it has become very common, because the soldiers, the movement [SPLA] ordered them to kill their brothers. (pers. comm., Bor, May 2008)

Hutchinson also attributes the changes in behavior to the introduction of firearms. “Unlike individually crafted spears (...) the source of a bullet lodged deep into someone’s body was far more difficult to trace,” a warrior would not know as easily who he had killed and thus inter-ethnic homicide become more and more ‘depersonalized’ and ‘secularized.’ The shift from spears to guns also led to the acceptance of ambushes, surprise and night-time attacks, the burning of houses and the intentional destruction of local food supplies. Now that the war is over, these changes in behavior nevertheless remain as remnants of the war. As mentioned by several interviewees cattle raids and abductions have changed for the worse. Raping is mentioned to have become a part of them, as well as killing women and children. Also, raiders and bandits now use the weapons and military tactics, such as hit-and-run tactics, which they learned from the war (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008). The past traditions that regulated cattle raids and warfare of the pastoralists in Jonglei, thus seem to have no influence anymore today.
Proliferation of arms

Due to the war there are many arms in the communities. Based on UN Comtrade data, the Small Arms Survey concludes that between 1992-2005 at least 35 countries have exported small arms, light weapons and ammunition valued at almost USD 70 million to Sudan, of which ninety-six per cent were from China and Iran. It is estimated that between 1.9-3.2 million SALW circulate in Sudan, of which two-thirds is held by civilians twenty per cent by the GoS and the remainder by the GoSS and other armed groups (Small Arms Survey, 2007b: 1-2). With two thirds of the SALW in hands of the civilian population in Sudan, civilian disarmament becomes vital to the stabilization of the situation. The dynamics of SAWL trade in the Horn of Africa is conditioned by a number of structural factors. The political tension and environmental scarcity at the regional level give rise to the diffusion of arms, and migratory patterns facilitate their transfer across boarders. The poor payment of security forces leads to the selling of weapons to civilians, and there has also been a tradition of outsourcing armed conflict to non-state groups. Targeted embargoes on state transfers will limit the impact of arms flows to and from Sudan, mainly affecting the GoS and some larger armed groups supported by the state. The unregulated ownership of arms by civilians “provides a monumental challenge to human security in Sudan” (Small Arms Survey, 2007b: 2-10).

Although gunshots are hardly heard today, compared to several times a week at the beginning of the year, many people mentioned that, “you need a gun, a gun is your protection” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008). Moreover, it should also be noted that the possession of a weapon is very important in the culture pastoralists. Martial values hold a central place and in the recent years of war these values have been linked with the possession of firearms. A gun is often given by a father to his sun with his initiation into adulthood. Disarmament thus not only means the loss of weapons and a means to protect themselves, their family and their cattle. The loss of their weapon also means a symbolical loss of manhood and “a return to childhood, and a reassertion of the power of the fathers and the traditional community leadership” (Young, 2007a: 3).

And it is relatively easy to obtain a firearm. During a survey of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) it was found that it in the last years the ease to acquire firearms has remained unchanged. Although this survey focused on other states than Jonglei (Central and Western Equatoria), there is no reason to believe this is different for Jonglei. Moreover, the survey found that places people acquire firearms from are individuals, soldiers, wildlife protection services personnel, dealers on the black market and the police. It also found that
people can rent a firearm from soldiers and police, the costs varying between 250 and 25 USD (Ashkenazi et al., 2008: 38-39). During the field research many people noted (always talking about other people, never about themselves) that a lot of people have both a rifle or shot gun, as well as a handgun, which can more easily be concealed.

An indeed, during the research many people were observed with AK-47 and other assault rifles in the rural areas alongside the Juba-Bor road, whereas firearms were not openly carried in the towns. However, also in the towns guns were seen in civilian hands on a number of occasions30 (Author’s field notes, Jonglei/Juba, May/June 2008). This is also confirmed by a research of the Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA)31 in Jonglei, which shows that the carrying of small arms had decreased dramatically since the signing of the CPA, with 46.6 per cent of the respondents carrying weapons before the CPA and only 2.1 per cent carrying weapons after the CPA. Interestingly is also the observation that before the CPA more people inside Pibor (11.9 per cent with n=143) traveled without any weapon than outside of Pibor (9.5 per cent with n=713), and fewer Pibor residents carried a rifle or gun than did residents of the other surveyed counties (33.1 per cent with n=143 as opposed to 49.1 per cent with n=713)32. This, however, does not mean gun possession has decreased dramatically. Of the respondents 78.3 per cent (n=660) thought is best to own one or more firearms to protect family and cattle. Only a limited number answered direct questions on gun possession, but of these respondents 90.7 per cent (n=150) outside of Pibor and 92.1 per cent (n=38) inside Pibor admitted to have at least one firearm (Garfield, 2007: 32-34).

And apart from easy to acquire, a firearm is also relatively cheap. With prices varying between 100 USD in rural areas and 500 USD in the city of Juba. And in Bor the price of a pistol was about 150 USD and an AK-47 could be acquired for 300 USD. These prices of course also

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30 One time in hotel in Juba the staff found a gun in the toilet; someone had taken the gun out of his pants to use the bathroom and just forgot it there as he left; exemplifying how careless people are with firearms.

31 The HSBA is a three-year research project (2005-08) administered by the Small Arms Survey and is developed in cooperation with the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNMIS, UNDP, and a variety of international and Sudanese NGOs. The research was undertaken in January 2007, and a team of sixteen interviewers from local communities took household surveys in five of the eleven counties in Jonglei, completing 880 interviews.

32 These figures must be treated with much bias, however, as owning of guns is not frequently admitted. Especially with the increased penalties for gun carrying and the lingering disarmament campaign of the government.
depend on circumstances, the age of the weapons, etc. In comparison, in Juba a night at a hotel including breakfast costs 120 USD (Author’s field notes, Jonglei/Juba, May/June 2008).

The proliferation of arms is an obvious security risk. One can also witness many people walking with traditional weapons such as spears and fighting sticks. But as was mentioned in several interviews, “A problem is that people don’t rely on traditional weapons. In the past we had sticks, but now guns. The presence of guns aggravates conflict.” It is argued that with guns people are more likely to get killed, which often leads to revenge, and a spiral of violence. “People keep their guns for reasons of defense, but then use them to attack.” Arms are now also used to earn a living. As looting was allowed during times of hunger in the war, and with very poor people owning guns this can be found an easy way to get an income. Gangs are said to form, even inter-ethnic, robbing from their own clans and tribes. It is also mentioned that there is misuse by soldiers and police (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008). As a field worker of Handicap International noted, also many accidents happen as children find guns, and people accidentally shoot others or themselves while cleaning their weapon (pers. comm., Bor, 23 May 2008).

**Security in Jonglei**

As mentioned earlier, one of the main reasons for people to acquire a weapon is security. A gun, one says, is your protection. And security indeed remains a big problem in Jonglei. A report by the HSBA finds that victimization remains a frequent occurrence in the years after the CPA, with almost 85 per cent (n=767) reporting being a victim at least once, 27.7 per cent (n=637) more than once, and 44.8 per cent (n=486) even more than twice. More than half of the households had been robbed, and 41.2 per cent (n=880) claimed that robbery with a weapon had become the most common violent crime, but the number of events varied a lot across the counties (see table 3). Notable is that the number of victimization events is lowest in Pibor (Garfield, 2007: 26-33).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Number of events</th>
<th>Number of residents</th>
<th>Average victimization per person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ayod</td>
<td>2,102</td>
<td>1,924</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duk</td>
<td>1,258</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyirol</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uror</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>1,697</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pibor</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarmament: The Case of Jonglei (Garfield, 2007: 31)

Although there are still many crimes most people noted that it is much safer in Bor and people also feel safer. This is largely attributed to more presence of SPLA and police. At night there are checkpoints checking people going in and out the town (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June
This is backed by statistics of the Small Arms Survey, which show that sixty-seven per cent of the interviewed in Jonglei feel safer today, compared to before the CPA. Interestingly, according to research, 53.5 per cent of the people in Pibor find security the same or worse as before the disarmament in 2007 (Garfield, 28-29: 2007). This partially reflects the distrust of Murle of neighboring communities and in the ability or willingness of the SPLA and police to protect them.

Although focusing on two different states in South Sudan, interesting are also the survey findings of the BICC, which show that over seventy per cent of the people interviewed admit that the presence of people with guns stop them from traveling from one area to another or going into the bush. Forty-five per cent of the interviewed claim not to be able to get the goods they need because of this insecurity and sixty per cent is no longer working their lands (Ashkenazi et al., 2008: 28). Similar arguments were made by interviewees in Jonglei (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008). As it was not possible to travel further into the state, into more rural areas, it is also interesting to find that the BICC research shows that security is more of a problem in rural areas than it is in urban ones (Ashkenazi et al., 2008: 29). This means that the demand for the people to have a weapon is likely to be stronger in the rural areas.

The BICC survey also observes that South Sudanese “citizens are not well-serviced in the area of security, and as a consequence, must ensure the possibility of providing their own security” (Ashkenazi et al., 2008: 33). Many soldiers and police do not receive regular salaries. This does not only result in protests, but also in looting of property during military campaigns, renting out of firearms to civilians, and a general reduction in morale, resulting in unprofessional behavior and even drunkenness while on duty. Although covering a different area, it is still interesting to note that the BICC survey found that sixty-three per cent had trust in the boma authorities and sixty-one per cent in the community police. However, less than half of the surveyed people said to have trust in the police and the military police (Ibid., 2008: 36).

