Armed and insecure

An overview of arms transfers and armed violence in the Horn of Africa (2010-2015)
Colophon

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About PAX

PAX works with committed citizens and partners to protect civilians against acts of war, to end armed violence and to build just peace. PAX operates independently of political interests.

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arge numbers of people from the Horn of Africa were born during conflict and have been witness to the constant danger of violence. Many of them have been forced to flee their homes. Millions of people are internally displaced within the nation they were born in, have resettled in neighboring countries, or have fled overseas to Europe and North America. The abundance of weapons in the region, and the continued flow of weapons to and within the Horn of Africa is certainly not the sole cause of violence, but their wide availability and poor arms trade controls clearly aggravate the level of conflict.

This report gives a unique overview of how armed conflict and arms trade are interrelated in the Horn of Africa. It shows how violence and poor governance go hand in hand, while it is civilians that pay the price. In efforts to build more peaceful societies, governments in the Horn of Africa should be more accountable on their arms procurement; at the same time exporting states should adhere to much stricter norms, such as those set in the UN Arms Trade Treaty. In fact, the level of problems facing the region makes one wonder what good more arms to a region already engulfed in violence could possibly do. As a South Sudanese colleague recently said in despondency: “Please educate me on how adding more arms to the situation in South Sudan will help bring peace, reduce the tension we currently see, and give us hope for a stable country!”

Jan Gruiters,
General Director
PAX
List of Abbreviations

ACLED  Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project
AMISOM  African Union Mission to Somalia
AOAV  Action On Armed Violence
ATT  Arms Trade Treaty
AU  African Union
CCM  Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCW  Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EU  European Union
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
HRW  Human Rights Watch
HSBA  Human Security Baseline Assessment (Small Arms Survey)
ICC  International Criminal Court
ICG  International Crisis Group
IDP  Internally Displaced Person
IFV  Infantry Fighting Vehicle
IHL  International Humanitarian Law
JEM  Justice and Equality Movement (Sudan)
LRA  Lord’s Resistance Army
MBT  Mine Ban Treaty
MIC  Military Industrial Corporation (Sudan)
MRL  Multiple Rocket Launcher
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<tr>
<td>NISAT-PRI</td>
<td>Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers at the Peace Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Oslo</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
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<td>RECSA</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Bordering States</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>Rocket-Propelled Grenade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudanese Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>SPLM/A-IO</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – In Opposition</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A-N</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army - North</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>Sudan Revolutionary Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSDM/A</td>
<td>South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sudan (until 2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (from 2011)</td>
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Agents of Political Conflict in Africa
(Data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data [ACLED] Project)

**Political Conflict by Agent Type**

- **N.B.**: ACLED does not include civilians as agents of conflict as they do not actively take part in conflict events.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># of Conflict Events</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>200</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Conflict Agent Type**

- Communal Militias
- Government Forces
- Rebels
- Political Militias
- Rioters
- Protesters
- External Forces

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Agents of Political Conflict in Africa
(Data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data [ACLED] Project)

Political Conflict by Agent Type

N.B.: ACLED does not include civilians as agents of conflict as they do not actively take part in conflict events.

Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Inter1
Government Forces
Rebels
Political Militias
Communal Militias
Rioters
Protesters
Civilians
External Forces

# of Conflict Events
1
100
200
300
400
492

Conflict Agent Type
- Communal Militias
- Government Forces
- Rebels
- Political Militias
- Rioters
- Protesters
- External Forces


N.B.: ACLED does not include civilians as agents of conflict as they do not actively take part in conflict event.
Kampala
Khartoum
Juba
Chad
Central African Republic
Egypt
Tanzania
Uganda
Rwanda
Burundi
Sudan
South Sudan
Abyei
Kampala
Khartoum
Juba
Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti.

Map 2
Horn of Africa

Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti.
large swathes of the Horn of Africa have suffered from prolonged armed violence. Sustained security and stability may often seem like a mirage in the region, as conflict, armed violence and terrorism have become tragically commonplace in recent decades. Civilians unacceptably bear the brunt, with thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands of people displaced in recent years as a direct consequence of armed violence. A closer look at some of the areas deemed ‘islands of calm’ in the sub-region reveal that their security is only relative to the ‘rough sea’ around them. Very few, if any, of the armed conflicts and major patterns of armed violence in the Horn of Africa are purely national phenomena. Rather, most often have a regional or trans-border dimension, sometimes with neighbouring countries involved militarily in other countries.

There are, of course, major differences between the countries, and in some cases major differences within a country. This report provides an individual look at the transfer and use of arms between 2010 and 2015 in eight nations: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. Given the complexities of each nation, this report does not aim to be exhaustive. It offers an introduction rather than an in-depth, detailed study.

Humanitarian Disarmament
PAX has been active in Africa and in large parts of the Horn for decades, working on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and towards peaceful resolution of conflicts. Moreover, PAX has a long tradition of working in the field of ‘humanitarian disarmament’, striving to prevent the
unacceptable humanitarian harm caused by the use of certain weapons.¹

Acknowledging the right of states to defend themselves in accordance with the United Nation Charter, PAX believes that it is equally important “to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources”, as stipulated in the UN Charter.²

It is important to acknowledge the risk that weapons can propagate destruction and promote the continuation of armed conflicts, thereby causing unacceptable harm to civilians and contributing to human rights violations. This is particularly true for controversial weapons banned under international treaties because of their inherently indiscriminate nature, causing civilian and military casualties alike. These weapons include anti-personnel mines (banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, MBT) and cluster munitions (banned under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, CCM). There are currently 162 States Parties to the MBT.³ Only 35 states remain outside the treaty, but most of them do not actually use or produce anti-personnel mines anymore, which can be considered a norm-setting effect of the treaty. The CCM has 100 States Parties, with another 19 that have signed but not yet ratified it.⁴ The CCM has also clearly stigmatised and thus reduced the use of cluster munitions beyond the States Parties. These weapons are inherently indiscriminate and therefore banned under International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

In other cases, the way in which conventional weapons are employed may cause civilian harm, even if such attacks are not explicitly banned under IHL. Specifically, explosive weapons with wide area effects cause immense harm to civilians when used in populated areas. Research shows that when explosive weapons were used in populated areas in 2015, 92 per cent of those killed or injured were civilians. This compares to 31 per cent in other areas.⁵ Moreover, the destruction of infrastructure vital to the civilian population, including water supply systems and sanitation, housing, schools and hospitals, results in a pattern of wider, long-term suffering. Victims and survivors of explosive weapons can face long-term challenges in the form of disability, psychological harm, and social and economic exclusion.⁶

Weapons are also likely to cause civilian harm when supplied to destinations where they have a high risk of being used for human rights violations, where they can further fuel ongoing conflicts or where they can even be used to violate international law. Moreover, weapons may be diverted to other destinations or their purchase may undermine available funding for policies aimed at improving health and education.

Therefore, PAX has long advocated the strict implementation of and improvements to arms export control regimes, such as the EU Common Position on arms exports and the UN Arms

⁶ PAX works within the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW) to contribute to stronger international standards, including certain prohibitions and restrictions, on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Currently 67 States have acknowledged the harm caused when explosive weapons, such as bombs, missiles or grenades, are used in populated areas. For more information see www.inew.org
Trade Treaty.\(^7\) As part of its humanitarian disarmament work, PAX encourages other states to accede and adhere to treaties such as the ATT, the MBT and the CCM, and to promote high standards to protect civilians in and following a conflict.

Through in-depth research and publications, PAX focuses on the entire chain of armed conflict, from the development of weapons to the arms trade and the use of weapons in armed conflict. As we strongly believe in the strength of cooperation, much of our advocacy work is done not only on a national level but also through international coalitions and networks, such as Control Arms, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition.\(^8\)

**Challenges**

Most countries in the Horn of Africa fall within the group of countries with the largest security challenges to overcome. A glance at the Global Peace Index 2016, an ‘aggregator’ of stability and violence indicators, shows that none of the countries under consideration here are in the top 100 of the world’s most peaceful nations.\(^9\) If the Horn of Africa were a single nation, it would rank 135\(^{th}\) out of the 163 countries listed, helped by its highest ranked country, Uganda, at position 101. Three countries in the region (Sudan, Somalia and South Sudan) are in the bottom nine globally, with South Sudan deemed only just safer than Syria in the entire world.\(^10\)

Among the list of ‘highly violent conflicts’ in the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2015, the Horn of Africa accounts for an inordinate proportion of active hostilities in the world, both under the category of ‘limited wars’ and that of ‘wars’.\(^11\) Accordingly, the region has a large proportion of all current peacekeeping missions: of the 16 UN-deployed forces in the world, the Horn countries host three: UNMISS (South Sudan), UNAMID (joint UN- AU, Darfur), and UNISFA (interim security force in Abyei, Sudan); AMISOM, the African Union mission in Somalia, is one of two deployed by that regional group (the other is in the Central African Republic).\(^12\)

Among the plethora of causal factors, underlying conditions and temporal triggers, the abundance of weapons is a major contributor to conflict and violence in the Horn of Africa, helping to feed and sustain cycles of violence and acting as a perennial barrier to solving the region’s most entrenched problems. With good governance the exception rather than the rule, feeble democratic institutions and precarious rule of law feed a general sense of insecurity.\(^13\) Patterns of systematically unfulfilled human rights and a lack of civil liberties are more common than not. Moreover, “corruption and conflict go hand in hand”: in terms of perceptions of

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\(^13\) Deemed “the process whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources and guarantee the realization of human rights in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law”, [http://ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx](http://ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx).
corruption, Somalia ranks last in the world (tied with North Korea), while Sudan and South Sudan fare just better than those two countries followed closely by Afghanistan. Other indicators, such as freedom of the press—Eritrea deemed the least free in the world, Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti in the bottom 15 globally—and human development (all these countries are considered to have ‘low human development’) likewise do not bode well for the region. Adding insult to injury, military expenditures often displace social investments in one of the world’s poorest areas.

As for other sub-regions, the very notion of the ‘Horn of Africa’ is, of course, in some ways abstract and artificial. Countries in the region have as much in common with neighbours outside the Horn as they do with those within. This is particularly true for the issues of large-scale violence and arms control, as conflicts and countries ostensibly not ‘in the Horn of Africa’ can play large roles in the dynamics of the countries under analysis here: take Libya after Gaddafi’s fall and the ensuing arms proliferation, the proximity of Djibouti to the Yemen conflict, or the potential for the displacement of people and weapons from the Great Lakes region to Uganda and South Sudan.

Nonetheless, the eight countries have many shared obstacles. This report is thus presented as a ‘panorama’—without the intention of being exhaustive or covering all aspects related to arms transfers and armed violence during the period. Rather than being aimed at experts in the Horn of Africa, the report seeks to introduce the region and the realities of its armed violence to an audience that has perhaps not focused on this part of the world—but should. With regard to major instances of armed violence and conflict, each chapter focuses only on some of the most lethal, dramatic or impactful; a multitude of examples that could have been mentioned have unfortunately not been included, although they left an indelible track of death and destruction.

Another caveat is essential: while data on arms and violence tend to be patchy, opaque and underwhelming worldwide, given both governments’ secrecy (due to perceived national security and commercial concerns) and the difficulty or lack of interest in collecting data on and reporting casualties, the scenario in the Horn of Africa is particularly disheartening. A basic tenet of governance—the ability to account for and report on violence (especially lethal violence)—is severely lacking in several of the countries under consideration. As such, most of the quantitative building blocks of the report are a condensation of what is possible rather than what is ideal. When it comes to individual instances of major violence, the difficulties are compounded in some countries by a lack of freedom of the press, a lack of political opposition, and/or a lack of freedom of expression. Thus, information should be assessed with some scepticism in cases where only a single source is available and/or where reports may be from politically biased or politically motivated media.

Outline
With some variations the general structure of the country chapters is as follows. The chapter starts with a very brief outline of a nation’s situation. Next, a discussion of Armed Conflicts and Armed Violence offers an introduction to the main dynamics and instances regarding the use

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15 See https://rsf.org/en/ranking for freedom of the press. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi. Kenya performs best in terms of human development at position 145 in the world; all the others are ranked at 163 (Uganda) or worse, with Eritrea at 186 out of 188 and Somalia not included.
of the ‘tools of violence’ in that country between 2010 and 2015. Particular attention is given to the **Weapon Use**, which has profoundly impacted the region’s societies, whether the weapons were aircraft bombs or drone missiles, artillery shells or internationally banned landmines and cluster munitions. Snapshots of the nation’s **Military Spending and Holdings** offer an indication of the baseline for each case before the influx of new weaponry during the period, both in terms of military expenditures and of the relative military strength in hardware holdings and human resources.

The stage having been set, the **Arms Transfers** section lists and comments on the transfers of major weapons into each country between 2010 and 2015, using data from SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database, specifying the supplier country, number and type of arms delivered and the transfer year. As small arms are the instruments of most violence in the region, a summary of each country’s incoming **Small Arms** is also presented, with data sourced by NISAT-PRIO. The inclusion of both databases is important as they offer a complimentary view of arms transfers into a given country, SIPRI covering the largest, most expensive and potentially destructive equipment, and NISAT the most portable, most concealable and thus most frequently used instruments of violence in the Horn of Africa. Where applicable, a brief discussion of Production, Diversion and/or Illicit Trafficking is included, in recognition of the fact that some African nations do indeed produce some ‘tools of violence’ (particularly ammunition) and that the legal trade in weapons is only part of the story of arms proliferation and its impact on violence patterns. Likewise, some country chapters include a brief discussion of relevant **Arms Embargoes**.

Finally, a brief snapshot of the country’s participation in **International Arms Control Mechanisms** lists which commitments each country has made. Additionally, most chapters have a **Spotlight** section, in which a given aspect of a country’s armed violence is discussed.

Following the country case studies, the report finishes with **Conclusions and Recommendations**: a brief analysis of major trends, lessons learned and recommendations for governments and institutions.

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17 For SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database, see [http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers](http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers). SIPRI only covers ‘major conventional weapons’, excluding e.g. small arms and artillery under 10mm calibre and their ammunition, unguided rockets and missiles, free-fall aerial munitions and military trucks. For a full discussion of the sources and methodology, see [https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods](https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods).


19 It should be noted that given different scopes and definitions of arms, SIPRI and NISAT data may at times overlap around what is considered ‘light weapons’, such as grenade launchers, MANPADS, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, and some mortars, depending on the calibre of the weapon.

20 The following instruments were prioritised: Arms Trade Treaty, Mine Ban Treaty, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, UN Firearms Protocol, and the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States. The Nairobi Protocol ([http://www.poa-ies.org/RegionalOrganizations/RECSA/Nairobi%20Protocol.pdf](http://www.poa-ies.org/RegionalOrganizations/RECSA/Nairobi%20Protocol.pdf)) is the region’s most important arms control agreement and entered into force in May 2006. It has 15 members: Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. At least on paper, it is among the world’s best small arms control documents. An intergovernmental organisation, RECSA (Regional Centre on Small Arms, [http://recsasec.org/what-we-do/](http://recsasec.org/what-we-do/)), was created in 2005 to implement commitments made in this agreement, including ‘certain national legislative measures, the strengthening of operational capacity and sufficient measures to control SALW both state-owned and in civilian possession. Other provisions cover tracing, safe disposal, transfer of SALW and brokering. The Member States agree to cooperate in terms of mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transparency, information exchange and harmonization’.
A few lessons learned can be mentioned at the outset. The discrepancy between the magnitude of the problems exacerbated by weapons and each government’s efforts to control their problems in the Horn of Africa is huge. While certainly no panacea, introducing and improving arms control mechanisms—licensing policies, border controls, stockpile management and transparency in reporting—can contribute to confidence building, especially in a region characterised by conflict, porous borders and arms transfers shrouded in secrecy.

Fundamentally, governments in the Horn of Africa must shift from a focus on ‘national security’ to prioritising ‘human security’, improving the wider perception of security by ensuring basic socio-economic preconditions such as personal safety and food security, an accessible labour market, and education and health systems. This is of crucial importance in order to significantly reduce levels of armed violence. As such, this survey aims to provide a unique overview of the deadly relationship between the trade in and the use of arms in the Horn of Africa. With so many people in the region morbidly used to armed conflict and major violence, it is imperative that efforts be made to better control the trade in arms, thereby preventing lethal instruments from ending up in the hands of those violating human rights or involved in war crimes.
Tank with Sudanese soldiers, 2016
Once the continent’s largest country, Sudan is still one of Africa’s biggest nations (after Algeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo) despite ‘losing’ South Sudan; covering an area almost three times as large as France, Sudan has an estimated 40 million inhabitants, comparable to Poland. Its multiple borders include Egypt to the north, the Red Sea, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, South Sudan to the south, the Central African Republic to the southwest, Chad to the west and Libya to the northwest. In this complex geopolitical position, Sudan has been led by President Omar al-Bashir since a coup in 1989.21

Sudan ranks very low on several social and economic indicators. For example, the nation stands 167th out of 188 in the UNDP’s Human Development Index—just below Uganda and above Djibouti and South Sudan—and is ranked 155th out of 163 in the Global Peace Index, while according to Transparency International only three nations in the world are more corrupt.22

Armed Conflicts and Armed Violence

Sudan has suffered for decades from violent ethnic strife and internal conflicts, including two civil wars in the south and the unresolved conflicts in the states of war in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile.23 As a consequence, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of

23 Between 1955 and 1972 and between 1983 and 2005; see also the South Sudan chapter.
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “the humanitarian situation in Sudan continues to deteriorate. Despite years of assistance, humanitarian needs remain acute and in some cases are worsening. These humanitarian needs are predominantly caused by armed conflict which, in turn, drives displacement and food insecurity.” OCHA further notes that “environmental factors also exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, driving displacement and food insecurity. In particular, Sudan has recently experienced unpredictable rainfall patterns and desertification that negatively affect the harvest and food supply. In other areas, annual rainfall causes flash-flooding, resulting in temporary displacement and the destruction of homes and livelihoods.”

Instability around Sudan’s borders is adding to the overall humanitarian burden, with hundreds of thousands seeking refuge in Sudan. It has the largest number of South Sudanese refugees: 232,000 as at June 2016, plus another 130,000 refugees with other nationalities.

All in all, the magnitude of Sudan’s turmoil is hard to fathom; while conflict deaths have decreased significantly since the pre-2005 period according to the Uppsala Conflict Database, at least 12,320 people were killed between 2010 and 2015. Another database (ACLED), monitoring gender-based violence and the use of “rape as a weapon of political violence” in 2015, noted that “by far the

25 Ibid. See also ‘Climate Change and African Political Stability’ at [https://www.strausscenter.org/acled.html](https://www.strausscenter.org/acled.html).
biggest perpetrator of this type of violence are political militias, specifically those in Sudan”.28

DARFUR
Darfur became the centre of massive violence in 2003, when the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) began an armed struggle against the government of Sudan, which they accused of oppressing Darfur’s non-Arab population. The government responded with a campaign of ethnic cleansing, aided by the notorious Janjaweed militias, mostly recruited among Arab Africans. Estimates of civilians killed in the violence vary from tens to hundreds of thousands. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued an arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir on counts of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide in Darfur.29

Despite peace agreements in 2006 and 2011 as well as a substantial United Nations/African Union blue helmet force (UNAMID), armed violence still rages in Darfur, with air and ground attacks by Sudan’s military (more on this topic below).30 Both JEM and the SLM/A-Abdul Wahid faction have lost significant territory, in South Darfur and Jebel Marra respectively, over the past two years.31

According to OCHA, “2014 saw an intensification of fighting and, as a result, a deepening of the humanitarian crisis. […] Now entering its twelfth year, the conflict in Darfur has become more widespread and unpredictable.”32 In the five months up to April 2014, over 3,300 villages were destroyed in the conflict in Darfur.33 The conflict has displaced 2.6 million people within Sudan; an estimated 200,000 people have been killed.34 A viable political solution to the conflict remains elusive and far away.

TWO AREAS
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N) emerged from southern Sudan’s original resistance force SPLM/A, after South Sudan became independent. It has been involved in an insurgency against the government in Sudan’s southern states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile—also known as the Two Areas—since 2011, a “previous, partially unresolved conflict” of the second civil war.35

Civilians from the Two Areas have suffered from five years of continuing violence, with nearly 400,000 people ‘displaced’, including to war-torn South Sudan.36 The situation is increasingly

29 https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur.
33 UNSC, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)’, S/2015/31, January 2015, p. 44.
critical in SPLM/A-N controlled areas, which humanitarian organisations have not been able to access since 2011. According to two experienced reporters on the Two Areas, “the conflict remains largely frozen—and with little chance for a military victory on either side. Diplomacy, too, has proved maddeningly slow. […] While the political impasse continues, it is civilians of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile who suffer the most.”

**COOPERATION?**

In November 2011, SPLM/A-N together with SLM/A and JEM formed the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), “committed to a common objective: overthrowing President Omar al-Bashir and creating what they considered to be a more equitable Sudan”. The alliance is less united today and appears to have split between the largely Darfur movements and the SPLM/A-N. In what could be a significant development, leaders from both South Sudan and Uganda travelled to Khartoum in June 2016, declaring their intent to normalise and improve relations. Importantly, “a new understanding between the three could bring a welcome change to the Horn’s complex balance of alliances and animosities”, noted the International Crisis Group.

**Weapon Use**

Clearly, the government of Sudan exercises little restraint in its use of weapons against its own population. Worse, it appears to be government policy to cause the highest level of death and destruction, as revealed in leaked minutes of a July 2014 meeting of the entire leadership of Sudan’s armed forces, including President al-Bashir. According to the document, Sudan’s Defence minister, General Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein, claimed to “have instructed the Air Force to bomb any place, whether it is a school, hospital, or a non-governmental humanitarian organization operating in rebel-controlled areas without permission from the government”, referring to South Kordofan. According to the same leaked document, al-Bashir made clear that “we have no intention […] to offer any concessions” to either the armed or unarmed opposition. “The solution is military victory. […] You are now instructed to crush the armed movements in all three fronts [Nuba Mountains, Darfur and Blue Nile].” The meeting staked out a timeline of six months to defeat the armed groups, particularly the SPLM/A-N, in a ‘Decisive Summer’ offensive.

A particularly worrying characteristic of the conflicts in both Darfur and South Kordofan/Blue Nile is the use of air-launched weapons. Apparent violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)—bombing hospitals and other civilian infrastructure—have been extensively
documented, a few of which will be described in this section. The section does not aim to be exhaustive, but sketches the scale and consequences of aerial bombardments, highlighting a few well-documented cases. Even such a brief glance reveals the enormous effects they have on civilians, scaring the people of Darfur and the Two Areas away from their homelands and depopulating major areas in these parts of Sudan.

AERIAL BOMBARDMENT IN THE TWO AREAS

Already in 2011, PAX noted that aerial bombardments deterred many farmers from tending their crops. Bombing raids were mostly carried out by modified Antonov cargo aircraft, “which indiscriminately drop bombs filled with jagged chunks of metal, sometimes weighing several kilos, from railings mounted in the back of the aircraft”.44 In June of that year, Sudan’s air force began aerial bombardments and intensified ground assaults “on civilian-populated areas in Um Dorein and Talodi localities”, according to UN staff.45 The violence has not subsided in recent years.

Extensive and reliable data on the numbers of casualties resulting from the bombing, and the conflict in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile in general, are hard to get since journalists and humanitarian organisations barely have access to the region. According to data from Nuba Reports—a network of journalists in the region—an aggregate 1,500 bombs and shells (air and land attacks) were recorded in 57 separate incidents over December 2014 and January 2015. More than 450 bombs and shells reportedly landed on civilian areas.46 Over 4,000 bombs have been dropped “on civilian targets” in the Two Areas since Nuba Reports started counting in April 2012.47 In February 2015 it noted that “the Sudanese air-force has more than tripled the number of bombs dropped on civilian areas in recent months”, counting 500 alone in January of that year.48

The Sudan Consortium—a coalition of African and international civil society organisations—reported 333 separate incidents of bombing and shelling attacks in South Kordofan during 2014 alone (a 48 per cent increase compared to 2013), resulting in 67 confirmed civilian deaths and 162 civilian injuries.49

The South Kordofan and Blue Nile Coordination Unit, a project by the organisation ‘Stop Bombing Civilians in Sudan’, reported 95 aerial bombs and 45 “long range shelling incidents” in South Kordofan alone in April 2016, resulting in 39 civilian casualties and nearly 13,000 displaced people. In the Blue Nile, 107 bombs were dropped by Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) aircraft, but no numbers of casualties have been reported.50

Amnesty International has released several reports documenting the use of weapons in South Kordofan. In June 2014 it wrote: “The aerial attacks often use unguided munitions dropped from aircraft at high altitudes. The SAF has continued to use unguided munitions such as barrel

45 Ibid.
46 The Sudan Consortium, ‘Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan’s Two Areas and Darfur’, March 2015.
47 4,082 as of 15 July 2016, as shown on its homepage: http://nubareports.org/.
49 The Sudan Consortium, ‘Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan’s Two Areas and Darfur’, March 2015.
50 South Kordofan and Blue Nile Coordination Unit, ‘Humanitarian Update – April 2016’. For previous reports, see http://sksudan.com/reports/.
bombs, which are rolled out manually from Antonov cargo planes or other aircrafts flying at high altitudes, and do not allow for accurate delivery. In these latest offensives, national human rights groups have additionally documented the use of parachute-retarded bombs launched from Sukhoi jets at high altitudes, causing extensive damage in civilian areas and to civilian objects.\textsuperscript{51} In a more extensive report from July 2015, Amnesty concludes “that many of the attacks targeted civilian areas and objects without warning, and without legitimate military targets” and that such attacks “amount to war crimes”.\textsuperscript{52}

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has also reported extensively on unlawful attacks, for example after visiting 13 villages and towns in rebel-held areas of the Nuba Mountains in April 2015, repeatedly hit by air-dropped bombs and ground shelling. The researchers focused on how abuses committed during the conflict are especially affecting children. “Children are literally being blown to pieces by bombs and burned alive with their siblings,” said Daniel Bekele, Africa director at HRW. “They are unable to get sufficient food, basic health care, or education, and the situation is only getting worse” (see also ‘Spotlight’ at the end of the chapter).\textsuperscript{53}

On 20 January 2015, the Sudanese air force bombed a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in the Nuba Mountains village of Frandala.\textsuperscript{54} The health organisation, one of very few in the region supporting civilian victims, cancelled its Sudan operations after the attack: “Repeated and targeted bombings in the region prevent the safe operation of medical activities, depriving the local population of life saving care,” the organisation wrote in a statement. “Today there can be no doubt that this was a deliberate and targeted bombing on a civilian hospital structure and part of a strategy to terrorise the community,” according to its Sudan head of mission. The same hospital had already been bombed in June 2014, with several patients injured and one killed, and significant damage to the hospital. Medical units are civilian objects with special protections under IHL.\textsuperscript{55} Parties to a conflict must ensure that medical personnel are not endangered or harmed, and hospitals and ambulances are not attacked, damaged or misused.

A rather recent development is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), more commonly known as drones, by the SAF for so-called Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. As drone flights often precede bombing raids, it is likely that drones are used for target acquisition purposes. For example, HRW notes that in May and June 2014, in three cases drones had flown over hospitals and medical facilities before they were bombed.\textsuperscript{56} In at least four cases since March 2012, SPLM/A-N reportedly shot down SAF drones in South Kordofan.\textsuperscript{57}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{IHL} See for example https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_nul_nup28.
\end{thebibliography}
The relentless bombing and constant SAF aerial presence in the skies has clearly disrupted civilian life in the Two Areas. Apart from the physical damage to homes and social infrastructure, the psychological effect should not be underestimated. The constant bombardment and the mere presence of military aircraft keeps people away from schools and discourages people from farming, in the end forcing them to flee since a normal life has been made impossible. Earlier in the conflict, the Small Arms Survey had already concluded that “SAF superiority in South Kordofan is limited to its control of the skies. As in its Darfur campaign, the use of adapted Antonov cargo planes and military aircraft for bombing has not led to military advances but has succeeded in terrorizing and displacing the local population.”

AERIAL BOMBARDMENT IN DARFUR

In Darfur too, aerial bombardment is an important part of the government’s approach to dealing with what it considers insurgent areas. While a UN arms embargo (see below) forbids the transfer and use of military equipment for offensive action in Darfur, including offensive overflights, it has not had much of an impact on the government of Sudan, the only party in the conflict able to conduct air raids.

In its February 2014 report, the Panel of Experts noted that the “Sudanese air force stated that the presence of Su-25 aircraft in Darfur was unrelated to internal security problems in the Sudan and that they had been deployed to protect sovereignty and citizens. It also indicated that the borders with the Central African Republic, Chad and Libya needed protection and that the Su-25 aircraft helped the Sudan in accomplishing that. Nevertheless, the Panel received various reports mentioning the use of attack/close air support aircraft in air strikes on civilian targets.”

UN experts have counted an annual average of 84 air attacks in Darfur since 2006, with a peak in 2012 (106 air attacks) and lower numbers in 2013 (64) and 2014 (48 in the first ten months). The most recently available report by the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan, from January 2015, mentions that “Various sanctions violations were identified, including, highly probably, the transfer of Antonov An-26 aircraft by the Government of the Sudan into Darfur when subsequently used in an improvised bomber role.”

In 2015 there was an apparent increase in hostilities, although reliable aggregate data are currently lacking. For example, on 15 April an Antonov “bombarded a drinking water source near Ronga village, killing fourteen (14) people, injuring eighteen (18) including children.”

Moreover, the Panel detailed the use of “improvised air-delivered munitions” by the Sudanese air force in an attack on the village of AbuLeha in North Darfur in October 2014, with six bombs reportedly dropped, two of which did not explode. One of the duds had landed in a school compound. The bombs were almost certainly delivered by An-26 aircraft. Analysis of the bomb shows that the type has “about 89 per cent of the destructive power of a conventional high

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61 UNSC, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan’, S/2015/31, January 2015, Fig. 8, p. 31.
explosive aircraft bomb such as the OFAB-100". The report further notes that a “Member State previously confirmed the supply of 10,000 AM-A Type Fuze to the Sudan, between 2009 and 2011. Therefore the transfer of the AM-A fuzes fitted to the improvised air delivered munitions into Darfur is almost certainly a breach of sanctions by the Sudan; the AM-A fuzes were delivered by the Member State conditional on their non-use in Darfur” (see also the ‘Arms Embargoes’ section).  

Possibly one of the deadliest air attacks documented in recent years was a week of bombing flights on Hashaba and surrounding villages in North Darfur in 2012. The attacks were carried out by planes and helicopters, as well as militias on the ground. According to the UN, the number of casualties ranged from 27 to 100. “There are a great many rumors and allegations concerning the facts of the Hashaba incident as well as considerable conjecture as to the motives of the sides involved,” reads an internal UNAMID report. “It is also fairly certain that while a SAF [warplane] may have done some bombing on 25 September, SAF ground forces were not involved.” That work appears to have been carried out by militias loyal to Khartoum. As a consequence of the violence, over 12,000 people were said to have fled the area, which residents described as “virtually deserted”.

FUEL-AIR EXPLOSIVES IN DARFUR

In their January 2015 report, the UN experts highlight a number of air-delivered and ground-launched munitions used in Darfur, including for example Soviet-developed S-8DM 80mm air-to-ground rockets, which have a fuel-air explosives (FAE) warhead. According to Human Rights Watch, “FAEs are not currently banned under international humanitarian law. However, because they are wide-area weapons, military forces must exercise extreme caution and refrain from using them in or near population centers.” According to the UN report, the rockets had been legally delivered by an unspecified state to Sudan “conditional on their non-use in Darfur”, while Sudan’s transfer of the missiles to Darfur was a breach of the embargo. The UN Panel mentions use of these missiles in an attack on Orschi, almost certainly by Su-25 aircraft, in April 2014, with nine civilians injured.

CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN THE TWO AREAS AND DARFUR

In 2013, the Small Arms Survey concluded that there is strong evidence that the SAF had employed cluster munitions in South Kordofan, mentioning the M20G-type submunition from

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107mm mortars, as well as reportedly Chinese-manufactured Type-81 DPICM, despite official denials by Khartoum. Further evidence from HRW showed a Soviet-made RBK-500 cluster bomb containing AO-2.5 RT submunition, which had failed to explode in the settlement of Ongolo in South Kordofan on 15 April 2012.

In 2015, HRW brought new evidence of cluster munition use in the Nuba Mountains, with six cluster bombs, including remnants of the weapons such as dud submunitions, apparently dropped by government aircraft on villages in Delami and Um Durein counties. Witnesses said that government aircraft dropped two bombs in the village of Tongoli, in Delami county on March 6, and four others on the village of Rajeefi, in Um Durein county, in late February 2015. The attacks destroyed homes and other civilian property.