It is also very difficult for the state institutions to provide security with such limited resources. A UNDP officer stated that the state institutions have a very limited capacity. “It is very challenging to change people from one situation [as a soldier in war] to another [as police officers in peace]. Moreover, the legal instruments are not very clear, and the judiciary is understaffed with only 3 or 4 judges for the state” (pers. comm., Bor, May 2008). Together with the UNDP, UNMIS is trying to strengthen the security sector, but limited resources are not the only obstacle. Workshops are given, among other things, and although a high ranking UN official was very proud of these workshops claiming them to be very successful, an UNMIS soldier giving these workshops was less cheerful.
According to him the prison guards and wildlife rangers participated, but the police is far from interested and officers only attend his workshops because they have to, but do not actively participate (pers. comm., Bor, May 2008).

Also, although not backed by substantial evidence, it was often heard that in the area of Bor Town Dinka could carry weapons without the police or SPLA intervening, whereas other groups could not. (Author’s field notes, Jonglei/Juba, May/June 2008). True or not, this shows a deep distrust in the security forces and fear of Dinka domination. This distrust in the security sector to ‘serve and protect’ and the continuing experience of insecurity in the form of theft, rape, and conflict with neighboring communities is, as mentioned before, the root cause of the demand for arms by the population of Jonglei. “In this context, and in the absence of a robust state security apparatus, the acquisition and use of small arms is part and parcel of both self-defense and livelihood maintenance patterns” (Garfield, 2007: 37).

Ways to solve conflict

Nevertheless there is still some trust in the police, and this is improving. When asked by the Small Arms survey who one would contact if there was an attack on their family 64.8 per cent (n=880) of the respondents reported that they would ‘tell the police’ (Garfield, 2007: 35-36). While this is an optimistic figure, the information gathered during the field research suggests that in the case of cattle raids people are more likely to mobilize clan members and pursue with arms themselves immediately, claiming that the government works too slow; “You take your gun and go after them. You don’t go to the police or to elders; you do it yourself.” This, however, gets out of hand relatively easy. One example of this was given in a focus group discussion. The Mundari came to Dinka territory during the 2006 dry season to graze their cattle. When they left, two cows from the Dinka were missing, but the Mundari claimed not to have taken them. In the dry season of 2007 the Mundari came again, but this year the original owner discovered his cows in the herds of the Mundari. He then stole his cows back, and took some cows from the Mundari. This can easily snowball into a large conflict between communities, whereas timely mediation by a third party (i.e. the independent security sector) could prevent this (Author’s field notes, Jonglei/Juba, May/June 2008).

One reason for this is clearly the limited capacity of state security institutions. There is a number of problems, with limited resources being the most obvious. As mentioned in the previous paragraph on security in Jonglei there is also the challenge of moving from a situation of war in which people got accustomed to military command structures to a situation of peace. The commissioner of Bor, having a long military background, for instance stated that, “the problems of cattle raiding, abduction and looting are a lot harder to tackle now. Now we have a government with a lot of bureaucracies while in the past you could easily give the order” (pers. comm., Abraham Arng Jok, Bor, 28 May 2008). And as mentioned before, there are tensions

33 Other options where: ‘tell chief or elders,’ ‘tell family member(s),’ ‘tell SPLA,’ ‘tell other government official,’ ‘tell church leader.’
between the traditional and local level leadership and the leadership at GoSS level. Moreover, these tensions are strengthened, and the capacity of the security sector is undermined, by the fact that there are differences between the traditional legal systems of the various groups in Jonglei. With a weak GoSS legal system, this makes it much harder for the security sector to perform. Nevertheless traditional chiefs’ courts are were seen in session in Bor. Elders, chiefs, the offending parties and the families themselves here come to a solution, often involving public display of regret, possibly punishment in the form of beatings with a stick or whip or imprisonment, and the payment of cattle for inflicted damages (Author’s field notes, Jonglei/Juba, May/June 2008).

To solve disputes between communities there are often peace conferences, either organized by the communities themselves or by local or international NGOs. Although these conferences doubtlessly contribute to the interaction between the different communities, there are some limitations to them and a number of lessons learned have been observed. One SPLM official, for instance, stated that,

> Big conferences [with people at GoSS level] don’t have much impact, but if small groups understand themselves from the grassroots and then from there know how to continue, it will lead to something. If it is done at the GoSS level without knowing what is going on in the community they [conferences] are nothing but political rallies. (pers. comm., Bor, May 2008)

Another problem with the conferences is that they, to the communities, appear not to bring any tangible results or peace dividends. It was often commented that during a conference some resolutions would be drawn up, but that there is no follow-up. A lack of self-help ethics again appears to be a problem, as a resolution is not perceived as something that the communities will have to continue to work on and follow-up is expected from outside. The civil administrator of Jalle payam, for instance stated that, “there is a conference, then there is a resolution, but there is no follow-up. After that nothing happens and it fails” (pers. comm., Bor, May 2008). Moreover, with by viewing a resolution as a result that is obtained rather than a tool that one has to work with, there is the risk of easily perceiving a resolution as a failure. As one interviewee noted, “resolutions talk about stopping raiding and looting and peaceful coexistence, but their implementation has never been successful” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008). With only one bandit raiding some cattle a resolution as a result is seen as a failure, because what is written down is apparently not based on the facts on the ground. A resolution as a tool, however, can still be used to make the peace process work.

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34 Due to the fact that many NGOs active in peace and reconciliation need to show results in order to legitimize their spending and obtain funds it is noticed that they too tend to present a resolution as end-results, as it is very difficult to show the tangible results desired by those who divide the funds.
Past disarmament campaigns

Before continuing with the disarmament in Jonglei, the past attempts at disarmament cannot be neglected. As mentioned in the introduction of this case-study, defining the characteristics of organized armed groups is very difficult, especially in Sudan, where groups are sometimes merely armed rebel groups not under state control and where, as mentioned by an interviewee “almost everyone was a soldier, and kept their weapon” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May/June 2008). As mentioned by an interviewee; In such a situation, who is labeled a civilian would probably be considered a combatant before the CPA, and as mentioned the definition of Pablo Policzer (2005) therefore used here states armed groups as “challengers to the state’s monopoly of legitimate coercive force” (qtd. in Small Arms Survey, 2006: 3).

The strong demand of the SPLA to disarm every other group in the south challenging its monopoly of force is thus understandable. The SPLA constantly emphasizes that “our people are killing one another” to justify the disarmament, largely referring to the Lou Nuer and their neighbors during dry season migrations but since the signing of the CPA also to clan-based fighting among the Dinka in the Lake District, Murle cattle rustling and a number of other local conflicts. Also, the SPLM/A did not achieve state power through a military victory over its opponents – including internal ones in the south – but as the result of a peace agreement, and is anxious to assert its hegemonic position in the south by claiming to have a monopoly on the possession of arms. Moreover, the SAF had supplied and supported a number of armed groups in the south, whose threat in the view of the SPLA should obviously be eliminated. Finally, creating a unitary southern military force, not obstructed or resisted by other armed groups, will make it easier for the SPLM/A to oppose the SAF in the northern and oil-producing borderlands, where the SAF is increasingly taking up positions. Apart from these strategic reasons, in “the course of the fighting in Jonglei other factors may have come into play, such as tribalism, the desire for revenge, and local power struggles.” However, the SPLM/A does not want ethnic divisions in the south to cause trouble, for this will obstruct their struggle with the north, and this can be seen by the fact that the Jonglei disarmament in the north was assigned to General Peter Bol Kong, a Lou Nuer himself, and that his force was ethnically mixed (Young, 2007a: 3-4).

The first forced disarmament in Jonglei

The first civilian disarmament campaign in Jonglei took place between December 2005 and May 2006. “The SPLA-led disarmament campaign in northern Jonglei was launched against a backdrop of shimmering tensions over common property resources and politicized inter-ethnic rivalries” (Small Arms Survey, 2007a: 3). Problems emerged after Lou and Gawaar Nuer pastoralists requested permission from the Dinka Hol and Nyarweng from Duk County to graze cattle in their lands in December 2005, upon which the Dinka authorities requested the Nuer to surrender their weapons before grazing their livestock. (Small Arms Survey, 2007a: 3; Young, 2007a: 3-4). Of course, the Nuer were hesitant to give up their arms, as this would leave them defenseless, but also – as mentioned before – because the possession of a weapon
symbolizes manliness and adulthood. Informal meetings were held, during which was stressed that forcible disarmament would take place if weapons were not to be surrendered peacefully. The then governor of Jonglei, Philip Thon Lek, a Nyarweng Dinka from Duk county, offered compensation for surrendered arms, but details concerning these compensations remained vague and the Nuer refused, arguing they needed to defend themselves against neighboring Murle (Small Arms Survey, 2007a: 3).

During the early stages of the disarmament campaign in January 2006 this led to a number of skirmishes between the white army and the SPLA. The killing of Wutnyang Gatkek – a spiritual leader of the Nuer from Fangak and a former white army member – who was sent to Yuai on behalf of the SPLA to sell the disarmament program, further intensified demands within the SPLA for military retaliation, threatening the onset of inter-ethnic conflict between Nuer and Dinka. After the attack on the SPLA by the white army, the Juba SPLM/A leadership got involved and the GoSS got split between those urging for restraint and those urging for retaliation. Meanwhile the SAF reportedly began to take advantage of the situation by stirring up violence in neighboring Upper Nile State and supplying the white army with weapons (Small Arms Survey 2007a: 3-4). GoSS Vice-president Riek Machar, a Nuer; Sports and Youth Minister John Luc, a Lou Nuer from Akobo; and Timothy Taban Juch, a Lou of the former SSLM and minister in the Jonglei State government were all brought to meet with the white army, and Riek (generally acknowledged as the founder of the white army) told its members that unless weapons were turned in peacefully to the SPLA, they would be taken forcefully. The Lou youth, however, kept their arms (Young, 2007a: 5-6).

Then in May 2006 the white army suffered great losses and retreated towards the north, looting from civilians. The pursuing SPLA also carried out looting as SPLA forces that were employed in the disarmament campaign did not receive regular food supplies, and thus took cattle and supplies from the local population to survive. Moreover, due to the conditions of instability and insecurity, the Lou Nuer were unable to carry out their seasonal planting, causing serious food shortages as an unexpected result of the forced disarmament. During the campaign an estimated 3,300 weapons were collected, of which the SPLA took some to unknown destinations, while others are reportedly still being held locally. The human costs for this were very high, with an estimated 1,200 white army soldiers, 400 SPLA soldiers, and 213 civilians killed (Young, 2007a: 2-6; Small Arms Survey, 2007a: 4).

 Obviously, there are many problems with the way that the SPLA approached the disarmament. First of all, the Lou Nuer had genuine grievances concerning access to land and water to graze their cattle and these should have been taken up before embarking on the ruthless disarmament campaign. Moreover, “more effort should have been expected on utilizing local authorities and continuing dialogue with the gun-carrying youth.” The people in Motot, Jonglei, in the region that most suffered from the fighting between the white army and the SPLA felt differently. They paint a picture of the white army as young man and often young boys, who “rampaged the countryside, stealing cattle, shooting people at will, and being completely beyond the authority of their fathers and traditional leaders.” Community members who were therefore under the impression that the harsh method of disarmament by the SPLA was a necessary evil
under the circumstances. Nevertheless, “there needs to be recognition that the members of the white army constitute child soldiers who require far-reaching programs of education and rehabilitation.” Another weakness of the campaign was “its lack of a legal basis and civilian supervision” and the SPLA brought in civilian leadership of the SPLM only later on to endorse decisions already made (Young, 2007a: 10-13). Moreover, one UN official observed that the forcible disarmament campaign was used to attract new SPLA recruits. While demilitarization of the population should be the aim, the SPLA thus also combined it with opposite purposes (pers. comm., Juba, June 2008).

‘Voluntary’ disarmament

The second disarmament campaign in Jonglei took place in Akobo County between March and August 2006. Prior to this campaign a small UN contingent worked with local government and SPLA administrations to develop a voluntarily disarmament campaign. With support of (then) Jonglei Governor Philip, the Akobo commissioner put the programme in motion in early 2006. “Sources indicate that SPLA commander Bol Kong initially gave Chol two weeks to generate visible results before Kong would move in and do the job himself – with possibly the same outcomes as in northern Jonglei.” Finally, with mediation of Pact-Sudan a peace process was mediated between Lou Nuer and Murle chiefs in May and June 2006. After that a campaign of sensitization began, and community-level disarmament teams were trained to safely clear, register and store weapons in ten disarmament centers. An estimated 1,400 (serviceable) weapons were collected, and no lives were lost in the process, making the program a success (although the SPLA claims only a fraction of the weapons in the area was collected). Although no actual violence took place in the disarmament program, the threat of the SPLA repeating what it had done earlier in Jonglei was very eminent (Small Arms Survey, 2007a: 6-7).

Apart from Akobo, voluntarily disarmament between 2006 and 2007 also took place in Pibor County, where 1,182 weapons were collected and the disarmament was overseen by the UN. In the focus group discussion the women leaders also claimed that the counties Ayod, Duk, Twic East, Uror, and Bor had undergone voluntary disarmament. Nevertheless in all of Jonglei – as the figures in the paragraph on the proliferation of arms show – arms remain present in large numbers. As was argued in several interviews there is a large influx of weapons, especially from Malakal. Moreover, there had been a break-in at a weapon depot in Khorflus County (Atar). And like one interviewee explained; “there are no things to bring people together. Why are they raiding? Do they need the cattle for food? Is it a hobby? It is a mistake of the government that they have never tried it peacefully” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May 2008). The reason that people armed themselves was not addressed and while both forced and voluntary disarmament campaigns produced a large number of weapons, people thus remain armed. There are also many misperceptions about the results of the various disarmament campaigns in Jonglei. For instance, a Murle interviewed mentioned that the number of weapons collected in Pibor was 6,000. Some Dinka, on the other hand, claimed that the Murle had not been disarmed at all. This, while the UN acknowledged that 1,182 firearms were collected in Pibor (Author’s field notes, Jonglei/Juba, May/June 2008). As many groups remain armed
because they fear other armed groups, these misperceptions about the disarmament of other
groups works counterproductive to any attempt to disarm the communities of Jonglei. That
there are so many misperceptions, however, is understandable as communication in the state is
almost as difficult as travelling. Most people – especially those hard to reach in rural areas – are
illiterate and the local radio station from Juba can only be received by the few that own a radio.
Moreover, apart from a division in English and Arabic speaking people, all groups have their
own language.

As most lessons learned from past disarmament campaigns prescribe, as can be seen in the first
part of this paper, the lessons here also reveal that, “efforts should be embedded in an
appropriate normative framework, be preceded by a sensitization campaign, and combine clear
criteria for surrendered weapons.” Also, adequately resourced procedures for compensation –
preferably not in the form of individual financial benefits – and weapons destruction should be
organized wherever possible (Small Arms Survey, 2007a: 3).

**Current disarmament**

Currently the GoSS is preparing itself again for a new disarmament campaign. As mentioned in
the introduction of this case-study, the Commissioner of Bor County expressed that a new
disarmament campaign in Jonglei would start from the first of June onwards (pers. comm.,
Abraham Arng Jok, Bor, 28 May 2008) and a few days later it was made public that a
disarmament campaign would start covering the whole of South Sudan. There have been
suspicions that in the past the government was taking a strong stance against arms in the hands
of civilians, but was not willing to take serious action: it only took away small numbers; it
delayed disarmament campaigns for weather and other logistical reasons; and it never called
for a hard deadline. This would be because the GoSS would fear that it would be fiercely
resisted in for instance Pibor, and that a campaign would then push the country back into civil
war. A more likely reason mentioned is that the SPLA was purposely trying to maintain a
number of armed groups to be used as proxy-forces if conflict starts again. Past obscurities and
delays of disarmament can indeed be attributed to logistical issues, as well as to differences of
opinion and priorities within the SPLA leadership. Moreover, contradicting policies can be
explained by the fact that the GoSS, like any other government or institution, is not a unitary
entity.

However, it has become clear that disarmament has begun at the moment of writing this report.
Early May, three weeks before the start of the disarmament campaign on the first of June, a
team had been sent to Pibor to undertake a peaceful disarmament campaign, led by Ismael
Konye. The team was sent by GoSS Vice-President Riek Machar, under who recently the CSAC
bureau is established. This bureau aims to create space for dialogue and a more comprehensive
approach to CSAC, and is supported by UNMIS and the UNDP. However, the President has
brushed the peaceful initiative of the table, claiming it was taking too long, and gave a go ahead
to the forced disarmament campaign (pers. comm., Eveline de Bruijn and Sarah Preston35, Juba, 4 June 2008). This turn in strategy on the disarmament policy by the GoSS President could be seen as a continuation of the attempts made to side-line Riek Machar during the SPLM conference. It could also be seen, however, as a fast attempt to eliminate all armed groups that could be used as proxy forces by the SAF, as escalating violence in Abyei is making clear that a new civil war is not unlikely. “The SPLA’s current de facto strategy is primarily a military one: to do what it must to neutralize the SSDF, eliminate all armed civilian groups in the South, and position itself to confront the SAF in the boarder and oil areas” (Small Arms Survey, 2007a: 7). And also the governor of Jonglei Kuol Manyang, known as a hard-liner within the SPLA and a possible candidate for the post of Defense Minister, is more inclined to forced disarmament, and rejected three million dollars offered by the UNDP to take forced disarmament of the table (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May 2008).

Willingness for disarmament

The people interviewed – both during formal and informal conversations – generally do not object disarmament in Jonglei. “It is good that all the guns are taken away from the citizens and let the government rule” (pers. comm., Michael Jok Major, Civil Administrator Baidit payam, Bor, 26 May 2008). Also people from the ethnic group considered most problematic by the others, the Murle, recognize the necessity of disarmament. As one interviewee explained, “The Murle also do not want guns. Especially the elders, because guns encourage the young to misbehave. The Murle also believe disarmament will lead to peace” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May 2008). This is confirmed by the research undertaken by the Small Arms Survey, that found that 16.8 per cent (n=143) of the respondents within Pibor felt that there are too many guns in the community, as compared to 13.3 per cent (n=880) of the total respondents (Garfield, 2007: 29-30). Interestingly is also to note that in 42.5 per cent (n=569) of the respondents outside of Pibor believed that the ones most urgently needing to be disarmed are the criminals, whereas in Pibor with 39 per cent (n=177) civilians were found to be in most need of disarmament (Ibid. 33-34). People in Pibor, as also became clear in interviews, do see the need for disarmament, but taking away arms from every civilian is not seen as the highest priority. Although arms are causing criminality and conflict, they are still considered to be necessary for self-defense.