Key to Sudan’s air force operations in Darfur is El Fasher airport, where in May 2013 Soviet-origin RBK-500 cluster bombs were seen, with the Panel of Experts having “evidence of previous use of cluster munitions in Darfur.”

While Sudan has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (see below), the use of cluster munitions is now generally accepted to be in violation of the principles of International Humanitarian Law. Khartoum has dismissed reports of cluster munition use as “fabricated and baseless”: according to an army spokesman, “We never used this kind of weapon in war areas in Sudan.” This echoes a similar SAF response in 2012: “Whether or not we end up joining the international treaty that bans cluster bombs, the fact remains that we never use them in our military operations and we don’t have them to begin with.”

**Military Spending and Holdings**

While the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is widely regarded as one of the most authoritative sources on military spending, it has for years not been able to produce sufficiently reliable data with regard to Sudan. Their most recent figures on Sudan are from 2006. Defence spending appears to have increased nominally in the subsequent years. Expressed as a proportion of GDP it is estimated to be around 4 per cent, according to data comparisons by Sudan expert Alex de Waal, who concludes that the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), meant to end the civil war and to lead to a referendum on self-determination for the people of South Sudan, “brought a massive expansion in military spending in north and south.”

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Current levels of military spending remain unclear, partly as additional ‘emergency’ allocations, such as for paying militias or the Rapid Support Forces—under direct control of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), and including Janjaweed militia—are not part of the defence budget. Thus, estimates range from 25 per cent to as much as a mind-boggling 70 per cent of the total government budget. On paper, some USD 2.8 billion was budgeted for security and defence in 2016, a quarter of the total budget. In comparison, government spending on education and health is only 2.3 per cent and 1 per cent of its budget respectively. Unsurprisingly, Sudan’s poverty and education indicators are extremely poor, even when compared to other lower-middle-income countries.

At the high end of the range of estimates, the Sentry, an initiative of the Enough Project, estimates that 70 per cent of governmental spending in Sudan goes to the security sector. In September 2015, the British ambassador in Sudan was summoned after statements he made to a local newspaper, saying it was impossible to cancel Sudan’s debt as long as the government spends 70 per cent of the budget on security and military functions rather than on health, education and other sectors.

The ‘Military Balance 2010’ report estimated Sudan’s armed forces to consist of 109,000 active personnel. Most equipment has been sourced from the former Soviet Union (especially Belarus and Russia) and Central European states, as well as China, Egypt and the US. In 2010 its land forces had some 475 tanks, over 300 armoured vehicles and at least 778 pieces of artillery and some 2,000 air defence guns. Also in 2010, the air force had 79 ‘combat capable’ aircraft, including a mix of former Soviet sourced MiG and Sukhoi fighter aircraft, some Chinese fighters and transport aircraft used for that purpose. Its helicopter fleet comprised 23 ‘Hind’ Mi-24 attack types and at least 20 Mi-8/Mi-171 transport helicopters.

Arms Transfers

Apart from ethnic, political and socio-economic factors, a key element in the sustainment of conflicts in Sudan (as elsewhere) is the availability of weapons. Though none of the states in the Horn of Africa are among the top global importers of ‘major conventional weapons’, Sudan is the biggest of the group, ranked number 48 among the 172 recipients identified by SIPRI for the period 2010-2015, slightly higher than Uganda and Ethiopia. Sudan’s main suppliers of larger

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80 NB: government budget, not GDP.
88 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
weapon systems are Russia, China, Ukraine and Belarus, with mostly second-hand stocks from the latter two. Recent deliveries have included ground attack aircraft and helicopters, as well as rocket artillery systems and anti-tank weapons. The table below summarises the most significant transfers since 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Weapons delivered</th>
<th>Transfer</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>15 Su-25 Ground attack aircraft, 4 Su-24 Bomber aircraft, 4 Mi-24/M-35 Combat helicopters, 2 Mi-8T Transport helicopters</td>
<td>2008-10</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2013-14</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>(460) type-63 107mm Towed MRLs, (50) WZ-551/Type-92 Infantry Fighting Vehicles</td>
<td>2001-14</td>
<td>Partly produced in Sudan as TAKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010-15</td>
<td>Assembled in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>(60) BTR-80A IFV, (50) V-55 Diesel engines, (28) Mi-24P/Hind-F Combat helicopters, (10) Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H Helicopters</td>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>Possibly assembled in Sudan, designation Shareef-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2008-12</td>
<td>For modernisation of T-54/T-55 tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2011-13</td>
<td>Probably second-hand, modernised; 12 more ordered in 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>(12) Utva-75 Light aircraft</td>
<td>2009-13</td>
<td>6 possibly second-hand; some assembled/produced in Sudan as Safat-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>130 T-72M1 Tanks, 60 T-55 Tanks, 50 BMP-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 46 2S1 122mm Self-propelled guns, (42) 9M14M/AT-3 Anti-tank missiles</td>
<td>2010-13</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2011-13</td>
<td>Second-hand, possibly modernised</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2011-13</td>
<td>Second-hand, possibly modernised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Probably second-hand; designation uncertain (reported as ‘missile and/or launcher’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 BM-21 Grad 122mm MRLs, 10 BTR-3U Guardian IFVs, 10 BRDM-2 Reconnaissance armoured vehicles, 5 D-30 122mm Towed guns</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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In June 2015, the Dutch VPRO radio revealed that military trucks had been supplied to Sudan by Van Vliet Trucks Holland BV. While they were said to have been ‘demilitarised’ and sold to a private company, at least four of the very same trucks had been captured from Sudan’s army by SPLM/A-N rebels in South Kordofan. The story originated in a 2013 report detailing how MAN military trucks, shipped from Europe in 2010 and 2011, were seen in South Kordofan. Labels still visible on the trucks revealed that Van Vliet had supplied the trucks, which they had previously bought from VEBEG, part of Germany’s Ministry of Finance that manages sales of Bundeswehr surplus stockpiles. The trucks were shipped from Antwerp on 26 June 2010 and from Amsterdam on 27 October 2011. One shipment offloaded in Port Sudan contained 99 ex-military trucks. So far, neither the Dutch authorities nor Van Vliet have revealed the volume of the second shipment, nor any further transfers of ex-military equipment.

The trucks are used for the transport of troops and to supply arms and ammunition, and are thus strategically important to the SAF. Furthermore, one Van Vliet truck was found with Séléka rebels fighting in the Central African Republic, as investigations by Conflict Armament Research revealed. It has not been established how it got there, nor how many more there are in that country. Germany has since introduced new measures, requiring foreign companies to ask permission whenever they resell equipment bought through VEBEG and to show an end-user certificate, regardless of whether authorities in the trader’s country would require a permit for such exports. In June 2015, Van Vliet said it was ceasing its business with Sudan as a consequence of the negative media attention and for fear of US sanctions. Nearly a year later, the Dutch government also changed its policy, requiring a licence for the export of former military vehicles, demilitarised or not.

**SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS**

Besides an abundance of decades-old stocks circulating in the region, Sudan’s imports of new...

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**TRUCKS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Condition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 MIG-29/Fulcrum-A Fighter aircraft</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 BTR-70 Armoured Personnel Carrier</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Second-hand, possibly modernised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(120) 9M33/SA-8 Surface-to-air missiles (SAM)</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Probably second-hand, possibly modernised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) 9K33 Osa/SA-8 mobile SAM systems</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Second-hand, possibly modernised</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


SIPRI only covers ‘major conventional weapons’ excluding e.g. small arms and artillery under 100mm calibre and their ammunition, unguided rockets and missiles, free-fall aerial munitions, as well as military trucks.

Note: data between brackets are unconfirmed.

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89 This section is based on PAX, ‘Export control strengthened after Sudan truck scandal’, May 2016, [https://wapenfeiten.wordpress.com/2016/05/30/export-control-strengthened-after-sudan-truck-scandal/](https://wapenfeiten.wordpress.com/2016/05/30/export-control-strengthened-after-sudan-truck-scandal/).


small arms and light weapons (SALW) before 2010 mostly came from China, and to a lesser extent Iran. According to NISAT-PRIO’s database, Sudan has received SALW from a total of 22 countries since 2010, including China, Egypt, Germany, Lebanon, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the UAE and Ukraine. However, it should be noted that more than anywhere else in the Horn, data on transactions with Sudan can contain large inconsistencies, suggesting that massive reporting problems are at play.

That said, a few military relationships and their transfers are particularly noteworthy. China’s exports to Sudan between 2010 and 2013 were enormous: 26,159 units of artillery (at USD 13.6 million), 1,450 grenade launchers/flame throwers, over USD 8 million in military rifles/machine guns, 2,650 shotguns and 1,268 pistols.

In 2011, Ukraine sent over USD 11 million in 58 (presumably heavy) machine guns, and almost USD 1 million in artillery (593 units). The flow continued the next year: over USD 1.5 million in ‘military rifles/machine guns’ (based on cross-referencing, most likely 22,000 sub-machine guns, 29 portable anti-tank guns/grenade launchers and 80 recoilless rifles).

Turkey was also a major provider: over 350 shotguns in 2010; 6,300 military rifles, over 9,000 units of artillery, 450 shotguns and 160 rifles in 2011; over 200 rifles, 200 shotguns and 100 pistols/revolvers in 2012; another 477 shotguns (at USD 228,801) and 100 rifles in 2013; and, finally, 1,103 shotguns and 225 rifles in 2014.

Russia has also provided Sudan with many small arms: at least 285 shotguns and 531 rifles in 2010; 222 shotguns, 210 rifles and 25 ‘missiles launchers’ in 2011; at least 200 shotguns, 89 pistols and 319 rifles in 2012; and 381 shotguns and 921 rifles in 2013-2014. Between 2010 and 2011, Thailand exported 57 ‘grenade launchers/flame throwers’ (at USD 332,763), 368 pistols/revolvers (over USD 200,000), 84 shotguns and 594 military rifles/machine guns (at almost USD 2 million) to Sudan.

DIVERSION AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

In 2009 the Small Arms Survey estimated that some 2.7 million small arms circulated in what was then Sudan, two-thirds of which were among non-state actors: civilians, armed opposition and tribal militias. Such demand stems from the fact that many sectors of Sudanese society view firearms as a necessity, despite harsh punishments for bearing and importing them without a license. Carrying weapons is especially important among pastoralists along Sudan’s borders. The Small Arms Survey has also reported extensively on flows of small arms and ammunition to

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94 Some lesser suppliers delivered significant amounts: India transferred 3,889 units of artillery (USD 170,000) in 2010 and delivered 36 firearms in 2013 (presumably heavy machine guns, considering the USD 9 million cost); Syria reportedly supplied USD 277,500 worth of pistols/revolvers in 2010 and 2011 and USD 175,000 in military rifles/machine guns; between 2010 and 2012, the UAE sent over USD 400,000 in firearms; in 2011, Germany sent 55 pistols and rifles worth USD 25,000; Ivory Coast sent 317 shotguns (almost USD 200,000); in 2014; and Lebanon sent 17 shotguns and 179 rifles (totalling over USD 100,000) in 2014.
95 All data in this section are from NISAT-PRIO Researcher’s Database.
and within Sudan, as well as from Sudan to neighbouring countries.98

Most rebel groups secure weapon supplies through battlefield captures, for example from Sudan’s armed forces. JEM and the SLA-Minni Minawi faction are said to have been sustained with supplies from the Gaddafi regime in Libya until its fall in 2011. Some claimed to have successfully moved significant materiel from Libya’s unsecured stockpiles in the south post-Gaddafi.99 Chad and South Sudan, which in the past reportedly backed some of the armed opposition, now appear to have diminished their support.100

China has been identified by UN researchers as the predominant source of new ammunition found in Darfur, most notably Chinese Type-54 12.7mm ammunition, despite the arms embargo on all parties involved in the conflict in Darfur (see below).101 As regards firearms, the iTrace system managed by Conflict Armament Research provides insightful information regarding 78 cases of diversion they physically documented.102 As of mid-June 2016, almost 18 per cent of the international diversions went to South Sudan; of the ten diverted weapons in Sudan with a traced foreign supplier, four came from China, four from Russia, and two from the United States. At least two firearms were deliberately diverted by ‘state agencies’.

**ARMS PRODUCTION**

Sudan is one of only a few African countries with an arms industry of real significance. Much of it has been developed with foreign assistance, both physical and in the form of transfers of technology. As the table on conventional arms transfers shows, some recent arms deals with Russia, China and Serbia have included local production arrangements. Moreover, Iranian and Bulgarian support, dating from the 1990s, has been well documented. Whereas Iran is considered an important source of technology in Sudan’s efforts to develop a domestic arms industry, any military-industrial cooperation since 2007 may have violated the UN arms embargo against Iran.103 Bulgaria put in place an arms embargo in 2001, prior to joining the EU.104

With roots going back to 1959, the current Military Industrial Corporation (MIC) was established in 1993 and incorporates some seven manufacturing plants. It is Sudan’s main arms industry portal and is controlled by the government.105 Current equipment advertised on its website includes different types of small arms, mortars and grenade launchers, as well as a wide range of artillery weapons and armoured vehicles.106 Many types of ammunition, small aircraft and air-to-surface

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100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.


103 UNSC Resolution 1747 (2007) ‘decides that all States shall prohibit the procurement’ of any arms or related materiel from Iran. See also <http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/iran>.


rocket launchers are also promoted. Aircraft bombs are not displayed, though MIC is known
to have produced them. One of its sites, the Yarmouk Industrial Complex—built with Bulgarian
assistance—was bombed in 2012, reportedly by Israel, which believes Sudan to be a key transit
point for weapons destined for Islamic militant groups in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.107

At the IDEX arms fair in Abu Dhabi in February 2015—one of the largest of its kind in the
world—MIC displayed a wide range of military equipment. Notably, President al-Bashir was
the only head of state attending the IDEX opening ceremony.108 According to the Small Arms
Survey, most weapons and ammunition displayed by MIC at IDEX reflected Chinese and Iranian
design, while the military vehicles were modifications of Russian and South Korean vehicles.109
MIC’s main ‘al-Bashir’ battle tank looks similar to China’s Type-85 tank and its ‘Sinnar RPG-7’
rocket-propelled grenade launcher resembles Bulgarian and Iranian technology.110 The ‘Taka’
12-barrel 107mm rocket launcher, moreover, bears resemblance to Iran’s Fadjr-1 version.111
Either the Taka or an imported variant has been seen deployed in Darfur.112 A MIC spokesman
at IDEX highlighted the progress made against a background of international sanctions pushing
domestic production, boasting their reliability as being battle-proven and already in operational
use in Sudan.113 Reliability, however, does not necessarily mean precision in this context.
For example, the Taka-2 and Taka-3 122mm rocket launchers that MIC markets are “not very
accurate”, according to a defence journalist.114

**ARMS EXPORTS FROM SUDAN**

Numerous types of weapons produced by MIC have been documented in conflict areas within
Sudan and across Africa. While it is not always possible to establish how weapons got to their
destination (captured, sold, re-sold or as aid), they have been found with various armed groups
in Sudan and South Sudan, as well as in a host of African and Middle Eastern conflicts.115

Following the rise to power of the Séléka rebels in the Central African Republic in 2013,
Sudan provided them with military equipment and training as part of a military cooperation
agreement.116 At least two deliveries of weapons from Sudan were made to the capital, Bangui.

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Weapons captured from the rebels after they lost power include Sudanese-made small arms ammunition, mortar rounds, rockets and military vehicles. After the November 2004 UN arms embargo was imposed, weapons of Sudanese as well as Chinese origin that had been retransferred via Sudan post-embargo were found in Ivory Coast by UN experts. Apart from small arms ammunition, made-in-Sudan mortar rounds were found with ex-M23 combatants in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in late 2013.

UN experts reporting on the arms embargo on Libya, imposed in 2011, found that Sudan had leased probably several, but at least three, Mi-24/Mi-35 assault helicopters to the Libyan air force, one of which had crashed during an air show in July 2013. The 2015 report by the UN's Libya experts notes that "since the outbreak of the conflict in 2014, the Sudan has been transferring military materiel to Libya in violation of the arms embargo. Interviews with knowledgeable Libyan and foreign sources indicate that the Sudan has been supporting armed groups aligned with Fajr Libya, including through the transfer of military materiel by air to Mitiga airport" in Tripoli. The report further mentions "credible information regarding Libyan-owned aircraft transporting military materiel from the Sudan to Misrata airport."

Finally, Sudan-made weapons have also been supplied through third parties. Djibouti, for example, supplied 27 Sudanese RPG launchers plus 372 PG-7 rockets, as well as machine guns and ammunition to Somalia in 2013—in addition to direct military supplies from Sudan to Somalia. Sudanese weapons, including FN-6 man-portable air defence systems and HJ-8 anti-tank guided missiles, appear to have been supplied via Qatar to rebel groups in Syria.

**Arms Embargoes**

All arms transfers to Sudan have been subject to restrictions since March 2005 when UN Security Council Resolution 1591 extended the initial arms embargo (July 2004, Resolution 1556) to all parties in the conflict in Darfur, including Sudanese government forces active in the region. However, the embargo allows for the provision of arms and military equipment to the government of Sudan outside Darfur. This exemption has enabled Sudan to continue acquiring weapons, and in fact use them in Darfur (and the Two Areas), making the sanctions rather meaningless. In an attempt to tackle that obvious loophole, in 2010 Security Council Resolution 1945, not unanimously adopted, strengthened the embargo by requiring that all states should ensure that any supply of arms and related materiel to Sudan is made contingent upon end-user documentation. Still, as evidence of new weapons use in Darfur emerged, civil society organisations such as Amnesty International continued to document violations of the embargo.
which they deemed ineffective. According to Brian Wood, Amnesty’s arms trade expert, “China and Russia are selling arms to the Government of Sudan in the full knowledge that many of them are likely to end up being used to commit human rights violations in Darfur”.

Similar patterns were revealed by former members of the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan who resigned in 2012, complaining about the standards of competence and neutrality on the Panel. In a damning analysis of the embargo’s ineffectiveness, one of the three notes: “Reports submitted by the Panel under its different compositions since 2005, provide a wide sample of concrete examples of transfers of military equipment standing as clear breaches of the provisions contained in the embargo, by both the Sudanese Government and the rebel movements”.

The Panel of Experts, which usually reports every year on the Darfur embargo, has continued to mention embargo violations. The UN Panel of Experts has frequently reported violations of the embargo, including transfers of weapons into Darfur, as well as offensive air operations. In the February 2014 report they write: “Various sanctions violations were identified, including, highly probably, the transfer of Antonov An-26 aircraft by the Sudan into Darfur when subsequently used in an improvised bomber role. Furthermore, violations of the arms embargo by the Sudan, which could now be characterized as ‘routine’, were also identified through the regular rotation of Sukhoi Su-25 attack/close air support jets and Mi-24 attack helicopters to an aviation maintenance facility near Khartoum and then back to Darfur.”

Its 2015 report notes “the use of the Rakhsh armoured personnel carrier in Darfur; a certain violation of the arms embargo by the Government of the Sudan”. Twenty of these Iran-made vehicles were reportedly supplied to Sudan in 2005 and 2006, subsequent to the adoption of the UN embargo.

At the national and regional levels, arms embargoes have been in place for much longer. The US government has suspended all exports of defence articles or services to Sudan since 1992, as it considers Sudan to be “a country which has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism”. In 1994, the European Union embargoed arms supplies to Sudan in response to the civil war in the south. In 2004, that embargo was expanded to include technical and financial assistance related to arms supplies. In July 2011, the EU embargo was amended to extend to both Sudan and newly independent South Sudan (see also the chapter on South Sudan). Its most recent version is from July 2014.
International Arms Control Mechanisms

Sudan has a mixed record in terms of its participation in international arms control agreements. It is not a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), though it has been a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty since 2004. Moreover, the four main armed factions operating in Sudan (JEM, SLM/A-Minni Minnawi, SLM/A-Abdul Wahid and the SPLM/A-N) have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, pledging to refrain from using anti-personnel landmines. Sudan signed the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1981, but has not ratified it. The country has signed neither the Arms Trade Treaty nor the UN Firearms Protocol.

Yet Sudan signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development in 2007, and is a member of the Nairobi Protocol, which entered into force on 5 May 2006 as a legally binding instrument and requires “national legislative measures, the strengthening of operational capacity and sufficient measures to control SALW both state-owned and in civilian possession. Other provisions cover tracing, safe disposal, transfer of SALW and brokering. The Member States agree to cooperate in terms of mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transparency, information exchange and harmonization.”

133 http://www.genevacall.org/country-page/sudan/.
On January 7 [2015], Albanin Butrus died from shrapnel that ripped through his body after a fighter jet launched seven rockets on his village Abu Layla in South Kordofan. He was seven years old. Our video documents some of the last moments of his young life. He struggles to breathe and shifts, keeping his body weight off the foot that is shorn nearly in half. He tries to find a comfortable position that might relieve some of his agony on the dusty ground. Albanin was one of several children who have been killed recently in a new barrage of bombings by the Sudan Air Force fighter jets and Antonov bombers. Nuba Reports journalist Abdu Ibrahim was nearby when the bomb hit Albanin. A group of people tried to help the boy – applying palm leaves as tourniquets to stem the bleeding while Albanin lay limp and laboured to breathe. He was driven by motorbike to a clinic where he died shortly after. Two other people were injured in the fatal bombing: 41-year-old Yuhanus Tulush Andalo, and 14-year-old Mitius Ibrahim Aldukhun.

Between December of 2014 and February of 2015, Nuba Reports estimates at least 970 bombs have been dropped on civilian targets, a drastic increase from the 230 that were dropped over the same period [the previous] year. Of these 970 bombs, more than 500 of them were dropped in January alone. This massive surge is a part of President Omar al-Bashir’s “Decisive Summer II” campaign. […] This push, Bashir has said in speeches, would force a conclusive end to conflicts plaguing the country. In South Kordofan there was a huge military push in January that saw an increase in shellings and bombings for civilians as well. After many bloody battles, the government forces were pushed back, but the bombings only increased.

Next to every family home, church, tea stand and mosque is a foxhole, it’s a place to take protection from the shrapnel bombs which throw metal hundreds of meters from the site of impact. Since the new year, many families in the Nuba Mountains have taken to putting their children to bed in these foxholes. But even that is not always enough.

On February 3 [2015], a bomb hit a foxhole in Um Dorian County where nine children were sleeping. A sixteen year-old girl was killed immediately. The explosion lit a nearby house on fire which fell on the group of children. Two were killed. The others, disoriented and severely burned, were pulled out of the fire by their parents. They are now being treated at the only hospital in the region. The same hospital that was bombed in June.

Two days before that, five children, ranging from ages two through fifteen, were wounded by an Antonov bombing in Regife. That same day in another village, a ten-year-old girl lost her leg to an Antonov strike.”

South Sudan artillery in military procession at independence commemoration, 2012
The world’s youngest nation, bordering Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, land-locked South Sudan remains in the midst of growing pains. With a population of around 12 million, or slightly more than Belgium, in a territory a bit smaller than France’s, South Sudan’s average life expectancy at birth is a mere 56 years, three less than the average in sub-Saharan Africa. Only 16 per cent of South Sudanese women are literate and only 25 per cent of all citizens are estimated to have access to health services. Africa’s 55th sovereign nation gained independence in July 2011, following the peaceful secession from Sudan through a referendum six months earlier, which, it was hoped, would put an end to more than 50 years of violent conflict marking the relationship with its former ruler, Sudan’s central government.

The Second Sudanese Civil War, which lasted from 1983 to 2005, was largely a continuation of the First Sudanese Civil War, waged between 1955 and 1972. The conflict officially ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, a deal that provided for a permanent ceasefire, autonomy for the South, a power-sharing government and a south Sudanese referendum on independence in six years’ time. Months later, southern rebel leader John Garang de Mabior was sworn in as the first vice-president of the new government of national unity. A new Sudanese constitution giving the south a large degree of autonomy was signed. Three weeks later, Garang died in a helicopter crash and was succeeded by the current president, Salva Kiir Mayardit.

The Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and other factions from the armed struggle formed the new government after the 2011 referendum led to independence. The SPLA became its armed forces.

UNMIS, the United Nations Mission in Sudan, wound up its operations in July 2011. In support of the new nation, the UNSC established the successor UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) for an initial period of one year, with the intention to renew for further periods as required, purportedly to consolidate peace and security and to help establish conditions for development. Because of the conflict that started in late 2013 (see below), its mandate was ‘reprioritised’ in 2014 with the aim of better protecting civilians and monitoring human rights, as well as supporting humanitarian aid.139

Armed Conflicts and Armed Violence

As noted, the birth of the nation did not end local patterns of armed violence; rather, its short lifespan has been marred by conflict. According to seemingly conservative estimates in the Uppsala Conflict Database, between 2011 and 2015 almost 7,500 people were killed in South Sudan; 2013 (with 1,800 deaths) and 2014 (almost 2,500) were especially bloody.140 Almost half of all casualties were ‘state-based violence’, that is, involving the South Sudanese government,

140 http://ucdp.uu.se/country/626. Note that these figures are much lower than often cited numbers of people killed since the civil war started in late 2013—see reference to other data further on.
which reportedly killed almost 1,200 civilians between 2012 and 2015.\textsuperscript{141} However, in addition, "non-state conflicts have plagued South Sudan since its independence. In particular […] Jonglei has experienced large-scale non-state conflicts with the Lou Nuer against the Murle being the worst with more than 1400 people killed in 2011".\textsuperscript{142}

Early on, particularly serious violations occurred in Mayom County, Unity State in 2010 and 2011. In a June 2012 report, Amnesty International documented serious human rights violations committed by South Sudan’s Army (SPLA) and the armed opposition group, the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA). The briefing revealed use of recently supplied weapons, including mortar shells made in 2010, probably in Sudan, and used by armed opposition groups shelling civilian areas. The report also notes:

"repeated incidents of civilians being killed or injured during fighting between the SPLA and the SSLA. Residents described a pattern of indiscriminate firing and shelling. […] In one episode on 29 October 2011, scores of civilians were killed and injured and several houses were destroyed during fighting between SPLA and SSLA forces in Mayom town. Ukrainian supplied T-72 main battle tanks have been used in such attacks by the SPLA. These battle tanks are entirely unsuitable for urban fighting as they cannot distinguish between military and civilian objects in urban areas."\textsuperscript{143}

Scores of civilians were killed or injured by Chinese manufactured anti-vehicle mines laid by the SSLA.\textsuperscript{144}

**CIVIL WAR AGAIN**

Less than two years after independence, an ‘elite power struggle’ precipitated the government break-up and subsequent civil war, which started in December 2013, initially between President Salva Kiir and former Vice-President Riek Machar (leading what is called SPLM-In Opposition or SPLM-IO), but gradually evolving into “a multi-faceted war that […] includes […] large-scale inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic violence”.\textsuperscript{145} The nearly two-year-long conflict has reversed development gains achieved since independence and worsened the humanitarian situation. Neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Sudan have been involved in the war directly and indirectly, reflecting long-standing rivalries and discrepant interests in the region. The UN Panel of Experts describes the role of Uganda in South Sudan since December 2013 as a “toxic political issue among the Nuer population in particular”.\textsuperscript{146} (See also the ‘Spotlight’ section in the Uganda chapter)
“Hundreds of extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances, gang rapes, sexual slavery, forced abortion, massive child soldier recruitment and indiscriminate attacks against civilians with entire villages burned down have been perpetrated by all sides in war-torn South Sudan,” the United Nations reported in January 2016.147 “The constant attacks on women, the rape, enslavement and slaughter of innocents; the recruitment of thousands upon thousands of child soldiers; the deliberate displacement of vast numbers of people in such a harsh and poverty-stricken country – these are abhorrent practices that must be halted,” said UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, whose office (OHCHR) compiled the report along with UNMISS. According to Navi Pillay, the previous OHCHR chief, “one of the main reasons we are seeing such extreme sexual violence in South Sudan is the country’s pervasive culture of impunity. The perpetrators - including members of the police, army and armed militias - know that there is no rigorous justice system and almost no risk of consequences.”148

Similar conclusions were drawn by the African Union’s Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AUCISS), established to investigate human rights abuses committed during the armed conflict. It found that civilians had been murdered, tortured, subjected to cruel, inhumane and other degrading treatment, raped or were victims of other sexual and gender-based crimes. It also found that parties to the conflict had forcibly conscripted children, and looted and destroyed civilian property. The report emphasised that accountability is central to building sustainable peace in South Sudan and it recommended the establishment of a hybrid judicial mechanism to bring those responsible to account, among other transitional justice processes.149

Examples of atrocities committed against civilians during the war were also detailed in UN investigations into SPLA-IO attacks in April 2014 on Bentiu Town and mob attacks on an UNMISS base in Bor Town two days later. Altogether at least 353 civilians were killed: 287 in a mosque, 19 in a hospital and 47 at the UN base.150 In January 2014, government forces pursued civilians who had fled Leer into the forest; one witness told Amnesty: “Once they had destroyed everything and burned the town they started following the civilians. They were shooting randomly and using very heavy artillery.”151

Regarding the violence, Nicholas Kristof recently wrote in the New York Times: “What has evolved is an ethnic cleansing that sometimes seems to be inching toward genocide, and those at greatest risk are not combatants but women and children suffering from hunger and disease. […] All this is unfolding in remote areas, without outside witnesses, without a global outcry. The victims are among the most voiceless on the planet, which is one reason the killing continues.”152

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In February 2016, an attack on an UNMISS ‘protection of civilians’ site in Malakal—then home to around 40,000 people—claimed the lives of at least 30 displaced people and injured a further 123. The incident culminated in dozens of armed government soldiers from the Dinka tribe reportedly entering the camp, yet it took UN peacekeepers more than 12 hours to intervene. Confusion about the rules of engagement is said to have marred their ability to protect the civilians at its site. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) strongly condemned UNMISS for its response to the incident: “By not ensuring that adequate preventive measures were taken, failing to act to stop the violence in a timely manner and actively blocking the IDPs [internally displaced people] from reaching safety during a large part of the emergency, UNMISS effectively failed to protect the civilians it is mandated by the UN security council to protect”.

Although reliable, detailed figures are lacking, the International Crisis Group estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 people across South Sudan were killed in the period December 2013 to November 2014. More than 2.3 million people—one in every five people in South Sudan—have been forced to flee their homes since the conflict began, including 1.66 million internally displaced people (with 53.4 per cent estimated to be children) and nearly 644,900 refugees in neighbouring countries.

The signing in August 2015 of an IGAD-led peace agreement has enabled a halt to the cycle of violence in the country and a move towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict. While many important issues remain unresolved, the return of Machar to Juba and his subsequent re-installation as vice-president in April 2016, joining a unity government formed to end the conflict, hopefully signals the beginning of more peaceful times.

In late June 2016 however, news emerged of a new rebel group called ‘Islamic Movement for Liberation of Raja’, led by veteran politician Ali Tamim Fartak, which had fought with government troops in the remote Wau region, leading to the reported deaths of about 39 civilians and four police.

In July, around the fifth anniversary of South Sudan’s independence, renewed clashes between SPLA and SPLA-IO troops broke out, reportedly killing around 300 people, including many civilians. In a reaction, UNSG Ban Ki-moon urged the Security Council to impose an arms
embargo on South Sudan. In early August, according to the UN refugee agency about 60,000 people have fled South Sudan over the past month, the large majority to Uganda.

** BORDER ISSUES **

With independence, South Sudan also inherited a few unresolved border issues. One is the contested Abyei area, between the Sudans, where a UN security force (UNISFA) has been keeping the peace since 2011. Heglig and Kafia Kingi territories also remain disputed. The Ilemi Triangle is an area claimed by South Sudan and Kenya, and bordering Ethiopia (which purportedly does not have any claims). While Kenya has de facto control of the area, the perceived economic marginality of the land as well as decades of Sudanese conflicts have delayed the resolution of the dispute.

**Military Spending and Holdings**

As at 2012, the SPLA had a conservatively estimated force of 210,000 soldiers and probably held some 250,000 small arms and light weapons (SALW). The 2011 follow-up Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) plan was meant to demobilise 80,000 soldiers from the SPLA and another 70,000 from the security forces (mostly under the Ministry of Interior) in eight years’ time. In mid-2013, the Small Arms Survey assessed that the government had a clear interest to “reduce the wage bill of a ‘welfare army’ at least 300,000 strong that absorbs funds needed for development […]. For them, ‘rightsizing’ the army to around 120,000 people is fundamentally an economic imperative.” However, “tensions could easily prove a disincentive to DDR participants in a country where being armed provides some form of economic empowerment”.

SIPRI data indicate that South Sudan’s military expenditure has varied between USD 900 million and USD 1.3 billion over the past ten years (expressed at constant (2014) prices). In terms of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), expenditures have grown from an already high average of 4 to 5 per cent of GDP in the transitional years leading up to independence, to 7 to 10 per cent between 2012 and 2014. The civil war then imploded the oil-dependent economy, causing South Sudan’s relatively stable absolute levels of military spending to become a nearly unheard of 13.8 per cent of its GDP for 2015. Only wealthy Saudi Arabia and Oman

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165 Small Arms Survey, ‘Reaching for the gun – Arms flows and holdings in South Sudan’, HSBA, April 2012.


167 Ibid.

168 Ibid.

are known to spend similar or higher proportions of their GDP on their militaries. Inevitably, South Sudan’s military apparatus also weighs heavily in terms of the governmental spending, absorbing 24 to 29 per cent of the state budget according to SIPRI.

South Sudan’s government, the country’s biggest employer, is nearly completely reliant on oil revenues to pay its public sector workers, including the armed forces and the wider security sector. In 2015 it was estimated that 96 per cent of national revenue consisted of oil revenues and that budgeted security sector spending would be 42 per cent of the total budget, with actual spending often significantly higher “because budgets are hardly adhered to”, especially by the Ministry of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs, and the National Security Service.

The UNDP’s 2015 report on South Sudan confirms that “indeed, the general government staffing allocations across military and civilian sectors tilts overwhelmingly towards security-related positions. Accordingly, 62 percent of salary spending is allocated to the Armed and Organized Forces, with only 6 per cent of staff salaries allocated to the education sector and 3 per cent to health. This underscores the striking finding that while there are 450 police per 100,000 population, there are only 1.5 doctors and 2 nurses, which compares unfavorably with other post-conflict and low-income contexts.”

**Arms Transfers**

After independence, ten Mamba armoured personnel carriers arrived from South Africa, and between 2012 and 2014 South Sudan reportedly received 25 Typhoon and 20 Cougar armoured vehicles from the Canadian company Streit, from its production line in the United Arab Emirates, according to SIPRI data (see table).

China has been another important source of weapons, including a controversial shipment by Chinese state-owned arms manufacturer NORINCO that arrived via Mombasa in July 2014, as the civil war raged. According to the packing bill the consignment included 1,200 Red Arrow anti-tank missiles and 100 missile launchers, 9,574 automatic rifles, 2,394 40mm grenade launchers, 660 pistols, 319 machine guns, as well as 24 million rounds of small arms ammunition and 40,000 rounds of Type-69 anti-tank rockets, apparently worth over USD 20 million, while the full contract value may have been USD 38 million. After the shipment made headlines, China said it halted weapons sales to South Sudan, saying it was “inappropriate to

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170 With no data for North Korea.
172 UNSC, ‘Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan’, August 2015, pp. 16-17 and Annex VII.
implement” the remainder of the contract, which was struck before the war broke out.177

Officials from South Sudan have acknowledged that the government had mortgaged crude oil to Chinese companies to acquire weapons in 2014.178 Again in early 2016, reports emerged that South Sudan had “recently” received “dozens” of Chinese shoulder-launched rocket systems, delivered via Mombasa (Kenya) and Uganda.179 The UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan noted that supply of weapons to the warring parties “has been instrumental in the continuation and escalation of the war to its current scale, leading to large-scale violations of international humanitarian law”.180

Another such example is the supply of Mi-24 attack helicopters. In late 2015, South Sudan’s government had at least three such helicopters, and was awaiting the delivery of a fourth, procured from Motor Sich, a private Ukrainian company, for USD 42.8 million. These helicopters “have been vital in providing an important advantage in military operations, have facilitated the expansion of the war and have emboldened those in government who are seeking a military solution to the conflict at the expense of the peace process”, according to the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan, which had earlier noted that the arrival of the helicopters provided a capability not available prior to the outbreak of war.181 According to experts consulted by the UN Panel, even if the contract included fees for maintenance and operations, the unit price for that type of aircraft was inflated. Ukrainian authorities have confirmed that they had granted a licence for the export of Mi-24 helicopters to South Sudan.

A second order for another four Mi-24s, probably also coming from Motor Sich, is valued at USD 35.7 million, but was bought this time by Bosasy Logistics, registered in Uganda. Its directors are closely connected to the Ugandan security establishment, according to the UN report. “Several independent sources in Kampala and Juba have told the Panel that there is a standing unwritten agreement to supply the government of South Sudan with arms and ammunition through Uganda. According to that information, Uganda either supplies South Sudan with its own stock or acquires the weapons and then transfers them to South Sudan, without necessarily involving or obtaining the consent of the primary seller. The attack helicopters from Bosasy Logistics were acquired under such an agreement.”182

In late 2015, two helicopter hangars were being constructed by Norwegian Development General Trading, based in Dubai, for USD 16.4 million. An Austrian-made Diamond DA42 surveillance aircraft based at the military airport in Juba has provided target acquisition support for the Mi-24s since mid-2015, according to the Panel of Experts (PoE).183

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179 Ibid.

180 UNSC, ‘Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan’, August 2015, p. 23.


PAX • Armed and insecure 51
Also added to the SPLA’s arsenal during 2014-2015 were ten tracked amphibious vehicles of Russian origin. It also appears that Israeli automatic rifles were added to existing stocks, including Galils from Ugandan stocks originally delivered in 2007.184

**SMALL ARMS**

South Sudan’s legal and recorded imports of small arms and ammunition since its independence have been basically non-existent. According to the NISAT-PRIO database, the only entries are a 2013 authorisation for the transfer of ammunition from Germany (which may or may not have been delivered), a minuscule transfer of USD 310 in small arms ammunition from Uganda in 2013, and 13kg (or USD 13,572) of ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition’ from Switzerland in 2014.185

However, pre-independence transfers of small arms and light weapons to southern Sudan are

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184 UNSC, 'Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan', January 2016, pp. 25, 26, 28; UNSC, 'Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan', August 2015, p. 21.
185 NISAT-PRIO.
thought to have been considerable, albeit unreported.\textsuperscript{186}

Moreover, as noted above regarding the Chinese transfer that included the Red Arrow anti-tank missiles and an enormous haul of small arms and ammunition, clearly these weapons have been delivered but not accounted for, and therefore at least their transparency and reporting, but possibly also their legality, remain in question. Completely illegal flows of weapons, however, both inflows and outflows, evidently abounded.

**ARMS TRANSFERS TO NON-STATE GROUPS**

Sudan appears to have supplied small arms and ammunition to David Yau Yau’s rebels in December 2012. The weapons included a type of Chinese rifle that had never before been observed in South Sudan (the CQ), which is a copy of an M16. Another was an A30 RPG-type rocket launcher from the Yarmouk factory in Sudan.\textsuperscript{187} What is more, according to South Sudan government officials, “Eritrea had provided logistical support as well as training and weapons to the Yau Yau rebels on several occasions. In addition, the officials stated that they had captured a cache of arms in May 2013. The South Sudanese authorities described the cache as including hundreds of AK-47s, G-3 Iranian-made rifles, as well as other logistics, such as equipment, food, sugar and batteries, but did not specify to the Group the actual quantities of weapons and ammunition that they had seized.”\textsuperscript{188}

More recently in South Sudan’s civil war, Conflict Armament Research documented air-dropped weapons for SPLA-IO forces: “weapons and ammunition documented display clear evidence of damage sustained during airdrops to SPLA-IO units, which reportedly took place in September–October 2014. Furthermore, the materiel is identical to previously documented arms and ammunition airdropped by Sudan to rebels in South Sudan in 2012, which provides strong indication of new, direct supplies from Sudan to SPLA-iO operations.”\textsuperscript{189} Most of the ammunition investigated was manufactured in Sudan or China.\textsuperscript{190}

\textsuperscript{186} “Military assistance to the SPLA since the CPA also appears to be partly characterized by relationships with countries in the region established during the North–South civil war, including Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as with major international arms suppliers such as Ukraine. But in contrast to the SAF’s ongoing, relatively public arms acquisitions, reports of significant SPLA rearmament only began to emerge in mid-2008 [...] small-scale weapons movements are nonetheless minor compared to the SPLA’s new acquisitions of heavy weaponry and small arms and light weapons supplied from Ukraine through Kenya since late 2007. [...] Because Southern Sudan remains a semi-autonomous territory in the interim period, there is no official public information about arms supplies to the SPLA. Comtrade does not include data from Southern Sudan. Similarly, no states report arms transfers to the GoSS/SPLA, either in national arms export reports or to the UN Register.” \url{http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-18-Sudan-Post-CPA-Arms-Flows.pdf}.


\textsuperscript{189} Conflict Armament Research\textsuperscript{it}Trace, ‘Weapons and Ammunition Airdropped to SPLA-IO Forces in South Sudan’, June 2015, \url{http://www.conflictarm.com/download-file/?report_id=2237&file_id=2239}.

\textsuperscript{190} UN experts further state: “SPLM/A in Opposition has also continuously sought to procure and obtain arms from numerous sources, albeit with comparatively limited success. The Panel has, however, confirmed that SPLM/A in Opposition has received ammunition and, to a lesser extent, arms, as well as other items such as uniforms, from the Sudan.” UNSC, ‘Final Report of the panel of Experts on South Sudan’, January 2016, pp. 3, 27-28.
DIVERSION, ILLICIT TRAFFICKING AND ‘SEMI-OFFICIAL PROLIFERATION’

South Sudan’s lack of policy and practices necessary for managing surplus arms, not to mention funding limitations, have not been helpful in preventing diversion and trafficking: “the SPLA is unable to demonstrate adequate controls over its existing arsenal; losses in battle are routine and poor stockpile security is the norm”. In addition, “South Sudan has not systematically destroyed surplus or non-serviceable firearms since obtaining independence in 2011,” according to another Small Arms Survey report. Security forces have been reported to pass on weapons to the civilian population, while soldiers have been accused of reselling weapons to the population that the soldiers had collected after they were removed during disarmament campaigns.

Border areas have also seen weapons traded between pastoralist, tribal groups, militias and other armed groups. The South Sudanese White Army—mainly ethnic Nuers from Jonglei and Upper Nile states and associated with Riek Machar—procure weapons and ammunition locally from traders across the border in Ethiopia’s Gambella region, according to Conflict Armament Research, which maps arms flows in conflict zones. In the words of its director Jonah Leff, “the majority of small arms that are available from traders locally are AK-type assault rifles. PKM machine guns and RPGs are also available, but in much smaller quantities. However, German HK G3 rifles sometimes cross the border from Ethiopia and Kenya.”

Arms were also distributed among citizens by the Khartoum government and the SPLA in the years before the CPA, according to civil society organisation Saferworld: “In Lakes State (in today’s South Sudan), the SPLA provided weapons to cattle keepers to enable them to protect themselves and their communities from cattle raiders. The arming of these youth groups, known as the gelweng, allowed the SPLA to shift their focus and efforts from community security to the ongoing war with the north.” Tribes are said to operate on the principle that there can be no security except through the possession of weapons. “One only needs to read the newspaper on any given day to understand the problem that the proliferation of small arms has caused in South Sudan. For instance, armed robberies in urban centres, the hijacking of vehicles, aid vehicles being detained, hundreds killed in cattle raiding, hundreds more killed in revenge attacks – such incidents are devastatingly common throughout South Sudan,” according to Saferworld. Meanwhile, the government’s inability to provide security to its citizens further fuels the internal demand for arms.

UN investigators have also highlighted that the supply of weapons at the community level has been part of the South Sudanese government’s war strategy. “The practice is so pervasive that...”

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192 Small Arms Survey, ‘Reaching for the gun – Arms flows and holdings in South Sudan’, HSBA, April 2012.


Equatorian leaders complained to the Panel about the limited number of Equatorians in the senior ranks of the SPLA, resulting in a comparative disadvantage in terms of materiel in their fight against Dinka pastoralists.\textsuperscript{197}

Finally, Conflict Armament Research’s iTrace system includes 21 cases of diversion physically documented and confirmed in South Sudan. Of these, 20 were diverted domestically; known foreign suppliers included Russia (six weapons), China (four), Israel (two) and the United States (two); almost 43 percent of the weapons (nine cases) were diverted by deliberate actions by state agencies.\textsuperscript{198}

\section*{Arms Embargoes}

In 2011, the European Union’s 1994 arms embargo on Sudan was amended to prohibit arms transfers to newly independent South Sudan as well. That South Sudan embargo has been extended since and also covers technical and financial assistance related to arms supplies, while it exempts supplies to UN, EU and African Union institutions in South Sudan.\textsuperscript{199}

In 2007, the US government had initiated military assistance programmes “in support of a Southern Sudan Security Sector Transformation programme”.\textsuperscript{200} The assistance included infrastructure, vehicles, training and logistics, according to a State Department spokesman, who emphasised that no “lethal equipment” was provided.\textsuperscript{201} In January 2012, US President Barack Obama further lifted restrictions on military exports to South Sudan as this would “strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace”—standard but, especially in this case, meaningless diplomatic rhetoric.\textsuperscript{202} From 2012 to 2013 it authorised the export of some USD 30 million worth of military equipment, though only USD 3.3 million is reported to have been delivered.\textsuperscript{203} The US government suspended military assistance after the outbreak of violence in December 2013.\textsuperscript{204}

In his July 2014 report to the UN Security Council on South Sudan, Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called on the parties to the conflict to “stop all mobilization, arms purchases and political activities aimed at strengthening one side against the other”.\textsuperscript{205} In January 2016, the UN Panel

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\end{itemize}
of Experts on South Sudan recommended that the Security Council impose an arms embargo to prevent further destabilisation of the country and large-scale human rights violations.\textsuperscript{206} Such calls have also been made repeatedly by civil society organisations, including Amnesty International, HRW and PAX.\textsuperscript{207} The UNSC has long threatened to impose an arms embargo but has lacked full support from, for example, Russia and Angola. Russia’s UN ambassador said in January 2016 that he was concerned that an arms embargo would be one-sided because it would be easier to enforce on the government.\textsuperscript{208}

**International Arms Control Mechanisms**

Though it could be partially excused for being in its political and diplomatic infancy, South Sudan has not yet joined any major arms control agreement. It has not signed or ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, or the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).\textsuperscript{209} South Sudan has also not signed or adhered to the UN Firearms Protocol, or the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, though in a meeting of the latter process in November 2014 its representative stated that “the Ministry of the Interior and Wildlife Conservation of the Republic of South Sudan is processing accession, signing and ratification of the Nairobi Protocol, the United Nations Programme of Action, the Arms Trade Treaty and other relevant declarations, including the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development to expedite their implementation”.\textsuperscript{210} Nonetheless, South Sudan has been a member since 2011 of the inter-governmental Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA), though it has not yet ratified the legally-binding Nairobi Protocol.\textsuperscript{211}


\textsuperscript{209} In September 2011, South Sudan stated that it “is not a user or producer of cluster munitions” and a government official informed the Cluster Munition Coalition that South Sudan does not stockpile cluster munitions. Monitor, ‘South Sudan Cluster Munition Ban Policy’, August 2014, http://archives.the-monitor.org/index.php/ip/display/region_profiles/theme/4023.


Spotlight: An Armed Newborn—Pre-independence Arms Holdings and Transfers

At the time of the CPA, most of SPLA’s arsenal comprised small arms and light weapons, including AK-47s supplied by former East Germany via Ethiopia in the 1980s, former West Germany transferred vast numbers of automatic weapons to Sudan and set up an ammunition factory near Khartoum; “in this way, Cold War animosities were played out in the Greater Horn of Africa”.

In the years leading up to independence, major efforts were made to acquire heavy weapons, most significantly through three contracts with Ukrainian state-owned arms exporter Ukrmash, a subsidiary of Ukrspecexport, between December 2006 and May 2008. These covered the supply of ZU-23-2 and ZPU-4 anti-aircraft guns, BM-21 ‘Grad’ multiple-launch rocket systems, mounted on Ural trucks, RPG-7Vs, and a large number of AKM assault rifles. The second contract consisted of T-72 tanks, while the third included 13,926 rounds of 125mm tank ammunition, suitable for the T-72s. Together these were probably South Sudan’s largest pre-independence armament programme, involving shipping companies from Germany and Ukraine, and UK- and Isle of Man-registered shell companies. The deals became world news when in September 2008 the merchant vessel MV Faina, which was transporting “33 Russian-made T-72 battle tanks, 150 rocket grenade launchers, six anti-aircraft guns and thousands of tonnes of small arms and ammunition”, was hijacked by Somali pirates. A copy of the freight manifest appears to show that contracts were concluded by Kenya on behalf of South Sudan’s government. Although the shipment was not illegal, it put Kenya in a tight spot diplomatically, not least because it helped broker an end to the civil war between South Sudan and Khartoum. Reports held that clearly Kenya’s government had “arranged the arms shipment on behalf of the Southern Sudan’s government”.

216 SIPRI, ‘Ukrainian arms supplies to Sub-Saharan Africa’, February 2011, http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIRP1102.pdf: “The case of the MV Faina is of interest because Ukrainian Government officials and Ukrspecexport have maintained the same position for more than two years—that they had a contract to deliver arms to Kenya and not Southern Sudan. Evidence to the contrary provided by international media, researchers and the US Government does not appear to have swayed them from this view. Although Ukrainian officials suggested that their responsibility for arms exports ends when they have received documentation from the consignee acknowledging receipt of the delivery, Ukrainian officials did undertake a post-shipment verification of the MV Faina delivery and concluded that Kenya was the final recipient. Ukrainian officials appear to believe that they relinquish responsibility for arms and ammunition once they have received information of receipt by declared consignees.”
The pirates released the ship and its crew only after four months (its captain was killed in the process), reportedly after receiving USD 3.2 million in cash.\footnote{New York Times, ‘Somali Pirates Get Ransom and Leave Arms Freighter’, February 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/world/africa/06pirates.html.} Despite denials by officials from Ukraine, Kenya and South Sudan that the freight was destined for the latter country, leaked cables revealed that there was little doubt about the ultimate recipient. Satellite imagery showed some T-72 tanks unloaded in Kenya, transferred to railway shunting yards for onward shipment, and finally in South Sudan.\footnote{BBC, ‘Hijacked tanks for South Sudan’, October 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7656662.stm; US cable in November 2009, revealed through WikiLeaks: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KYIV1942_a.html.} How many of the tanks eventually made it to South Sudan remains unconfirmed.

In a parallel case, Uganda may have re-transferred anti-aircraft weapons to South Sudan between 2010 and 2012. Since 2013, Soviet/Russian origin S-125 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems have been seen at a military camp 20 kilometres from Juba. Satellite imagery from June 2015 showed 16 missile launchers as well as support vehicles, suggesting that four batteries with four launchers each were present. While there are no reports of South Sudan receiving SAM systems, SIPRI has noted that Uganda acquired four S-125s along with 300 V-600 missiles from Ukraine between 2010 and 2012, while according to analysis by IHS Jane’s, no S-125s have been seen in Uganda. This suggests they were acquired by Kampala on South Sudan’s behalf. However, satellite imagery suggests they have not been deployed operationally since November 2013.\footnote{Jane’s Defence Weekly, ‘Analysis: South Sudan deploys S-125 SAM system’, January 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/57003/analysis-south-sudan-deploys-s-125-sam-system.}
Ugandan soldiers on patrol in Central African Republic to fish out LRA leader Kony, 2012
3. Uganda

With a population slightly larger than Canada’s concentrated in a territory the size of the United Kingdom, Uganda is in many ways the crossroads between major sub-regions: the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the Great Lakes (or Central Africa). Uganda’s history is characterised by interests and actions that overlap—for good and for bad—with many of its neighbours; in several cases an ethnic group or tribe straddles both sides of the border. Though its capital, Kampala, is enveloped by a buffer zone of sorts, Uganda has porous borders with its five neighbours—including Tanzania across grandiose Lake Victoria, which almost belies the fact Uganda is landlocked.

As such, Uganda has in recent decades had tensions and clashes, some partially inspired by economic interests, with basically all its neighbours: military incursions into Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, troubles on its border with Kenya (Karamoja), declaring Rwanda a “hostile nation” (in 2001), accusations of aiding armed rebels in other countries, and a particularly volatile relationship with Sudan/South Sudan. Adding insult to injury, Uganda has suffered a 20-year insurgency by the Lord’s Resistance Army, which emerged in its north but has roamed among neighbouring countries.

Against this backdrop of turmoil, these days Uganda is perceived as a fairly stable nation in an otherwise overly volatile part of the world. Uganda has been governed by President Yoweri Museveni for the last 30 years—only four other African nations have leaders who have been in power for longer. Since seizing power in 1986, following the turbulent times during and after

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220 Those countries are Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Cameroon and Zimbabwe.
the bloody dictatorships of Idi Amin and Milton Obote, Museveni has been praised for creating relatively strong economic growth (despite the remaining crippling poverty, especially in rural areas) and for successful programmes for containing the HIV epidemic.221

While electoral victories have kept Museveni’s hands on the helm (most recently in 2011 and 2016, after a 2005 constitutional amendment withdrew term limits and theoretically implemented a multi-party system), Uganda’s democratic credentials are not quite pristine. Particularly after the most recent election, the US, the EU and the Commonwealth joined the country’s opposition in questioning the election’s fairness and transparency.222 Ironically, in 2000 Museveni wrote that “the problem of Africa in general and Uganda in particular is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power”.223

Electoral politics have not been the only issue of contention. NGOs have reportedly been faced with a “narrowing legal space” in Uganda; while the country’s infamous ‘anti-gay law’—signed into law but frozen by courts in 2014—has drawn widespread international opprobrium.224 More recently, revelations of a secret state surveillance programme using computer malware from a UK company to spy on opposition, media and high-profile citizens—allowing police to “crush

civil disobedience”—led to another uproar on behalf of civil liberties.225 International unease with Museveni was further demonstrated in his most recent inauguration in May 2016, as “some Western officials walked out of the ceremony when he mocked the International Criminal Court” as a “bunch of useless people.”226

Conversely, Uganda’s press freedoms are better than those of many of its neighbours—even if it is only ranked 102 out of 180 by Reporters Without Borders in 2016, falling five positions from the previous year.227 Despite some limitations, the nation has been deemed a “pioneer in the liberalisation of the media in Africa”, with almost “200 private radio stations and dozens of television stations and print outlets”.228

**Armed Conflicts and Armed Violence**

At first glance, Uganda cannot be deemed a highly violent country nowadays—especially compared to some of its neighbours and its own recent history. In 2012, Uganda ranked 70th in the world in violent death rates with 5.5 per 100,000 population (about half the rate in Ethiopia and lower than all other nations under consideration here).229 But there are some peculiarities in how homicides were committed: in 2010, there were 438 killings due to ‘vigilante justice’ in Uganda, “accounting for 25 per cent of all homicides in the country”.230 Relative few of the violent deaths were directly attributed to firearms: a rate of 0.9 deaths per 100,000 (2007-2012), or about 250 gun homicides per year.231 Between 2005 and 2010, an average 13 percent of homicides were committed with a firearm.232 Uganda’s gun ownership levels are low, estimated at 1.4 firearms per 100 people.233 Subnational differences, as with most countries, are also noteworthy: Kampala’s homicide rate for the years available (2008-2010) was 13.5, compared to 9.3 for the country as a

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226 The government also ordered all social media access to be blocked during the inauguration period. Reuters, ‘Walkout over court comments mars Uganda president’s inauguration’, May 2012, www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-politics-idUSKCN0Y30UJ.
227 Among the countries covered in this report, only Kenya fared better, as it was ranked 95. “Acts of intimidation and violence against journalists are an almost daily occurrence in Uganda. […] This has especially been the case in the run-up to the 2016 presidential elections. Media outlets that cover the opposition candidate’s campaign are threatened with closure.” Reporters without Borders, ‘Uganda’, www.rsf.org/en/uganda.
230 UNODC, ‘Global Study on Homicide 2013’.
Regarding ‘conflict deaths’ specifically, Uganda’s average (2007-2012) was about 400 per year—a stark contrast to earlier decades, even if the country continues to host several ethnic, religious and regional active armed groups. For example, Uganda averaged about 1,500 conflict deaths per annum between 2002 and 2005.

Concerning terrorism, all 74 fatal victims of Al-Shabaab on Ugandan territory perished in July 2010 in Kampala, as civilians who had gathered to watch the World Cup final were struck by twin suicide bombings in one of the most lethal terrorist attacks in the Horn of Africa. Deemed Al-Shabaab’s “first international strike”, this was the worst terrorist attack in East Africa since the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and a retaliation for Uganda’s participation in AMISOM; it also injured at least 70 people. Fears of further attacks remained until the end of that year, and surfaced again after the Nairobi Westgate attacks in 2013, but attacks did not materialise—despite a possible close call in September 2014, when explosives were reportedly seized “from an Al-Shabaab cell” and arrests made in Kampala. In late May 2016, “the Ugandan International Crimes Division of the High Court handed down a landmark decision convicting several of those accused of masterminding the attacks” in Kampala, convicting eight of the 13 men on trial to long prison terms (but rejecting the prosecution’s request for the death penalty).

More consistent over time has been Uganda’s pattern of political unrest—and the brutal security forces’ response that follows. The majority of incidents listed under ACLED (the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project) for the period refer to ‘violence against civilians’ by police and armed forces (known as the Uganda People’s Defence Force, UPDF) or ‘riots/protests’. Tensions reached boiling point in 2011, when dissatisfaction with Museveni’s re-election combined with food and fuel price hikes led thousands to protest in ‘walk-to-work’ marches, which were violently repressed.

234 The dynamics in Nairobi, for example, are the opposite. UNODC, ‘Global Study on Homicide 2013’, Table 8.4. For more information, see the chapter in this report on Kenya.

235 Probably the most high-profile and impactful of these is the ADF (Allied Democratic Forces), purportedly an Islamist group. Active in western Uganda since the mid-1990s but dormant for years and resurfacing in 2010, ADF killed over 500 civilians in 2014 and 2015 alone (mostly in the DRC). ADF was also implicated in the murder of two Muslim clerics in December 2014, and some have speculated about the group’s contact with Al-Shabaab. Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, ‘UDF Civilians’, http://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=1027&entityType=6 and http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/489; Yahoo News, ‘Uganda charges 18 for murder of Muslim clerics’ January 2015, www.yahoo.com/news/uganda-charges-18-murder-muslim-clerics-115346498.html?


241 While these are a frequent occurrence, at the rate of several dozen a year, they mostly do not result in fatalities. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, ‘Uganda’, http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Uganda.xlsx.

against the arrest and beating of an opposition leader (and presidential candidate) in April; at least nine died by May, with police even repressing protesters mourning the earlier deaths.\(^{243}\) The crackdown continued throughout the year, with opposition leader Kizza Besigye repeatedly arrested, harassed and injured.\(^{244}\) In March 2012, the death of a policeman in riots led the government to outlaw the protest movement.\(^{245}\)

The pattern of political arrests and repression continued well into the next election cycle, which saw Museveni re-elected and sworn into office once more in May 2016. Former prime minister Amama Mbabazi was arrested along with Besigye in July 2015, and his supporters were also attacked by police with tear gas in September.\(^{246}\) Brutality and politically motivated arrests continued throughout the campaign and after the vote in February 2016: police clashed with opposition supporters in March, when soldiers also “killed at least seven allegedly armed opposition supporters in western Kasese district; fifteen others were reportedly killed in Bundibugyo” district.\(^{247}\)

Closely connected with these dynamics, the Ugandan police force, which reportedly holds 28,000 firearms, has given proof of its origins in the armed forces by a ‘militarisation’ in methods and equipment, such as the recently procured helicopter anti-riot materiel.\(^{248}\) Furthermore, Uganda’s government created a sort of militia specifically for the election period, supposedly volunteer ‘crime preventers’ that, according to human rights groups including Amnesty International and HRW, demonstrated “overwhelming evidence the programme is strongly linked to the ruling NRM party and is primarily ‘aimed at intimidating or reducing support for the political opposition’”.\(^{249}\)

Though much less frequent, other forms of armed violence have also taken large tolls.\(^{250}\) A particularly lethal series of clashes occurred in western Uganda in July 2014 between ethnic groups (Bakonzo, Basongora and Bamba) and security forces; relating to leadership disputes

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\(^{250}\) While data is not currently available, an important line of further research would be to determine the effect of Uganda’s ‘anti-gay laws’ in homophobic armed violence. The Guardian, ‘Uganda anti-gay law led to tenfold rise in attacks on LGBTI people, report says’, May 2014, [www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/12/uganda-anti-gay-law-rise-attacks](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/12/uganda-anti-gay-law-rise-attacks).
in the Rwenzori region; it resulted in the deaths of probably over 100 people.\textsuperscript{251} Bakonzo ethnic militia attacked military and police bases, reportedly killing four policemen, three soldiers and three civilians. The deaths of the security forces were met with brutal retribution as Uganda's armed forces may have killed up to 60 ‘gunmen’ shortly afterwards.\textsuperscript{252} Regarding the retaliations, HRW stated it was “deeply concerned by credible allegations that in Bundibugyo district, Bakonzo civilians were attacked, detained in private homes, mutilated, tortured, killed, and burned or buried in mass and unmarked graves”.\textsuperscript{253} Indeed, several discoveries of mass graves in the region could indicate an even larger death toll; a muddled amnesty programme and a “lack of justice” have marked the aftermath.\textsuperscript{254}

Of the ethnically or regionally based internal conflicts in Uganda, the tensions surrounding the Karamoja area along the border with Kenya have gained the most international attention.\textsuperscript{255} While many incidents lack independent confirmation—such as the claim by a lawmaker in early 2010 that the UPDF had killed 30 civilians in an air raid against cattle thieves—a steady flow of lethal encounters occurred in the period under review, particularly between the armed forces and groups such as Jie, Pokot or Karamojong Ethnic Militia, often involving one to five casualties, but sometimes many more.\textsuperscript{256} In September 2013, a clash between UPDF and Karamoja cattle herders resulted in the killing of 16 suspected cattle rustlers and two soldiers.\textsuperscript{257}

Finally, it is impossible to cover ‘armed violence’ and ‘Uganda’ without mentioning the Lord’s Resistance Army—one of Africa’s most brutal armed groups, which originated in the north of the country in 1989. However, Uganda’s population and territory were spared the most atrocious recent violations committed by Joseph Kony’s militia, which has roammed and murdered mostly in neighbouring countries: South Sudan, the DRC and the Central African Republic. In fact, while the LRA have reportedly killed over 6,000 civilians in the region since the year 2000, no attacks within Ugandan territory with civilian casualties have been recorded since 2007.\textsuperscript{258} While a smaller number of LRA lethal attacks have been reported in recent years, the rebel group has


\textsuperscript{255} For an example of PAX’s programmes across borders in the sub-region, “where PAX has co-founded a network of organisations and churches in South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya” supporting “partners in facilitating peace dialogue between rivaling communities and the government to promote peace, security and collaboration”, see: www.paxforpeace.nl/our-work/programmes/south-sudan-uganda-and-kenya-peace-dialogue-and-reconciliation.

\textsuperscript{256} The case of Karamoja’s violence (primarily cattle raids) has received excellent coverage in a range of reports (though most are at least five years old). One source brings many of these reports together: www.saferworld.org.uk/Karamoja%20A%20literature%20review.pdf.


\textsuperscript{258} Upssala Conflict Data Project, ‘LRA – Civilians’, http://ucdp.uu.se/#/onesided/1026.
nonetheless killed 725 civilians in the three neighbouring countries since 2010.259

The geographic displacement of the LRA is not incidental; particularly since 2005, a major crackdown by Uganda’s armed forces pushed the rebels out of the country. Therefore, given the temporal and geographic scope of the present study, the LRA will not constitute a central focus, even if Uganda’s armed forces continue to hunt down the group abroad, doing so with assistance from 100 US Special Forces since 2011, and under an African Union military task force since 2012.260 The close relationship between the US and Uganda under the ‘anti-terrorism’ rubric continued, and in early 2014 the US increased support, sending “several CV-22 Osprey aircraft, along with 150 Air Force Special Operations forces”261

Weapon Use

Focusing on specific weaponry, Uganda suffered from major armed violence in the report period, though not at the level of its neighbours. After the tragic July 2010 Al-Shabaab attack in Kampala, no other incident of such magnitude occurred. Regarding landmines, cluster munitions and other unexploded ordnance, a total of 531 people were recorded as having been killed, and another 2,241 injured in Uganda since records began, up to the end of 2014.262 The number of victims has dropped: “following a peak of about 150 casualties recorded per year during 1996–1997, the number of annual casualties has decreased significantly; since 2003, casualties have been 21 or fewer per year”.263 The nation’s latest reported landmine casualty dates to shortly before the country declared itself mine-free in December 2012. Concerning cluster munitions, no casualties have been recorded since 2006, though at that time a casualty survey in Gulu district noted 3 percent of all recorded casualties in the area had been caused by cluster munition remnants.264

Military Spending and Holdings

Despite a robust military numbering 45,000 soldiers, Uganda’s expenditures have been relatively small from a Horn of Africa perspective.265 Since 2000, the nation’s military expenditure

259 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid: www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2016/uganda/mine-action.aspx. “Contamination in the Republic of Uganda, located in the north, northeast, West Nile, and the Rwenzori subregions in western Uganda, was the result of armed conflict and civil strife, especially over the past two decades with regards to the Lord’s Resistance Army.”
as a percentage of GDP has remained at or below 2.5 per cent—with the exception of a spike in 2010 and 2011 (3.8 per cent and 3.9 per cent respectively). Since that spike—which some observers in hindsight blamed on a perceived “arms race with Sudan”—spending levels have decreased significantly, remaining at 1.4 per cent between 2013 and 2015. As a share of all government spending, Uganda spent 6.2 per cent on its military in 2015, the smallest proportion since data have been available (1997).