The willingness to disarm is thus strongly connected to the perception of security discussed earlier. The Small Arms Survey, for instance, also found that the disarmament was perceived to have triggered insecurity, with 23.5 per cent of the respondents outside of Pibor reporting that disarmament caused fighting (e.g. attacks targeted at disarmed communities or fighting between SPLA and communities), and 21.7 per cent of the respondents within Pibor feeling ‘less

35 Eveline de Bruijn is working for the UN together with David Lochhead, Acting Programme Manager CSAC of the UNDP. Sarah Preston works for Saferworld, and is assisting the CSAC bureau in building capacity, building legal frameworks, and creating dialogue between the GoSS, states, civil society, and the communities.
safe’ due to disarmament (Ibid. 29-30). Similar arguments were made by interviewees, as one Murle for instance did not consider it to be safe enough for his children to be in Bor. This was strongly related to the attack on Murle in Bor at the end of 2007, and he explained that he did feel safe in Pibor, where Murle had the guns and the Dinka are not ruling. If the SPLA would be there to take away arms, “tensions will increase” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May 2008).

In general, people do want disarmament, but the insecurity is a still great obstacle. Moreover, people do not want to give up arms if other groups remain armed. As also mentioned in several interviews, people expect some form of compensation for arms surrendered. The commissioner of Bor County explained that because,

*There is no compensation for the guns and people run. But if there was compensation the people would maybe hand in their guns. But I know that with this [current] policy they will try to run and sell elsewhere or store the guns for later use when disarmament is over.* (pers. comm., Abraham Arng Jok, Bor, 28 May 2008)

Similar observations were made in a research conducted by David Lochhead (2007). He finds that the population of Akobo County, Jonglei, is overwhelmingly in favor of disarmament. However, communities were only willing to voluntarily disarm if there were guarantees for security, there had to be simultaneous disarmament of communities, a neutral party must be involved, and compensation for weapons was required.

**How it is undertaken**

Although the international community has strongly been advocating voluntary forms of disarmament, the GoSS is up to now not seriously considering this. As mentioned, also with the earlier peaceful disarmament the threat of force was ever present. Also the local church has been actively advocating peaceful disarmament, but seemed to have given up. As one church leader explained; “we have told the government that forced disarmament is not going to work and cause harm, but they don’t want to listen. So we told them to go ahead then, since we cannot stop them” (pers. comm., Bor, 23 May 2008). The Commissioner of or County made it very clear he was not positive about the forms of disarmament suggested by the international NGOs. “They talk about peaceful disarmament and singers and drama, but that can only be done in developed communities. But not with these communities in Sudan. You need to take the guns by force. When you are singing those who loot and abduct are in the forest.” When asked how the new disarmament campaign would be undertaken, he made it clear that force will be used if necessary.

*Of course it [disarmament] may be both [forced and peaceful]. Now what is happening is enlightenment first, that everybody who is a civil person should hand in their guns through the chiefs and it is going to be registered. And than burned or stored or something. And those people who do this will be thanked. Others who
resist will be told it is wrong. If you resist the policy of the government, you are a rebel, and you may face any action. (pers. comm., Abraham Arng Jok, Bor, 28 May 2008)

In the same interview the Commissioner stressed that they are aiming to disarm all communities in the state, and that the GoSS is planning to disarm all communities in the South for which a decree had just been passed. How the disarmament campaign is proceeding at this time is very unclear. It has been made public that the GoSS is indeed planning to disarm all communities in the South (Sudan Tribune, 2008b). As of now forceful searching for weapons has not started yet. Officials of the UN and UNDP have held meetings with the Governor of Jonglei and state Ministers, and the UN has been welcomed by the Governor to monitor the disarmament (in contrast to some other states). The Governor has even asked the UN to report any human rights violations, which is a welcome fruit of international pressures. In all counties one month is given to the local authorities to convey the message to hand in arms to the communities. If this is not done, the SPLA will do it by force. At state level and at community level civilian disarmament committees have been set up to coordinate and monitor the disarmament process, and registration forms have been created for collected weapons. As of now, the SPLA has started (peaceful) disarmament in Duk and Pibor. And in Akobo local authorities have collected 800 arms. In Bor they are still organizing disarmament and the Governor has not yet given the order to the SPLA (pers. comm., Eveline de Bruijn, Juba, 17 June 2008).

The role of IGOs, NGOs and CSOs

In the context of Sudan disarmament is generally seen as state business and state business alone. NGOs and CSOs, such as the churches, can play a direct role in the disarmament, albeit particularly of advocacy. This is underscored by the Commissioner of Bor County, who commented on a possible role for IKV Pax Christi that, “what could be done is to support disarmament. Enlighten them to disarm. Tell them guns should not be in the hands of people who are not trained. And tell them they will be protected once they are disarmed” (pers. comm., Abraham Arng Jok, Bor, 28 May 2008). Similarly, the church leaders also viewed advocacy as their role, but they also acknowledge that weapons are a part of their culture. “We talk about not carrying guns. They may have spears, ok, but the SPLA and the police are the only ones who can have guns” (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May 2008). Another interesting example of what the church (in this case, but also relevant for other CSOs and NGOs) can do was given by Pastor Ismaial Malek Garang.

Taking away guns with force is for the army. We, the church, have another way of disarmament. We have a way of replacing weapons and searching for the ability of people and than create projects based on that. For instance, in our community a six year old kid was abducted by Murle and came back 12 years later. Because he can speak both languages [Murle and Dinka] he is now used as a translator and mediator, since both sides can now understand that the conflict is not about killing
people, but about poverty and resources. From there on conflicts can be solved.
(pers. comm., Bor, 21 May 2008)

There are thus clearly some very realistic and positive views on what NGOs and CSOs can contribute to the disarmament. And in South Sudan, as in most parts of Africa, the church is one of the strongest institutions available, if not the strongest. In Jonglei the church has a very well covering network, better than any other organization or even the government. Moreover, church leaders are regarded with a large amount of respect by the local communities, and can therefore play a great role in advocacy (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May 2008).

As mentioned the role of the UN will primarily be to monitor the process. With peaceful disarmament the UN has in previous efforts also offered technical and logistical support, as well as sensitization of the population. This support, however, is not given in case of forced disarmament, as the UN objects that. Although there are many people within communities as well as within the GoSS that claim peaceful disarmament can only be successful if financial incentives are given, the UN does not support this, as this will likely feed into arms trade (pers. comm., Ezekiel Garang Juba, 2 June 2008). This is a rightful argument, as also discussed earlier in this paper. However, other incentives could be given, which will be discussed shortly.

Comments and critique

Although the GoSS is claiming disarmament will this time be comprehensive and include all communities, there are reasons to believe that it is only aiming to disarm particular groups. Or disarm all communities to store weapons and rearm some when thought necessary. Past disarmament campaigns have always neglected the arms in the hands of Dinka. Nevertheless, the SPLA is not popular everywhere, and they must try to implement the disarmament to all communities at the moment, in order not to alienate the other tribes, as this will cause great problems in a possible third civil war against the north. And that a war is coming seems inevitable as “even Salva Kiir himself right now says it is not a question of if there will be another war, but when” (pers. comm., Carola Baller, Juba, 4 June 2008).

Another problem with the current disarmament is that is does not take away the root causes for people to possess arms. Indeed, arms itself are seen as root cause of the problems. The Minister of Communication in Jonglei, for instance, stated that;

Our ministry should be efforting at the awareness, but there is something that is preventing us. Maybe I repeat myself, but, these counties, these tribes of the Jonglei state are troublesome and resisting disarmament. For three years, they, like the Murle, have refused. When given an ultimatum, they rebelled. It is very difficult for the government to convince them and disarm them in a peaceful way. Because there are human rights laws at GoSS level, but at the same time these people are attacking others. (pers. comm., Elijah Magot, Bor, 23 May 2008)
Like many other GoSS officials interviewed, the Minister is not asking why people arm themselves. Although guns are indeed a cause of conflict, as is discussed earlier, on the other hand they are perceived by the communities to be necessary, as the government is not capable to ensure everyone’s security. As a UNHCR official commented, “the government is trying to take the guns away, but not the mind shift” (pers. comm., Bor, 22 May 2008). And security is a problem in the broadest sense of the word. Malik Leasay, Head of UNMIS in Jonglei state noted that:

People must feel secure and that is the job of the state. We can only help facilitate, but at the end of the day it is the responsibility of the state. Important is to answer why people have a gun, why they feel insecure. Also political insecurity plays a big role. Not feeling like second class citizens. (pers. comm., Bor, 22 May 2008)

It is clear that a forced disarmament campaign led by the SPLA, which in the eyes of other groups in Jonglei is perceived to be Dinka dominated, will not take away the fear of personal and political insecurity. The commissioner of Bor County did state that “we are pressing the government to disarm and then protect” (pers. comm., Abraham Arng Jok, Bor, 28 May 2008). And the Governor of Jonglei said that there are 500 police officers in training to boost the security force (Sudan Tribune, 2008a). However, these security forces are only to start working after the disarmament campaign is completed in December. It is thus unlikely that this promise will make the communities feel more secure in handing in arms at this moment. Moreover, a UN official commented that these forces are SPLA paramilitaries that are being retrained, and are likely to become a force to control potential proxy forces in Pibor, rather than securing the communities of Jonglei as a whole (pers. comm., Juba, 2008)

**Recommendations**

Within the complex context of South Sudan, with much internal tensions and fears of a relapse into civil war, any recommendations on disarmament in Jonglei must be made with great modesty. The author had hoped that, apart being from a useful case study, the findings of the field research could also be used to develop sensible conflict sensitive approaches to arms control in Jonglei, and elsewhere in South Sudan. However, like anywhere, the situation in Sudan is constantly changing and as it turned out an unanticipated disarmament campaign was given a go ahead during the field research. The campaign has started in some places in Jonglei, and is still being organized in others, yet reliable information on what is exactly going on remains extremely scarce at the time of writing. Nevertheless some modest recommendations will be made, also to illustrate the arguments made in the literature research.