Not all is restraint, however. In the words of one 2011 protestor: “they spend our money on fighter jets and teargas when people have no food”. In early 2015, Uganda's armed forces were reportedly denied a request for an extra USD 170 million to purchase advanced weaponry. A September 2015 report for the US Congress noted that “some observers further question whether U.S. support for the UPDF’s engagement in multiple regional missions has encouraged a small country to maintain an otherwise unsustainably large military.”

Uganda’s involvement in Somalia, as part of AMISOM, serves as a case in point: the costs are considerable, not only in financial terms (even if significantly covered by the international community), but also in terms of loss of lives and equipment. An example is the August 2012 accident on the slopes of Mount Kenya that destroyed three Mi-24 attack helicopters (and led Uganda to request reimbursement from the UN) and killed seven crew members. Despite a backlash (including the Kampala terror attack and heavy losses in Mogadishu), the deployment shows no signs of ending; as recently as March 2016 a battalion rotation took place, with 2,000 fresh troops (and incoming equipment from the US), while Kampala vowed in May to stay in AMISOM despite a reported 20 per cent cut in compensation from the AU. The first country to deploy in 2007, and still the largest with over 6,000 soldiers, Uganda’s contingent is stationed mainly in the extended area around Mogadishu.

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Concerning major weapons systems, the Ugandan security forces are quite heavily armed. According to ‘The Military Balance 2010’ and other reports, Uganda held 162 T-54/T-55, ten T-72 and 20 light tanks, 46 reconnaissance and 79 armoured personnel carriers, 31 BMP-2 armoured infantry fighting vehicles and over 312 units of artillery (including three to six ATMOS 2000 systems, six to 12 BM-21 multiple rocket launchers and over 60 mortar systems). Its navy had eight patrol and coastal combatants, and its aircraft holdings included 16 combat capable aircraft and six attack, five support and five utility helicopters.275

A 2012 report noted 17 MiG fighter aircraft in several variants and 16 helicopters, but many were said to be “non-operational”.276 Uganda’s fighter jet fleet has been upgraded significantly in recent years with the arrival of a new generation of Russian fighter aircraft; likewise, in addition to the armoured vehicles and those procured between 2010 and 2015 (see below), it appears Uganda will soon add new arrivals from South Africa and the United States.277 In terms of firearms holdings, Uganda does not stand out amongst peers: defence forces are reported to hold 133,000 firearms.278

Arms Transfers

Over the past five years Uganda has acquired significant assets for its armed forces, with most imports occurring between 2010 and 2012, making it the world’s 49th largest recipient of weapons between 2010 and 2015.279 Russia has been by far the most important supplier, with highly capable combat aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, followed by Ukraine with surface-to-air missiles/launchers. Most recently, the US has emerged as a significant supplier, with weaponry for use in peacekeeping and anti-terror operations.280 Prior to 2010, Belarus and Israel were also significant sources of military equipment. Russia’s robust transfers to Uganda are indicative of a close relationship; not coincidentally, the nation was one of two non-African nations at Museveni’s 2011 inauguration.281 The 2011 sale of advanced Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets was a particular eye-opener; one press report quoted a SIPRI director noting that “Uganda’s...
### Table 3. Arms transfers to Uganda 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Weapons delivered</th>
<th>Transfer</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>(6) Bell-206/OH-58 Light helicopters</td>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1 Mi-24V/Mi-35/Hind-E Combat helicopter</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>17 ACMAT Bastion Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
<td></td>
<td>For use with AMISOM, 2016 delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>44 T-90S Tanks</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32 BTR-80A Infantry Fighting Vehicles</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Reported as ‘armoured vehicles’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Su-30MK2 Flanker combat aircraft</td>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>USD 635 million deal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100) KAB-500/1500 Guided bombs</td>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>For use with Su-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(75) R-73/AA-11 Short range air-to-air missiles</td>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>For use with Su-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25) Kh-31P/AS-17 Anti-radar missiles</td>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1000) 9M133 Komet-E/AT-14 Anti-tank missiles</td>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1 Springbuck APV/Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Probably second-hand, modernised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42 Casspir Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>2010-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>(4) S-125-2D Surface-to-Air Missile Systems</td>
<td>2010-10</td>
<td>Second-hand, converted SA-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(300) V-600/SA-3B Surface-to-Air Missiles</td>
<td>2010-12</td>
<td>Probably second-hand, modernised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15) R-2 Anti-tank Missiles</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Reported as ‘missile and/or launcher’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>10 RG-33L Armoured personnel carriers</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Second-hand, aid, for AMISOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Cessna-208 Caravan Light transport aircraft</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Reportedly donation, for AMISOM 282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 Cougar Armoured personnel carriers</td>
<td>(2015)</td>
<td>Second-hand, aid, for AMISOM 283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Unknown)</td>
<td>(3) L-39ZA Albatros Trainer/combat aircraft</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Second-hand, modernised in Ukraine?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


SIPRI only covers ‘major conventional weapons’ excluding e.g. small arms and artillery under 100mm calibre as well as their ammunition, unguided rockets and missiles, free-fall aerial munitions, as well as military trucks.

Note: data between brackets are unconfirmed.

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SU-30s do not appear to meet any obvious security need and, therefore, raise concerns over the use of resources. Transparency International states that the military spent USD 740 million “on six copies of the plane, which is more than double what the hardware should have cost. Uganda’s legislature wasn’t consulted on the deal and T.I. couldn’t find any indication for a competitive bidding process. Some of the excess money is said to have ended up in political campaigning for the ruling party, presumably after those who arranged the deal received kickbacks from the Russian sellers.”

SMALL ARMS

In terms of SALW, especially in 2010 and 2011 during Uganda’s spending spike, its imports were robust, coming from over 30 countries. Though most transfers were fairly small, a few major trades and partners should be highlighted. Notably absent from the above list of conventional weapons, China was nonetheless a major player, as elsewhere in the region. Uganda was the third largest recipient of Chinese military SALW in the world between 2006 and 2010 with USD 5.9 million in purchases. Close to the entire amount was transferred in 2010, including almost 2,500 shotguns and 10 tons in shotgun cartridges. The rush continued into 2011, with another USD 3.5 million in military rifles/machine guns and USD 110,000 in ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition’. After that, however, China sold about 40 rifles and some ammunition and parts to Uganda between 2012 and the end of 2014.

Israel has also been a major provider, particularly in the categories of weaponry that straddle the threshold between small arms and major weapons systems. For example, in 2010 Israel delivered USD 1.47 million in ‘grenade launchers, flame throwers and other’ and almost 5.8 tons of ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition’. There were no reported transfers after Uganda halted its spending spree in 2012, possibly also because the relationship came under strain with allegations regarding possible use of Israel-Uganda sales as a front to send weapons elsewhere, a story full of byzantine turns that resulted in the arrest of a UK citizen acting as an arms dealer for Israel.

As seen time and again in the Horn, Eastern Europe has also had a large presence in SALW deliveries. In 2010, Ukraine sent 36,798 sub-machine guns, 25 heavy machine guns, and 50 grenade launchers; another 75 heavy machine guns were delivered the next year.
Montenegro sent almost 8 tons in small arms ammunition; in 2013, the Czech Republic sold Uganda almost EUR 1.35 million in ‘ammunition and fuse setting devices’. Bulgaria was a main exporter of SALW to Uganda, with at least 20 light machine guns, 10 hand-held grenade launchers and 3 units of 82mm mortars in 2010; its last sales came in 2013, with 73 ‘assault rifles’. Still riding the spending wave, in 2010 and 2011 Uganda bought a combined quantity of 400 revolvers/pistols, 100 heavy machine guns, 300 light machine guns, 100 sub-machine guns, USD 3.6 million in ‘cannon, mortars and others’, and almost 11 million units of small arms ammunition from Slovakia; after a hiatus in deliveries, in 2013/2014 Kampala received another influx of USD 2.2 million in small arms ammunition and military rifles/machine guns.

Uganda imported more from its own continent than most other nations in the Horn, including purchases from Tanzania, Kenya and Ivory Coast. South Africa—a relevant trader in major weapons as well—sold six tons of ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition’ between 2010 and 2014 and about USD 57,000 in different calibre firearms ammunition. Yet these pale in comparison to the unusual, one-off purchase from Zambia: USD 570,514 in small arms ammunition in 2014.

Lastly, the world’s largest producer and exporter of weapons, the United States, was also represented among the main SALW sellers to Uganda. As examples, in 2010 Uganda received 1,161 military rifles/machine guns made in USA, in 2011 a USD 43,250 ‘grenade launcher’, and in 2012 another 30 military rifles/machine guns. Regarding small arms ammunition, the US sold Uganda a combined USD 215,000 between 2010 and 2014. At least 58 ‘firearms, close assault weapons and combat shotguns’ were transferred in 2015.

PRODUCTION, EXPORT AND DIVERSION
Uganda has flirted with the production of conventional weaponry in the past; for example, the nation “produced antipersonnel mines until 1995 when the state-run facility was decommissioned”. Soon afterwards, plans to refurbish armoured vehicles and produce firearms were discussed, with at least the former becoming successful with a facility at Magamaga as of 2014. The long-standing security relationship with North Korea could have assisted Uganda (like Ethiopia) in developing domestic capabilities, only to be precluded by UN sanctions on that Asian country. That relationship has also drawn South Korean interest with

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291 Romania apparently authorised over EUR 100,000 in exports of arms and ammunition to Uganda in 2010, but no deliveries were reported.

292 All data from NISAT-PRIO http://nisat.prio.org/.

293 Ibid.


the aim of offsetting the North’s influence.298 During a visit by South Korea’s president in May 2016, Uganda agreed to cut all military and police ties with North Korea.299

Nonetheless, Uganda’s industrial military output today is limited, consisting basically of small arms ammunition, with reportedly three manufacturers in Uganda. The largest, Nakasongola Arms Factory, which stems from the UPDF, has had commercial sales since at least 2003 and the Chinese government and private sector may have stakes in its ownership.300 Luwero Industries in Kampala is state-owned, affiliated with the UPDF and claims it “produces 7.62 x 39mm cartridges” and carries out the “assembly of 40 x 46mm grenades”; it also benefitted from Chinese (and possibly North Korean) assistance in the past.301 This production has allowed Uganda to make several exports in the report period, mostly to other African countries, such as a few thousand US dollars’ worth of ammunition to Sudan between 2010 and 2013, to Tanzania in 2010, to Rwanda in 2012, and to Burundi and South Sudan in 2013.302 The only major transfer reported in the period under review, almost USD 1.3 million in ‘military rifles, machine guns and other’ to Somalia in 2014, was classified as a re-export and presumably was related to Uganda’s support of AMISOM.

Most unusual within this arena is Uganda’s large-scale but little-known ‘export of mercenaries’ for military and security jobs around the world—including protecting US diplomats in Iraq, World-Cup-related infrastructure in Qatar and the UAE embassy in Mogadishu. By some estimates, at least 20,000 Ugandan nationals serve abroad in support of other militaries and security forces, constituting the nation’s main trade influx: “mercenary remittances surpassed coffee exports in 2009”.303

With domestic ammunition production came the illegal trade. Ugandan-made ammunition has been trafficked to Somalia; one report notes that 7.62 x 39mm ‘Kalashnikov’ rifle bullets produced in 2004 by Luwero Industries in Kampala were found in that country.304 In 2004, Nakasongola may have been the origin of two “embargo-breaching” shipments to DR Congolese militias documented by the UN, which “included 150 cases of 7.62mm ammunition along with Kalashnikov assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, heavy-calibre rifles and mortars”; at the time, Uganda’s government refused to cooperate with the UN investigations.305

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303 “U.S. government contracts are the real payday, though. Wherever the Pentagon next marshals a shadow army of security contractors, an overwhelming number of those hired guns will likely be recruited from the trash-strewn streets of Kampala”: Bloomberg, ‘Uganda’s Top Export: Mercenaries’, May 2016, www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-uganda-mercenary/.
A 2007 study found that “ammunition that should have been manufactured exclusively for state security forces is in the hands of Karamojong warriors” who in addition “exhibit very ‘young’ stocks of ammunition, suggesting a short chain of supply”. With 13 per cent of ammunition analysed there produced by Luwero—incidentally deemed of “low quality” by security forces—the study notes that “governments in the region claim illicit cross-border trade is a major reason for sustained insurgency, crime, and general violence in their countries. But in the case of Karamoja, and indeed elsewhere, the roots of the problem may well lie at home rather than abroad.”

International Arms Control Mechanisms

Uganda has a better record than most of its neighbours when it comes to making international arms control commitments. Like others in the Horn of Africa (but unlike 37 African nations as at June 2016), it has failed so far to sign the Arms Trade Treaty, but Uganda has been a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999, is a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and has ratified the CCW (though it has not signed its Protocols II-Amended and V). On SALW, Uganda signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development in 2007, and has signed and ratified the UN Firearms Protocol and the Nairobi Protocol. Its commitment to implementing the UN Programme of Action was ranked 87th among 159 countries.

307 Ibid. The same does not entirely hold for the small arms themselves; as one study notes, “sources of small arms supply to Karamoja include Kenya and South Sudan, as well as pilferage from the armed forces and the remnants of weaponry left over from past armed conflicts in Uganda. In view of the long, open, and unregulated borders with Kenya and South Sudan and the abundant availability of small arms in those countries, the Karamojong can easily access such weapons.” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR17-Karamoja.pdf.
309 Regarding the Mine Ban Treaty, it has got behind on its transparency obligations (Article 7): http://www.the-monitor.org/en-qb/reports/2016/uganda/mine-ban-policy.aspx. Regarding the Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Uganda has expressed its intent to ratify the convention on several occasions since 2010” but has not yet followed through with implementing national legislation: http://www.the-monitor.org/en-qb/reports/2016/uganda/cluster-munition-ban-policy.aspx. Moreover, Uganda has been accused of using the weapons within South Sudan (see ‘Spotlight’).
Spotlight—Uganda and South Sudan: a Troubled Friendship

Uganda has enjoyed particularly strong cultural, economic and political ties with South Sudan, though the relationship has raised eyebrows due to its military repercussions as Uganda deployed several thousand soldiers in support of President Salva Kiir after South Sudan’s civil war started in late 2013, soon calling for regional troops. In January 2014, Uganda confirmed it was “helping loyalist forces flush rebels out of Bor, the strategic town near the capital of Juba”; according to South Sudan’s defence minister, Ugandan forces there numbered “a battalion”. Moreover, Uganda established “a base at Juba International Airport to support its deployment of Mi-24 and Mi-17 helicopters to South Sudan”. That country’s opposition—which had “accused Uganda of using its long-range Su-30s to carry out airstrikes against its forces”—asserts the jets were then properly deployed to Juba.

Perhaps more troublesome, the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan asserts that “there is a standing unwritten agreement to supply the Government of South Sudan with arms and ammunition through Uganda”, including the abovementioned attack helicopters. Indeed, in the alleged purchase of “four Mi-24 attack helicopters that ended up in possession of the South Sudan government”, Uganda may have “bypassed parliamentary objection and acquired a USD 170 million loan from a Russian bank to fund the arms deal”. Providing the weapons and soldiers (possibly up to 3,500) reportedly prolonged the war, emboldening the South Sudanese government to delay peace talks and seek military victory.

Fighting continued, even as in August 2015 the UPDF fought an incursion nine kilometres into Ugandan territory (Lamwo District) by “about 200 armed South Sudanese soldiers”—drawing attention to the fact that, despite their umbilical

314 The Independent (Uganda), ‘Uganda in Chopper Saga Again’, December 2015, http://alifrika.com/stories/201512080942.html. Those may have been the same funds the armed forces were denied by the government, as noted in the discussion of military expenditures above. “Uganda is free to acquire on behalf of South Sudan or sell weapons directly to the country. But the trouble, according to experts, is when such weapons are used to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity as is suspected to have happened in South Sudan.”
military relations, the nations also have an ongoing boundary dispute. At another point on the border, in Amuru District, Ugandan police strengthened security in early May 2016 to “prevent the continued entry of illegal guns”, as local forces had recently apprehended multiple guns “believed to have been stolen from South Sudan and sold to thugs in Uganda”. In October 2015, Uganda announced it would withdraw its troops from South Sudan before the end of the month, as demanded during the South Sudan peace negotiations in Addis Ababa, making way for a regional presence, the IGAD Protection and Deterrent Force. The last UPDF battalion reportedly left South Sudan on 30 October.

Furthermore, Uganda—a signatory of the CCM—has been implicated in the use of internationally banned cluster bombs in its participation in the South Sudan conflict. In May 2014, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2155, noting “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” and urging “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future”. By July 2015, “at least 29 countries had expressed concern at or condemned cluster munition use in South Sudan”. Though Uganda has denied the reports of its use as “rubbish”, the evidence appears overwhelming. UN “mine action experts found the remnants of at least eight RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and an unknown quantity of intact AO-1SCh sub-munitions” that had been used between mid-December 2013 and February 2014 “outside of Bor, the capital of Jonglei State, during conflict […] with air support for the SPLA provided by Uganda”. The only belligerent with possible holdings and capacity, Uganda has never properly explained this troublesome part of its complicated friendship with its northern neighbour.

Refugee shelters in the Dabaab camp complex, northern Kenya. 2011
Kenya has been called the ‘cradle of humanity’, though in recent years the cradle has often been rocked. With a population a bit larger—and a territory slight smaller—than Spain’s, Kenya leads all Horn of Africa nations in the Human Development Index, though its position (145\(^{326}\)) only places it on the brink of ascending from ‘low’ to ‘medium human development’. A major trade and logistical hub, and arguably the most stable nation in the sub-region when viewed through several governance lenses, Kenya is somewhat free in terms of its media, which has been described as “courageous and pluralistic”, ranking 95th in the 2016 World Press Freedom Index—a less-than-stellar position that nonetheless places the country in the lead among Horn of Africa countries.\(^{327}\)

Uhuru Kenyatta, the nation’s president since 2013 and the son of Kenya’s founding president, has presided over a country still reeling from violent political protests in 2007-2008 and increasing terrorist attacks—and the accompanying deep cuts in tourism revenues. Corruption is rampant and deep-rooted at all government and private sector levels, and its most recent electoral disputes have been suspect and violent.\(^{328}\) In recent years, entanglement in the conflict in Somalia has left profound impacts on Kenya, not least of which is the massive influx of refugees that has created Dadaab, the world’s largest refugee camp (with over 350,000 Somalis, it would be Kenya’s third

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largest city), which the Kenyan government has recently threatened to close.329

Armed Conflicts and Armed Violence

Kenya flips the most common narrative in the region by witnessing greater unrest and violence over the last few years than in the decades before. Kenya’s rate of intentional homicides saw an upwards jump fairly recently: while it hovered around 3.5 per 100,000 between 2005 and 2008, the period between 2009 and 2012 had an average of almost 6 per 100,000, with the highest rate (6.4, or a total of 2,761 homicides) in 2012.330 Interestingly, the rate for Nairobi alone between 2009 and 2012 (5.2) was lower than the national level, a fairly unusual dynamic of homicide levels being higher outside the country’s capital. From 2007 to 2012, the average yearly body counts from ‘conflict deaths’ and ‘firearm homicides’ were similar, 434 and 314 victims respectively.331 Regarding firearm homicides, the country’s estimated high

number of firearms held by civilians—between 530,000 and 680,000—are a significant factor in lethality.332

The dynamics of conflict in Kenya also differ from its neighbours inasmuch as ‘state-based violence’ is much less of a factor than ‘one-sided’ or ‘non-state violence’. Of the more than 2,700 deaths recorded in the Uppsala Conflict Database for Kenya between 2005 and 2015, fewer than 100 were ‘state-based’ while 1,850 were ‘non-state’, mostly clashes between ethnic and regional groups. Such a breakdown is perhaps unsurprising considering the dizzying plethora of armed groups and militias in Kenya: many are ethnic- or tribal-based, pastoralist or otherwise not particularly organised; others, like the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF, active in the Mount Elgon conflict, killing 128 civilians between 2006 and 2008) or the Mungiki religious sect (which engaged in violence, killing 106 civilians), were brutal and short-lived.333

Clashes between ethnic groups create a steady trickle of deaths each year, with a fairly constant series of incidents with multiple, if single-digit, casualties. Often, however, tensions reach boiling point, such as in August and September 2012 around Tana River, when battles between Orma and Pokomo groups reportedly resulted in up to 100 dead; another 50 or so were killed in December, and fighting continued into 2013.334 Clashes between the Gabra and Borana along the border with Ethiopia in Moyale have also been sporadic but violent, killing dozens and displacing thousands.335 In November 2012, over 30 police officers were killed by Turkana cattle raiders in “the worst attack on police in Kenya’s history”.336

Likewise, electoral violence has consistently added casualties. The period after the disputed December 2007 elections was particularly bloody, as close to 1,500 people were killed; of these, at least 220 were killed by police forces (or armed forces in the Mount Elgon conflict).337 Demonstrations were met with “extreme police brutality”, including executions, indiscriminate killings and shooting randomly into crowds of peaceful protesters, reportedly part of a policy to subdue the protests.338 So grave was the electoral violence that six Kenyan politicians were summoned by the International Criminal Court to stand trial for alleged crimes against humanity, including the current president, Kenyatta, though the charges against him were dropped at the

338 Ibid. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a poll found that “the period of violence around the December 2007 elections has left its mark on the population, with the majority of household respondents stating that they feel the most insecure during election periods”, www.smallarmsurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR16-Kenya.pdf.
end of 2014; the remaining cases are in pre-trial, as three arrest warrants are still outstanding. Though government violence against civilians has diminished since—there were four reported fatalities between 2010 and 2015—clashes in 2016 have revived memories of the police’s penchant for the excessive use of force. As recently as May and June 2016, political protests again turned violent, including a clash that produced an iconic image of a riot policeman brutally kicking an unconscious man.

Beyond electoral violence, Kenya’s anti-terrorism security unit has been accused of severer violations, including “at least 10 cases of killings, 10 cases of enforced disappearances, and 11 cases of mistreatment or harassment of terrorism suspects” since 2011, according to Human Rights Watch. Kenyan police forces have also been accused of implementing an unofficial ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy to tackle petty crime in Nairobi’s shanty towns. Their increased militarisation in methods and equipment—including the receipt of 30 Chinese armoured vehicles in early 2016—has also drawn stark criticism.

Nonetheless, recent major armed violence in Kenya has mostly been a transnational affair, as part of the “increasingly cross-border impact of conflict” manifesting itself in many parts of Africa; specifically, Kenya’s fate seems indelibly intertwined with that of Somalia, whether through refugee flows, contribution to the AU Mission (AMISOM) or strikes by Al-Shabaab. From the beginning, Kenya’s 2011 military incursion into southern Somalia—“the biggest security gamble Kenya has taken since independence, a radical departure for a country that has never sent its soldiers abroad to fight”—was second-guessed in light of the terrorist retaliations it could spawn, as with Uganda. With its troops formally integrated into AMISOM in February 2012, Kenya’s current 3,664 troops are concentrated in the mission’s Sector 2, around the port city of Kismayo.

339 “The Prosecutor contended that over 1,000 people were killed, there were over 900 acts of documented rape and sexual violence, approximately 350,000 people were displaced, and over 3,500 were seriously injured. […] elements of brutality, for example burning victims alive, attacking places sheltering IDPs, beheadings, and using pangas and machetes to hack people to death”, and that perpetrators, allegedly “terrorized communities by installing checkpoints where they would select their victims based on ethnicity, and hack them to death, commonly committed gang rape, genital mutilation and forced circumcision, and often forced family members to watch.” ICC, ‘Kenya, ICC-01/09’, www.icc-cpi.int/kenya.


in addition to Lower and Middle Juba.\textsuperscript{347}

Between January 2009 and August 2013, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) recorded 103 attacks by Al-Shabaab in Kenya, 41 of which “involved the deliberate targeting of civilians, while 62 engaged police or military forces”\textsuperscript{348}; 65 per cent occurred in the northeast of Kenya, 20 in Nairobi, and 15 in the coastal region. Before Kenya’s military involvement in Somalia, an attack occurred once every seven weeks; since the incursion there was almost one attack per week in the period under review.\textsuperscript{349} One particularly gruesome attack in November 2012 saw Al-Shabaab kill ten civilians by detonating grenades in a crowded Nairobi bus. Indeed, Al-Shabaab attacks on Kenyan territory increased in 2012, including reports from Nairobi of “involuntary suicide bombers, people who were tricked into carrying objects that turned out to be remote controlled bombs”.\textsuperscript{349} Nonetheless, the tools of violence in attacks usually showed a “preference for small arms and light weapons by the attackers (and) has clearly established the prominent role of guns, hand grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)”.\textsuperscript{350}

Violence took a turn for the worse in 2013, as on 21 September a small group of Al-Shabaab militants (possibly around ten), arriving in three groups and armed with automatic weapons and grenades, began a siege at the affluent Nairobi shopping mall Westgate, holding hostages for four days; the eventual toll was over 70 people dead (including the assailants) and up to 200 injured. The operation that ended the siege reportedly included Israeli commandos, special forces, Kenyan military and armed volunteer ‘Samaritans’—a terribly disorganised response that probably added to the number of casualties.\textsuperscript{351}

The carnage continued in 2014 and 2015: between Somalia and Kenya, Al-Shabaab killed somewhere between 400 and 500 civilians. It has been considered one of most active terror groups in the world, conducting 80 attacks in Kenya in 2014 alone, and more than 200 since 2008.\textsuperscript{352} In June 2014, 48 people were killed in attacks on hotels and a police station near the island resort of Lamu.\textsuperscript{353} Though unclear whether Al-Shabaab was responsible for all of these attacks, several other attacks continued in the region throughout July, possibly resulting in over 100 casualties.\textsuperscript{354} In November 2014, Al-Shabaab perpetrated an attack in Mandera County in northern Kenya, with gunmen pulling non-Muslim passengers out of a bus and killing 28 of
A few days later, 36 workers in a Mandera quarry were murdered. Possibly the most tragic attack—and Al-Shabaab’s largest strike—came in April 2015, when 147 people, mostly students reportedly targeted for being Christian, were massacred by four gunmen at Garissa University in Kenya’s northeast. Despite a siege of over 12 hours, the security forces’ response was once again heavily criticised. The brutal attack was “among the three most deadly terrorist attacks on educational targets on record since 1970” worldwide. The purported mastermind of the attack, Mohamed Kuno, who had reportedly since defected from Al-Shabaab with 1,200 fighters to join a pro-ISIS faction, was killed in Somalia in May 2016.

Almost five years on, it would appear that early criticisms of Kenya’s intervention in Somalia—its haste in preparation (mainly in response to kidnappings of foreigners), lack of proper strategy and international support, shifting goals and ignorance of the potential blowback—were vindicated: “involvement in Somalia was partly motivated by a desire to inoculate North Eastern Province from the chaos across its border, ease a huge refugee burden and curtail the radical influence of Al-Shabaab, but the unintended consequences may prove destabilising.”

Indeed, it is quite feasible that rather than protecting Kenyan citizens, involvement in Somalia has brought upon them higher levels of violence, as the border “is now the soft underbelly in the war against Al-Shabaab [...] part of its strategy is to outflank the KDF and wage a low-intensity guerrilla campaign [...] behind Kenyan lines.” In fact, the blowback has spread geographically, with attacks in the following locations in 2014: Mandera (19 attacks), Nairobi (nine), Mombasa (nine), Garissa (seven), and Wajir (five). Now entrenched, Al-Shabaab threatens to further ignite ethnic and political conflicts in Kenya.

361 Ibid.
363 “Al-Shabaab has kept its promise to bring the war to Kenya, whether by its own hand or local affiliates and by sowing divisions in a nation still not at ease with itself. Its intent is two-fold: to put pressure on the government’s continued deployment with AMISOM in southern Somalia by hitting targets that directly affect the financial interests of the middle ‘political’ class and divide them; and meanwhile insert cells and trained fighters into locations with pre-existing grievances and patterns of violence that the authorities have historically struggled to address and contain”, ICG, ‘Kenya: Al-Shabaab – Closer to Home’, September 2014, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/102-kenya-al-shabaab-closer-to-home.pdf.
Weapon Use

Because of Al-Shabaab, Kenya has appeared more than once among the world’s 15 countries most affected by explosive violence since 2010. Related to this, Kenya was ranked among the 20 nations most affected by terrorism in 2014. Kenya suffered 18 recorded incidents of explosive violence during 2011. This number almost doubled in 2012, pushing Kenya up to the number nine spot of most affected countries in the world. Kenya’s 35 incidents that year resulted in casualties of 418 civilians, who made up 88 per cent of the victims.  

Another 18 incidents occurred in 2013. The same number in 2014 rendered Kenya the world’s 14th most affected country that year, with 265 casualties, 98 per cent of whom were civilians. In 2015, Kenya was no longer in the top 15; nonetheless, 11 incidents of explosive violence were recorded.

Concerning weaponry such as landmines and other munitions, Kenya was one of the 25 countries in the world that had anti-vehicle mine incidents in 2015, with a total of five recorded blasts. Between 1999 and the end of 2014, Kenya had recorded 45 people killed by landmines and explosive remnants of war; over 1,000 were injured. Of the 29 casualties in 2011, 22 were children, and in 2012 a “British World War II-era bomb killed a six-year-old boy”. While no casualties occurred in 2013, in 2014 six people were injured and a six-year-old boy was killed “by an explosive device near a military training field” in Baringo; local residents noted a landmine had been left behind by Kenya’s armed forces.

Military Spending and Holdings

Kenya’s levels of military expenditure have been remarkably stable for the last two decades. Neither one of Africa’s smallest spenders nor one of its largest, Kenya’s military expenditures have not fallen outside the range of 1.2 to 2.0 per cent of its GDP since 1991. More recently, after four years at 1.9 per cent (2008-2011), relative expenditures have dropped, reaching 1.5 per cent of GDP (or 5.4 per cent of all government spending) in 2015. However, in terms of value (and reflecting a growing economy) spending has increased each year from

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2009, reaching USD 954 million in 2015. Observers have questioned whether increases in investment are wise in the light of systemic problems of integrity in the security sector: “endemic corruption, in particular, is a huge blight on the success of Kenya’s security agencies in countering terrorism [...] donor governments must realise that pouring more money into the security agencies will not solve internal ethical and professional deficiencies”.

Concerning stockpiles, according to ‘The Military Balance 2010’ Kenya’s army held 188 tanks, over 90 units each of reconnaissance and armoured personnel carriers, and 115 units of artillery (including 11 multiple rocket launchers and 62 mortar systems); its navy had 11 patrol and coastal combatants; and aircraft included 42 combat capable aircraft and 47 helicopters, in addition to two missile systems. Kenya’s 24,000 active members of the armed forces have an estimated 45,828 firearms, holdings that are larger only than Djibouti’s in the Horn of Africa, and are only slightly higher than the number of guns held by Kenyan police (42,000).

**Arms Transfers**

Kenya’s arms imports between 2010 and 2015 were significant. In addition to an ongoing military relationship with China, Nairobi has more recently begun to receive major equipment from the US, particularly for aerial surveillance purposes—including drones—and other anti-terrorism efforts. While Kenya is a smaller buyer of Russian and Eastern European major weapons than other Horn of Africa nations, recent purchases from Serbia could signal a shift. Kenya has also invested substantially in its maritime capabilities in procurements from European countries, rendering its navy “the best equipped force on the East African coast”, with a view to protecting its 500-kilometre coastline, particularly from Somalia-launched piracy. The absence of Israel in the list may be deemed surprising considering the active military diplomacy.