As mentioned, the situation in Jonglei, with most arms in the hands of civil militia who are now considered to be civilians, a classic DDR programme cannot be organized. Yet, a civilian disarmament campaign in which weapons are to be handed in, with the argument that civilians have no right to carry a weapon in times of peace, neglects the underlying reasons people carry arms. Of course most of the present armed groups in Jonglei are not large militias with a strong
political ideology. Rather, they are small armed groups out to loot from others (thus basically being bandits), to protect the community from those who loot, or to revenge if any harm is done to their community. This is nothing new; this complexity of groups has been present during the war, and most groups then have been fighting for the same reasons of self interest as they do now, taking up the role of warrior that is so well respected in the pastoralist cultures. Apart from the difficulty to distinguish between civilian and combatant - and thus making it impossible to decide who qualify for enrolment - there are more reasons why a classic DDR programme cannot work in this case. After twenty-two years of war the government is just trying to establish itself, there is hardly any development and although there are institutions established they lack much in capacity. So even if one could distinguish between civil militias and armed communities, there is no environment to reintegrate people into. Looking back to the findings from the literature research, one of the characteristics of a community-based approach is that it does not differentiate between groups within a community, thus making a clear distinction between civilian and combatant is not necessary per se. Also, while avoiding individual financial incentives for weapons handed in, it provides benefits for communities as a whole. Without feeding into arms trade, these benefits then bring a tangible dividend and by focusing on the findings from the field research they can take away the incentives for people to carry arms.

It should be stressed again, as underscored by the literature research as well as by past experiences in Jonglei, that disarmament by force is highly unlikely to have any success. Disarmament should be voluntarily, as people will surely rearms themselves or hide weapons if they remain with the desire to be armed. This need to be armed should therefore, at least to some extent, be addressed before disarmament commences. In the case-study in Jonglei it is clear that there is a tension between those favoring military state security - and consequently favoring a state-centered approach to DDR - and those favoring a human security and a development approach. With arms in everywhere the state is trying to gain a monopoly on legitimate violence. From the state’s perspective force is therefore a logic option if there is no compliance with the disarmament process. On the ground, however, it has become clear that one of the largest issues is the feeling of insecurity; the fear of being attacked or politically dominated by other groups. People ask for security and development before they are willing to hand in their arms and with the threat of force the government is undermining itself in building this trust. Improvement of the security - and the perception of security - is therefore vital before successful disarmament can take place. Another big issue is the unemployment and idleness of youth who then raid cattle in order to gain wealth, although it will of course not exclusively be youth. Linked to this are cultural issues, such as the symbolic importance of a weapon, of being a warrior, of having many cows, and the bride-price of marriage. Adding to this are the weapons and tactics of warfare acquired during the civil war, creating a dangerous combination in which disarmament is very difficult and demands to be very comprehensive. For many youth joining or forming armed groups is simply the best (or only) sustainable way to make a living. Before successful disarmament can take place, the economic opportunities thus have to be improved. The situation clearly demands for a comprehensive community-based approach aiming at development, rather than a state-centered approach aiming at short-term security.
As was proposed in the literature research, community-based disarmament targets the community as a whole and aims to address those areas of economy, civil society, and law and justice. A first step would then be to focus on the youth by supporting the establishment of schools and the training of teachers and school managers to bring about change. A project like this was undertaken by the UNHCR, and although it stopped (likely due to funding) a UN official was very positive about this (pers. comm., Bor, 22 May 2008). One thing preventing girls from going to school is cultural, and just like the issue of dowry, must be addressed through advocacy in any possible way. Security is another reason why people mentioned keeping their children from going to school, and insecurity was also a reason for people not to cultivate land (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May 2008). The security sector thus needs a lot attention, as insecurity is also an important reason for people to carry arms. A 2003 report commissioned by Oxfam GB to document lessons learned from disarmament in northern Kenya suggested that,

Boosting security in marginalized communities is important, precisely because the culture of self-protection that is endemic in pastoral communities derives from a legacy of state neglect. Even where there is popular support for weapons recovery, the lack of alternative security mechanisms undermines lasting disarmament. The reach of the state in pastoral communities is important in addressing their security needs, but it also needs a better system for controlling legal weapons, since most illicit weapons start out as legal arms in the hands of State security forces. (Khadiagala, 2003: 5)

Strengthening the security sector in Jonglei is being addressed, by the UNDP and UNMIS among others, yet great improvements should not be expected overnight. A big concern is the unprofessional behavior of officers. For instance, during the field research a police officer was called to intervene between two people who were having an argument. Not being able to break up the fight the officer just shot one of them dead on the spot. Even more problematic is that the officer in question did not receive severe punishment for his act, but was only sent to participate in a human rights workshop organized by UNMIS (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May 2008). It should therefore be stressed that the GoSS establishes clear laws to which also security officers are subject. Police officers need the human rights trainings organized by the UN, but problematic here is that many of them are not interested and do not actively participate and research should be undertaken on how to involve the police more into human rights issues. Timely payment of wages should also be stressed, as it is clear that underpayment undermines the discipline of security officers. And of course security is the responsibility of the state and UN agencies, NGOs, and other organizations cannot do much more than advocating and facilitating positive changes in the security sector. However, contributing to better security and trust between the communities and the security sector could be an initiative similar to that undertaken by Saferworld in Kenya, which has been mentioned earlier. Their community-based policing projects gave good results, and one of their pilot projects was in a region with similar characteristics as in Jonglei; the pilot area of Isiolo has a number of different ethnic groups relying on a combination of pastoralism and agriculture, and is also troubled by unemployment (Saferworld, 2008: 20). Moreover, as is noted during the field research, many villages have a committee to manage the borehole, or even committees involved in schools and churches,
which – in case they are indeed functioning, which varies largely by committee – could possibly be used to mobilize communities for community-based policing (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May 2008). Interesting is also a recommendation made in the report of The Hague conference on community responses to armed violence, which proposes to involve pastoralist warriors fully in providing security for their communities (Hollestelle & Simonse, 2005: 236).

Linked to the earlier mentioned need for education is the economy. There is almost nothing produced in Jonglei and many businesses are run by people from Kenya, Uganda, and other East African countries. Tensions are starting to increase between guest workers and the local population as the latter feel that their jobs are being taken away by foreigners. However, this is largely because the inability of many local people to do this work, lacking education and other means to start up small businesses (Author’s field notes, Jonglei, May 2008). Moreover, uneducated and frustrated youth resort to cattle raiding in order to gain wealth. A possible way to deal with this problem would be by providing training in communities involving basic skills that would help set up small businesses, something that is being done by some organizations in some regions of the state. Problematically again are counties such as Pibor, Akobo, etc. where little help is given due to its inaccessibility during most of the year. However, the road to Pibor is being constructed and improved at the moment, and opportunities to involve these regions into the local economy should be seized whenever possible. Involvement of the less accessible regions into the local economy would also mean more interaction between the various groups, as well as preventing a sense of marginalization. Apart from training in setting up businesses, micro-credit could be an affordable way to help support initiatives as it has also proven to be successful in other cases.

These are all measures to address some of the incentives for people to carry arms. It cannot be neglected, however, that the proliferation of arms itself is also a problem, and a reason for others to arm themselves. And although people have relied on weapons to protect themselves, their cattle, and their families and communities for decades, the recent civil wars has swapped traditional weapons (e.g. spears, sticks, bow and arrow) for modern firearms. With a weapon being also of cultural value, given to young boys when they are initiated as men, security and economy are not the only issues that need to be addressed. Advocacy is therefore needed, attempting to reverse the normalization of firearms in society. This is already changing to some extend, as firearms are no longer publicly carried in the towns, but with people still carrying concealed pistols and openly carrying automatic rifles in rural areas there is still a long way to go. Civil society organizations can play a great role here, as well as the church with its wide network and respected position in society. An interesting example was also given by the Chairman of the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), who explained how he had organized ‘gun-owner clubs’ in Equatoria, in which gun ownership is now discussed (pers. comm., Bishop Paul Yugusuk, Juba, 17 May 2008).

Apart from a comprehensive disarmament of all communities and the provision of security, one of the prerequisites for voluntarily disarmament mentioned by communities is some form of compensation for arms handed in. Individual financial compensation, however, will risk feeding into arms trades. A solution here is then to provide community benefits to communities
cooperating with the disarmament, such as the provision of schooling, trainings for small businesses, community access to micro-loans, as well as materials for the construction of schools, boreholes, and churches.

As mentioned, with the threat of force and reluctance of the GoSS to effectively address the incentives of people to carry arms, disarmament is unlikely to be successful. Moreover, it is likely to limit the possibilities for future disarmament in the short-term, as it is promising to filling the security gap after disarmament without having the capacity to do so. Also, disarmament, as well as the above mentioned propositions, is not possible without approval and cooperation of the GoSS. Realistically, full disarmament in Jonglei state seems improbable in the short-term, with security and economic opportunities unlikely to improve quickly, and porous borders and large amounts of weapons in bordering regions. The GoSS simply does not have the capacity and means to do so, and neither does it seem willing to comprehensively undertake voluntarily disarmament without the threat of force. Adding to this is the uncertainty over of the results and consequences of the 2011 referendum and the lurking relapse into civil war. With this in mind, a first step to disarmament is to establish laws controlling the use of arms, as these do not exist at this moment. A firearms act could at least start regulating the use of arms in the short term, with misuse – apart from punishment by the court for the actual crime – possibly leading to confiscation of the weapon. Of course this will unlikely to be accepted by the GoSS at this moment, as it would be contradicting its current policy of disarmament. But with the current disarmament campaign by the GoSS again likely to fail, this is something that should be kept in mind. Together with this a sensitizing campaign could then slowly pave the way to full disarmament, as the above mentioned issues are being addressed. What the international community can support at this point, however, is the improvement of security and socio-economic opportunities of the people in Jonglei. As the case study has shown, many of the reasons people arm themselves can be reduced to these issues and much work lies ahead in a country that has been completely destructed by decades of war.
Conclusion

“War is a cowardly escape from the problems of peace”
– Thomas Mann –

The first section discussed the best practices and lessons learned from past DDR experiences. DDR is a process that is implemented in post-conflict areas, but also in countries with ongoing conflicts (e.g., Colombia). Originally DDR programmes were mainly focused on the disarmament of superfluous armed forces and rebel groups, but in there has been a graduate shift to include more long-term development initiatives as the programmes became more and more an intrinsic part of the whole peace process. Since contemporary conflicts are predominantly intra-state conflicts, and since the central government in a post-conflict situation generally still lacks complete control and is troubled with financial and logistical deficiencies, the international community usually takes (or is expected to take) a large role in the DDR process.

The first step in a DDR programme is disarmament, which should be voluntarily since forced disarmament brings forth numerous problems, such as strong resistance to the government that is often already lacking strength and legitimacy. Forced disarmament should carefully be reconsidered, as past attempts (Afghanistan, Sudan) have all failed. Moreover, it will be more likely that arms will be hid away for future use or illicit arms trade. In order for armed groups to comply, the creation of viable alternatives is vital and DDR programmes should therefore aim to take away the incentives to pick up arms. For combatants to give up their arms a secure environment is also important, since they must feel secure enough to do so. Also a secure environment should prevent the collected arms from ending up in illicit trade. The weapon often sustains or sustained a combatant in his or her livelihood, and in some cultures a certain status is derived from the possession of a weapon. It is therefore important that disarmament should not signify capitulation and subordination, and should preferably also be the result of a political agreement. Incentives are therefore often given in return for a weapon. While doing so, it is important to assess the local situation carefully, to prevent appearing to sanction blackmail or rewarding those who were the perpetrators of the violence, or feeding into arms trade. Therefore, a good alternative are community benefits.

An accurate number of combatants to be disarmed and demobilized is often unknown or unreliable, thus a census should be conducted whenever possible. If the choice for encampment of the former combatants is made, camps should be in well secured areas and kept relatively small to ensure security and deterioration of conditions of hygiene. To prevent the period of encampment of going beyond the level of tolerance of the combatants, and to prevent overcrowding because of new combatants entering the programme, a follow up to the reintegration phase should be rapidly organized and deployed. During the demobilization phase reinsertion programmes are crucial to inform and educate the former combatants about
their socioeconomic opportunities and civilian live, as well as it offers a good opportunity to assess the skills, needs, and aspirations of the former combatants for the design of reintegration programmes. Also important are market assessment, as past programmes have insufficiently considered market opportunities, leaving former combatants with skills that they cannot use to obtain a job in the local context.

The reintegration phase intends to provide former combatants with assistance measures to increase their economic and social potential for themselves, their families, and the community in which they are to reintegrate in. However, the success of reintegration largely depends on the support former combatants receive from their families and communities. Reintegration as short-term stabilization is therefore only viable in situations where combatants have to be moved from military to civilian life and away from criminality, until the reform of the security and/or political sector is completed, and where the socioeconomic environment is able to absorb the influx of former combatants into civil life. Since sufficient conditions in post-conflict situations are often not met, it is suggested that reintegration should be based on a long-term commitment to development and transformation. Reform of the state, SSR, and the codification of international norms into national law are therefore to be accompanying the DDR process.

To provide former combatants better opportunities for reintegration, and communities with better opportunities to accept them, the literature often advocates for community-based approaches to DDR. Problematic is here that ‘the community’ cannot always easily defined. However, the idea behind a community-based approach is exactly its inclusiveness; supporting everyone – although not neglecting special attention to those in need – and not giving support to a prioritized group. Defining the community would entail setting boundaries. It is therefore suggested that ‘community’ refers to the level on which support is given, instead of the traditional state to individual level. Community-based DDR is then the providing of communities with the skills and the resources to support the reintegration of former combatants – instead of developing state-centered programmes for individual reintegration – with the intention to take away the incentive to pick up arms. Peace building is from this perspective thus a development issue first, rather than a security issue first. This view is shared by theorists such as Lederach (1997) and Galtung (1996).

But what do these ideas and theories mean for DDR programme design and implementation? Derived from experiences in community-based development and reintegration programmes, this paper suggests that this entails the support and development of civil society, local governmental institutions, and economic opportunities. The support of the development of civil society is a first important step. Civil society organizations are often able to provide a channel for services where governments do not deliver them. Moreover, they can contribute to the promotion of dialogue and reconciliation, and in the context of a patrimonial society and/or a decentralizing government they serve as a ‘watchdog,’ holding the government accountable for its actions. Civil society organizations can be supported with resources, but also with knowledge and political support. Although initiatives should remain extremely careful not to alienate the central government, decentralization and the development of local mechanisms of governance and dispute settlement aim to involve the local population and prevent large scale
corruption. Important is that a community council has downward accountability, and that mechanisms are understandable for the people. Moreover, the development of community councils should be based on existing mechanisms, but in such a restructured way that it does not exclude certain community members from full participation in the political arena. Another important aspect of governance is the security sector, which is vital for people to feel secure enough to hand in their arms. A community council can also function as a bridge between the community and the security sector, involving the community in its own security in another way than self-protection with firearms. And an example of this is the initiative undertaken by Saferworld mentioned earlier. Apart from governance and security, economic security is also vital as a weapon is often a means to provide this economic security. Apart from donating funds, a very interesting alternative are micro-credit programmes, aimed at the former combatants, but also the community as a whole. The advantage is that it is more cost effective and gives the participants ownership instead of dependency. Such initiatives should also be combined with training on how to establish small businesses.

A community-based approach to DDR is here thus defined as the assistance measures provided to former combatants and the communities in which they want to reintegrate, that would increase the potential for their and their families’, economic and social integration into civilian life, and take away the incentives to remain armed. And the extent to which the focus shifts from the individual combatant to the community then depends on the context. In one situation, for instance, combatants may not be included in a clear military structure and blend in with the civilians, making a centralized individual approach impossible and demand for community-based DDR. Such a programme will closely resemble community security programmes, but also recognize the fact that there are former combatants part of the community. Yet in another situation, for example, only the reintegration phase may need to be implemented with a community-based approach whereas the disarmament and demobilization can be conducted a traditional centralized way with camps.

As the concrete policies are highly depended on the context, a case-study was undertaken in Jonglei, South Sudan, in order to exemplify this. Jonglei has had a great number of armed groups, with some organized in a military structure but most consisting of small armed groups defending and raiding in their own interests, yet supported by either SAF or SPLA to function as proxy forces. This makes it impossible to make a clear distinction between combatant and civilian – and thus making it impossible to decide who qualify for enrolment. Moreover, after twenty-two years of war the government is just trying to establish itself, there is hardly any development and although there are institutions established they lack much in capacity. So even if one could distinguish between civil militias and armed communities, there is no environment to reintegrate people into. With a long history of war, and youth still taking up the role of warrior and raid and loot with tactics acquired during the war, they need to be treated as such. However, without clear army structures and civilian life and warrior culture blend into each other a ‘classic’ DDR programme is impossible and this case therefore requires a community based approach to disarmament. One of the characteristics of a community-based approach is that it does not differentiate between groups within a community, thus making a clear distinction between civilian and combatant is not necessary per se. Also, while avoiding
individual financial incentives for weapons handed in, it provides benefits for communities as a whole. Without feeding into arms trade, these benefits then bring a tangible dividend and by focusing on the findings from the field research they can take away the incentives for people to carry arms.

The case-study in Jonglei also clearly shows the tension between a military or state perspective on security and human security. Where the state is urging for short-term security improvement, mainly to prepare for a new civil war, the situation on the ground demands a development perspective to disarmament which also could decrease the chances of a relapse into war. One of the largest issues in Jonglei is the feeling of insecurity; the fear of being attacked or politically dominated by other groups. Another big issue is the unemployment and idleness of youth. Linked with cultural issues, such as the symbolic importance of a weapon, of being a warrior, importance of cows (wealth, dowry) and weapons and tactics acquired during the war, this has led to the formation of many armed groups. With the state not being able to respond, this leads to more insecurity and conflicts between the various groups in the state. For many youth joining or forming armed groups is simply the best (or only) sustainable way to make a living. Before successful disarmament can take place, the economic opportunities and the security situation thus have to be improved.