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between the countries at the beginning of the period under consideration.378


### Table 4.
Arms transfers to Kenya 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Weapons delivered</th>
<th>Transfer</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>(4) AS365/AS565 Panther helicopters 5 AS365/AS565 Panther helicopters</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Z-9WA armed version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014-15</td>
<td>Z-9WA armed version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1 P-400 Patrol ship</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6 G-120 A-K Trainer aircraft 2 MTU-1163 Diesel engines</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Deal has option for 6 more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>For Jasiri OPV; year of ord./licence: 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>(15) F-5E Tiger-2 Fighter Aircraft</td>
<td>2010-12</td>
<td>Second-hand, modernised, USD 38 million deal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3 Mi-171E Transport helicopters</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Armed version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>(18) B-52 NORA 155mm Self-propelled guns</td>
<td>2014-15</td>
<td>Reports stated deal worth USD 29 million 379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10) BOV M-11 Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>2014-15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>(67) Puma M-26 Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>USD 20 million deal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1 Jasiri Offshore Patrol Vessel</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>USD 60 million deal; year of order: 2003 380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>(2) Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 1 Cessna-208B-ISR Caravan Light Transp. Aircraft</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Delivery prob. 2016; USD 9.9 million deal Surveillance version; aid 381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(67) B5.9 Diesel engines</td>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>For Puma M-26 Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


SIPRI only covers ‘major conventional weapons’ excluding e.g. small arms and artillery under 100mm calibre as well as their ammunition, unguided rockets and missiles, free-fall aerial munitions, as well as military trucks.

Note: data between brackets are unconfirmed.

PRODUCTION
Kenya has a small arms ammunition production capacity, allowing for some domestic coverage of its demand. Set up in 1996 with assistance from FN Herstal (Belgium) in a reported EUR 75 million deal, its lone factory—Kenya Ordnance Factories Corporation (KOFC)—has the capacity to produce three lines of ammunition. As regards conventional weaponry, late 2012 reports noted that South African company Osprea Logistics—the main provider to AMISOM—was establishing a factory in Mombasa aiming to produce 100 Mamba vehicles in its first year of operation, but this does not appear to have materialised. Further reports noted that in 2014 two European companies set up a presence in Kenya: Eurocopter in Nairobi and Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri in Mombasa.

SMALL ARMS
Kenya imported significant quantities of SALW between 2010 and 2014, with transfers arriving from 35 countries. The largest deliveries were mostly from European countries, though a few exceptions stand out. Between 2010 and 2014, Brazil sold Kenya a steady stream of firearms and ammunition: 139 shotguns, 522 rifles, and 35 tons (or USD 824,000) of shotgun cartridges. In addition, in 2010 Brazil exported 65 units of ‘cannons/mortars’. India sent 13 ‘military rifles/machine guns’ in 2011, at over USD 1.4 million based on the sticker price. That same year, Israel sold USD 492,000 in ‘cannons/mortars’. In 2014 alone, South Korea sold over 11 tons (USD 778,570) in shotgun cartridges and almost 10 tons (USD 945,430) in ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition’. Within Africa, Zambia sent USD 202,451 in small arms ammunition to Kenya in 2014; that same year, Tanzania sent 14 tons (or USD 58,781) in ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition’.

In Europe, Austria was a major provider of small arms: just under USD 500,000 between 2011 and.

386 It should be noted that many European transfers considered ‘small’ can be quite impactful in terms of human security, particularly in the context of potential diversion and illicit trafficking post-delivery.
and 2013, in addition to more than USD 215,000 in ammunition during the period.\footnote{387} Italy exported 120 rifles, 324 shotguns and 39 pistols/revolvers between 2010 and 2014, totalling almost USD 600,000.\footnote{388} Between 2010 and 2014, Turkey transferred 184 semi-automatic pistols, 172 shotguns and 145 rifles. Switzerland sold Kenya USD 28,081 in ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition’ in 2011, but transfers increased in 2013-2014 with about USD 270,000 in firearms and almost USD 60,000 in ammunition.\footnote{389} Kenya also procured a significant quantity of SALW from its former coloniser; between 2010 and 2014, the UK transferred 429 military rifles/machine guns, 217 shotguns, at least 175 pistols/revolvers, 29 rifles, 451 rifles/carbines, 95 assault rifles, 60 machine guns, and 50 grenade launchers—in addition to over USD 375,000 in ammunition.\footnote{390}

From Eastern Europe, firearms sales from the Czech Republic were plentiful; 63 shotguns and 942 rifles (including 204 VZ58 assault rifles) between 2010 and 2014, in addition to over USD 200,000 in different types of small arms ammunition. More significantly, 3,816 ‘pistols/revolvers’ (worth almost USD 1.6 million) were transferred during the period. In addition to the weapons included in the SIPRI database noted above, Serbia sent Kenya six grenade launchers in 2010, USD 13.5 million in ammunition in 2011, six portable anti-tank guns in 2012, ten light machine guns and six portable anti-tank guns in 2013, and nine rifles in 2014.\footnote{391} Ukraine also sold an inordinate quantity of small arms to Kenya; in 2010, 2,000 sub-machine guns, 350 light machine guns, 100 heavy machine guns, and 26 units of 82mm mortar. After a hiatus, the flow continued in 2012 with 3,000 sub-machine guns, 43 heavy machine guns and 50 units of mortars. Since then, Ukraine has only sent ammunition: USD 136,000 worth in 2014.\footnote{392}

Finally, Kenya received its share from the world’s largest exporter of arms. From 2010 to 2014, the United States exported 1,298 pistols/revolvers, 7,525 military rifles/machine guns (at over USD 13 million), 92 shotguns, 6,728 carbines (worth about USD 9 million), and ten grenade launchers—in addition to over USD 5.94 million in ammunition.\footnote{393} Though deliveries are not yet confirmed, authorisations in 2014 included 50 ‘firearms, close assault weapons and combat shotguns’ worth USD 93,750.\footnote{394}

As for exports, Kenya has engaged in some trading over the period, mostly small transfers of ammunition to other African countries. Among these, the largest were a 2010 transfer

\begin{footnotes}
\item[387] Firearms under ML1 in EU Report; probably specifically including 55 pistols and 135 rifles/carbines in 2010, USD 4,695 in rifles in 2012, 49 rifles in 2013, and 66 rifles in 2014.
\item[388] It is unclear whether authorisations made for USD 10.5 million in weapons “with a caliber greater than 12.7mm” in 2010 and USD 1.4 million in ammunition (ML3) in 2012 have resulted in actual deliveries.
\item[389] Firearms were not specified in the national report, but UN reports suggest they included at least eight pistols, ten rifles/carbines, and ten ‘mortars’ or artillery weapons (at USD 55,869).
\item[390] It is unclear whether the over USD 423,000 for ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition’ reported is in addition to or overlaps with the stated ammunition.
\item[391] Possibly the same transfer as noted in the SIPRI data under ‘155mm self-propelled guns’ is the almost USD 9 million in ‘NCL 1, Smooth-bore weapons’.
\item[392] This is in addition to an influx in the previous years: between 2007 and 2009, Kenya received 42,500 automatic rifles and sub-machine guns, 100 light machine guns and 655 grenade launchers from Ukraine.
\item[393] Also reported: USD 578,000 in ‘Other weapons and ordnance’.
\end{footnotes}
of USD 16,305 in small arms ammunition to Somalia, as well as a 2013 sale to Ghana of USD 434,846 (or 7.7 tons) in shotgun cartridges.395

International Arms Control Mechanisms

For a nation with its diplomatic clout, Kenya’s record on international arms control regimes is underwhelming. Despite being one of the seven ‘co-author’ nations that spearheaded the process within the UN, Kenya has so far failed to even sign the Arms Trade Treaty, a stark discrepancy between rhetoric and practice. Kenya has been a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty since 2001.396 However, it has not joined the Convention on Conventional Weapons, though it signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008—and has reportedly been indicating its commitment to ratification ever since.397 Unsurprisingly, Kenya has signed and ratified the Nairobi Protocol, and in 2006 it signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. The nation has also signed and ratified the UN Firearms Protocol. As regards its implementation of the UN small arms commitments under the Programme of Action, Kenya was ranked 101 out of 159 Member States.398

Spotlight: Diversion and illicit trafficking in the seat of the Nairobi Protocol

The diversion and illicit trafficking of small arms and ammunition has been a staple in Kenya for decades, and is a major contributor to its armed violence. The headquarters for the region’s most important arms control agreement, as the diplomatic seat of the Nairobi Protocol, Kenya has nonetheless struggled to keep SALW away from the hands of violent individuals and groups. The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and Bordering States was rendered legally binding in 2004 and entered into force in May 2006; it currently has 15 members and, at least on paper, is among the world’s best small arms control documents.399 An intergovernmental organisation, RECSA (Regional

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395 The largest volume of transactions went to the United States—between 2010 and 2013, over USD 1.1 million in ‘parts and accessories’ of various sorts of firearms were shipped—though it is improbable that these were commercial sales, but they may have been related to AMISOM or US deployments in Africa.
Centre on Small Arms), was created in 2005 to implement the commitments in
the protocol. While independent assessments and monitoring of the Nairobi
Protocol’s on-the-ground impacts is limited—particularly as counter-factual
exercises in the secretive area of SALW illicit trade are extremely complex—it is
fair to say that despite advances, serious challenges remain to curbing proliferation.

Possibly nowhere are these challenges clearer than in Kenya. As of 2011, “most
progress has been made in the areas of research, stockpile management and
information exchange. Comparatively little has been achieved in most other areas.”
Indeed, “addressing the issue of arms proliferation is particularly
problematic given the numerous avenues for arms flow into Kenya. The most
important challenge bedeviling dealing with arms proliferation in the country is
tied to the insecurity in countries such as Somalia.”

A recent comprehensive study on small arms in Kenya noted that “Somalia is
perceived to be the source of most arms in Kenya, but firearms are thought
to come from Ethiopia, Uganda, and Southern Sudan as well.” Indeed, Kenya’s
extensive and porous borders with neighbours represent a major channel for the
illegal movement of arms. Earlier studies had noted that Kenya has also seen
illicit trafficking “through the same channels used for legal arms shipments, with
Mombasa’s port being one of the entry points used by smugglers.”

To wit, “certain national legislative measures, the strengthening of operational capacity and sufficient measures to control SALW both state-owned and
in civilian possession. Other provisions cover tracing, safe disposal, transfer of SALW and brokering. The Member States agree to cooperate in terms of
mutual legal assistance, law enforcement, information exchange and harmonization.” Programme of Action Implementation Support System,

401 For the most comprehensive, see Saferworld, ‘Controlling small arms and light weapons in Kenya and Uganda’, www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/
number of states have struggled with armed conflict – RECSA’s achievements are noteworthy” though as of 2011 “progress on (law) harmonisation has been
slow” and “RECSA is yet to effectively mobilise regional support for tangible inter-state efforts aimed at securing borders and combating cross-border arms
trafficking”. Also see: Bevan and King, ‘Making a Mark Reporting on Firearms Marking in the RECSA Region’, April 2013, www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/
docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR19-Making-a-Mark-RECSA.pdf: “Governments have spent more than ten years and millions of dollars to make good on their
commitments in this regard. The 15 members of (RECSA) [...] have made great progress in attaining their objectives. But progress is not uninterrupted or even.
Why have some governments made greater strides whereas others have moved forward haltingly?”


403 “Given the reality of the porous borders and ill-equipped security agencies, it is clear that real success in dealing with the crisis of arms proliferation in
Kenya is as much external as it is internal. Without peace and stability in Kenya’s neighbours, it will be impossible to effectively deal with the scourge of arms


Sabala, Kizito, ‘The Proliferation, Circulation and Use of Illegal Firearms in Urban Centers: The Case of Nairobi, Kenya’, in BICC, ‘Small Arms in the Horn of Africa:
There was controversy whether the case reflected a ‘clerical error’ or international arms trafficking: Indian Express, ‘Kenya finds arms, drugs ‘smuggled’ in Indian army trucks’,
One fascinating investigative report by a Kenyan newspaper in 2013 offers a glimpse of the illegal arms trade with neighbouring countries, including interviews with a purported trafficker, who asserted "the arms were varied and many: from AK47 rifles, Chinese and Russian pistols, rocket propelled grenades, hand-held grenades to ammunition", that he sold AK47s for USD 1,100 and pistols for USD 700, and in one case that the arms were concealed in an old Nissan truck "securely packed inside empty sugar bags and sacks labelled WFP".406 A highly detailed 2012 report noted similar themes in the illicit trafficking of small arms in northern Kenya along the Somalia border, including possible Al-Shabaab and rogue security officials’ involvement, preferred weaponry and running prices, trafficking routes and times, and the human and community impacts of uncontrolled firearm proliferation—including precluding tourism plans.407

Yet there is also, of course, the devil within. As in the case of other African countries that produce ammunition, diversion from official stockpiles is common. Leakage has happened in large volumes, such as between December 2009 and February 2010 in Narok, with multiple arrests around the recovery of a total of 130,000 rounds of 7.62mm RQFC ammunition, reportedly from a police station and a British military base in Nanyuki.408 One study concluded that "Kenyan security forces were the primary source of the (then-unidentified) Iranian 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition circulating in the region—specifically the Kenya Police and Kenya Police Reserves" in around 2007/2008.409 Investigating the proliferation of arms among the Karamoja and its relation to international arms transfers, one 2010 study asserted that the "governments of the region are all equally responsible for the proliferation of SALW in the region and this involves internal as well as external diversions. All governments are known to have been arming local communities, local militias or local auxiliary forces, to enable these communities to secure themselves against raids or armed groups. As well as this internal diversion of weapons, all governments have also supplied arms and ammunition to neighboring countries, destabilizing the internal situation there."410 It is unlikely that the dynamics have shifted considerably since, and Kenya continues to struggle to address the diversion and trafficking of small arms and ammunition.

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Ethiopian soldiers during a ceremony in Baidoa, Somalia, to mark the inclusion of Ethiopia into AMISOM, 2014.
Among the largest and most prominent countries in Africa—second only to Nigeria with a population of almost 100 million, with an area close to twice the size of France (smaller only than Sudan in the Horn of Africa), and with almost no history of foreign domination—Ethiopia’s relevance is clearly reflected in the fact that the African Union’s headquarters are located in its capital, Addis Ababa.411

Ethiopia has been led by Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn since 2012, following the death of the former leader Meles Zenawi, continuing with the coalition of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).412 Under EPRDF rule, democracy is partial at best—recent elections have been described by some as “just an exercise in controlled political participation”.413 Freedom of the press and freedom of expression are very limited, with most media outlets owned by the government or otherwise within its orbit, with some of the few independent outlets resorting to self-censorship to avoid repression.414

Armed Conflicts and Armed Violence

The recent history of violence in Ethiopia is closely interwoven with that of Eritrea. However, in addition to the armed conflict with its seceding neighbour—which claimed tens of thousands of lives, had an immeasurable social and economic cost, and remains latent—other forms of internal conflict are ongoing and worrisome. The rate of violent deaths in Ethiopia between 2010 and 2012 was roughly 11 per 100,000 inhabitants. This was a marked decrease from the six years before, when rates were always over 20—including a peak of 26.3 in 2008. Nonetheless, the resulting average rate of 17.7 from 2007 to 2012 means over 15,000 deaths a year given Ethiopia’s population—almost 14,000 classified as ‘intentional homicide’ and just over 1,000 as ‘conflict deaths’.  

Of the homicides in 2007-2012, a little over 13 per cent were committed with a firearm. In fact, according to some estimates, the private gun ownership rate in Ethiopia is very low (reportedly the smallest in the Horn of Africa): 0.4 firearms per 100 people, 174th out of 178 countries surveyed.

However, these general rates of armed violence—neither obscene nor impressive for the continent—conceal several protracted disputes along political and ethnic fractures within the country. Among the ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia listed by the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer in 2015—which includes international disputes such as that with Eritrea, as well as with Egypt (and involving Sudan) over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam—the most worrisome are


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the secession and autonomy efforts (Oromo, Ogaden) and the struggle with the opposition for national power.417 Tensions with the opposition, ongoing since 2005, increased in 2015, and violence in the Oromia region erupted in late 2015.418 These internal struggles reflect, and catalysed, the “asymmetrical federation” created by the EPRDF with “nine ethnic-based regional states and two federally administered city-states”, a process that according to one analysis “has not dampened conflict, but rather increased competition among groups that vie over land and natural resources, as well as administrative boundaries and government budgets”.419

Among those with grievances unresolved by the ‘artificial’ ethnic federalism are those represented by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)—an ethnic Somali group which has been active for over two decades and gained notoriety through its 2007 attack on an oilfield that killed 65 Ethiopian soldiers and nine Chinese employees—and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), fighting in the name of greater autonomy for the nation’s largest ethnic group.420

Of course, as is often the case in Ethiopia, these fractures are not purely internal. As of 2012, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea “obtained credible information, and in some cases firm evidence, concerning Eritrean support to the following Ethiopian armed opposition groups: ONLF, OLF, the Tigrayan People’s Democratic Movement (TPDM), Gimbot Sabat and ARDUF”—even if today most of these groups are severely weakened.421

Beyond their motivations and support, these armed groups have been key actors in most of Ethiopia’s major armed violence incidents over the last several years, particularly in instances of political violence. Of the more than 650 incidents included in the ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project) database for the period from 2010 to the end of 2014, the vast majority can be described as clashes between military forces and non-state armed actors, particularly the Ogaden and Oromo rebels.422 Dozens of these clashes have reported casualty counts that are enormous, often from a dozen up to 100 deaths. However, reports often note that the armed forces or rebels ‘claim’ a certain number of opponent deaths, without any independent substantiation or evidence; many reports from the rebel side come from clearly partial and supportive media.

Notwithstanding that caveat, several incidents over the last five years have resulted in independent and multiple reports. The year 2010 saw numerous violent clashes, particularly between government forces and the ONLF; one bloody clash in September reportedly claimed the lives of 123 rebels in Ethiopia’s Somali region.423 These dynamics remained in force in 2011, when repeated clashes led the rebels to accuse the army of purported “ethnic cleansing” after several civilian deaths,

torture and even beheadings. In February 2012 the military was accused of killing 16 civilians. Even after replacing “thousands of troops” with a local counter-insurgency force (the Liyu police, often accused of serious abuse), the security situation remained tenuous and clashes have continued; one database recorded over 250 casualties involving the ONLF between 2010 and 2015. Violent struggles for greater autonomy, largely based on historical ties with Somalia rather than Ethiopia’s central government, could reignite—especially as attempts at peace talks between the parties have often derailed.

In late 2015, protests in the Oromia region flared, and in a violent repression, Ethiopian security forces reportedly “killed up to 50 peaceful protesters” that December alone. Attempting a purported ‘land grab’ that would expand Addis Ababa territory at the cost of Oromo farmland (the so-called ‘Master Plan’, later withdrawn), and deeming protesters ‘terrorists’, the Ethiopian security forces have continued the repression, reportedly killing at least 140 civilians by January and “hundreds of protesters” since clashes began. According to the Ethiopia Human Rights Project, since November 2015, “police brutality have reached its climax and deaths, injuries, mass arrest, kidnapping have tragically been reported in the State. In only the first hundred days of these protests, hundreds of towns and villages have witnessed mass incidents. In addition, death tolls have reportedly reached more than four hundred, thousands of people were injured and tens of thousands people were briefly arrested.”

The crackdown on civil society has received stark condemnation internationally, despite limited visibility. In April 2016, 12 US senators proposed a resolution demanding an end to the “brutal” violence and calling for a review of security assistance to Ethiopia “in light of allegations that

424 Reuters, ‘Rebels accuse Ethiopian army of ethnic cleansing’, January 2011, [URL]. Voice of America, ‘Ethiopian Forces, Rebels Clash in Ogaden Oil Exploration Region’, September 2011, [URL]. These accusations have not been independently confirmed, with some observers noting they are “unsustanitated allegations” and “propaganda”.

425 Bloomberg, ‘Ethiopian rebel group says army kills 16 civilians in Ogaden’, February 2012, [URL].


427 Al Jazeera, ‘Changing fortunes in Ethiopia’s Ogaden’, September 2012, [URL].

428 The Independent, ‘Ethiopia security forces kill up to 50 people in crackdown on peaceful protests’, December 2015, [URL].

429 “Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism legislation permits the government to use unrestrained force against suspected terrorists, including pre-trial detention of up to four months. People that have been subject to pre-trial detention under the anti-terrorism law have reported widespread use of torture and ill-treatment.” The Independent, ‘Ethiopia security forces kill up to 50 people in crackdown on peaceful protests’, December 2015, [URL].

Ethiopian security forces have killed civilians”. Human Rights Watch has complained at the scant media attention it was receiving, due to “an almost complete information blackout” sponsored by the government—which countered accusations as “absolute lies”. In June 2016, Human Rights Watch asserted in a comprehensive report that Ethiopian security forces had killed more than 400 people, listing the names of over 300 of those supposedly killed. Ethiopia’s government dismissed the findings, pointing instead to an investigation by the parliament-appointed Ethiopia Human Rights Commission that affirmed that 173 people had died during the turmoil, including 28 security forces and government officials. Regardless of the exact numbers, if unresolved this conflict bodes ill for the future of security in Ethiopia.

Finally, while clashes between Ethiopia and Eritrea have been somewhat rare in the report period—reportedly including the death of ten Ethiopian soldiers in the first hours of 2010—the dormant and unresolved conflict still holds severe potential for destabilisation. A March 2012 strike on three bases inside Eritrea, in retaliation for the slaying of five European tourists in Ethiopia, was one such reminder. A new border clash between the countries along Tserona in June 2016, which reportedly included “heavy shelling”, led the UN to urge the rivals to “exercise maximum restraint”.

With the village of Badme still controlled by Ethiopia despite the decision to the contrary by a Hague-based commission, peace has remained elusive. According to one observer, “Ethiopian equivocation over a ‘final and binding’ delimitation decision – a key hurdle in the resolution of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border dispute – is dictated by perceptions of risk firmly rooted in the

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433 Since November 2015, thousands were reportedly injured, tens of thousands arrested, and hundreds were victims of enforced disappearances. HRW, ‘Such a Brutal Crackdown’, June 2016, www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/15/such-brutal-crackdown/kilings-and-arrests-response-ethiopias-oromo-protests.


435 The ebb and flow of violence from different groups is also in response to the multiple demands of a plethora of ethnic and political actors within Ethiopia—for example, the recent emergence of the ‘Ginbot 7’ armed group. Voice of America, ‘Ethiopian Opposition Group Threatens Armed Resistance’, July 2015, www.voanews.com/content/ethiopias-opposition-group-threatens-armed-resistance/2878413.html.


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complex origins of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war” and shows little sign of moving. Conversely, following fresh border squabbles, the International Crisis Group stated that “recent shifts in Eritrea and Ethiopia’s international and regional standing, and relative internal vulnerabilities, may offer opportunity to end the two-decades-long estrangement” [...] as the “Tserona incident could also be a wake-up call that after a decade on the sidelines, the stalemate of no peace, no war is unsustainable”.441

**Weapon Use**

Despite these levels of armed violence, prevalence in Ethiopia of explosive violence specifically, as captured by AOAV’s monitoring, can be best described as low and intermittent. After no recorded incidents in 2011 and 2012, Ethiopia had one incident in 2013.442 Again without incidents in 2014, the country suffered two incidents in 2015.443 Regarding landmines, cluster bombs and other unexploded ordnance, while the last confirmed casualties occurred in 2010, when two deminers were injured, the threat remains—90 lives have been claimed and 126 injured since 2004.444 In March 2015, the Ethiopian government reported that nearly 5.9 square kilometres of ‘confirmed hazardous areas’ with landmines remain in the country, while another 314 areas are suspected of contamination.445

**Military Spending and Holdings**

Perceived as a major ally in Africa, Ethiopia was reportedly assisted by the US when it invaded Somalia in 2006 to attempt to reverse gains by Islamist armed groups; it took over Mogadishu, only to withdraw three years later.446 More recently, Ethiopia has housed a drone airfield at Arba Minch in the south for the superpower to launch drone attacks, mainly against Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Operational since 2011, reportedly with one Reaper and one Predator drone, the base was unexpectedly closed down in late 2015, for reasons that remained publicly unclear.447 Nonetheless, the US-Ethiopia relationship shines light on forms of military assistance that do not always appear clear. A cursory glance at the arms transfers below, whether major conventional systems or SALW, may give the impression that the US is a minor player in Ethiopia, but a closer look at the broader ‘military and security assistance’ rubric reveals that

while providing limited hardware, the US has been a major supporter of Ethiopia’s security apparatus, for example providing over USD 18 million in 2015 for a ‘Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund’.448

Ethiopia’s security forces are both large and considered among the strongest on the African continent—in the words of one EU observer, “Ethiopian [troops] scare the hell out of everybody[... ] because they deliver”.449 With 135,000 ground troops, the country’s armed forces are “arguably outmatched only by Egypt, Algeria and South Africa. And these three countries spend far more on their militaries, both in per capita terms and in actual dollars, than Ethiopia.”450

As of April 2016, Ethiopia was contributing over 8,000 soldiers to UN peace-keeping operations, making it the largest contributor in the world—only a bit less than China, Brazil, Egypt and South Africa combined.451 Ethiopia also formally joined the AU mission in Somalia in 2014 with over 4,000 soldiers, after having troops accused of terrible violations in the military incursion years before—according to Amnesty International, purportedly including slaughterering Somali civilians “like goats”, slitting “throats, gouging out eyes and gang-raping women”.452

In terms of conventional weaponry holdings, according to ‘The Military Balance 2010’ Ethiopia’s army had over 246 tanks, 450 reconnaissance and armoured personnel carriers, and over 460 units of artillery (including 50 multiple rocket launchers and over 400 towed artillery).453 As regards small arms, the armed forces are reported to hold 1,095,000 firearms—the largest stock in the Horn of Africa—while police forces boast 105,000 guns.454 Ethiopia’s air forces, with 3,000 staff, are well regarded but suffer from a need for maintenance and parts, which reportedly will begin to be provided by a Lithuanian company in 2016.455 The air-force holdings included 42 combat capable aircraft, 20 attack and 30 support/utility helicopters.456

448 Security Assistance Monitor, ‘Ethiopia 2010-2015’, www.securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Ethiopia/2010/2015/is_all/Global. There are also physical transfers that may not be covered by the major conventional arms database (SIPRI) or that for SALW (NISAT-PRIO). For instance, in 2012 the US showed almost USD 29 million in ‘Direct Commercial Sales’ to Ethiopia, the vast majority of which were 36 items under ‘Category VIII – Aircraft and Associated Equipment’, in addition to 272 items under ‘Category X – Military Equipment’. Those categories were also responsible for close on USD 4.5 million in support for 2014. The other category, ‘Foreign Military Sales’, accounted for almost USD 3 million between 2011 and 2014. See US Department of State, ‘Section 655 Annual Military Assistance Reports’, www.pmddtc.state.gov/reports/655_intro.html.


455 DefenceWeb, ‘Lithuanian company to help maintain Ethiopian Air Force aircraft’, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=artic le&id=42820:lithuanian-company-to-help-maintain-ethiopian-air-force-aircraft&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107. The same report notes the following aircraft as part of Ethiopia’s current holdings: “roughly a dozen MiG-21s, a dozen MiG-23s, eight Su-25s and a dozen Su-27s [... ] Fixed wing transport aircraft include five C-130B/C-130E/L-100-30 Hercules, over half a dozen An-12s (one crashed in Mogadishu in August 2013), half a dozen C-47s, and a handful of An-32s, An-26s, Yak-40s, Twin Otters and Y-12s. Training is carried out by half a dozen L-39s and several SF-260s. The rotary wing component includes Mi-24/35 Hind, UH-1H (Ethiopian Army Aviation), SA-316 Alouette III, Mi-6, Mi-8/17, SA 330 Puma and Mi-14 helicopters.”

456 ‘Military Balance 2010’. 
In terms of spending, observers have noted that Addis Ababa spends surprisingly little yet remains militarily strong.\textsuperscript{457} Indeed, Ethiopia’s military expenditure in 2015 was only 0.6 per cent of GDP, among the lowest proportions on the African continent, and has been 1 per cent or less since 2010.\textsuperscript{458} As a proportion of government spending, Ethiopia reached 4 per cent in 2015, after a steady decrease from the peak of 44.3 per cent(!) in 1999, as its war with Eritrea raged.

However, in addition to having a large proportion of soldiers ‘removed from payroll’ onto UN missions, Ethiopia’s earlier (high) military expenditures have created a significant baseline; its average military expenditure from 1998 to 2000 was more than 7.5 per cent of GDP.\textsuperscript{459} Though its ability to produce weaponry domestically (see below) quenches some of Ethiopia’s thirst for arms imports, domestic production would be included in military spending. Still, it may be misleading to discount Ethiopia simply as a light spender on defence and security. Partially, it spends little today because it spent too much in the recent past; as shown by a detailed analysis of the nation’s budgeting for the military sector, “the high level of militarization of Ethiopian society and the huge expenditure on the military sector have been major factors in the economic underdevelopment of Ethiopia”—possibly partially offset by recent growth rates.\textsuperscript{460}

\section*{Arms Transfers}

Within the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia is one of two countries that can boast a military industry.\textsuperscript{461} Organized in 2010 under the umbrella of Metals and Engineering Corporation (Metec), a public company, its larger factories focus on armed vehicles, purportedly being able to ‘manufacture’ 72-Ts tanks (though probably mostly repairing and modernising), also for external users, including the African Union’s AMISOM.\textsuperscript{462} The repair and renewal of aircraft, and the production of ammunition (possibly up to 26 different types, including “tank shells, mortar bombs and grenades; and 120mm ‘Katyusha’ rockets”), are reported as capabilities as well, in addition to several “basic infantry weapons”.\textsuperscript{463} A May 2016 report highlighted “the most sophisticated work known to have been carried out by the Ethiopian defence industry to date”,


\textsuperscript{459} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{461} The other is Sudan; Kenya and Uganda have small arms ammunition factories. SIPRI, ‘Arms transfers to East and Southern Africa’, December 2009, \url{http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP0912.pdf}.


\textsuperscript{464} HS Jane’s, ‘Ethiopia turns S-75 SAMs into self-propelled systems’, May 2016, \url{http://www.janes.com/article/59987/ethiopia-turns-s-75-sams-into-self-propelled-systems}.

Weapons may include “the ET/97-1 and Gafat 01 in 7.62x39 mm calibre (presumably AKM-derived assault rifles), an unidentified 7.62x54mm machine gun (probably a PKM copy), the 35 mm ET04/01 automatic grenade launcher (possibly a copy of the Chinese QLZ87), and the 82 mm ET05/01 mortar”.

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with the transformation of S-75 surface to air missile kits into self-propelled systems.\textsuperscript{464}

Ethiopia had significant North Korean assistance in establishing its manufacturing facilities, ties that to some extent may continue today and have given rise to speculations about it violating the embargo against the Asian country.\textsuperscript{465} Another plant established with North Korean support was reportedly “originally built to manufacture AK-47s and light machine guns” but has since been “upgraded to produce ‘40mm grenade launchers and other automatic weapons attached on armoured vehicles and helicopters’ as well as ‘heavy artillery and howitzers’”.\textsuperscript{466}

Though it reportedly repairs military vehicles and aircraft for some neighbours, Ethiopia does not appear to have exported any major conventional arms in the last decade.\textsuperscript{467} Given its limited production capabilities, the country procures much of its larger and more sophisticated perceived military and security needs from abroad, as summarised below.

**SMALL ARMS**

SALW imports were rather plentiful: 24 countries transferred at least some SALW, ammunition and/or parts and accessories to Ethiopia between 2010 and 2015.\textsuperscript{468} While many of these were relatively small, others countries were responsible for a significant influx of arms into Ethiopia. The sale of parts and accessories of firearms also stands out. Of course, as in the case of ammunition, Ethiopia’s security forces hold an enormous number of guns that need to be repaired and, seemingly, fired.

The following countries could be described as Ethiopia’s largest providers of small arms. Israel transferred almost USD 1.25 million in ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition, mines and others’ in 2010. In 2012 alone, the Czech Republic delivered almost EUR 2.4 million in heavy military firearms and 64 units of large calibre artillery. Between 2011 and 2013, Bulgaria delivered a combined total of around EUR 5.3 million in heavier military firearms, over EUR 2 million worth of ‘ammunition and fuse setting devices’ and EUR 3.35 million in ‘bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles’ or other explosives.