This paper has aimed to make the concept ‘community-based DDR’ more concrete and give it contents. In this way it is hoped that it can become a constructive concept, rather than a label attached to programmes as it is deemed fashionable. The paper, however, is not considered to be exhaustive and further research is needed looking at how community-based DDR can be implemented in concrete cases. Moreover, as this has proven to be problematic in all DDR programmes, research must be undertaken on how to monitor such programmes. And apart from community-based DDR, many issues such as SSR and developing political and socio-economic opportunities are intrinsically connected. Much work thus lies ahead, but it is essential in order to support countries in stable development after conflict.
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Appendix 1. IKV Pax Christi and DDR

“So we must fix our vision not merely on the negative expulsion of war, but upon the positive affirmation of peace”
– Martin Luther King, Jr. –

As this thesis is in part done in assignment for IKV Pax Christi, a brief overview will be given of the projects and working experiences of IKV Pax Christi relating to DDR, based on interviews with project managers, reports, and presentations. It is not, however, intended to give a comprehensive description of all available information, since this can already be found in the various programme proposals and reports36. Interesting in this overview is also the relation between community and national and regional. In Colombia, for instance, the support of local initiatives is backed by lobbying for governmental policy changes on a national and regional level. And local projects in Sudan, Uganda and Kenya are put in their regional perspective through the cross-border connection of the various projects into the programme.

Colombia

Since the 1960s there has been a violent conflict in Colombia between guerilla groups (FARC, ELN, and other smaller groups), and the Colombian government and paramilitary troops (AUC)37. IKV Pax Christi works in the regions Cauca and Tolima, and aims to support both the reintegration of former combatants, as well as the support of the victims and create a dialogue.

Individual reintegration research

Since 2002 the government of Colombia has admitted over 10,000 former combatants into its programme for individual demobilization and reintegration. ‘Individual’ in this case means that the former combatants left the armed groups on their own initiative. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs is funding a part of the programme through the OAS, which is managed by the IOM and Centro Mundial. The three Centros de Referencia y Oportunidades (CROs, Centres for Orientation and Opportunities) funded by the Dutch government differ from the other four CROs, as they provide extra personal accompaniment and psychological support if the former combatant asks for this. Since there was little known about how the process was progressing, and because partner organization ACIN who wanted to start a local individual reintegration and reconciliation project approached Pax Christi with many questions, it was decided to research the individual process.

36 In the appendix with the list of interviews, the names of the responsible program managers can be found.
37 The paramilitary troops have officially been demobilized by the end of 2005 and have ceased to function as a formal organization.
The results were published in the report *A New Beginning, an Open End. The Reintegration of Individually Demobilized Combatants in Colombia* (Pax Christi, 2006). The *desmovilizados* were men and women from all armed groups (AUC, FARC, ELN), and during a two year period they received a monthly allowance, housing, education, vocational training and (some minor) psychological support. The main observation of the report is that “the government programme has no component of dialogue or reconciliation whatsoever,” which is considered to be a great obstacle for the reintegration of former combatants into society (Pax Christi, 2006: 57).

**Retorno a Casa, North Cauca**

The ACIN wanted, as mentioned, to start up a local indigenous reintegration project (ACIN, 2005a; 2005b; 2007). In the areas in the North of Cauca there were a number of deserters, who risked the death penalty from the FARC (where most of them fled from), as well as being arrested by the government. Moreover, also the communities in which the deserters are hiding risk reprisals from FARC. The indigenous deserters do not want to enroll in the government programme, since they want to reintegrate into their communities, instead of in the cities where the government projects are located.

IKV Pax Christi is therefore now supporting the ACIN with the set up of an indigenous reintegration programme. Apart from financial support, IKV Pax Christi also uses its influence to enable the indigenous former combatants to receive a CODA certification from the government, make sure the government supports (or at least not hinders) the project, as well as the acceptance of the project by FARC.

The ACIN also visits indigenous combatants in prison, to make an assessment of the number of prisoners, why they are there, and how long their sentences are. This information is necessary to improve the human rights situation, as well as to create better conditions for successful reintegration after their sentences.

**Reperación y Reconciliación**

Closely linked to demobilization activities, IKV Pax Christi also concerns itself with reconciliation and the support of the victims of the violence through partner organizations such as AMUNORCA, ACIN, ASOM, and Corporación Juan Bosco. These organizations set up contacts with victims and their families to give the victims a face. Moreover, they give inform them about their legal options, and provide them with judicial and logistical support if needed. There is also contact with the government and the Comisión Nacional de Reparación y

38 A certification that a former combatant receives providing there are no charges for crimes against humanity, terrorism, kidnap, genocide, drugs trade and murder, which are unrelated to hostilities. With this certification a former combatant can return to civilian society without legal problems.
Reconciliación (CNRR) in order to investigate the possibilities for symbolic and financial reparations for the victims.

Democratic Republic Congo

The experiences of the international community with DDR in the DRC have recently been quite negative, especially that of the MDRP from the World Bank which is believed to be neglecting local realities on the ground. Local communities have not been sufficiently involved and the proliferation of small arms continues to be a problem. IKV Pax Christ has therefore recently proposed a plan for DDR in North and South Kivu.

Proposed DDR plan North and South Kivu

The proposed plan for DDR in the DRC focuses on the two provinces North Kivu and South Kivu, in the east of the country (IKV Pax Christi, 2008). Both provinces are administratively divided into a number of chefferies and secteurs (17 in North Kivu and 23 in South Kivu), which are headed by a chef (chief). These chiefs represent the traditional power, and thus the public administration. There are several militias active in Kivu, most notably the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALIR), Rasta and MaiMai militias. The war has led to the deterioration of interethnic relations and xenophobia between different groups. Moreover, because of the war and the absence of state authority the risk of conflicts within groups has also increased, especially concerning rights on land. Where the civil society, including the churches, are fragmentized along ethnic and political lines in North Kivu, the civil society in south Kivu is much more capable.

According to the proposal the deployment of the reintegration phase of the DDR projects (which is to last about 1 or 2 years) must be faster, so that it comes right after the demobilization phase. The design of the programmes must be done in cooperation with the local communities and the national programme must leave more room for local initiatives. Moreover, the programme should be integrated in a wider peace-building programme.

The strategy outlined in the proposal envisages not only the possibility for the local population to express itself, but also influence and participate in the decision-making process. One method widely accepted is the barza communautaire, in which civil society, the local administration, police, army, and representatives of the population\(^{39}\) jointly discuss the DDR problematic. Another method that is generally recognized is a local commission, which can be elected at the end of a barza. The commission is then to concern itself with reconciliation, security, etc. For

\(^{39}\) civil society and the local population (women’s associations, local associations, youth associations) must make up two-thirds up to three-quarters of the barza, which usually compromises about 500 participants in total.
social and economic rehabilitation of the whole community – both former combatants and victims of the violence – a DDR programme should have a good transition into a development programme, which is similar to the observations in the literature described in thesis. The commissions must help with the DDR (determining the priorities and frameworks) and should form mechanisms for conflict resolution (based on the traditional forms, such as nyumba kumi), harmonize horizontal and vertical actions. This approach, according to the proposal, must be organized by a variety of NGOs (both local and international) and assure a equal distribution of ethnicity, religion, gender and age, to ensure both legitimacy and capacity.

Local Peace Initiatives in Ituri

Apart from the previously mentioned project proposal, IKV Pax Christi als has experiences with Local Peace Initiatives (LPI) in Ituri.

The work in Ituri is organized through the Réseau Haki Na Amani (RHA), a network of local non-governmental organizations in Ituri, in which both religious and non-religious organizations are cooperating. The RHA is steered by a Consultative Council that compromises representatives of all RHA members. Through training by RHA teams, the formation of ILP have started, which are autonomous institutions for conflict prevention and management by and for the local population.

According to a report on the project, “the pacification mandate of the RHA is gradually changing to a mandate of local capacity building and conflict resolution.” The report warns for mission creep, and urges that each member organization should clearly define its own ambitions and role, and “criteria should be discussed and established for organizations to join the RHA.” Also, it should not be expected that the pilot ILPs are skilled and able enough to train more peripheral ILPs at this point in time. The report is generally positive about the programme; “positive points about the ILPs are their bottom-up, local, open and inclusive nature, the fact that there are women members, and that there has been intensive training and capacity building.” Many of the established ILPs also still exist today (Frerks & Douma, 2007: 40-42).

Sudan

The projects related to DDR in Sudan focus mainly on the South of the country. The Peace and Sports programme is a regional programme with the boarder region between Sudan, Uganda and Kenya as its target area. Recently IKV Pax Christi has also started with the implementation of the Sudan Integrated Peace-building Programme in the south-eastern part of the country.
Peace and Sports

The Peace and Sports programme takes place in northern Uganda (Karamoja), southern Sudan (Eastern Equatoria), and in northern Kenya (Turkana) and has as its goal to bring youth warriors from cattle raiding communities in the region together, in order to find local solutions for conflicts and ways for sustainable peace and development (Ketelaar, 2007). IKV Pax Christi is supported in their work by the Nederlandse Katholieke Sportfederatie (NKS), the Dutch catholic sports federation. The programme is coordinated by Seeds of Peace Africa (SOPA) International in Nairobi, Kenya. The implementation is facilitated by the Catholic Diocese of Torit (CDOT), the Holy Trinity Peace Village Kuron (HTPVK) and Pibor Development Access (PDA) in southern Sudan. In Uganda it is facilitated by the Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN), and in Kenya by the Lokichoggio Oropoi Kakuma Development Organization (LOKADO).