China transferred over USD 4.5 million (165 tons) of ‘parts and accessories’ for shotguns or rifles, USD 652,892 in ‘military rifles/machine guns’ and 1.7 tons of shotgun cartridges between 2010 and 2012. This level of trade indicated a significant dip, as between 2006 and 2010 Ethiopia was the world’s largest recipient of Chinese ‘military SALW’, importing over USD 16 million worth “shortly after a joint Chinese–Ethiopian declaration on the need to enhance cooperation in the fields of military technologies, peacekeeping and military training”.\textsuperscript{469}

\textsuperscript{464} IHS Jane’s, ‘Ethiopia turns S-75 SAMs into self-propelled systems’, May 2016.
\textsuperscript{466} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{467} SIPRI, ‘Arms Transfers Database’, www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. Regarding SALW exports, we learn from the NISAT-PRIO (http://nisat.prio.org/) data that Ethiopia actually exported a small amount between 2010 and 2012.
\textsuperscript{468} Data in this section are from NISAT-PRIO (http://nisat.prio.org/), unless otherwise noted.
Table 5.
Arms transfers to Ethiopia 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Weapons delivered</th>
<th>Transfer</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>(10) Type-89/ZSD-89 Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20) WZ-551 Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>2012-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) HQ-64 Surface to Air Missile System</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>For use with HQ-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(75) PL-11/FC-60 Beyond Visual Range Missiles</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12 ACMAT 'Bastion' Armed Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>To be delivered in 2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>12 Mi-24V/Mi-35 Combat helicopters</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>8 Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopters</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Reported as combat helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>64 D-30 122mm Towed guns (or 122mm Howitzers)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Probably second-hand; via Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>4 BTS-5B Armoured Recovery Vehicles</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Second-hand, possibly modernised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1250) Combat Anti-tank missiles (or ‘guided shells’)</td>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>For use with T-72 tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>139 T-72UA1 (or T-72E1) Tanks</td>
<td>2012-14</td>
<td>Second-hand; modernised T-72s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72 T-72B1 Tanks</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1 C-130E Hercules Transport Aircraft</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Second-hand; possibly loan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


SIPRI only covers 'major conventional weapons' excluding e.g. small arms and artillery under 100mm calibre as well as their ammunition, unguided rockets and missiles, free-fall aerial munitions, as well as military trucks.

Note: data between brackets are unconfirmed.

### Arms Embargoes

Ethiopia’s war with Eritrea brought with it a few arms embargoes between 1999 and 2001. Upon the deflagration of hostilities, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1227 in February 1999 in which it strongly urged “all States to end immediately all sales of arms and munitions to Ethiopia and Eritrea”.[470] In May 2000, “deeply disturbed by the continuation of fighting between Eritrea and Ethiopia”, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1298, a full and legally-binding embargo that was in force for a year.[471] In parallel, and also to assist in the implementation of the UN ban, the European Union imposed an embargo that was also lifted in May 2001, but

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had been binding since March 1999. Unlike its neighbour, however, Addis Ababa was able to shake off the sanctions—as can be seen by the arms trade Ethiopia has engaged in since.

**International Arms Control Mechanisms**

As regards its international legal and political commitments, Ethiopia signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development in 2007, has signed and ratified the UN Firearms Protocol, and was ranked 99th out of 159 Member States on its implementation of the UN Programme of Action on SALW. Regionally, Ethiopia has signed and ratified the Nairobi Protocol on SALW. Ethiopia has been a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty since June 2005, but like most of the region as at June 2016, Addis Ababa has so far failed to sign the Arms Trade Treaty.

Likewise, Ethiopia has still not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, nor has it joined the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Regarding cluster bombs, Ethiopia has reportedly expressed interest in joining but has taken no significant steps in that direction, a position that seems remarkably consistent since 2008. The feet-dragging is particularly troublesome as, despite Ethiopia’s denials, “there is ample evidence that it attacked several parts of Eritrea with cluster munitions” during the border war, and that the nation’s military still possesses cluster munitions.

474 Small Arms Survey, ‘Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA)’, www.smallarmssurvey.org/tools/rs-poa/profiles-of-regional-organizations/africa/recsa.html.
475 Though it has recently violated the norm by missing deadlines, and has been advised to “significantly improve the quality and frequency of its reporting both at Mine Ban Treaty meetings and through Article 7 reports”.
Military equipment abandoned by retreating Ethiopian troops in 1991 can still be seen along many roads in northern Eritrea, 2012.
The nation of Eritrea—fewer than six million inhabitants, in terms of area a bit smaller than Greece and one of Africa’s poorest nations—was quite literally born from violence. The separatist struggle to split from Ethiopia, in which the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front took control of the capital Asmara in 1991 after years of clashes, set the stage for its independence in 1993, but the deadly tensions were not left behind. A border dispute in 1998 over the village of Badme led to a vicious conflict between the two rivals, which raged for two years and may have killed up to 100,000 people.479

The costs of that war continue to be paid today, not in lives, but in the form of a highly secretive and repressive government that forces a breath-taking lack of freedom on its citizenry in the name of post-war reconstruction. It could be dubbed ‘Africa’s North Korea’: a one-party state bereft of a working constitution and led by President Isaias Afewerki since independence in 1993, and the continent’s only country without an independent or private media, ranked last in the world for press freedom by Reporters Without Borders for the last eight years.480 Even though public health improvements have been reported, this ‘information black hole’ also makes it difficult to understand the scope of Eritrea’s humanitarian challenges—due to reoccurring...
severe drought and food shortages—as well as its current patterns of violence and insecurity. Up to 10,000 people have reportedly been imprisoned by the Afewerki government without charge or trial, often held in underground or desert prisons—including inside shipping containers—and subjected to widespread torture and inhumane treatment. Combined with mandatory conscription for indefinite periods, in which men are forced to serve time in the military or engage in civil (forced) labour, sometimes for decades, from their youth to their 40s, it is no surprise that Eritrea's human rights record has been severely criticised. Though UN Special Rapporteur Sheila Keetharuth was denied entry into Eritrea in 2013, her ensuing report was scathing, noting that

“human rights violations committed in Eritrea include, but are not limited to, extrajudicial killings; the ruthless implementation of a shoot-to-kill policy of persons attempting to cross borders; enforced disappearances and incommunicado detention; arbitrary arrests and detentions; widespread torture,


both physical and psychological, during interrogation by the police, military and security forces; inhumane prison conditions; compulsory national service of an unspecified and extended duration; no respect for civil liberties, including the freedoms of expression and opinion, assembly, association, religious belief and movement; discrimination against women, and sexual and gender-based violence; violation of child rights, including conscription, which has a profound impact on education; and precarious living conditions. These violations were cited as reasons pushing a constant stream of Eritreans to cross the borders.484

So worrisome was this report that the UN Human Rights Council established a Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea; its first report in June 2015 was just as terrifying, finding that “systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed in Eritrea under the authority of the Government. Some of these violations may constitute crimes against humanity.”485 A follow-up report—to document the said crimes against humanity—was launched in June 2016, noting “no improvement with respect to the most critical human rights violations”, asserting “reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity, namely, enslavement, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, torture, other inhumane acts, persecution, rape and murder, have been committed in Eritrea since 1991”, and recommending the UNSC “refer the situation in Eritrea to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for consideration”.486

As a result of Eritrea’s deplorable situation, thousands of people have fled the country—at times up to 5,000 per month—leading to enormous refugee flows to neighbouring countries (particularly Sudan and Ethiopia); in mid-2014 the UNHCR estimated the total number at over 350,000, or almost 10 per cent of the nation’s citizens.487 As such, Eritreans are reportedly the “second-largest nationality seeking asylum in Europe after Syrians”, despite the treacherous journey across sea and/or desert that this entails.488 Thousands of Eritreans, including unaccompanied minors as young as seven years old, have escaped to Sudan, particularly its Shagarab camp, where almost all the 35,000 refugees are Eritreans hoping to reach Europe.489

In the words of Amnesty International, “twenty years on from the euphoric celebrations of independence, Eritrea is one of the most repressive, secretive and inaccessible countries in the world”.490 With tensions with Ethiopia unresolved—the status quo has been described as a state of “no war, no peace”, as there has been no peace deal, a UN peacekeeping mission has left, and thousands of troops face off along the heavily fortified 1,000 kilometre-long border—is...
Eritrea a ticking time-bomb? Or is there perhaps reason for some hope, as the country’s diplomatic and economic isolation appears to be easing?

Armed Conflicts and Armed Violence

Despite its internal repression and appalling human rights situation, Eritrea today is not, on the surface, a highly violent country internally. In the absence of a raging armed conflict like the historically recent clashes with Ethiopia, Eritrea’s rates of violence have purportedly declined significantly. In fact, since 2010, the available data for ‘violent deaths’ places Eritrea quite close to the global average, which for many countries in the Horn of Africa—and Africa more broadly—would be quite an accomplishment. For the most recent year available, 2012, Eritrea’s rate stood at 7.4 per 100,000. Likewise, when considering only ‘homicides’ by whatever means, the country’s rate for that same year was 7.1. These numbers are particularly impressive as they are roughly half the rates that applied between 2004 and 2008. With an average of 100 firearm homicides per year between 2007 and 2012, it will come as no surprise that civilian ownership of guns in Eritrea is extremely low: an estimated 0.5 firearms per 100 people, giving one of the lowest rates of private gun ownership in the world, with the country ranked 169 out of 178 countries.

It is unclear, however, how much of this decline and the low levels of violence are real, or related to the repressive regime snuffing out conflict and imprisoning political adversaries, or whether the data are tainted by Eritrea’s absolute lack of transparency and the unknown numbers of citizens suffering ‘enforced disappearance’. As noted by the Commission of Inquiry, “it is not law that rules Eritreans, but fear.”

Weapon Use

Regarding the use of conventional weapons and explosives in major incidents of armed violence, there were several deadly attacks, particularly between 2010 and 2012, from Eritrean armed rebels on military positions and economic infrastructure (power stations, water...
tanks) that killed dozens and reportedly involved heavier arms.497 Groups such as the Eritrean National Salvation Front (ENSF), the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation (RSADO), the Eritrean Popular Congress, the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of the Eritrean Kunamas and the Islamic Party of Eritrea for Development and Justice were all active during the period.498 In October 2011, RSADO claimed it killed 12 soldiers in a multiple attack in southern Eritrea, following an attack on military positions the year before that supposedly killed 17 or 18 soldiers.499 While the frequency has decreased, rebel attacks have continued periodically since; for example, RSADO rebels attacked military positions in April and December 2014, resulting in the death of over 30 military officers, while an attack in late January 2016 reportedly killed another six.500

During this time, clashes on the border with Ethiopia have continued, with several attacks reported by one of the rivals, but denied by the other. In some cases, it was unclear whether the Ethiopian government was involved at all or whether rebels had staged attacks from its territory.501 The most recent border clash with its rival occurred in June 2016 (see the chapter on Ethiopia). In addition, the period saw a kidnapping of European tourists inside Ethiopian territory by a rebel group supported by Eritrea (January 2012, “two Germans, two Hungarians and one Austrian were shot dead; one Belgian and one Briton were gravely wounded by gunshot wounds”), a high-profile defection of military pilots (with the presidential jet, October 2012), and a hostile takeover of the state television station at the Ministry of Information in Asmara by ‘100 dissident soldiers’ that has been described by some as a coup attempt or ‘mutiny’ (January 2013).502

The Eritrean government was purportedly also prepared to use explosive violence, as a UN report indicated that in January 2011 its government attempted to detonate multiple bombs in Addis Ababa, including at the African Union headquarters during a summit of 30 leaders.503 According to a July 2011 UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea report, Eritrea’s government “conceived, planned, organized and directed a failed plot to disrupt the African Union summit in Addis Ababa by bombing a variety of civilian and governmental targets”, and “if executed as planned, the operation would almost certainly have caused mass civilian casualties, damaged the

497 Often referred to as ‘bombs’ and ‘heavy weapons’ in reports, though the exact weaponry cannot be verified. It should be noted that within the parameters and methodology used by Action On Armed Violence in its Explosive Violence Monitor series, Eritrea does not appear as a country with incidents of ‘explosive violence’ from 2010 to 2015. AOAV, ‘Explosive violence’, https://aoav.org.uk/explosiveviolence.
Ethiopian economy and disrupted the African Union summit”. At the time, the Eritrean government responded to the accusations as follows: “totally a fabrication and the report is absurd”.

Specifically regarding casualties caused by landmines, cluster bombs or other ERW (explosive remnants of war), while there have been no reported incidents since the end of 2012, up to that point 2,522 people had been killed and 2,777 injured by mines and ERW in Eritrea; nine were killed and 43 injured in 2011 and 2012, and “of the nine fatalities, seven were children”. The danger posed by mines continues: in late 2013, “Eritrea reported that 434 mined areas remained over an estimated 33.4km².”

Military Spending and Holdings

Eritrea’s historical, and ongoing, conflict with Ethiopia has resulted in enormous military spending, particularly for such an otherwise poor country. Though the most recent available data comes from 2003, the levels are remarkable and likely to be somewhat similar today to the extent possible. In 2003, Eritrea’s military expenditure was 20.9 per cent of GDP (the highest in the world by far that year), or 31.1 per cent of all government spending (the third highest globally that year, after Singapore and Oman). These mind-boggling levels were already a stark reduction compared with their 1999 levels: 34.4 per cent of GDP (the highest in the world, double that of second-place Angola), or 41.9 per cent of government spending (behind only Sudan and Ethiopia, its belligerent, that year). Such an emphasis on the military has taken a huge economic and social toll on the country. UNDP calculates Eritrea’s Human Development Index at 0.351, putting it 181st out of the 187 nations compared; indeed, “military expenditure, including the huge costs of military mobilization, is one major factor contributing to the country’s economic decline”.

Eritrea’s emphasis on the military can easily be gleaned from its reported 200,000 active and 120,000 reserve soldiers. In terms of weaponry holdings, public information is somewhat sparse—as is often the case for highly secretive countries—but according to ‘The Military Balance 2010’, Eritrea held 270 (T-54/T-55) tanks, 40 reconnaissance and 25 armoured personnel carriers, 15 BMP-1 armoured infantry fighting vehicles, and at least 204 units of artillery (including 25 self-propelled, over 19 towed and 44 multiple rocket launchers and over 100 mortar systems); its navy had 13 patrol and coastal combatants; and its air-force holdings included 31 combat capable aircraft and one attack and eight support helicopters.

509 Ibid.
Furthermore, information on the air force gained by the UN Monitoring Group offers an interesting insight, noting for example that “its most sophisticated fighter aircraft are Mig-29 Fulcrums, Su-27 Flankers and Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships”, among the fleet of “22 fixed-wing and 7 rotary-wing aircraft”, only seven of which were thought to be operational in 2012. At the time, the Monitoring Group estimated that Eritrea’s air force was “only able to sustain all phases of maintenance operations for approximately 30 per cent of its fleet.” The number and proportions today are presumably even smaller, given the current UN arms embargo against Eritrea (see ‘Arms Embargoes’ below).

Eritrea’s armed forces reportedly have 804,374 firearms, a remarkable number for such a small country. In the Horn of Africa, only Ethiopia’s armed forces have more firearms, and Eritrea’s armed forces holdings are roughly the same as those of Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and Somalia combined. Police forces in Eritrea are reported to have 6,725 firearms.

**Arms Embargoes**

Regardless of the exact numbers, the nation’s military holdings have surely eroded. Eritrea’s unambiguous patterns of belligerence have unsurprisingly rendered the nation somewhat of a pariah to the international community. As such, multiple embargoes and sanctions have been imposed against the Asmara regime, precluding any major new acquisitions. Several arms embargoes were in response to the brutal conflict with Ethiopia (and banned weapons sales to both). However, in 2009 the UNSC determined that Eritrea should be sanctioned with a full arms embargo for supporting the Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia (as well as for its failure to comply with mandated terms for its border dispute with Djibouti, thereby violating Security Council Resolution 1862 of 2009). This resolution (Resolution 1907) continues to be in force; in fact, because of Eritrea’s continuing violations it was expanded in 2011 with Resolution 2023, with further restrictions regarding diaspora taxes, mining and financial services.

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513 Ibid.


518 “Decides that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply to Eritrea by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial and other assistance, related to the military activities or to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of these items, whether or not originating in their territories; Decides that Eritrea shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related material, and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of the items, training and assistance described in paragraph 5 above from Eritrea by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of Eritrea.” (UNSC, ‘Resolution 1907’, 2009). It should be noted that the Security Council decision was not unanimous, with Libya voting against and China abstaining: [www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9833.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9833.doc.htm).

Arms Transfers

The imposition of the arms embargo has prevented Eritrea from legally procuring major conventional weapons during the period under consideration, 2010-2015. It is nonetheless interesting to take a look at arms transfers for a five-year period prior to the embargo on the country in order to understand its current holdings.

Table 6.
Arms transfers to Eritrea 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Weapons delivered</th>
<th>Transfer</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>2 S-125-2T/SA-3B Surface to Air Missiles</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Second-hand; modernised for delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(70) V-600/SA-3B Surface to Air Missiles</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Second-hand; possibly modernised for delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 BM-22/9P140 Uragan Self-propelled MRLs</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>40 M-30 122mm Towed gun (or howitzers)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 M-46 130mm Towed guns</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 2S1 122mm Self-propelled guns</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 MT-LB Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120 T-55 Tanks</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2 (or 4) MiG-29SMT/Fulcrum-F FGA aircraft</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(80) 9M133 Kornet/AT-14 Anti-Tank Missiles</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>5 R-27/AA-10 Beyond Visual Range Missiles</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 R-73/AA-11 Short Range Air to Air Missiles</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Su-27/Flanker-B FGA aircraft</td>
<td>2002-3</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI's Arms Transfers Database: [http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers](http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers) (data generated in June 2016) SIPRI only covers ‘major conventional weapons’ excluding e.g. small arms and artillery under 100mm calibre as well as their ammunition, unguided rockets and missiles, free-fall aerial munitions, as well as military trucks.

Note: data between brackets are unconfirmed.

SMALL ARMS

Regarding small arms and light weapons, the general tendency of transfers decreasing to a trickle and procurement from ‘emerging’ arms producers, is also apparent. Since 2006, only Bulgaria has reportedly sold SALW to Eritrea.520 Bulgaria had been selling weapons to Eritrea

520 The sole exception was a ‘re-export’ sale from Canada in 2011 for ‘parts and accessories’, not small arms per se, amounting to USD 1000. From 2012 to 2014, Turkey was purportedly the sole vendor to Eritrea, selling roughly USD 125,000 in ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition, mines and others’ (a total of over eight tons) and 53kg of USD 1800 of ‘parts/accessories of revolvers or pistols’. Taken at face value, these sales could constitute a violation to the UN embargo that Turkey itself voted in favour of—it is quite possible, therefore, that these transfers were of equipment under ‘other’ rather than weapons, or a recording error of some sort. NISAT-PRIO, [http://nisat.prio.org/](http://nisat.prio.org/).
for years, reportedly before, during and after the period in which the conflict with Ethiopia was raging.\textsuperscript{521} Between 2006 and 2008, Bulgaria delivered over EUR 5.3 million worth of ammunition, 50 units of 82mm mortars and EUR 312,458 worth of anti-tank guns/heavy machine guns.\textsuperscript{522}

**DIVERSION AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING**

Unable to arm itself on the legal international market and seemingly uninterested in fully complying with international law, Eritrea has reportedly turned to illicit trafficking for some of its perceived hardware needs. Regarding arms diversion, the iTrace system has hard evidence of some of the dynamics regarding Eritrea, with 20 cases of diversion recorded, 13 of which (or 65 per cent) were diverted to Ethiopia in ‘State-sponsored diversion’ (or deliberate re-transfer by state agents).\textsuperscript{523} Of the five weapons with identified foreign suppliers, four came from Bulgaria and one from Russia.

According to the UN Monitoring Group’s 2011 report, senior members of Eritrea’s armed forces were involved “in the trafficking of weapons and people from Eritrea into Egypt (the Sinai) via Sudan”, with the weapons mainly being “Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades”, many of which had “the inscriptions of the Eritrean military units to which they previously belonged”.\textsuperscript{524} One trafficker reportedly “used to take delivery of at least 1,200 small arms per month, as well as large quantities of ammunition”. The Group’s 2014 report established that Eritrea was violating the arms embargo (Resolution 1907) “by importing weapons and ammunition from eastern Sudan on a regular basis and with the knowledge and direction of Eritrean officials affiliated with the President’s Office”.\textsuperscript{525} The report identified at least three deliveries that went from a weapons depot in Kassala (Sudan) to Teseney (Eritrea) in February, March and April 2014, with the knowledge and facilitation of officials on both sides of the border; the combined arms listed were 60 Kalashnikovs, 10 rocket-propelled grenades, three mortar tubes, 20 PKM machine guns, and ten ‘Doshkas’ (Soviet heavy machine guns), as well as plentiful ammunition for the said weapons.\textsuperscript{526}

### International Arms Control Mechanisms

Hardly an upstanding member of the global community, Eritrea has not signed the Arms Trade Treaty, the UN Firearms Protocol, or the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. While Eritrea has been a State Party of the Mine Ban Treaty since 2002, it has not joined the CCW, nor signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions—even though it reportedly


\textsuperscript{525} iTrace, [https://itrace.conflictarm.com/](https://itrace.conflictarm.com/).

used, and was contaminated by, cluster bombs during the war with Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{527} Eritrea has expressed interest in joining the CCM, but "has not taken any steps towards accession". It denies stockpiling cluster bombs, though it reportedly "inherited Chilean-manufactured CB-500 cluster bombs when it achieved independence from Ethiopia".\textsuperscript{528} Regarding small arms, Eritrea was ranked 90 out of 159 nations on its implementation of the UN Programme of Action, and the country has signed and ratified the Nairobi Protocol.\textsuperscript{529}

**Spotlight: Burning Borders**

Eritrea’s short national history is chock-full of tensions and clashes with the countries that border it. In addition to its tragic conflict with Ethiopia, Eritrea has clashed with each of its other neighbours—including Yemen across the Red Sea, in a dispute over the Hanish Islands that led to hostilities and the death of 27 soldiers in December 1995.\textsuperscript{530} Eritrea cut off diplomatic relations with Sudan in 1994 after a series of Islamist rebel incursions; relations were re-established in 2005 and, while tensions subsist, more recently the bilateral relationship has improved markedly, including with a state visit by Afwerki to his counterpart Omar Al-Bashir in 2015.\textsuperscript{531}

The dispute with Djibouti was more violent, with the two countries clashing in 2008 over the Ras Doumeira border region, a conflict that continues to play out today. In June that year, the armed forces of both nations engaged in battle, resulting in 30 dead and 39 injured Djiboutian soldiers, according to that government; as impactful on relations was the fact that Eritrea reportedly took 19 prisoners of war, at least five of whom "were known to be still alive in September 2011, albeit surviving under dire conditions".\textsuperscript{532} Eritrea’s continuing denial and refusal to cooperate regarding the dispute resulted, as noted above, in the violation of UNSC Resolution 1862, with the imposition of further sanctions (including the arms embargo still in force) through Resolution 1907.\textsuperscript{533} In March 2016, four POWs were freed after being imprisoned for eight


years, after intensive Qatari mediation efforts.534

Eritrea’s borders have been particularly violent for years, as the country enforced a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy for citizens attempting to flee the repressive regime. According to the Special Rapporteur,

“an unknown number of people have been shot near the Eritrean borders with Djibouti, Ethiopia and the Sudan, allegedly for attempting to cross illegally. Border military personnel have standing orders to implement a shoot-to-kill policy to those attempting to flee […] The account of a young woman who was shot while crossing the border in 2012 was particularly harrowing. After her first attempt to cross failed, she was imprisoned at Sawa detention centre for almost a year, without her family being informed. When she attempted to cross the border again, she was shot seven times, in the leg, foot, hand and breast, but still managed to escape. She had to be hospitalized for nine months.”535

The most recent high-profile example occurred in August 2014, when border police reportedly shot dead ten Eritrean nationals attempting to cross into Ethiopia.536 A particularly gruesome but unconfirmed incident supposedly occurred in August 2013, though details are murky and come from only one source; purportedly at least 80 members of the Eritrean navy from the Afar ethnic minority were massacred by border security agents as they attempted to defect to Yemen on government speedboats.537

The Asmara regime’s belligerence continues today, as reports indicate it may be participating in the raging conflict in Yemen. Eritrea has been accused of, and in early 2016 denied, sending 400 troops in support of Saudi Arabia’s offensive there, supposedly embedded in a UAE detachment, but other forms of assistance are apparent, including allowing the use of its airspace and port of Assab, another potential violation of the UNSC embargo.538

All in all, Eritrea has been described as “a land from which everybody is


trying to run away” and “one of the biggest sources of instability in the Horn of Africa”, “essentially a failed state” led by an “unhinged dictator” who “saddled his country with a collapsing economy and a hungry, restless population contributing to one of the world’s worst refugee crises”, where tragically “thousands of its citizens have to make a choice between patriotism and starvation”, “the country’s reservoir of hope is now largely depleted” and the “regime is one bullet away from implosion”. 539

Yet it has been like this for years—the last comment, leaked from a US ambassador, was made in 2009. In the absence of significant changes to its unresolved border conflicts—which realistically could only be expected from a new government—the latent potential for major armed violence remains. As such, and considering that “there is no family in the country that has not known death, arrest, detention or exile”, we agree with the words of the Special Rapporteur: “the international community also has a responsibility to keep Eritrea under scrutiny for its policies and practices”.540


Civilians ride past soldiers serving with AMISOM in the town of Buur-Hakba, Somalia, 2013.
Somalia topped the ‘Fragile States Index’ for six years—leaving that position to South Sudan in 2014.\textsuperscript{541} Conflict has been a constant for decades in Somalia, which has an area about the size of France and a population close to Belgium’s.\textsuperscript{542} From the anarchy of warlords, civil conflict and disintegration after the fall of dictator Siad Barre in the early 1990s to the 2006 capture of the capital Mogadishu by Islamist forces and the resulting intervention by foreign militaries (Ethiopia, Kenya, AU forces under AMISOM and the US), to today’s feeble central government, Somalia’s recent history has been one of turmoil.

Led since 2012 by Hassan Mohamud, who won the first presidential election in Somalia since 1967, incremental improvements in the country are challenged at every step by the violence waged by Al-Shabaab. The nation has suffered immensely from terrorist attacks; in one ranking, Somalia appears as the eighth most affected nation in the world in 2014.\textsuperscript{543} Its history of violence has left Somalia with over 1.1 million internally displaced people, and almost the same number of refugees leaving the country in search of safety, especially in Kenya, Yemen, Ethiopia and Uganda.\textsuperscript{544}

\textsuperscript{542} Its territory includes Somaliland, which is de facto sovereign but unrecognised as such, and Puntland, a semi-autonomous region; if Somaliland is excluded, Somalia is about the size of Spain and has about four million fewer inhabitants.
\textsuperscript{543} The countries more affected than Somalia were, in order of decreasing scores, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, India and Yemen: Vision of Humanity, ‘Terrorism Index 2014’, www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/Indexes/terrorism-index/2014.
Further, Somalia’s troubles are almost single-handedly the reason why parents around the world can no longer tell their children that “pirates don’t exist anymore”: of the 52 ships seized globally in 2010, Somali pirates took all but three.\(^545\) As of 2015, Somali piracy has remained at a low level and largely contained to a level comparable to 2006.\(^546\)

Somalia’s economy is in shambles: conflict caused GDP per capita to fall from USD 643 in 1992 to USD 452 in 2001, rendering it the “clearest example available of the worst-case scenario of long-term conflict and insecurity and its impact on economic growth and human development potential”.\(^547\) Even if GDP per capita has bounced back up slightly since 2001, the situation continues to be dire. Based on one methodology, the “economic impact of violence containment” in Somalia accounts for 18.4 per cent of its GDP; only five nations in the world have a higher proportion.\(^548\)


\(^546\) “The rapid decline in piracy off the coast of Somalia since 2012 has been the result of external efforts and measures. […] While the threat posed by piracy to merchant vessels remains low, the Monitoring Group is concerned that illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by foreign vessels may re-establish the conflict dynamic with local fishing communities that contributed to the rise of piracy a decade ago.” UNSC, ‘S/2015/801’, October 2015, [www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/801](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/801).


In a 2015 global study of corruption, Somalia tied with North Korea as the worst in the world.\(^{549}\)
The country’s press freedoms are weak: it is ranked 167\(^{th}\) in the world and journalists commonly face persecution and targeted violence.\(^{550}\)

Somaliland, a former British protectorate in the north-west, declared independence in 1991. Though not internationally recognised, it has a working political system, government institutions, a police force and its own currency. The former British protectorate has escaped much of the chaos and violence that plague Somalia.\(^{551}\)

Puntland, to its east, declared itself an autonomous state in 1998, but does not seek recognition as an independent entity, wishing to be part of a federal Somalia (for more on this, see ‘Spotlight’).\(^{552}\)

### Armed Conflicts and Armed Violence

Somalia’s levels of violence are not fully represented by its homicide rate of 8 per 100,000 inhabitants for the only year available (2012).\(^{553}\)
Civilian firearm holdings are significant (apparently only lower than South Sudan’s in the Horn) at up to 750,000 guns (both licit and illicit) in the hands of the population, giving a rate of 9.1 firearms per 100 people (putting Somalia 66\(^{th}\) out of 178 countries in the world), but most violence is conflict-related or terrorism rather than interpersonal.\(^{554}\)

Several points of conflict can be listed; most are deemed ‘violent crises’ for ‘subnational predominance’ by the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer.\(^{555}\) The exception is the most severe, current and national: Al-Shabaab’s onslaught against Somalia’s government (and Kenya’s), considered the "most violent conflict" in the Horn of Africa.\(^{556}\)

Al-Shabaab (‘The Youth’ in Arabic, the radical youth splinter of what used to be the Islamic Courts Union) boasts somewhere between 5,000 and 9,000 members, and reportedly has had ties to other terror groups, predominantly Al-Qaeda.\(^{557}\)

According to the Uppsala Conflict Database, over 10,000 people have been killed in Somalia’s...
upheaval since 2010. Of these, about 86 per cent were deemed to have died in ‘state-based violence’, that is, clashes between security forces and (mainly) Al-Shabaab; violence between armed groups and against civilians accounted for a total of about 1,400 deaths. Clashes between armed forces and the terrorist group killed roughly 2,000 people per year in 2010 and 2011, over 2,500 in 2012, and probably around 1,000 in each of 2013, 2014 and 2015. In broad terms, therefore, the intensity of the conflict has lessened, particularly after 2012.

In 2011, withdrawing from Mogadishu entailed different forms of violence for Al-Shabaab, including suicide bombings. In 2012, a large number of deaths were due “to the air based attacks by Kenya, sometimes resulting in over 100 reported deaths. Violence also moved significantly outside Mogadishu with the continued offensive by government and AMISOM troops”. Most attacks in 2013 hit Mogadishu, and that year saw the “high mark for one-sided violence perpetrated by Al-Shabaab”, though general levels of violence declined, particularly as the new government and AMISOM stepped up efforts, in a clear response to attacks in Kenya.

Since then, Al-Shabaab has changed tactics and organisation, “from holding large swaths of territory, to act more as a guerrilla style outfit, conducting hit and run attacks on police and military positions”, especially in Mogadishu. By 2015, with intensified efforts from AMISOM and the Somali National Army, Al-Shabaab had been driven from its strongholds, though the security situation did not improve drastically. There has also been some geographic displacement of violence, as the large-scale attacks in Kenyan territory during the period show. By 2012, before the Westgate and Garissa massacres, about a quarter of all Al-Shabaab attacks were already in Kenya. Thus, Al-Shabaab has become engaged in asymmetrical warfare, which it continues to wage today even if its threat as a potential national actor in Somalia has decreased: “like mosquitoes in the night, (Al-Shabaab) fighters will continue to strike. Like mosquitoes, they will sting where it hurts and will be difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate.”

General trends notwithstanding, large-scale attacks have occurred throughout, probably rendering Somalia more dangerous for civilians even as major battles have become less frequent.

561 Ibid.
562 As al-Shabaab has lost power, they have gradually transformed into a guerrilla-style group that conducts smaller operations and sometimes targets civilians to make a statement vis-à-vis the Somali government: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, ‘Government of Somalia - Al-Shabaab’, http://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=750&entityType=4.
563 “This shift was forced due to the fact that the popular support for, and membership of, Al-Shabaab dropped significantly during 2013. This type of warfare has generated fewer fatalities, […] the threat posed by Al-Shabaab is perhaps even more present to civilians.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, ‘Government of Somalia - Al-Shabaab’, http://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=770&entityType=4. As of April 2015, Al-Shabaab has ‘most commonly attacked military targets (48.8% of all attacks since 2007) […] in addition to attacks on military forces, Al-Shabaab targets have included private citizens and property (26% of all attacks), general government (12.9%), police (8%), businesses (6.1%), diplomatic entities (2.0%), and journalists and media (2.0%).’ START, ‘Al-Shabaab Attack on Garissa University in Kenya’, April 2015, www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_alShabaabGarissaI_April2015.pdf.
Particularly dramatic attacks occurred during a 2013 spike in violence, with strikes against the presidential palace and the UNDP compound in Mogadishu. In 2014, an assault on the capital’s seat of government, Villa Somalia, was painfully symbolic of the nation’s widespread insecurity, even in protected pockets.

Attacks on hotels and government buildings in Mogadishu have continued sporadically, including a February 2015 suicide attack on the Central Hotel that targeted and killed at least three government officials, among the ten victims. Likewise, a January 2016 attack on a popular Mogadishu beach-front restaurant killed between 17 and 20 civilians. In June, Al-Shabaab attacked Hotel Ambassador and the Nasa-Hablod Hotel, both in the capital, killing at least 30 people in the attacks, including a minister and two lawmakers. The targeting of soft targets, such as hotels and restaurants, with car bombs and suicide attacks in the capital, has become so common that a Somali website keeps a running tally, where one can unofficially see the attacks and victims since 2009.

From 2015 a further pattern emerged: taking over AMISOM bases with a suicide car bomb followed by an assault with firearms, resulting in dozens of dead soldiers and looted military equipment. In June, barely a week after an ambush purportedly “killed more than 60 Ethiopian troops in southern Somalia”, up to 70 soldiers from Burundi were killed as Al-Shabaab fighters took over an AU base near Leego (northwest of Mogadishu) after a suicide car bomb ran “into the entrance of the base, before dozens of militants armed with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades unleashed their assault.” Shortly after, an ambush with IEDs on troops in the same region was documented. An August attack saw the same modus operandi used to overrun an African Union military base in Janale in southern Somalia, possibly killing between 50 and 70 soldiers, though officially Uganda stated only 12 of its soldiers had perished. A similar attack occurred in January 2016 at another AMISOM base (El Adde, near the Kenyan border), possibly killing 63 soldiers and capturing hardware, including 28 to 30 “military officers killed in a suicide attack on an AMISOM base in southern Somalia.”

vehicles". The pattern has remained, as in June 2016 an attack on a base in Hiran followed the blueprint of earlier attacks, with both sides stating dozens of enemy fighters had been killed in the pre-dawn gun battle, with an AU spokesman claiming 110 dead Al-Shabaab fighters and Somalia’s government claiming more than double that number.

As noted, the predominance of ‘state-based violence’ and the absence, or feebleness, of Somali armed forces mean that foreign forces have been a significant vector of violence in Somalia. Kenya’s intervention was in response to attacks on its soil and it has waged large-scale armed violence on Somali territory; given Al-Shabaab’s strikes in Kenya the countries have been dubbed “blood brothers." So intertwined are the neighbours that violent events in one country invariably have both causes and consequences in the other nation. In retaliation for the Garissa massacre, Kenya’s air force reportedly destroyed Al-Shabaab camps in Gondodowe and Ismail, close to its own borders, in April 2015. This was neither the first nor the last strike: in June 2014 Kenyan jets targeted two other camps, in Anole and Kuday in Lower Juba, reportedly killing at least 80 Al-Shabaab fighters. More recent reported air strikes have included strikes in Lower Juba in December 2015 and Gedo in June 2016.

Kenya’s ground troops have also stung and been stung. Most traumatising, a January 2016 attack may have killed over 140 Kenyan soldiers; another example of muddled body counts, Somalia’s president claimed the number was 200 casualties. Kenya’s forces reportedly killed 21 Al-Shabaab members—recovering 17 AK-47 rifles, two rocket-propelled grenade launchers, five RPGs and ammunition—as recently as late May 2016.


Despite being dubbed “Al-Shabaab’s number one enemy”, Ethiopia has successfully prevented major attacks on its territory, reportedly foiling several terror plans. In one sense, Ethiopia (as part of AMISOM) waging ‘pre-emptive attacks’ and incursions could be seen as self-protection from the terror threat. For example, up to 3,000 troops reportedly crossed the border into Somalia in June 2015. The country’s return to the fray as part of AMISOM in early 2014 drew a fair amount of consternation given previous incursions. Ethiopian soldiers were reportedly attacked as part of AMISOM in April 2016, in an ambush near El Bur in central Somalia.

Though numerous, the exact numbers of casualties of AMISOM soldiers remain elusive, a thorny and disturbing issue in itself. A September 2015 report rightfully proposed that “we should be skeptical about the accuracy of all estimates and be aware of the politics and inherent limitations of ongoing efforts to estimate AMISOM’s fatalities”. Still, “measured by the number of fatalities per peacekeeper deployed, AMISOM is probably the most deadly peace operation ever conducted in Africa […] probably because there are no publicly available records of AMISOM’s fatalities”. Deemed the best estimate, SIPRI’s database on peace operations concludes that between 2009 and the end of 2013, “AMISOM suffered 1,039 fatalities”, a knowingly conservative estimate.

Looking forward, the touted gains in Somalia may be heavily infused with wishful thinking. While levels of violence have decreased, their nature has changed as well—and that may not be good news, according to Bronwyn Bruton, deputy director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council:

“Al-Shabaab is simply retreating, conceding ground […] they are not actually confronting AMISOM head-on anymore, which means that their forces and weapons are mostly intact. They have shifted from a conventional force to a pure terrorist one that is increasingly focusing its attention on attacks outside of Somalia, in Kenya, and elsewhere in the region. AMISOM’s territorial gains have also spread its forces more thinly, leaving their supply lines exposed to asymmetrical attacks. Ambushes and improvised explosive devices, once relatively infrequent in Somalia, are now regular occurrences on the sparsely


588 “This topic is important for several reasons. First, peacekeepers that die while performing tasks mandated by the United Nations Security Council and AU deserve to have their sacrifice publicly recognized… Second, the families of fallen peacekeepers deserve to receive the death compensation payments due to them as spelled out in the Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) signed between the AU and AMISOM’s contributing countries… And, third, the deliberate policy of keeping such information secret has arguably contributed to undermining AMISOM’s credibility to the extent that its strategic communications are perceived by many Somalis to be unreliable.” IPI Global Observatory, ‘Special Report: How Many Fatalities Has the African Union Mission in Somalia Suffered?’, September 2015, http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/09/amisom-african-union-somalia-peacekeeping/.

monitored highways that connect pockets of AMISOM control."  

In other words, as suggested by another analysis, Al-Shabaab’s “conclusive ‘defeat’ remains elusive… More military surges will do little to reduce the socio-political dysfunction that has allowed Al-Shabaab to thrive; in certain areas it may even serve to deepen its hold.”

**Weapons Use**

The use of explosive weapons in Somalia has been so devastating that it is worth discussing in greater detail. From 2011 to 2015, according to AOAV, Somalia has been slowly moving down the world ranking of the 15 countries with most explosive violence incidents. With 96 incidents in 2011, resulting in 1,326 casualties (84 per cent of whom were civilians), Somalia was ranked fifth among the countries with the most incidents in the world, with over 6 per cent of all reported global casualties that year. In fact, the 2011 incident with the greatest number of reported civilian casualties worldwide occurred in October in Mogadishu, when “a truck loaded with explosives was driven into a government compound killing and injuring a reported 267 people, many of whom were students”, an attack claimed by Al-Shabaab.

Somalia was one of the two countries most affected by mortar use in 2011, including the “repeated use of mortars and artillery shells within residential areas” such as in May in the “populated Bakara market, where in one incident, at least 14 civilians, including women and children, were killed and more than 80 injured when mortars struck as people did their shopping”. This incident was particularly troublesome as in addition to Al-Shabaab, the other combatant using mortars was AMISOM, which—despite its denials—came under severe criticism for this serious violation. In fact, Human Rights Watch had earlier affirmed that “mortars fired by al-Shabaab and African Union troops […] continue to kill civilians and ravage Mogadishu. All sides have violated the laws of war by conducting indiscriminate attacks and other abuses.”

In 2012, Somalia suffered 77 incidents of explosive violence, with 605 casualties (67 per cent of whom were civilians), putting it eighth in the global ranking. Indeed, “civilian casualties...
reduced by almost half as incidents of shelling in densely-populated Mogadishu between troops from the African Union Mission in Somalia and non-state armed group Al-Shabaab became less frequent.597 The situation continued to improve in 2013 (41 incidents, 408 casualties, 82 per cent of whom were civilians).598 In both 2012 and 2013, Al-Shabaab in Somalia was “the world’s 5th largest non-state user of explosive weapons”; the latter year included 11 suicide bombings.599

Since, the percentage of civilian casualties has oscillated drastically: from 82 per cent in 2013 to 46 per cent in 2014 and 64 per cent in 2015. By other measures, there was some stability: 44 incidents, 620 casualties (including from aerial explosive weapons and suicide attacks) and a ranking of 12th in 2014; and 45 instances of explosive violence with 700 casualties, rendering Somalia the 13th most affected country in the world in 2015.600 It should also be noted that in recent years Somali territory has been host to one of four international coalitions in the world that use explosive weapons (AMISOM), even if earlier potentially illegal patterns of use have subsided.601

Somalia has likewise been highly affected by landmines, cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).602 Between 1999 and the end of 2014, Somalia (excluding Somaliland) suffered at least 3,094 mine/ERW casualties, with 1,149 killed and 1,518 injured.603 In 2014 alone, 30 were killed and 54 injured; over 83 per cent were civilians, and almost half were children.604

DRONES

One of the forms of explosive violence in Somalia comes from the sky: US armed drones have been recorded as being in use over Somalia since 2011 (at that point launched from Ethiopia). This is a case of new technology continuing standing policy: the US has been utilising explosive weapons in Somalia for decades—since before the infamous ‘Black Hawk Down’ in 1993, through to air strikes in the south targeting Al-Qaeda in 2007—and continues to have extensive involvement in Somalia.605

597 “At the same time, a sharp rise in IED and grenade incidents was recorded in neighbouring Kenya as a result of a spillover in violence related to the ongoing conflict in Somalia.” AOAV, ‘An Explosive Situation, Monitoring explosive violence in 2012’.
599 Ibid.
601 In 2015, the other coalitions were MINUSMA in Mali, the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and the US-led coalition against al-Qaeda and ISIS-linked elements in Iraq and Syria. AOAV, ‘Unacceptable Harm: AOAV’s Explosive Violence Monitor 2015’.
604 Ibid.
As such, in 2014 Somalia was one of six nations to suffer the recorded 47 drone attacks globally. That year, the US drone programme in Somalia notched perhaps its biggest ‘success’, killing Al-Shabaab founder Ahmed Godane. Today, drone operations are secretly run out of the southern coastal city of Kismayo, as well as an airstrip in central Baledogle (in addition to known bases in Djibouti and, formerly, Ethiopia) by up to 80 members of the Joint Special Operations Command. In June 2016, a US drone believed to have taken off from Baledogle crashed onto Al-Shabaab dominated territory, not the first such UAV lost in Somalia.

Though exact numbers remain elusive given the secrecy of the programmes, some estimates assert that the US launched at least 26 drone attacks on Somalia’s territory since 2011, with 11 taking place in 2015 and eight in 2016 up to the end of May. Another monitoring programme notes at least 17 drone attacks in the period under review. Regarding casualties, somewhere between 219 and 383 people have been killed, though the number of confirmed civilian deaths (at least three, possibly up to ten) is likely to be severely underreported. Another database, which covers both drone and other (conventional) strikes estimates that between 299 and 343 militants and between 28 and 40 civilians have been killed by the US in Somalia since 2003.

In March 2016, an aerial strike that included drones on an Al-Shabaab training camp about 200 kilometres north of Mogadishu reportedly killed 150 fighters, making it one of the largest such attacks ever. However, taking the numbers for this and other attacks at face value would be naïve: a study on Pakistan drone attacks showed that claims of zero civilian deaths were simply false; rather, attacks probably killed around 45 civilians. Dynamics in Somalia are likely to be similar, and the number of civilian casualties since 2011, though unknown, is probably significantly higher than reported.

606 AOAV, ‘Explosive States, monitoring explosive violence in 2014’, May 2015. The other countries were Afghanistan, Mail, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen.


PAX ● Armed and insecure 133
Military Spending and Holdings

It is somewhat difficult to speak of aspects pertaining to regular military resources in the case of Somalia, as it lacked national security forces for years, the transitional government has struggled to establish proper armed forces (partly because of the arms embargo), and Somaliland and Puntland have their own security forces/militias. Moreover, what Somalia does have in terms of holdings is often inoperable.617 Tellingly, SIPRI has not been able to estimate the country’s military expenditure since the civil war started.

Nonetheless, in terms of holdings according to 'The Military Balance 2010', forces in Somalia held 33 tanks, some reconnaissance (BTR-50) and armoured personnel carriers (around 20 Fiat 6614), and 69 units of artillery (including 12 D-30 ‘howitzers’, up to 12 BM21 multiple rocket launchers, 45 mortar systems, 16 recoilless rifles and a ZU-23 anti-aircraft unit).618 As regards small arms, Somalia’s forces reportedly have 106,750 firearms, while police hold 14,672.619

As at 2010, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia had 2,000 Ethiopian-trained soldiers in its army, while in 2013 the country’s ‘armed forces’ were deemed to total 20,000, though that number would include foreign forces operating under AMISOM, as well as Somaliland and Puntland forces (see ‘Spotlight’).620

A brief discussion of AMISOM and the military presence of other nations in Somalia is essential to understand on-the-ground dynamics and the holdings of arms in Somalia. Established in December 2006, deployed a year later and boasting over 22,000 troops, AMISOM has struggled to fulfil its mission “to provide support for the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to stabilize the country and foster political dialogue and reconciliation”, as well as “to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and create necessary conditions for the reconstruction and sustainable development of Somalia”.621 Militarily it has evolved from battling the Islamic Courts Union to battling its successor Al-Shabaab. As at June 2016, AMISOM operates under the command of a Kenyan general, and has more than 20,000 troops from Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, in addition to police forces. For years, US and EU troops have provided training to both AMISOM and Somalian soldiers.622 Despite USD 1.1 billion in US and

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618 Ibid.
EU funding since 2007, AMISOM’s “logistics and hardware is at best rudimentary and inferior to that of [Al-Shabaab] in many areas”, and the mission has “faced allegations of mismanagement, corruption and poor discipline”. Demands—and promises—of better funding and resources have also been a constant.

Arms Embargoes

Because of the worsening humanitarian situation, in January 1992 the UNSC established a full arms embargo on Somalia through Resolution 733. Since then, the terms of the arms embargo, which remains in force, have evolved continuously, often on a yearly basis. Resolutions in 2001 and 2002 established that supplies of non-lethal military equipment for use in humanitarian missions were allowed, and that the financing of arms acquisition and the supply of military advice and training were prohibited, respectively. The embargo was partially lifted in 2006, though only for military transfers and support to the regional humanitarian intervention force. The 2007 resolution maintained the embargo only for non-state groups, allowing military supplies to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), while the following year, Resolution 1844 introduced amendments to target those who had violated the embargo, including Eritrea, resulting in the 2009 arms embargo against that country (see the chapter on Eritrea). Resolutions in 2013 clarified the means of supplying the new government, noting that for one year (until March 2014), “the arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to deliveries of weapons, military equipment, assistance or training intended solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and to provide security for the Somali people”.

According to SIPRI, while this superficially allowed supplies to be delivered to the Somali government, the conditions for doing so actually became more restrictive, with an annex listing military equipment that required “advance approval from the Sanctions Committee on a case-by-case basis”. Somalia’s government, rather than supplier states, was made responsible for notifying the Sanctions Committee of proposed transfers, and it was forbidden to transfer weapons to any other entity. Resolutions in 2014 reaffirmed the terms of the arms embargo
and extended it until October 2015, when it was again extended until November 2016.632

In terms of violations, in 2012 the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea accused a military contractor operating in Somalia—Sterling Corporate Services, based in Dubai and training an anti-piracy force in Puntland—of “brazen, large-scale and protracted violation” of the arms embargo.633 In its 2014 report, the Monitoring Group stated it had “obtained evidence implicating Musa Haji Mohamed ‘Ganjab’, who acted as an adviser to the President […] in the leakage of weaponry to Al-Shabaab and other forces beyond the army”.634 Speaking to the Wall Street Journal Mr Ganjab denied he had dealt in arms, calling himself a victim of a conspiracy by the UN inspectors, whereas Somalia’s Minister of Defence labelled the inspectors as obstacles to the anti-Shabaab fight, who want to “tie the government’s hands behind their back”.635

The report also documented the “importation of weapons, ammunition and other military items by the former Puntland authorities early in October 2013 in the absence of due notification to the Committee” and thus violating the embargo.636 In its most recent report (October 2015), the Monitoring Group stated that:

“Violations of the arms embargo continue to be committed in Somalia, whether through the illegal sale or unauthorized distribution of weapons from Federal Government of Somalia stocks or through illegal imports. The environment for illegal weapons flows has been exacerbated by the market created by the conflict in Yemen and increased militarization in parts of Somalia.”637

Arms Transfers

Given the conflict and arms embargo that Somalia has endured for years, arms transfers have been limited to a handful between 2013 and 2015. The international community clearly does not trust the feeble Somali government with heavy lethal equipment, providing much of the hardware to other countries participating in AMISOM, or directly to AMISOM. As an analysis put it back in 2010: “although there is broad international support for strengthening the armed forces of the TFG, the actual supply of arms to the TFG is problematic […] EU member states seem to be willing to bolster the TFG with training in military tactics but unwilling to supply

636 The reports notes “an Ilyushin-18 aircraft with registration number TT-WAK, leased by Honesty Air Cargo, a Somali-operated airline based in the United Arab Emirates, was found delivering items from Yemen in excess of those notified to the Committee, in addition to items not notified to the Committee, including assault rifles, light and heavy machine guns and ammunition, in violation of resolution 2111 (2013)”, and specifically “suggests that the former Puntland Government, in the person of its Minister of Security, Khalif Isse Mudane, has indeed imported weapons, ammunition and other military items into Somalia, and in absence of any notification to the Committee has violated the arms embargo on Somalia.” UNSC, ‘S/2014/726’, October 2014, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/726.
the weapons these forces need to allow them to use their newly acquired skills.638

It should be noted that countries like China, Russia and Eastern European suppliers that feature prominently as providers to other Horn of Africa nations have not stepped in to fill the gap in the case of Somalia. Nonetheless, the United States may be transferring equipment not yet reflected in the table below, as authorisations for 2013 and 2015 included four units of Category IV items (USD 238,650 in ‘Launch vehicles, guided missiles, ballistic missiles, rockets, torpedoes, bombs and mines’) and 65 units of Category VII items (ground vehicles) for over USD 12 million, possibly for use with AMISOM.639 Six patrol ships for Somalia’s coast guard were ordered through a Dutch company in 2013 and will reportedly be delivered later in 2016; according to SIPRI they are aid.640

Table 7.
Arms transfers to Somalia 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Weapons delivered</th>
<th>Transfer</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>13 ACMAT Bastion Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Delivery in 2016, financed by US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1 SA-316B Alouette-3 Light helicopter</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Second-hand, for Puntland maritime police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Arab Emirates</td>
<td>(6) RG-31 Nyala Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Aid, second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>(25) AT-105 Saxon Patrol Armoured Pers. Carriers</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Aid, second-hand, delivered via Djibouti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>(3) S-2RT Light aircraft</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Second-hand, for Puntland maritime police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database: http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (data generated in June 2016)

SIPRI only covers ‘major conventional weapons’ excluding e.g. small arms and artillery under 100mm calibre as well as their ammunition, unguided rockets and missiles, free-fall aerial munitions, as well as military trucks.

Note: data between brackets are unconfirmed.

638 As of 2010, “Somali non-state actors continue to obtain weapons from external sources. Eritrea, in particular, is accused of having supported Somali opposition groups since at least 2005. It is now under a separate arms embargo. Both the TFG and AMISOM need arms, but risks and difficulties associated with providing them put potential suppliers in a dilemma. The TFG has been accused of human rights abuses. Also, TFG arms have gone missing and both TFG and AMISOM materiel has ended up with opposition groups. Neither the TFG nor AMISOM seems to have a system in place for controlling arms stockpiles. The United States and the European Union (EU) both militarily support the TFG, but EU members seem unwilling to supply arms.” SIPRI, ‘Arms flows and the conflict in Somalia’, October 2010, http://books.sipri.org/files/mos/SIPRIBP1010b.pdf.


641 SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database.

SMALL ARMS
Because of the embargo, NISAT-PRIO data show no incoming SALW to Somalia between 1997 and 2002, and only a handful of transactions up to 2010. Since then, as the terms of the arms embargo evolved, European countries have been the most significant suppliers—transfers may have had AMISOM as their end-user. Between 2011 and 2014, Germany sent almost USD 245,000 in ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition’; Croatia exported USD 211,812 (or 75 tons) in small arms ammunition in 2012; Turkey transferred 4,000 shotguns (worth USD 440,000) in 2012. Between 2012 and 2014, the United Kingdom sent Somalia a total of 45 pistols/revolvers, 50 assault rifles, USD 42,861 in small arms ammunition and USD 63,597 in ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition’. Surprisingly, the biggest seller to Somalia in the report period was Slovakia, which in 2014 sent USD 390,026 in military rifles/machine guns, 510 pistols/revolvers (worth USD 296,941) and 20 tons in small arms ammunition (USD 133,409).643

While deliveries were not confirmed and may include larger weaponry, South Africa appears as authorising USD 3.7 million in sales to Somalia in 2010 (probably for AMISOM as it is for ‘UN demining operation’ and gives Kenya as the final destination), and USD 96,000 in ‘assault weapons and associated ammunition of a calibre smaller than 12.7mm’ in 2012, specifically for AMISOM. In 2014, Uganda delivered (as re-export) almost USD 1.3 million in military rifles/machine guns to Somalia.

DIVERSION AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING
What Somalia lacks in legal trade, it tragically makes up for with illegal trade and diversion. According to Conflict Armament Research, based on ongoing research,

“the majority of weapons in the hands of Al Shabaab are legacy weapons often found in circulation in East Africa and the Horn. These include decades old AK-pattern rifles, PKMs, RPG, recoilless rifles, and mortars. The dominant source of weapons to Al Shabaab and other clan militias in Somalia is Yemen. Most of these weapons enter through small ports on the northern coast of Puntland and Somaliland. Recent evidence suggests that Iran supplies significant quantities of weapons to Somalia as well. A third source of weapons and ammunition for Al Shabaab derives from accidental and deliberate diversion from Somali State and AMISOM stockpiles”.644

These on-the-ground findings corroborate dynamics reported by the UN Monitoring Group, particularly regarding diversion from government stockpiles (especially the Somali National Army) and trafficking from Yemen, most cases of which are in clear violation of the arms embargo. For example, in 2014 the Group “obtained evidence of large-scale leakage of some of the 291,000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition delivered by Djibouti into the illicit arms
markets in Mogadishu”. The ‘strictly confidential’ Annex 6.4 of that report, ‘Diversion of arms by political networks connected to the Federal Government of Somalia’, presumably had even more interesting information.

Nonetheless, the Monitoring Group also shared the information that army Type 56-2 rifles were leaked into Mogadishu markets, concluding that “the weapons were sold illegally by SNA officers taking advantage of poor accountability at the unit level, or that these weapons have been leaked at a higher level and the SNA’s supporting documentation has been doctored or manufactured as cover for missing weapons”. Visits to illegal arms markets in Mogadishu in February 2014 and September 2015 provided a list of diverted weaponry and their prices, for example original version AK-47s at USD 1,500 to USD 1,800 per weapon, Dushka heavy machine guns at USD 25,000, rocket-propelled grenades at USD 700, PKM machine guns at USD 12,000, Makarov pistols at USD 1,700 and grenades for only USD 80.

Considering trafficking, the Monitoring Group confirmed that “maritime vessels from Yemen have delivered consignments of weapons and IED component materials to Al-Shabaab commanders at drop off points on the Somali coast”. In fact, in October 2012 a “large shipment of weapons that had been supplied from Yemen to a location close to Qandala, north-eastern Somalia […] included 220 RPG-7 rockets, 304 PG-7 boosters, 230 hand-grenade detonators, a 73 mm cannon, 137 kg of TNT, two bags of ammonium nitrate, five rolls of red detonating cord and 500 electric detonators (C-DET), making it one of the largest seizures of an illegal arms cache on record in Somalia in recent years”.

Moreover, in October 2013, the report mentioned an “arrival at Garowe International Airport of several shipments of weapons and ammunition flown in from Yemen by Russian made aircraft […] the shipments consisted of anti-aircraft guns, small arms, and ammunition destined for the Puntland authorities”, including an unknown quantity of AK-47 assault rifles and PKM light machine guns, 100 heavy machine guns, 200 barrels for anti-aircraft guns and 150 tons of ammunition.

In addition, several reports and press investigations have added details to the patterns of illegal trade in weaponry in Somalia. In 2011, reports speculated as to whether the US was indirectly

646 Ibid. “Notably, the Monitoring Group has consistently received testimony that relates to high-level involvement in direct transfers of arms to the markets and to Al-Shabaab, which is detailed in strictly confidential annex 6.4.”
supplying enemy lines, as it has been known to do in Iraq and Afghanistan, with up to half of the hardware in Al-Shabaab’s hands potentially provided by (purportedly Ugandan) AMISOM soldiers who were not being paid properly. A 2014 report fleshed out the case a bit more, noting that “it seems clear that at least some of the weapons and ammunition so diverted were paid for by the US Government directly - through cash deliveries - to the Somali government since at least 2009, and other weapons have been supplied to Somalia via the Ugandan army which forms the cornerstone of the African Union peacekeeping mission.”

Bullets have illegally arrived from all over the world: a 2014 study found that “the illicit small arms ammunition documented in Somalia originated in Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Germany, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Sudan, Uganda, and Ukraine”. While several of the bullets were identified as from the 1940s and 1950s, “the most recently produced ammunition encountered in Somalia was made in Algeria (2006), China (2008), the Russian Federation (2010), Sudan (2010), and Uganda (2004).” Finally, in June 2016 five Ugandan AMISOM soldiers and ten Somali civilians were arrested for selling military equipment on the black market.

In March 2016, the Australian navy’s HMAS Darwin discovered, approximately 330 kilometres off the coast of Oman, “1989 AK-47 assault rifles, 100 rocket propelled grenade launchers, 49 PKM general purpose machine guns, 39 PKM spare barrels and 20 60mm mortar tubes” under fishing nets in a Somalia-bound boat lacking a flag or verifiable origin, in evident violation of the arms embargo. Barely two weeks later, French naval vessel FS Provence seized another haul, close to Socotra Island in the Indian Ocean, “including several hundred AK47 assault rifles, machine guns and anti-tank weapons” from another unidentified boat. The origin and intended end-user remained uncertain, though some sources speculated the shipment came from Iran and was intended for Houthi rebels in Yemen.

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International Arms Control Mechanisms

Despite its turmoil, Somalia has joined some global arms control regimes: it is party to the Mine Ban Treaty (as of October 2012) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (which entered into force for the nation in March 2016), though it has not joined the CCW. Like most of its neighbours, Somalia has yet to sign the Arms Trade Treaty. Despite the proliferation of small arms and related violence on its soil, Somalia has not signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development or the UN Firearms Protocol. Finally, Somalia has signed, but not ratified, the Nairobi Protocol.

Spotlight: Autonomy and Violence: Somaliland and Puntland

On the very ‘horn’ of Africa geographically, the regions of Somaliland and Puntland are in a sense both part of and external to Somalia. Though formally part of the nation, Somaliland is a de facto sovereign state, albeit unrecognised by the international community, having declared independence unilaterally in 1991. Seven years later, Puntland declared itself an autonomous region. A disputed area between the two is further claimed by Khatumo State, in what has been described as “multi-layered political clashes for control of contested territory”. Despite—or perhaps because of—these complexities, the regions have attempted to cover their security needs with human resources and equipment.

Both regions have maritime police, or coast guards. Somaliland’s, for example, reportedly clashed with its Djibouti counterpart over fishing disputes in March 2016, with one casualty. Puntland boasts its own armed forces, which number between 5,000 and 10,000 soldiers. As the embargo has loosened, Puntland has recently received arms directly (see ‘Arms Transfers’ above), but Somaliland has reportedly procured weaponry for its armed forces and police in less conventional ways. A recent unconfirmed report stated that in February 2018 Somaliland’s leader Ahmed Mohamud “sent back [a] huge arms

660 Presentation by Danish Demining Group, ‘Challenges and Opportunities on SALW-Armed Violence in the Horn of Africa’, May 2016. “Somaliland forces have clashed with Puntland forces and militias loyal to Khatumo, a political organization based in the Dhulbahante clan that is pursuing the creation of a regional state within Somalia and separation from Somaliland. […] The region is particularly prone to conflict, given the competing claims by Somaliland, Puntland and Khatumo over oil-rich territory there and political infighting among the Dhulbahante, who are divided in loyalty between Puntland, Khatumo and Somaliland. The conflicts have also resulted in attacks on civilians and population displacements.” UNSC, ‘S/2014/726’, October 2014, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/726.
consignment” seized on the MV Shakir (purportedly including battle tanks, artillery pieces and modern combat vehicles) sailing from Berbera Port to Sudan; the intended destination of the arms was disputed, with Somaliland affirming no knowledge of the transfer, and has remained obscure.663

Puntland’s role as a landing point for illicit weapons coming from Yemen has been noted; in fact, the Monitoring Group established that it had violated the UN arms embargo (Resolution 2111 in 2013) through the “importation of weapons, ammunition and other military items by the former Puntland authorities early in October 2013 in the absence of due notification to the Committee. On 8 October 2013, an Ilyushin-18 aircraft with registration number TT-WAK, leased by Honesty Air Cargo, a Somali-operated airline based in the United Arab Emirates, was found delivering items from Yemen in excess of those notified to the Committee, in addition to items not notified to the Committee, including assault rifles, light and heavy machine guns and ammunition”.664 The region was also the main staging ground for most of Somalia’s piracy in that threat’s heyday (2005 to 2012), before the increased efforts of the international anti-piracy coalition (EU NAVFOR, or Operation Atalanta).665

Patterns of violence in Somaliland and Puntland are quite distinct from those in south-central Somalia; in a nutshell, autonomy has been accompanied by some stability and security.666 While data are by no means robust, Somaliland has recorded 158 conflict deaths since 2010, virtually all of them in 2012 in clashes with the Khatumo administration.667 Despite formally covering a third of Somalia’s territory, according to one account Puntland has recorded ‘only’ 221 conflict deaths between 2010 and 2015, all in the ‘non-state violence’ category.668

Both Somaliland and Puntland are contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war.669 Remarkably, a 2009 survey in the former territory found

663 Dalsan Radio, ‘Somaliland Administration Seizes Ship Carrying Military Hardware at the Berbera Port’, January 2015, http://allafrica.com/stories/201501260600.html. “Somaliland administration seized a ship carrying arms and military hardware, which docked in the port city of Berbera. Somaliland Interior Minister Ali Waran Addde said their authorities did not know who owns the ship and to whom the ship was carrying the weapons. ‘The ship is docked in the port of Berbera and was carrying weapons, artillery and armored vehicles, we do not know where it was going,’ said Ali Waran Addde. Somaliland Minister of Fisheries also told VOA that the ship was carrying food to Somaliland, and military equipment was seen during the off-loading of the food. Reports indicate that the ship had left the United Arab Emirates, and was heading to Sudan for the military equipment, although it was not identified which Sudan belong to the military hardware’. See also: Garowe Online, ‘Somaliland Govt sends huge arms consignment back to Sudan’, February 2015, http://www.growweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somaliland-somali-govt-sends-huge-arms-consignment-back-to-sudan.
667 http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/675.
that 12 per cent of households (about 70,000) had private stocks of ERW.670 In Somaliland, 938 casualties (including 237 deaths) were identified between 2000 and the end of 2014.671 Casualties have declined since 2007; according to the HALO Trust, there were 20 in 2013 and 19 in 2014—almost all were civilians, mostly children, becoming victims while tampering with the explosives—with seven killed.672

Despite the relative calm, the potential for armed violence is high. Small arms are plentiful, in addition to holdings of explosives, with "52 per cent of the owners claiming to keep their ERW with some sort of future violence in mind".673 A Danish Demining Group survey in 2010 estimated that 74 per cent of households owned firearms, and "the total amount of privately owned small arms likely exceeded 550,000, the majority of which were unregulated, unregistered and stored in an unsafe manner".674 Eighty per cent of those firearms were thought to be automatic rifles: AK-47s (73 per cent) and M16s (7 per cent). For the low level of violence and relative security to be sustained, efforts will have to be made to prevent latent armed violence from materialising.