Peace and Sports facilitators are trained in sports and education, who then identify sports leaders in the communities, such as coaches, referees and sports officials. After sports practice and inter-community competition, the teams will work towards establishing links with regional sports and peace networks. The main idea of this programme is to bring youth warriors (both male and female) together on a regular basis in peace and sports activities, in order for them to express their needs, aspirations and difficulties.

Sudan Integrated Peace-building Programme

Recently IKV Pax Christi has also started the implementation of the Sudan Integrated Peace-building Programme (SIPP) (Pax Christi International, 2005). The SIPP focuses on the consolidation of peace and security in the south-eastern part of the country, in order to support the fragile CPA. It works in the regions Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile, since these regions are known to be troubled with a number of disputes. Its intentions are to work with local organizations and support local initiatives. The aim is then the settlement of local disputes, the control of arms and creating citizen capacity to effectively monitor corporate social responsibility, and to effectively advocate and lobby for the peace and development process.
Appendix 2. Dutch foreign policy on DDR

“The purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our own sentiments of hope or indignation; it is to shape real events in a real world”
– J.F. Kennedy –

In the light of possible future endeavors of IKV Pax Christi in the field of DDR, it is inescapable to shortly shed a light on Dutch foreign policy on DDR with Dutch subsidies being a large contribution the IKV Pax Christi’s budget (medefinancieringsstelsel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The recent experiences with DDR have all been financed through the so called ‘Stability Fund’ (Stabiliteitsfonds), which is an attempt of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to better integrate political, military, and development interventions. Although the Dutch government has not yet formulated a precise policy concerning DDR, a rough 55 per cent of the budget was spent on DDR and SSR in 2004 and 2005 (Klem & Frerks, 2007: 27). The projects concerned were the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) in Africa, the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) in Afghanistan, and programmes for individually demobilized combatants in Colombia which has been discussed in the previous appendix on IKV Pax Christi and its experiences with DDR.

The MDRP is a multi-agency effort led by the World Bank, and with the Dutch government’s large contribution it had a strong influence over the programme’s contents. It targets an estimated 450,000 former combatants in Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, the DRC, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. The MDRP aims to complement national and regional initiatives, and provides support for the social and economic reintegration of former combatants by giving technical and financial support, helping to establish standard approaches throughout the region, and coordinating partner initiatives. Disarmament is not funded through the programme, but within the MDRP there are partners included who facilitate disarmament. The programme is still active today (MDRP, 2008).

The DIAG is led by the Government of Afghanistan under the responsibility of the Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, and aims to eradicate illegal armed groups in Afghanistan. A large effort by the DIAG is also made to improve governance, as it targets politicians with links to armed groups, giving them one month to disarm after which they face dismissal. Critical to the DIAG is also that it is an obligation to comply, there are no rewards or incentives given, and non-compliance leads to prosecution (DIAG, 2008).

Future Dutch policy on DDR is yet to be determined and at the moment local embassies are the first point for advice and approval of projects and funds. Expected is that a policy article will be complete in the summer of 2008, a little before the finalization of this report. This article, however, is an internal document for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will not be published.
publicly. The intention is that this policy article will connect with the policies on SSR, small arms, fragile states, and the financing modules. Also, there are plans to create a summary of the frameworks for DDR, SSR, small arms, and fragile states in order to inform the Dutch parliament and the public, including NGOs. Expected is that the policy will keep favoring multilateral projects through the UN and the World Bank. This has the priority, since the Netherlands is a relatively small country and DDR often demands large scale projects with high costs. Also, by funding through the UN and the World Bank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes to have a greater influence in the programmes, compared to the funding of independent NGOs. These funds will all go through the Stability Fund, since this fund enables large investments. The downside to this is that the fund is legally confined to benefit NGOs directly\textsuperscript{40}. Apart from the funding through the Stability Fund, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does fund many Dutch and international NGOs, who in their turn can use this for DDR projects. These projects are then not necessarily geared to the policy goals of the Dutch government (pers. comm., Hugo de Vries, The Hague, 8 May 2008). What is further known is that the Dutch government strongly advocates a gendered policy on DDR, as is clear from the published booklet \textit{Towards a Dutch Policy on Gender, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration} (Bouta, 2006). With regard to the reintegration phase in DDR, there is currently a research ongoing by Clingendael, assigned by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is expected to be completed shortly after the finalization of this paper (pers. comm., Leontine Specker, The Hague, 9 May 2008).

\textsuperscript{40} Funds from the Stability Fund granted to for example the UN or World Bank, can then by these organizations be used to contract NGOs.
### Appendix 3. List of Interviews

#### Name: 

**Netherlands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function/Organization:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paul Allertz</td>
<td>Programme Manager Horn of Africa IKV Pax Christi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Kanneworf</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marianne Moor</td>
<td>Programme Manager Latin America IKV Pax Christi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joost van Puijenbroek</td>
<td>Programme Manager Central Africa IKV Pax Christi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leontine Specker</td>
<td>Research Fellow Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugo de Vries</td>
<td>Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Kenya**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function/Organization:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Simon Simonse</td>
<td>IKV Pax Christi Horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
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**Sudan**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function/Organization:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bonfrey Abuwi</td>
<td>Programme Assistant, WFP (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatima Musa Ajak</td>
<td>Acting Director Gender, Ministry of Education Jonglei State (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carola Baller</td>
<td>Dutch Embassy Sudan, Juba Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetsuto Binnaka</td>
<td>Country Representative, Peace Winds Japan (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eveline de Bruijn</td>
<td>UN DDR CSAC working group (Juba), UNMIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garang Alier Cuor</td>
<td>Depute Director Life Skills and Nutrition, Ministry of Education Jonglei State (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezekiel Garang</td>
<td>UN DDR Officer Sector III (Malakal, Bor, Bentiu), UNMIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Garang</td>
<td>UNHCR (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Gatkouth</td>
<td>Field Coordinator, UNRCO (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abraham Arng Jok</td>
<td>Commissioner Bor County, Jonglei State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georg Kibayiru</td>
<td>Save the Children Sweden (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thierry Labrouze</td>
<td>Refugee Assistance Programme Manager, Handicap International and Atlas Logistique, Jonglei State (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malik Leasay</td>
<td>Head UNMIS Jonglei State and Team Leader Civil Affairs, UNMIS (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Lochhead</td>
<td>Acting Programme Manager CSAC, UNDP (Juba)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Luthiko</td>
<td>Advisor to the Minister for Local Government, Jonglei State (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title and Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deng Jerebuom Macuor</td>
<td>Depute Director Planning and Budgeting, Ministry of Education Jonglei State (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maddalene</td>
<td>Community Service Expert, Intersos</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elijah Magot</td>
<td>Director of Communication, Ministry of Information and Communication Jonglei State (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Jok Major</td>
<td>Civil Administrator Baidit Payam, Jonglei State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rev. Stephen Mathiang</td>
<td>Executive Director, Church &amp; Development (Bor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alier Michael Molet</td>
<td>Civil Administrator Jalle Payam, Jonglei State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aloysious Moriba</td>
<td>UNHCR (Bor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sarah Preston</td>
<td>Project Officer Africa, Saferworld (Juba)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Martin Sagal</td>
<td>UNDP (Bor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Piotr Sasin</td>
<td>Polish Humanitarian Organization (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuol Yol</td>
<td>UN FAO (Bor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop Paul Yugusuk</td>
<td>Chairperson SSANSA</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## Appendix 4. Focus Group Discussions

### Focus group discussion youth leaders, 20 May, Bor, Jonglei State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County or origin</th>
<th>Designation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simon Makol</td>
<td>South Bor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayen Ayuen</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machul Michael</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michael Deng</td>
<td>Twic East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Atem Apel</td>
<td>Twic East</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elijah Yai Anyueth</td>
<td>Bor South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Nhial Maler</td>
<td>Bor South</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machior David Maketh</td>
<td>Twic East</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nyang Aluel</td>
<td>Akuei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Njek James</td>
<td>Malet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anjang Ajuon Mayong</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zachariah Mlec Mock</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayen Sebit Kur</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kec Riak Akon</td>
<td>South Bor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akech Dieng</td>
<td>Duk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngong David Kieka</td>
<td>Bor South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Matiop Mayen</td>
<td>Duk</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Focus group discussion church leaders, 21 May, Bor, Jonglei State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rev. John Anyuon Riak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Mathew Agulo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelist Anis Achiek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Majuk Aderek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiliam Tut Diet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bateros Koang Lam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rev. Thomas Chagor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. John Rhiak Gasmel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abraham Chol Myok</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rev. Peter Thon Manyok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastor Isaiah Malek Garang</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Focus group discussion women leaders, 20 May, Bor, Jonglei State

County of origin

Fatima Musa Ajak  Bor
Rashiel Athok    Twic East
Anna Yom Gudeau  Duk
Alson Lueth Abuoi  Bor
Mary Peter Awoui  Ayod
Zrew Manor       Bor
Sarah James Kun  Fangak
Appendix 5. Map of South Sudan

Source: UN Sudan Information Gateway (2007)
Appendix 6. Map of Jonglei State

Source: UN Sudan Information Gateway (2007)
Appendix 7. Map of Ethnic Sub-groups in South Sudan

Source: UN Sudan Information Gateway (2008)
Appendix 8. Counties and Payam of Jonglei

Adapted from: Ministry of Health GoSS website (2007)