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672 Ibid.


Small in territory (roughly a third of the size of Ireland) and population (fewer than one million inhabitants), Djibouti is often presented as a secure ‘island’ in a sea of violence, surrounded by neighbours with a constant propensity for unrest. Even so, Djibouti’s peculiarities place the nation well within the dynamics of armed violence in the Horn of Africa. For one thing, Djibouti’s location makes it not only an essential port in a major shipping lane—with all the connections to the trade and potential trafficking of weapons this entails—but also renders it comprehensively entwined in the geopolitical dynamics of its neighbours, as can be attested by its unresolved border tensions with Eritrea, and the estimate that currently 85 per cent of Ethiopia’s trade goes through its sprawling port.

Another testament to its crucial position in sub-regional integration is that Djibouti hosts the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Horn of Africa’s regional body. Djibouti also punches well above its weight diplomatically: “it is more active within both the African Union (AU) and Arab League than its poverty and small size would suggest”. Cross-border security with neighbours appears sparse at best, as illustrated by the robust but unregulated daily imports from Ethiopia of the widely-used qat stimulant. Furthermore, the

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nation’s maritime border extends for 370 kilometres along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Moreover, largely due to geography, Djibouti has an unusual position in relation to foreign military presence: the United States’ only permanent base in Africa, France’s largest, and China’s first are all located in the small nation. Referred to as an “international garrison” and an “international maritime and military laboratory”, Djibouti’s port and hosting of foreign military bases have become the country’s economic lifeblood, and could become important components of the dynamics of violence in the wider region.679 Finally, with a full-blown conflict and humanitarian disaster raging in Yemen, barely 32 kilometres across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Djibouti has already felt the effects, with a recent significant influx of refugees.

Combined with a government more democratic in name that in reality—President Ismail Omar Guelleh has clung to power ever since 1999 through opposition boycotts, constitutional tweaks and dubious elections (the most recent in April 2016)—the small nation’s standing as the Horn of Africa’s ‘oasis’ should not be taken for granted.680 In the words of one observer: “Djiboutian democracy is deeply flawed” and thus “should be subject to the same scrutiny and standards as those applied to other countries with dubious track records”.681 A May 2016 letter from the International Criminal Court “with respect to their failure to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir

while present on the territory of the Republic of Djibouti” did not help the country’s international 
standing.682

**Armed Conflicts and Armed Violence**

Praised for its calm in relation to neighbours, Djibouti has nonetheless had worrisome
violence—especially in tandem with elections or protests against the long-running government—
despite the absence of major armed conflict.683 Though the lack of independent media—it ranks
172 out of 180 in the world on press freedom—and robust opposition parties certainly do not 
help in fully understanding Djibouti’s patterns of violence, some data are available. 684

During the period under review, political violence has undoubtedly been Djibouti’s main bugbear.
While most of the reported 58 incidents between 2010 and 2014 from one database are de-
scribed as “riots/protests” and did not claim lives, some can be considered quite serious, such
as grenade attacks on civilians in the capital or “army clashes with FRUD rebels” in the north.685
Several of the clashes resulted in fatalities, such as a May 2010 incident claiming the life of three
soldiers.686 Police violence against protesters has also been common, with at least three deaths in
2011-2012, beatings of journalists and activists, and dozens of arrests of opposition members.687

More recently, in December 2015 a clash following a religious festival illustrated the data dif-
ficulties often encountered in assessing armed violence in the Horn of Africa, as either the police
killed nearly 20 civilians (according to the opposition) or they injured fewer than ten ‘armed
individuals’ who had purportedly attacked security forces (according to the government).688 Later
on, another government official claimed that ‘only’ seven people had died, with 23 civilians and
50 police officers injured, while the Djibouti Human Rights League reported 29 people were

682 Foreign Policy, ‘The international criminal court really wishes Djibouti had arrested an accused war criminal’, May 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/31/ 
exclusive-the-international-criminal-court-really-wishes-djibouti-had-arrested-an-accused-war-criminal/.
683 The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2015 deems the tensions between government and the opposition (MJO/USN) as a ‘non-violent crisis’ (level 2, where
5 is ‘war’), unchanged from last year but occurring since 2011. However, the long-lasting (since 1991) and unresolved conflict with the FRUD rebel faction is 
desemed a ‘violent crisis’ (level 3), even if also unchanged from the year before and today carried on only by a small splinter group: Heidelberg Institute for

 detention for non-payment – the repressive arsenal used against Djibouti’s journalists has it all. The Freedom of Communication Law is itself an obstacle to
 free speech and media pluralism. [...] La Voix de Djibouti, the only independent media outlet, broadcasts from outside the country.”

685 ACLED, www.acedata.com/data/. These reports refer to a small but still active splinter group of the FRUD, as the original group signed a peace
agreement with the government in 2000: http://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/810; African Intelligence, ‘New clash between FRUD Armé and the army’, March 2016,

stability-in-strategic-country-86986499/155034.html.


allafrica.com/stories/201512230596.html.
Regardless, the history and prospect of political division and electoral violence deserve attention, especially in the light of claims of widespread fraud in the recent April 2016 election that gave President Guelleh another five years in power. In the absence of democratic and social reforms, tensions could rise.

Regarding common forms of armed violence, particularly interpersonal violence and firearm homicide, Djibouti’s levels are relatively low by African standards, reflecting a small number of guns in the hands of civilians (22,000, or 2.8 per 100), giving the nation a rank of 119 out of 178 countries. Taking all forms of violence (irrespective of the instrument used), Djibouti’s homicide rate in 2012 was 10.1 per 100,000. Its ‘violent death’ rate for the same year was 8.3 per 100,000. While relatively low, it should be noted that the former rate was three times higher than four years earlier (3.4 per 100,000)—it will be important to pay close attention how the rate may have changed since the last available data.

**Weapon Use**

Specifically regarding mines and explosive remnants of war, in 2013 Djibouti reportedly had “11 military casualties caused by an incident when their vehicle was damaged by an explosive device suspected to be a landmine”, though the total number of casualties across the years is unknown. According to the Landmine Monitor, 23 people were killed and 55 injured by these weapons between 1999 and 2012.

Other forms of mass violence have occurred, showing Djibouti’s embeddedness in regional patterns, notably the terrorist attack on the La Chaumière restaurant in May 2014, a first for the nation, that resulted in three dead and 15 wounded, including six Dutch soldiers. The double-explosion suicide attack, which included grenade use, was claimed by foreign Al-Shabaab rebels, purportedly in retaliation for Djibouti sending troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); at the time the contingent stood at 950 soldiers, with more than double that...
Military Spending and Holdings

Unsurprisingly, Djibouti’s armed forces are amongst the smallest in Africa, with a total of 10,450 troops as at 2010. As noted, around 2,000 Djiboutian soldiers are part of AMISOM. SIPRI has not published an estimate on Djibouti’s military spending since 2008, when it stood at 3.7 per cent of the nation’s GDP, with a total expenditure of USD 36.3 million. This was a marked decrease from the high point of 2006, with an estimated 6.4 per cent of GDP—or USD 65.80 per capita—and over 17 per cent of all government spending.

Holdings of conventional weapons are limited, and it should be noted that some of Djibouti’s ‘order of battle’ is used in its AMISOM mission rather than strictly for self-protection. For example, when Djibouti’s second battalion joined AMISOM in 2015, several recently acquired systems (see ‘Arms Transfers’ below) were deployed in tandem. Among the known weapons systems of the armed forces are Ratel-90 and AML-90 armoured vehicles and M109 self-propelled howitzers. According to ‘The Military Balance 2010’, Djibouti held 39 reconnaissance and 20 armoured personnel carriers, and 96 units of artillery (including 45 mortar systems); its navy had eight patrol and coastal combatants; and its aircraft holdings included six combat capable aircraft and some Embracer 314 Super Tucano light attack aircraft, in addition to two attack helicopters and three support helicopters. As regards small arms holdings, Djibouti’s defence forces reportedly have 18,715 firearms, while police hold 1,070.

These numbers, however, can be misleading—the real story regarding arms control and potential levels of armed violence in Djibouti concerns the foreign militaries based there. Camp Lemonnier, the US’s base, houses over 4,000 personnel. Other countries such as Germany, Italy and Japan (with 600 members of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces) also have a (smaller) military presence in the country. Importantly, France is the “external guarantor of Djibouti’s security, including its air and maritime space”.

The US base in particular, rather than having a local focus, has been described as “the principal logistical hub for US and allied operations in East Africa and the Arabian peninsula. It is also

the launching-pad for drone surveillance and attacks, as well as the logistics hub for anti-piracy and other multilateral missions in the region”—including the EU’s first joint naval mission, EU NAVFOR Atalanta, an anti-piracy mission.\textsuperscript{706}

The Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), based at Lemonnier, has already had an impact on violent dynamics in the broader region, particularly under the ‘counter-terrorism’ rubric.\textsuperscript{707} The base has served as a launching pad for numerous US drone strikes reportedly against Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda militants, particularly with between eight and 14 unmanned Predator and Reaper drones—piloted from Nevada and New Mexico—launching Hellfire missiles onto Somali and Yemeni territory.\textsuperscript{708} At one point with 16 take-offs and landings a day, Lemonnier was deemed “the most important base for drone operations outside the war zone of Afghanistan”.\textsuperscript{709} Following several crashes and air traffic near misses, the US was forced to move its drone operations in September 2013 to a more remote area of Djibouti.\textsuperscript{710} Its new location, Chabelley Airfield, has been described as “little more than a gray smudge in a tan wasteland… (on which) sits a hive of high priced, high-tech American hardware”, rendering it “America’s preeminent African drone base” while allowing for less oversight if not total secrecy.\textsuperscript{711}

While safely stockpiled, US weapons based at Lemonnier have probably the largest destructive capacity in the entire Horn of Africa region, including a squadron of F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jets and stationed C-130 Hercules aircraft.\textsuperscript{712} The common use of Osprey MV-22 aircraft (carrying heavy machine guns) has been publicised.\textsuperscript{713} Continuously present since 2001, the US is reportedly “expanding the base and plans to spend $1.4 billion upgrading the facility over the next two decades”, having recently renewed its lease with Djibouti at USD 70 million
per annum—almost double the previous price—clearly pointing to a long-term presence.\textsuperscript{714} No surprise, as Djibouti has been called “the unsung hero in the United States’ ongoing war against terror and piracy”.\textsuperscript{715}

The French base in Djibouti—its largest abroad, a staging ground for that country’s military during the Gulf War and currently leased for EUR 30 million per annum—houses 1,900 to 2,000 soldiers, and reportedly boasts seven Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft, “a detachment of Army helicopters (Gazelle and Puma), helicopter and cargo aircrafts from the Air Force (Puma, C160 Transall)”, naval vessels and armoured vehicles.\textsuperscript{716}

Finally China, the ‘new kid on the block’ among the military powers in Djibouti, began in 2008 with anti-piracy operations, considered “the first major instance in which China has dispatched security forces independently in areas outside its sovereign territory to protect Chinese citizens and national interests” and “China’s only sustained direct military presence in the global commons”.\textsuperscript{717} More recently, China has launched an aggressive ‘charm offensive’, to ensure that rather than just paying rent for its military presence, it also includes a formal security and defence agreement, in addition to massive economic investment in Djibouti's infrastructure.\textsuperscript{718} In tandem with its naval base in northern Obock, for which it will pay USD 100 million per annum, China is financing a new port, two airports, a USD 4 billion, 700-kilometre railway linking Djibouti to Addis Ababa, and more—generally the lion’s share of the more than USD 14 billion to be invested in Djibouti’s infrastructure over the next few years.\textsuperscript{719}

Indeed, with Camp Lemonnier’s recent lease extension and physical expansion, and the arrival of China’s permanent military footprint in Africa, Djibouti may become more relevant and a micro-cosmos of larger military tensions and dynamics between the US and China.\textsuperscript{720} The interplay may also allow the Guelleh government to gain leverage and further its ability to keep the status quo despite political tensions and unrest.\textsuperscript{721} Regardless, the presence and potential


\textsuperscript{715} Foreign Affairs, ‘China Comes to Djibouti’, April 2015, \url{www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-africa/2015-04-23/china-comes-djibouti}.


\textsuperscript{721} “Government officials argue that Djibouti is not simply switching the source of its dependency from the United States and other Western powers to China. This might be true; what is more likely, though, is that Djibouti is taking part in the Cold War-era game of playing would-be patrons/powers against each other to wrest additional advantages. In this case, in view of its iron-fist rule, the Djiboutian regime seeks to deter Washington from exerting pressure regarding the government’s authoritarian rule.” Sun & Zoubir, ‘The Eagle’s Nest in the Horn of Africa: US Military Strategic Deployment in Djibouti’, in: Africa Spectrum, 51/1, 2016, pp. 111–124, \url{journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/asfp/article/download/9525/932}.
use of major weapons in Djibouti—as well as the domestic political tensions that have often caused armed violence—are heavily dependent on foreign powers.

**Arms Transfers**

As can be surmised from the discussion above, Djibouti is a small-scale importer of major conventional arms, and recent additions have often been second-hand, donations and/or for use by the country’s AMISOM deployment (see table). Among these are Cougar armoured vehicles and Peace Keeping Security Vehicles (PKSV), both from US company General Dynamic Land Systems (GDLS).  

**Table 8.**  
Arms transfers to Djibouti 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Weapons delivered</th>
<th>Transfer</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2 PW127 Turboprop/turboshaft engines</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>For use with MA60 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1 MA60 Transport Aircraft (5) WMA-301 Assaulter Tank Destroyers</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>For use in AMISOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1 EDIC Landing craft</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>10 M-109L 155mm self-propelled guns</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Second-hand; aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Puma APV Helicopters</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Second-hand; aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>15 Cougar Armoured Personnel Carriers (10) RG-33L Armoured Personnel Carriers 2 Shorts-360 (C-23B) Transport Aircraft</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Second-hand; aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Second-hand; aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Second-hand; aid – ordered 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database, [http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers](http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers) (data generated in June 2016) SIPRI only covers ‘major conventional weapons’ excluding e.g. small arms and artillery under 100mm calibre as well as their ammunition, unguided rockets and missiles, free-fall aerial munitions, as well as military trucks.

Note: data between brackets are unconfirmed.

Other than these transfers, an interesting outlier occurred in 2011, when US direct commercial sales of ‘arms’ to Djibouti soared to almost USD 1.4 billion—from less than USD 5 million the year before and down again to a bit more than USD 50 million the following year.  

in the category ‘military electronics’ (Category XI), which covers products in the electronics,
computer, telecommunications and avionics industries—including software—such as sonars,
radas, command, control and communications systems, a ‘transfer’ clearly related to the US’s
military presence.725

SMALL ARMS
Regarding small arms, in addition to minor deliveries from China, Germany, Japan, South
Korea, Portugal and others (as well as a steady flow of ‘parts and accessories’ for virtually
all countries mentioned in this report), some recent transactions for the period from 2010 to
2015 are noteworthy.726 Between 2010 and 2014, Djibouti received from the United States 782
‘military rifles/machine guns’ (worth USD 421,659), 13 units of ‘other weapons and ordnance’
at USD 264,000, 90 ‘grenade launchers/flame throwers’ (USD 95,400), 24 sporting/hunting
rifles (USD 24,754) and 24 pistols/revolvers (USD 7,680). A total of five thousand ‘sporting and
hunting rifles’ (at a cost of USD 1,167,000) came from Brazil in 2014.

European nations, however, were the main providers of small arms to Djibouti: Denmark
sold (in 2010-2011) a total of 4.7 tons of ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition’ (at USD 1,243,783),
while 1.55 tons of the same type of weaponry came between 2010 and 2012 from France
(for USD 309,752). Djibouti bought a total of 502 pistols (USD 208,235), 50 shotguns
(USD 22,945), 821 ‘sporting or hunting rifles’ (USD 807,921) and 1.89 tons of ‘small arms
ammunition’ (USD 471,537) from Italy between 2010 and 2013, while Malta delivered 27 pistols
(USD 12,041), 2,621 shotguns (around USD 3 million), 25 sporting/hunting rifles (USD 67,885)
and over USD 609,000 in ‘small arms ammunition’ between 2010 and 2014.

Turkey was also a significant seller in 2012 and 2013, with a total of 6,517 shotguns
(USD 602,767), 750 sporting/hunting rifles (USD 74,418), 13 tons in ‘bombs, grenades,
ammunition’ (USD 129,067) and USD 215,278 in small arms ammunition. Finally, the United
Kingdom sent a massive quantity of small arms to Djibouti between 2010 and 2013: a total of
21 heavy machine guns, 2,871 assault rifles, 265 ‘rifles and carbines’, 210 rifles, 436 ‘sporting/
hunting rifles’, 11 ‘sniper rifles’, 300 shotguns and 360 ‘revolvers/pistols’.

International Arms Control Mechanisms

As of June 2016, Djibouti is the only one of all the countries in the Horn of Africa
that is a signatory to the Arms Trade Treaty, having joined on 3 June 2013—a peculiarity that
speaks both of the small nation’s diplomatic energy and the region’s worrisome neglect of the
ATT. Djibouti has ratified the Mine Ban Convention (May 1998), signed the Convention on
Cluster Munitions (July 2010), and acceded to the CCW (Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, in July 1996), being bound by Protocols I, II, and III.727

Djibouti has not signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, or

LIST’, http://fas.org/ssp/cstrawars/offdocs/iran/s121.htm#C-XI.
the UN Firearms Protocol on small arms. An assessment of Djibouti’s implementation of the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons, a political commitment, found that the nation was ranked 133 among 159 countries analysed.\(^{728}\) However, at the regional level, Djibouti has signed and ratified the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States, a legally-binding commitment.\(^{729}\)

**Spotlight: Spillover from Yemen**

While the patterns of its armed violence are both opaque and relatively small-scale compared to its neighbours, conflict nearby has exacted significant impacts on Djibouti. Yemeni refugees, particularly from southern locations such as Ibb, Aden and Taiz, have flocked to the tiny African nation; some are highly educated and most suffer a difficult transition given the poor living conditions in the refugee camp in a remote area close to Obock, a four-hour drive north from the capital.\(^{730}\) Despite sandstorms and temperatures as high as 50 degrees Celsius, life in Obock can compare positively to what was left behind, as many refugees are ‘deeply traumatized’ and even had troops on Yemen’s mainland fire artillery at them as their escape boats crossed the Bab-el-Mandeb. The US ambassador to Djibouti has praised the government, stating “they’ve saved thousands of lives. It deserves credit for opening its borders to people who had nowhere else to go”.\(^{731}\)

Current estimates point to around 35,000 Yemenis having arrived in Djibouti fleeing the brutal war.\(^{732}\) As at May 2015, the UN had registered 1,200 Yemenis at the Markazi camp, reaching 2,800 by November, and around 3,000 at its peak.\(^{733}\) A report in April 2016 noted that the influx had dropped from a high of 800 refugees per week in late 2015 to 40 a week in early 2016. Highlighting the rough conditions of the camp, which also houses Eritrean citizens who had fled that country only to be forced back because of the conflict, one Yemeni refugee stated, “either we die here, or we die there. There’s only death […] We ask that the world helps us, and take us far from here. We want a place where

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there is peace.”

But Obock is not only an arrival point for those suffering; it also has served as a point for departure. About 600 Yemenis have taken the risk of leaving the camp to return to Yemen, “ignoring warnings from the UN refugee agency”. And while Yemenis continue to arrive, “heading in the opposite direction are Ethiopian migrants taking smugglers’ vessels”, most hoping to eventually reach Saudi Arabia: “at least 1,300 migrants departed from beaches on the outskirts of Obock in March (2016)”.

In 2015 alone “an estimated 92,446 new arrivals landed along the Arabian and Red Sea coasts of Yemen, of which 89% Ethiopian (the majority from Oromo region) and 11% Somali”. A stark reminder of how dire the situation is for many in the Horn of Africa: feeling compelled to flee towards a country that is in the midst of a brutal war.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

The above overview of the transfer and use of arms in the Horn of Africa between 2010 and 2015 allows for a straightforward and far from novel conclusion: the Horn of Africa is a very volatile region and as such transferring arms to most of its nations is an extremely risky proposition. Tragically, the use of weapons in the region is not a hypothetical question. In many circumstances, arms are likely to be used, whether by government forces or armed groups.

Of course, armed violence in the Horn of Africa is not self-contained; it impacts and is impacted by adjacent areas. Arms sent or held by actors in the broader region have the potential to result in civilian deaths in the Horn. Indeed, arms, and the violence they facilitate, often migrate sub-regionally rather than in a broader geographic scope. Military stockpiles can quickly spread across national borders into the hands of various armed forces and actors. Likewise, trafficking lanes often operate in both directions.

Conflict
In several countries, internal or transnational conflicts continue to cause civilian casualties on a daily basis, despite their relative invisibility in terms of global media coverage and political attention. The ‘calm’ areas or countries within the Horn of Africa are only so in comparison to their more troubled neighbours. According to the most recent estimate available (2007-2012) for the eight nations under consideration (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda), an average of 35,336 people a year are killed in the region, whether in...
conflict situations or homicides. Rough estimates of those who died in the civil war that started in South Sudan in late 2013—up to 100,000 people—suggest that the average annual figure for the years beyond 2012 is likely to have increased. Moreover, the numbers of those wounded, traumatised or forced to flee their homes or countries dwarf the numbers of those killed. With so many already impacted and countless others at risk, it is imperative that efforts be made to better control the trade of arms, to prevent them from ending up in the hands of those violating human rights or involved in war crimes.

While many of the historical, ethnic, political, social and economic factors that ultimately drive and sustain conflict and armed violence in the Horn of Africa are beyond the scope of this report, it is clear that the weapons that facilitate or render violence particularly lethal must be better curbed and restrained.

As noted at the outset, governments must shift from a traditional focus on ‘national security’ to prioritising ‘human security’ as part of efforts to significantly reduce levels of armed violence. In that context, human security goes beyond military protection, to include a wide range of security areas, such as economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.

Likewise, efforts must be made at the local level, with successful community, cultural and awareness-raising programmes that are already in place being scaled up and supported by donors and the international community. This report focuses on the national and international levels, and many lessons learned there are evident. As noted, the discrepancy between the problems exacerbated by weapons and efforts by individual governments to curb them is enormous in the Horn of Africa.

Arms Control

While certainly no panacea, introducing and improving arms control mechanisms can help build confidence, especially in a region characterised by conflict, porous borders and arms transfers shrouded in secrecy. Thus, better arms control structures—licensing policy, border control, stockpile management, restraints on civilian possession and transparency in reporting—are urgent and essential.

One important measure of a government’s readiness to receive weapons is its ability to keep them safe from diversion and accidents. Stockpile security and management are basic but essential aspects of control over the instruments of violence; diversion to unauthorised groups or individuals (whether through corruption, malice, incompetence or omission) can be an indicator of how well a given state performs. Regional mechanisms, including work done by the African Union, IGAD, RECSA and UNREC, as well as civil society initiatives, are important in raising further awareness about the need for strict arms control in the Horn, and assist in its
On a political commitment level, as expressed in the participation in international arms control mechanisms, the Horn of Africa states have a mixed record at best, as shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horn of Africa participation in international arms control mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi Protocol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: Yellow = ratified/acceded (for Geneva Declaration: signed); Orange = signed (not ratified); Red = no action

**Military Spending**

Excessive military spending means that governments have less budget to ensure proper basic services and rights for their citizens, such as education and health care. Even where military budgets look relatively small, arms purchases can put a significant burden on these states, in particular because they may exacerbate debts. "Unnecessary arms imports may be caused by inadequate military planning and budgeting processes or by corruption", according to SIPRI.

Notably, most of a military budget is spent on personnel (salaries, pensions) and military equipment (purchases, operational costs). Some of the countries’ military expenditures are summarised below while others are unavailable due to a lack of governmental transparency.

740 IGAD is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa (www.igad.org). The Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) is an intergovernmental organisation that also covers ATT-related activities (www.recsasec.org). UNREC is the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, based in Lome, Togo (www.unrec.org).


For example, SIPRI has been unable to make credible estimates for Eritrea and Somalia for the entire period of 2005-2015. South Sudan’s spending was already high by any standards, but after the war started in late 2013 and with the oil-dependent economy in freefall, its military spending was estimated to make up nearly 14 per cent of the country’s GDP by 2015—among the highest globally. By way of comparison: global military spending is estimated at 2.3 per cent of the world’s GDP.743

### Table 10.
Military spending in the Horn of Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At constant prices (2014), USD million</th>
<th>As % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>759</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

.. unknown | * estimate


Clearly, it is important to make more concerted efforts to increase transparency in order to overcome the lack of reliable, publicly available data.

**Arms Transfers**

Likewise regarding arms transfers, the opacity of data and lack of reporting is a major obstacle to ascertaining the actual level of weapon influx into the region. Moreover, while imports into the Horn are small compared to top importers such as India, Saudi Arabia and China, they are certainly significant, particularly given how often they are used. Considering their socio-economic standing, the top-60 spots for Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda are therefore certainly remarkable—and worrisome.

The Horn of Africa desperately needs a new pattern and culture of restraint regarding arms, and both importing and selling countries have responsibilities to this end. Exporting nations should make proper risk assessments, whereas importing governments need to weigh up the perceived benefits of arms against their opportunity costs.

For arms exporters it will mean exchanging short-term financial profits for long-term enhanced global stability: lower levels of violence, less humanitarian need, lower refugee flows and other consequences of major armed violence.

**Small Arms**

China is often "portrayed as a supplier of last resort, willing to supply any state that is not subject to a UN arms embargo and with whom it has positive relations". According to SIPRI, "Two factors have been highlighted to explain how China has become such an important source of SALW [small arms and light weapons] for African states. First, China’s adherence to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs means that it is willing to supply SALW, even where there is a risk that they will be used for internal repression. Second, China offers competitive pricing, including ‘friendship pricing’, and favourable financing options (e.g. soft loans, barter trade and mining concessions)." But in addition to international transfers of SALW, intra-African trade and trafficking is also an important aspect of these flows.

Easily dismissed as ‘lesser’ weapons in a trade in which units of major weapon systems can cost millions and include cutting-edge technology, a few relatively cheap guns can wreak major havoc. A few thousand dollars’ worth of firearms or grenades can facilitate tragedies on the scale of the attacks on Kenya’s Garissa University, the Westgate Mall in Nairobi and the World Cup strike in Kampala. Furthermore, these weapons are used in most of the daily clashes and killings that comprise the thousands of deaths every year in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, SALW are the most commonly used weapons in the conflicts in the Horn of Africa; often they are the only weapons used by armed non-state groups. "The purpose for which the

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**Table 11.**

Position of Horn of Africa countries in SIPRI’s list of top global arms importers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>..*</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

..: no data | * Somalia’s Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which ruled significant parts of Somalia until 2006, was ranked 158 in this period.


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weapons have been acquired is often unclear, as is the intended user (e.g. the armed forces, police, militia, or private individuals or groups), where they are distributed, and if delivered weapons are adequately protected against theft and diversion [...] It is even more difficult to assess the volume of illegal supplies of SALW to non-state actors, including individuals, criminals and rebel groups, or to governments subject to UN arms embargoes.746

**Embargoes**

Further, this report argues that arms embargoes, while essential, are often insufficient as implemented at present. Though they clearly have a positive impact in preventing some transfers of arms to the region’s worst conflicts, stronger terms, more robust enforcement and indeed more political will are needed to curb the proliferation of arms in the Horn of Africa. Some UN sanctions appear effective in terms of bringing major arms supplies to a near stop such as in Eritrea, while others, such as in the case of Somalia, ensure that arms transfers are tightly controlled. Conversely, the Sudan/Darfur embargo appears only marginally effective and of no use to the people in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile.

Regional embargoes, such as the EU embargoes against South Sudan and Sudan, do indeed stop most arms transfers from the EU and are an essential cornerstone in a global architecture of greater restraint, but are easily circumvented by others with fewer qualms.

Where no embargoes prevail, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) could make a difference, if implemented strictly—and provided that supplying states are parties to the treaty or at least adhere to its norms in practice. However, major suppliers to the Horn, such as Russia, the United States, China and Ukraine, have not acceded to the ATT so far.747 Restraining national arms export policies could make a big difference in the meantime.

ATT compliance among State Parties remains a serious issue, as recent UK arms transfers to Saudi Arabia have shown. Despite an arguably ‘predominant’ risk that they “could be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law” in Yemen, London has continued to licence their export.748 Adherence to a strong international norm must become more commonplace for such transfers to become a thing of the past.

**Governance**

Nations in the Horn of Africa must increase their levels of governance, transparency, rule of law and democracy. Though often ignored in discussions of armed violence and arms control, issues such as corruption, freedom of the press and the existence of political opposition parties and competitive elections may be as important to the future of conflict and armed violence in the Horn of Africa as any other factor.

Indeed, in the military sector corruption is leading to insecurity and instability, “as it weakens the institutional capacity and effectiveness of the armed forces and it repurposes these forces for

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747 The United States and Ukraine have signed but not ratified the ATT.

748 ATT, Article 7.
commercial and predatory ends”. In Transparency International’s 2015 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, of the countries analysed in this report Kenya has the ‘best’ scores with merely a ‘high’ risk of corruption, while Ethiopia and Uganda are deemed ‘very high’ and Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan are considered ‘critical’.

In the absence of meaningful reforms in the areas of political representation and electoral process, latent conflicts in the Horn of Africa could become increasingly violent. Proper channels for political debate and democratic alternation in power must be nourished and protected.

In fact, “lower intensity conflict is becoming more prevalent and there has been a rise in social conflict, especially anti-government violence, since 2011, combined with a rise in the level of protests and riots. Elections-related violence has also increased across Africa, even as the push for democratisation and multi-party elections has brought about significant improvement in accountability”.

Based on these conclusions, we offer the following recommendations to reduce levels of conflict and armed violence in the Horn of Africa.

**Recommendations**

**To the United Nations and regional organisations**

- Establish stricter instruments preventing arms transfers to and within the region.
- IGAD and/or RECSA should strengthen and extend the goals and impact of the Nairobi Protocol.
- Promote and support the universalisation and implementation of disarmament and arms control instruments, such as the Arms Trade Treaty, the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
- Explore confidence-building measures, through IGAD and/or the African Union, on issues such as reporting on military spending and arms transfers, reducing military spending, arms transfers moratoriums, use of armed forces in neighbouring countries, border disputes, and other security-related issues that would benefit from multilateral support.

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750 No score was calculated for Djibouti. The index measures the risk of corruption in national defence and security establishments worldwide. The 2015 report notes that “increases in defence spending are not necessarily enhancing state security. Too often procurement decisions are taken with little reference to strategic requirements, military effectiveness is eroded by poor controls on personnel, while forces are repurposed for commercial ends”. [https://government.defenceindex.org/downloads/docs/GI-Africa-results-web.pdf](https://government.defenceindex.org/downloads/docs/GI-Africa-results-web.pdf).

To the governments of Horn of Africa nations

♦ Reassess and reallocate levels of military expenditure to prioritise socio-economic investments, including health, education and infrastructure; ensure transparent military procurement processes.

♦ Within the security budget, reallocate funds to focus on ensuring that security forces respect human rights and due process, and other security sector reform priorities.

♦ Accede to and promote the universalisation and implementation of disarmament and arms control instruments, such as the Arms Trade Treaty, the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

♦ Prioritise and strengthen regional arms control mechanisms and instruments; focus in particular on strengthening RECSA; strengthen and ensure full implementation of the Nairobi Protocol.

♦ Prioritise and invest in an overhaul of structures and resources to prevent the diversion and trafficking of small arms, light weapons and their ammunition; make major efforts on stockpile management, stricter firearms and ammunition controls, and tackling corruption in security forces.

♦ Refrain from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, and support the development of an international political instrument to reduce harm from the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas.752

To the governments of nations supplying arms

♦ Accede, ratify and strictly implement the Arms Trade Treaty, adopting its parameters and criteria even before concluding the political process to do so, supporting and enforcing the new international norm.

♦ In the meantime, commit to and implement transparent arms transfer decision-making processes that exercise maximum restraint on potential arms sales.

To the governments operating armed drones

♦ Significantly reduce the use of armed drones in the Horn of Africa, particularly in order to avoid civilian casualties and other harm to civilians, and to avoid fostering resentment among communities and engendering support for armed groups within communities affected by drone strikes.

♦ With respect to any residual use of drones in the Horn of Africa, follow the Call to Action by the European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD) to “fully, publicly and democratically debate” the legal and ethical issues regarding the use of armed drones.753

